

SECRETS OF ARGUMENTS IN THE COURTROOM AND ELSEWHERE

*The Art of Argument to Beat
Fraudulent Claims of Authority
and
All Manner of Fraudulent Arguments*

Revised November 1999

A WORKSHOP IN ONE VOLUME

COMPRISING CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 15
and
APPENDICES

James Benjamin Wood III

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**OTHER WORKSHOPS
AND
BOOKS
BY THE AUTHOR
OF THIS WORKSHOP**

Travel as of Right. AVAILABLE NOW. Presented as workshop manuals in three volumes. Volume 1 comprising 30 chapters totaling 468 pages taking you from the basic political facts upon which all presumption of law facts to govern depend and the law facts pertaining the traffic regulatory scheme. This "fourth branch" of government scheme is "uniform" across the entire nation. This means once you understand your state's traffic regulatory scheme you will understand all other state's respective traffic regulatory schemes and, as well, all your state's and other state's regulatory schemes and how they are administered and enforced in the same manner no matter what the particular piece of regulatory business happens to be. Volume II comprises 190 pages of actual motions, demands, affidavits, notices, memos of law, and the like appropriate to proceedings in a traffic court case. Volume III comprises over 150 pages of appendices providing additional background information.

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THIS DEDICATION IS TO YOU

**At the beginning of the argument
there is you.**

**At the end of the argument
there is you.**

&

**Also to the American Indians
who understood
that
"Everything is connected."**

“What a scientist does that makes of him a scientist, is to formulate new questions, or to revise old questions, in such ways that they can be answered on the basis of systematic observation. His assistants can make the observations. His main task, as scientist, is to frame the questions in such ways that the observations will be worth making – will be reliable and relevant to the broadest possible human concerns.”

Wendell Johnson

ADDITIONAL
COURSE MATERIALS
FOR
*SECRETS OF ARGUMENTS
IN THE COURTROOM
AND
ELSEWHERE*

Certain subjects reviewed in this workshop are core subjects to the task at hand.

They all pertain to the business of becoming a linguistic literate from which it will follow the individual will know and be able to practice the secrets of argument.

It is a tragic fact that Americans may have the opportunity of becoming functionally literate by attending the educational establishment, public and private, of the nation, but only a very few ever have the opportunity of becoming linguistically literate. Without this literacy, there is little prospect of success in truly being the master of one's own individual fate – all the hokum about America being the "land of opportunity" to the contrary.

The student of this workshop is fortunate that instead of having to range through dozens of books to bring himself up to speed in matters with which this workshop deals, namely, linguistic literacy, that the following books and materials will serve him more than adequately to the task, notwithstanding no subject of any consequence is ever exhausted by reference to a few sources.

Therefore, be advised the following books and materials are a part of this workshop, without which, your studies will be incomplete:

How to Argue and Win Every Time: At Home, at Work, In Court, Everywhere, Every Day. Gerry Spence, St. Martin's Press, New York, N. Y. 1995. The present workshop picks up where Spence leaves off. Obviously, that makes Spence's book a prerequisite to the present workshop. Therefore, do not fail to get and read this book.

People in Quandaries, Wendell Johnson (1946) available from the Institute of General Semantics – see Appendix III for ordering information. This book is an essential part of this workshop. This book provides the key to becoming a linguistic literate.

The Three-Pound Universe, Judith Hooper and Dick Teresi, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, N. Y., 1986, ISBN 0-87477-650-3. This book is an essential part of this workshop. This book informs in what must be understood about the human brain's "hardware and software" – so to speak, if one is more adequately to understand how to use the general semantics key offered through working knowledge of the methodologies of general semantics for becoming a linguistic literate.

Megabrain: New Tools and Techniques for Brain Growth and Mind Expansion, Michael Hutchison, Balentine Books, New York, 1991, N. Y., ISBN 0-345-41032-7. It will be appropriate to consider this book also a part of this workshop. What is said above regarding *The Three-Pound Universe* applies here also.

Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain, Patricia Smith Churchland, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, ISBN 0-262-03116-7 (hardcover),

ISBN 0-262-53085-6 (paperback). Part II of this book provides an astonishing review of the history of the epistemological-oriented philosophies and is a review of man's endeavors to comprehend the limits of knowing and assignment of meaning to what can be known. The power of this review is in its perspective of this philosophic endeavor bringing us to the present comprehension of the task where knowledge of the brain itself is so extensive. It is intriguing to find that the work of the general semanticists – presented by Alfred Korzybski in *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems* in the early 1930s and restated so clearly by Wendell Johnson in *People in Quandaries* published in 1946 – are unreservedly validated as methodologies by the discoveries of the neuroscientists of the last several decades and the epistemologists as philosophers of the present period. A study of the subjects in this book will serve to your benefit. It will be a worthy addition to your reference materials.

Brain Power: Learn to Improve Your Thinking Skills, Karl Albrecht, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1980, ISBN -0-13-136317-4. Albrecht does a splendid job of introducing the reader to improving his powers of critical thinking using the methodologies of general semantics which Korzybski so awesomely formulated coupled with understanding of how our brain's function as revealed by neurological science. **This book is an essential part of this workshop.**

Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument, W. Ward Fearnside and William B. Holther., 1959. Out of print for approximately 35 years, this is available in reprint from the author of this workshop. Without this book, this workshop is simply incomplete. This book is a veritable catalog/encyclopedia of forms of arguments which rely on unfounded presumptions, false premises, misdirection, etc. as their basis for acceptance. It provides the reader with introduction to many forms of "fallacy" daily encountered that he may recognize them and be prepared to rebut them. Knowledge gained from the general semanticists, see above *People in Quandaries*, for example, will accelerate and advance understanding of the internal inconsistencies – the uncritical, a.k.a. false, reasoning – inherent in each form of fallacy one may encounter. **This book is an essential part of this workshop.**

Mission: Critical, David Mesher. This is a course offered over the Internet. See Appendix IV for access information and related. This is another source of studying actual forms of fallacies and other forms of uncritical reasoning. Consider this workshop incomplete without your individual access to this information on the Internet.

All other books referenced in this workshop may be considered "optional" reading. However, as you encounter them and you consider the author's comments regarding them within the context of this workshop, you must decide whether at some time they are worthy of your investigation. Every single one of them will augment your insights and understanding for playing the game – becoming the master of your individual domain on your terms through a mastery of the art of argument adequate to the individual events/experiences of your own life.

**SECRETS OF ARGUMENT
IN THE COURTROOM
AND
ELSEWHERE**

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"...and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started
and to know the place for the first time."

T.S. Eliot

THE MOTHER OF MEGASECRETS: Effective oral (and written) arguments in the courtroom and elsewhere require you to be a linguistic literate.

MEGASECRET: Effective oral (and written) arguments requires recognition from the outset that all communications are a challenge both of the communicator to make himself understood and the communicatee to understand the message, but the burden will always be on the communicator when the communication fails.

DO YOU WANT THE BOTTOM LINE FIRST?

Everyone wants to get the monkey off their back. But too few are prepared to learn the ways of the monkey in order to deal with the monkey.

Instead, they want the quick fix. The quick remedy. The easy stroke. A quick rubbing of vanishing cream on the offending carbuncle, and poof! And then on with their lives -----

OK. So what is the bottom line? It is this:

You are being beat up in court and elsewhere because you don't know how to argue your cause.

And why is that?

Because you are a linguistic illiterate.

No matter whether you hold a high school diploma or went on for your Ph.D. in Sociology at Hotchkiss State University, the odds overwhelmingly favor you are unversed in epistemological matters regarding your mother tongue. In consequence, you know less about how to interpret the language you grew up with than you realize. In particular, you

know little or nothing about how to “read the law” because of a fundamental illiteracy in the linguistics of the “language of law.”

And this linguistic illiteracy includes lack of understanding of how to make, firstly, your intellectual argument which must appear in the court record as the written documents you file with the clerk of court and then, secondly, to make your subsequent oral arguments on every occasion they must be made – more especially to the jury if things come to that – which arguments go beyond the intellectual arguments pertaining to the political, law, and other facts of your case and arises from the depths of your “heart” as Gerry Spence puts it.¹

Do not be offended by these statements. You are in good company. By all appearances, the majority of lawyers are as linguistically illiterate as you are.

And that friends is the bottom line. The reason you are here.

Now what are you going to do about it?

Dismiss the preceding statement because it isn't the bottom line you were expecting? If your answer is “yes,” then the inference is you already knew the secrets of oral and written arguments in the courtroom and elsewhere.

Or, are you prepared to discover what it means to be linguistically illiterate and what it takes to overcome that illiteracy?

Are you prepared for discoveries that will make you a master of courtroom argument? A feat that can be accomplished by no other means than by mastering the epistemological nuances of your mother tongue. That is what this workshop is about.

If you have other ideas about what the secrets of oral (and written) arguments in the courtroom and elsewhere are, then hold them up to the light of the neurological-epistemological-general semantics lantern you will find here and analyze them as you proceed.

If you do not have time for this endeavor, then be on with your journey and good luck to you.

¹ Gerry Spence says “it all” in his *How to Argue and Win Every Time*. His book is an indispensable part of and prerequisite to this workshop. The author of this workshop declares he is picking up the story where Gerry leaves off. Said differently, this workshop brings you the story behind Gerry's story – the facts of which you must have conscious awareness in order to more fully comprehend the mysteries in the “magic” to which Gerry alludes in his book. That is the mysteries of arguments which “win” the day for you whether in the courtroom or elsewhere.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

All adversarial proceedings to which we may become parties whether arising from some civil action, criminal action, or some infamous "fourth branch of government" administrative proceeding invariably share at least one thing in common.

It is failure of the parties to communicate. Proceedings unfold under mutually shared illusions and delusions that all parties are communicating.

And the same must be said more often than not where ever there is intent to communicate.

This should be a surprise to no one, but in fact, both plaintiffs and defendants are usually so busy making their case, they are unaware their arguments may be getting through to no one. Typically they are unaware they can't even explain their own arguments, if put to the test.

Can you imagine the advantage a party may have if he has conscious understanding of both the limitations of his truly understanding his opponent's arguments and his opponent's limitations in understanding his? Can you imagine the advantage a party has if he realizes every statement he makes may be unintentionally not understood or intentionally misinterpreted? Can you imagine the advantage a party has if he realizes his statements must be carefully constructed and that construction will be no better than his understanding of every thought to include every word, phrase, and clause of every sentence he utters? The advantage will arise because he knows he is capable of verifying the meaning of the thoughts comprising his statements and he knows how to compel confirmation from opposing parties that they comprehend the meaning he intends. This is the challenge of communication.

A genuinely skilled lawyer understands the challenge of effective communication. He doesn't have to be a master to succeed on any given occasion. He only needs have more conscious awareness that all communication is a challenge and that generally only illusions and delusions of communicating exist between individuals whether in an adversarial proceeding or elsewhere.

However, appreciate the typical "certified," bar card toting attorney is hardly more knowledgeable regarding the challenge of communication where political, law or any other matters of consequence are concerned than is John and Jane Q. Public.

Imagine the advantage accruing to the citizen who recognizes the illusory nature of communication generally and adversarial argument specifically!

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He needs only to be as skilled as his opponent regarding the challenges inherent in any communication effort in order to best his opponent. In such "equally matched" contests, his successes will only require that his arguments are more verifiable than his opponents.²

Of course, when skills of argument are grossly unmatched, the winner has no need for a verifiable argument. Isn't that the predicament the hapless citizen usually enjoys whether having hired "counsel" for his cause or attempting to stand for himself?

For after all, there must be two parts to successful arguments which are dependent upon reason. First there must be agreement between the parties that each understands the other's meaning and, secondly, the successful argument must be the more verifiable.

This is not to say that many successful arguments are not the result of illusions of communication and illusions of verifiability of the points and issues upon which the argument is constructed. The entire business of manipulation is, after all, the business of succeeding in argument, a.k.a. persuasion, by employment of illusions of communication. Such are fallacies.

Such are the only necessary requirements for successful rulership.

So why should you not be able to discover and empower a capability existing within you to make arguments which depend upon reason and verifiability of your facts and then be able to reinforce those arguments by being able to argue them from your "heart" – the place where dwells the mother of persuasion?

In any adversarial proceeding or any other social interchange which outcome depends on communicating for a verifiable result or conclusion, the individual who best understands the challenge of communication will be the one who controls both the communication process itself and the outcome of the communication.

If you are in a courtroom, the judge, himself, will not be in control of the proceeding, even though he may think he is controlling. The same point must be

² The *Travel as of Right* workshop materials address arguments pertaining to the limitations of governance which are easily more verifiable than are the arguments of our fellow citizens serving as our political trustees in so-called public offices when they presume to have official authorities which simply can't be proven when properly challenged. That is to say, they can't prove their authority by arguments more verifiable than those which a properly skilled political trustor can raise. Then can't verify their authority as superior to the authority of the people who are the holders of the inherent political power. Normally, our self-appointed, fellow citizen rulers get away with their treasonous outrages because the typical citizen has no comprehension of the challenge of communication. The typical citizen political trustee, a.k.a. public servant, is usually little better equipped, but obviously a little bit is enough. America's growing prison population is mute testimony to that fact. In America, as elsewhere, ignorance never takes a holiday.

Introduction

appreciated no matter where you are, for example, on the side of the road after being stopped and detained by a law enforcement officer. **Consider the point being made here as one of the mega-secrets of successful arguments in the courtroom.**

In subsequent chapters we shall encounter other “mega-secrets” so to speak.

We are victims of the whims, prejudices, and special interests of our fellow citizens who presume to rule over us because we fail to recognize most of their authorities are based upon nothing more than unverifiable presumptions which they have piecemeal imposed upon our body politic from the beginning of our nation-state.

Few Americans ever challenge the presumptions of authority and of law by their political trustees and those who do are most often met with evasive, nonsensical arguments even silence. Fallacies of argument are the norm. Fallacies are sufficient when a people are so unconscious of the challenge of communication they recognize no difference between specious statements and verifiable statements.

It is a fatal error to presume one has made a challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction³ in his individual case when one fails wholly to understand the challenge of communication.

Merely making a demand or motion in some adversarial proceeding to dismiss for want of subject-matter jurisdiction does not constitute a demand or motion which must be obeyed or granted. It is the substance of the demand or motion which will determine the meaningful value of said demand or motion. And the substance will have value if it can be verified as superior to any arguments which the adversary may raise.

If the individual is mistaken in the value of the substance, namely the meaningful content of each of the statements and averments in said demand or motion, then his demand or motion will succeed only by luck.

But to add “insult to injury,” not only must you file written arguments which have meaningful substance regarding your cause, but you must also be able to “magically” argue them orally. Why?

Because your public servants are almost certainly to be so poorly informed about the “law” themselves, they don’t even realize when proper written arguments are under their noses to which they must appropriately respond. Literally, they usually don’t even

³ Any time one challenges subject-matter jurisdiction, he is challenging the presumptions of the public servants who accuse him of some violation of law that he is actually a party subject to that law. The same applies if accused of some civil wrong by anyone by civil complaint.
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know how to answer properly. How is that for a state of political, jural, and linguistic illiteracy?

Therefore, do appreciate that where his written and filed (with the clerk of court) demands, or motions, to dismiss for want of subject-matter jurisdiction in his case are concerned; if the individual is incapable of communicating to his adversaries that the burden of proving their jurisdiction is on them and can only be demonstrated by answering the express averments of his written and filed demand, or motion, then said individual will fail -- unless by a stroke of luck his adversary decides to withdraw.

At the core of these hundreds of thousands of individual tragicomic encounters unfolding daily in America we find intentional and unintentional failures to communicate.

THE SOLUTION

This workshop will review root causes of failure to communicate and how to become skilled in getting the best of any argument. There is no reason why many individuals can't successfully master the art of challenging fraudulent authority and fraud in any of its many manifestations, but it will entail firstly understanding the challenge of communication.

It's all in understanding how man communicates with his fellow man. This will entail having some knowledge of how man's brain is organized and functions. Some basic knowledge of this will decidedly improve the individual's understanding of how man communicates at the nonverbal, a.k.a. body language, level and at the verbal level.

Man has uniquely evolved sophisticated powers of verbal language. He has randomly produced thousands of language systems. Linguists inform us that languages continuously mutate and that in a period of 1500 years any given language can change so much with respect to word usage and syntax that it becomes a new language bearing little resemblance to its root language.

Every language is a system of symbolic logic. How each individual processes this symbolic logic determines the outcome of every communication. Too often there is little or no verifiable substance to man's communications, but the brain does not automatically distinguish between the verifiable statement and nonsense. The human brain is a magnificent generator of illusions and deceptions. From illusions and deceptions are man's social orders built -- the business of rulership in human societies.

The American experiment was established upon a premise that body politics were possible wherein the people governed themselves through enlightened self interest. This was the intent of their state and federal political trust-deeds -- their written state and federal constitutions.

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The substance of this political premise is as politically valid today as it was in 1776 or 1789 or any other date you care to name subsequent to 1776. That means it can be as effectively argued today as at any time since the 4th of July, 1776. That means the burden to prove otherwise is as much on your public servants today as at any time since that July 4th.

It is irrelevant nonsense to argue that public servants can run-a-muck with impunity today because the nation is under martial law, or a permanent state of emergency, *etc.* Public servants are as accountable to prove their authority now as ever. But the individual challenging their presumptions of authority must be a linguistic literate or, otherwise, he will buy their illusions and deceptions and suffer the consequences.

How can there be an enlightened body politic if the people fail to comprehend their every communication is potentially susceptible to illusions and deceptions of meaning by themselves as senders and by their receivers?

How can there be an enlightened body politic if few comprehend the challenge of communication and are prepared to challenge the verifiable content of every statement directed to them?

Here lies the challenge of communication. If we are to succeed in the courtroom and elsewhere, we must recognize this challenge and be able to meet it. Otherwise our challenges of fraudulent authority will be successful only with luck and more often we will find ourselves victims of The Rule of Willful Men.

Plus se change, plus se meme chose.

CHAPTER 2

WHO IS YOUR ENEMY/ WHO IS YOUR FRIEND?

“Man is his own worst enemy.”

Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.)

“There is no little enemy.”

Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790)

MEGASECRET: Effective oral (and written) arguments requires knowing who are your allies and who are your adversaries/enemies. No greater act of self discovery is possible than to discover you may be your worst adversary/enemy and the others whom you take for adversaries/enemies may actually be your best allies.

MEGASECRET: Effective oral (and written) arguments are vastly augmented by discovery of techniques for converting others aligned against you as your adversaries/enemies into your unwitting best allies to your cause.

Many present day Americans are so spiritually and mentally neutered they are incapable of comprehending the dangers all about them threatening their survival.

Thanks to the miracles of modern science and the technological machinery derived from those miracles, their minds are under continuous saturation bombardment to conform to politically and economically correct agendas and norms. Every thought and idea is carefully prepackaged for their consumption by “hidden persuaders.” Like innocent babes they receive their daily instructions for living and dying without questioning, without comprehending, but with blind acceptance. Without a clue they are daily manipulated by others who understand them better than they understand themselves.

Their abject lack of self knowledge makes them the unwitting mark of every scheme, every proposal, every claim of authority, every charge of a duty or charge of a failure of a duty regarding which others may confront them.

Who Is Your Enemy, Who Is Your Friend?

Who are these "others?"

They are every person more knowledgeable than they regarding their needs to believe without daring to question their own beliefs, their fears without understanding their own fears, their fantasies without willingness to recognize them, their every quirk of behavior and not least their lack of faith in their individual selves.

If the demands of others do not serve our best interests and we are compelled to submit to them, then they are our enemies. Why? Because that which doesn't serve our best interests will serve us otherwise and the otherwise leads either sooner or later to our destruction.

But how many Americans today have a clue regarding their "best interests?" This question poses no mere academic exercise. What are "best interests?" What is best for one may not be best for another. When do our individual best interests become more important than others' best interests? Are there "best interests" of the community collectively which must come before individual best interests? Are the best interests of the community at large often the same as the best interests of each individual member of the community? In the answer to that question lies understanding of the fundamental premise upon which the scheme for American's self governance was conceived.

The truth is that individual self interests are "best" for the individual when they do not conflict with the self interests of each other member of the community. But to understand such issues the individual must be capable of critical reasoning for otherwise he will fall under the influence of others who argue persuasively for causes which prove either sooner or later to be in no one's best interests. Why is critical reasoning necessary? Because in the "real world" things are unlikely to ever be found absolutely clear cut. We must understand our best interests in such a context. We must understand our unalienable rights in such a context. Otherwise, we will always be the unwitting dupes of salesmen, lawyers, doctors, ministers, educators, politicians and every other variety of hustler, charlatan and propagandist always on the ready to persuade us to their idea of what is our best interests.

But few Americans are capable of critical thinking. Few understand the elements of critical thinking.

Without basic knowledge of our individual mechanisms and capacities for critical thinking we are at a definite, likely catastrophic, disadvantage in facing a challenge of learning to think critically. Foundational knowledge in how the human brain functions must be considered an essential subject for the serious student here.

Equally important, without basic knowledge of methodologies which can serve effectively in the development of critical thinking we are seriously compromised in ever

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learning how to think critically. Here we will be well served by knowledge of epistemology and semantics, but more especially, by an in depth knowledge of a methodology classified by its originating exponent, Alfred Korzybski, ¹as “general semantics.” From this it becomes possible to comprehend the limits and ranges of man’s linguistics for all communication. From here it becomes possible to recognize all faulty reasoning and to out argue every form of argument which cannot prevail upon a foundation of reason.

Without adequate powers of reason, hence capacity for self analysis, then analysis of one’s own arguments and the analysis of others’ arguments is simply not possible.

With ability to reason, one may discover his enemies and his allies. The discoveries will include discovery of the self as enemy and ally.

We are each, individually, our own worst enemies. To ourselves we do the greatest harm and injury. Through ourselves, we allow others to harm and injure us and, thus, to be our enemies. When we harm or injure ourselves without recognizing our own deeds, we likewise fail to recognize we are our own enemies. When others harm and injure us and we refuse to recognize their acts against us, we delude ourselves that we have no enemies.

We do these things in the name of “self interest” because we are too uncritical in our thinking and the decisions we make to recognize that our “self interest” is rarely what we may first imagine it to be.

Such are the nature of self illusions and self deceptions. From such gossamer are self delusions manufactured. Insane behavior goes unrecognized when it is our own dysfunctional selves so engaged.

Crowd insanity goes unrecognized for similar reasons when we are a part of the crowd. A crowd, whether a majority or a minority of a community, are insane when they believe and act or will act on things which have no reasonable basis in verifiable facts. ²

¹ Alfred Korzybski, the originator of the discipline styled as “general semantics.” See Appendix III for his published works and related.

² For a most entertaining, astonishing, and insightful glimpse into our Western world past, read *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and Madness in Crowds*, by Charles Mackay in 1857, presently republished by Noonday Press. Recounts major episodes of crowd manias and madness from the crusades until the early 1800s. Will give you many insights regarding the “politically and religiously correct views of our forbears of the last 1000 or so years. Those who are committed to entertaining only their own contemporary opinions of religion, politics, law and order and the like and holding themselves aloof from knowledge of earlier opinions on the same subjects are also committed to the follies which inherently lie within their opinions of the present.

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Of course, we can be equally deluded when we believe we have been wronged or have enemies who have wronged us or who will do so when the opportunity presents itself when there is no verifiable basis for the belief.

Whether individually or collectively, our delusions speak for themselves sooner or later. No matter how self deceived and thus incapable of recognizing our own dysfunctional conditions, a time comes when we are clearly the victims of our self deceptions and delusions. At such times, the enemy can be known if capacity to recognize is still within us.

Americans are today caught up in self and collective delusions of monumental proportions. Until the bubbles of illusion burst individually and collectively, most of us -- by definition -- shall most likely remain unaware of our dysfunctional predicaments.

When you are confronted with dealing with charges you have violated laws knowing you cannot properly be subject to them, then you must be able to recognize the difference between your enemies and your allies.

If you are ignorant of the business requiring your personal attention, then you are your own worst enemy. Your fellow citizens who presume to rule over you in matters beyond their lawful authority will enlist your own ignorance as their ally. You will be outnumbered and out maneuvered by a superior force which includes in its ranks your own ignorance. It will not matter that the "others" may be as ignorant or more ignorant than you. You will have to count yourself among your enemies.

You must recruit your self as your first ally and friend if you are to have any other allies and friends. You must discover the secret(s) of empowering yourself. Through that discovery, you will discover that the "others" will empower you. At that moment your enemy becomes your ally.

Traffic tickets can be defeated before they are ever issued. Juries can be your friends and allies. Even judges and prosecutors, in spite of themselves, can surrender to justice when justice rightfully belongs to you.

There is no "little enemy" either within or without our individual selves and our own ignorance is our first and greatest enemy. In the face of our own ignorance, we have little hope of defeating our enemies from without.

There is supposed to be a plaque in the U.S. Naval War College which quotes the 18th and 19th Century German philosopher Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as saying "*There is nothing so terrifying as ignorance in action.*"

The more we learn about our enemies, the more we learn about ourselves.

Who Is Your Enemy, Who Is Your Friend?

In this workshop you are introduced to important means of self discovery and, thus, discoveries about all humankind. Without such discoveries and the knowledge they yield, the secrets of oral (and written) arguments in the courtroom and elsewhere will remain unknown to us as individuals and we will remain individually beggars in our own land. Without this "secret" knowledge the prospects for winning our causes when they are just will remain remote.

They say "*justice is blind.*"

A more serviceable truth is entertained if we acknowledge justice is more likely a figment of our imaginations, yet can be coaxed forth to our service if we are masters of arguments for our own individual causes.

Why must we be fools in the service of fools when we are supposed to be individually the holders of the inherent political power of our respective states and our Union of states?

Why must we be our own worst enemies?

Why must we allow others to be our enemies?

Can there be a power within us capable of defeating the enemy within our own persons?

Is it possible to defeat our other enemies using firstly our own internalized power and secondly the strengths and weaknesses of those others who would destroy us?

Indeed it is possible to take your adversaries' own arguments and turn those arguments against them forcing from them the very words they are loath to utter. It is possible to compel their agreement in your arguments in spite of themselves -- to admit their presumptive authority is nonexistent, or that the merits of their case are "frivolous and without merit." It is possible to compel them, in spite of themselves, to concede your points, your grounds, your arguments.

How are such things done given the levels of ignorance, the degrees of corruption and arrogance in our governments, our courts, our land? That is the point of this workshop. It is done using their own ignorant, arrogant, corrupt, and contemptible silence and evasion to force admissions of agreement in our arguments.

CHAPTER 3

KNOWING YOURSELF LEADS TO KNOWING HUMANKIND

“Nothing in the world is so distasteful to man as to go the way which leads him to himself.”

Hermann Hesse (1877-1962)

MEGASECRET: Effective oral (and written) arguments dictates understanding what, why, and how your adversaries think, and consequently, what motivates them. To understand such things you must first understand what, why, and how you think, and thus, what motivates you.

HOW CAN YOU KNOW YOURSELF, IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE “STORY” OF YOUR “NATION?”

American's have a unique birthright which can't be denied them without admitting to the overthrow of their respective state body politics and their national body politic, hence the overthrow of their respective state and national governments. It encompasses rights available only to persons who are holders of the inherent political power of their states and of their national Union of States, a.k.a. United States of America. Such status exists only in our American nation.

But a most curious thing has happened since the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Fellow Americans have stealthily and methodically usurped American birthrights. In piecemeal fashion the republican, three branch, scheme of governance is overthrown at the connivance of elitist-minded individuals for the purpose of monopolizing the political and economic resources of the American community. Along the way they have enlisted the aid of the American multitudes without whom their incremental erosions were not and are not possible.

However, the great irony in these developments -- where our unalienable rights are concerned -- is there is nothing that has been done that cannot be undone, but it is the individual who must undo.

It is the individual who must reclaim his unalienable rights and exercise them.

It is unlikely our individual rights can be reclaimed any other way, notwithstanding in doing so we shall find we do necessarily enlist the aid of our fellow Americans. How this is done, is the subject of this workshop.

Our "me-first," elitist-oriented, treasonous-minded fellow Americans have done their works using the time-tested methods of connivance and persuasion which require skills in the manufacture of illusions and deceptions of authority and so-called authority's laws. Willfully conniving men rule and manipulate, hence monopolize, the political and economic resources of the American community under the guise of the Rule of Law. In practice Americans are foolishly and unnecessarily at the mercy of the Rule of Willful Men.

HOW CAN YOU KNOW YOURSELF, IF YOU DON'T RECOGNIZE YOUR SUSEPTIBILITY TO FALLACIES AND FRAUDS?

It is all done using every form of fallacy. False images are employed in every medium available to man's sensory and information processing organs for projecting persuasion for and on behalf of their elitist-oriented causes. Every form of visual graphics serves the purposes of manipulators. Every system of symbolic logic devised by man serves their purposes in creating illusions and deceptions.

Many are the forms of fallacy made manifest using our spoken and written languages and other symbolic representations as mediums for transmitting the seemingly endless variety of fallacies.

Yet to this day, the individual American can defend his unalienable rights successfully.

Why is this still possible?

It is possible because the original political terms and conditions for American governing authority remain the only valid political terms and conditions. To this day, law facts which postulate terms and conditions of American governance are wholly dependent firstly on the originally postulated political facts. This subject is reviewed at length in the author's *Travel as of Right* workshop materials volumes and elsewhere.

What did men such as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and John Adams say over 200 years ago? "*All authority belongs to the people.*"

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This is the political fact which simply can't be subverted in spite of two hundred plus years of collective and compounded connivance by fellow citizens endeavoring shamelessly, ignorantly, and unrelentingly to create illusions and deceptions to the contrary by statutory and all other manner of schemes and propagandistic endeavors.

How are the people's state-level and national-level body politics "thrown over" creating the illusion they are overthrown by and through these multitudinous schemes?

By means of political and legal transcendental flimflam. It is the business of metaphysics run rampant -- mind over matter running open loop. It all occurs exclusively within the unique province of man's marvelous brain machine. Fancy overwhelms facts. Substance playing second fiddle to form. It is the business of fallacies swallowed whole by the unthinking multitudes. It is the practical day-to-day art of politicking, lawyering, salesmanship, educating, ministering, and other species of propagandizing for the hearts and souls of Americans across the length and breadth of their land.

And yet every American has the power within himself to defeat the shameless who believe -- with absolutely no supporting political foundation at all and consequently no lawful basis -- they have the right to rule their fellow Americans in the manners they see fit.

But the individual American can only exercise his power if he understands the mechanisms of fallacy -- for these are the conduits of treachery.

And treachery depends upon self deception firstly in order to succeed.

Every manipulator depends upon the susceptibility of his unwitting manipulatee to self illusions from which arise his manipulatee's disposition for self deception. In no other manner can persuasion succeed when it wholly depends upon fallacies.

From the mutual collusion between manipulators and manipulatees are self delusion and crowd delusion nurtured.

Self delusions and crowd delusions are but states of mind where the world of man beyond his own skin bears little or no correlation to the one he constructs in his mind.

What else, but self illusions and self deceptions, are "*appeals to blind faith, self interest, fear, prejudice, fancy*" dependent upon? How else can persuasion built wholly upon fallacies succeed if not requiring the individual to avoid analysis of the appeal using powers of reason, but instead accepting the argument at face value?

The very purpose of most forms of persuasion is to get acceptance or cooperation from the manipulatee regarding the proposition which is the subject or object of the

persuasion no matter how irrelevant, unverifiable, meaningless, or nonsensical the information employed in persuasion.

The confidence artist, the politician, the salesman, the lawyer, the minister, the educator succeed in their efforts because their targets -- their marks, their constituents, their prospects, their clients, their juries, their flocks, their students are firstly preconditioned to self illusions, therefore, to self deceptions, thus do frauds succeed.

While it is undoubtedly treachery when our fellow American, self-appointed elitists and manipulator/handler/rulers use fallacies for purposes of persuading us to support their causes and most often hidden agendas, it is nevertheless pointless to lay all the blame on others presuming to exercise sovereignty over us.

Others rule over us because we allow them. We allow them because we fail to understand the power to deny their rulership over us lies within our individual selves. The power does not lie in the voting booth.

The voting booth became a mocking totem of republicanism from the day the republics were born.

Democracy is a sham as witnessed through the voting booth and the mouths of politicians.

No one can succeed in exercising his individual rights as an American political trustor and fail to recognize treachery begins with self.

What cruelty to find treachery lies within. By self illusions are shields of self deception raised which block understanding of how to recognize, then challenge and subsequently to dismiss fraudulent authority.

EVERYTHING DEPENDS FIRSTLY ON KNOWING YOURSELF

When we recognize that deception begins with acts of self deceiving, then we discover how we are deceived by others. We can learn to filter the arguments of those bent upon persuading us with fallacies instead of reason, or logic, or simply without verifiable facts in support of their arguments. The filtering occurs through conscious and unconscious reasoning. There is a great difference between such filtering and mere dismissal of others' arguments merely because they do not map with ideas we presently entertain as "truths," -- our received wisdom of the moment.

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So may we develop our skills in winnowing information wheat from information chaff. ¹ Such is the business of fallacy recognition and fallacy countermeasures. Such is the nature of argumentation which serves the American political trustor as opposed to argumentation which serves him not at all.

When we neither understand our own arguments nor those of our adversaries no matter the forum there is no possibility that our arguments will prevail except in consequence of a moment's luck.

Must it be a surprise to learn that defeating fraudulent authority in our individual cases depends firstly on understanding ourselves? Why do we accept fallacies as truths? How do we know fallacy from truth? We must understand the workings of our own minds.

Therefore, we must search for the best possible facts seemingly describing how we organize our perceptions into information and how we accept some information as factual and other information as either not factual, or less factual. We must gain some reasonable amount of understanding regarding how our own brains function because our organic functional brains comprise the machinery of our human minds. We must understand something of the workings of our minds in processing all that we perceive. We must understand such things if we are to understand the mechanisms of discrimination between fallacies and truths such as we find them. In such manner we will discover how to argue effectively for our causes.

Ironically, we will learn to critically analyze our own causes. It is a curious fact that becoming truly skilled in argument encompasses ability not only to argue persuasively for our own causes, but ability to argue the causes of those who presume to assert fraudulent authority over us as well as any others from the pestilent multitude of persuaders we encounter daily whether from Madison Avenue, or Wall Street, or Pennsylvania Avenue or wherever. ²

¹ Recall the introduction of radar in WWII. Early on it was recognized enemy radar crews could be confused by having aircraft crews drop packets of aluminum foil which dispersed into the air stream confusing the radar crews by creating many targets. Each target reflection was information to the radar and its crew. But it was not possible to discriminate between the real targets/information of interest and the fraudulent targets/information. Recall these packets of aluminum became popularly described as "chaff."

² Do not confuse what is being said here with the once popularly promoted and practiced formal debate. Once upon a time "debating societies" were a part of many high school and college curricula or extra curricula activities. But these were stylized into contrived either/or, pro or con, affairs not generally allowing a critical review of the issues which the debaters were to argue either "for or against." Yet such debates likely did aid individuals in furthering their skills in persuasion through their practice of the debating "game" and by the gaining of insights in consequence of their practice in these debates. Considering the pathetic level of argumentative skills one finds in today's generation of "licensed" attorneys it would appear that the art of argument is less understood now in part because such debate practicing forums are no longer employed in the education world.

Will it seem strange to then discover that if we understand the mechanisms of our own behavior we will come to understand the behavior of our self-appointed American rulers? Our self-appointed rulers are not only mortal, they are fools. To recognize them, we need look no further than into a convenient mirror.

As individuals, do we dare seek insights into what makes us tick, in order to understand what makes our fellow citizens tick?

The answer had best be "yes" for if the individual fails to recognize himself as a member of the human race and that all human beings share common features of mind and body, then he will fail to comprehend another of the **mega-secrets of successful arguments**. The secret here is that every individual must understand his own functionality if he is to understand the functionality of others.

In such understanding you will discover your own enemies can be and must be enlisted to your cause. You can make their arguments your arguments and compel them to accept your arguments as their arguments. When this "trick" is understood, they will be unable to overcome your arguments and you will prevail. But this maneuver of argument is impossible if you fail to understand what makes you "tick" and consequently what makes your adversary "tick."

This "secret" will unequivocally require your wholehearted, conscious acceptance and awareness. It must become embedded in the remotest psychic regions of your mind -- if you are to be master of your own fate.

If this "secret" seems so obvious to you that it hardly seems deserving of further conscious thought, then stop now and take a very, long, long deep breath.

Know that what may seem obvious can prove to be the most mysterious, unexplored, and unknown.

Such are the stuff of illusions and deceptions.

From illusions and deceptions are delusions nurtured until they become self sustaining.

Imagine going to court or elsewhere with expectation that our point of view, our cause, our circumstance, our issue merits a hearing followed by agreement by all parties that we should prevail, if we do not even know ourselves well enough to understand our limitations and strengths in championing our position.

And old adage runs "*A man must know his own mind.*" Imagine going to court or elsewhere believing we are "in the right" and the other party is "in the wrong," and knowing so little about ourselves that we fail to see we are blinded in our own cause.

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When we are blind, then we are unable to see that there is no absolute "right" or "wrong" in any cause, hence unable to recognize the weaknesses in our case or the strengths in our adversary's case. In such a condition, we are unable to win our causes. And all because we do not understand our own needs, motives and behavior from which it follows we do not understand why we believe as we do. Thus we can never understand the needs, motives and behavior of our adversaries, and consequently, why they believe as they do.

Our mechanisms for thinking and believing are no different from those of all our fellow human kind. We must understand as much as possible about how we think and believe as individuals in order to understand the processes of thinking and believing employed by all our fellow citizens to include those who presume to have authority to rule over us.

When we challenge presumptions of authority, we are challenging beliefs held by our self-styled, self appointed rulers. In the process we are also challenging their thinking. If we understand how their thinking and belief mechanisms work, then we can use their own thinking and beliefs to induce their admissions of the limits of their powers of rulership. To do this we must first understand our own thinking and belief mechanisms.

When occasions arise where we must defend ourselves upon the merits of our case, the same burden of understanding ourselves and our opponents rests on us.

How else can justice be coaxed from its metaphysical hiding place? In the "real world," justice simply does not "exist." Therefore, if justice is to serve us, then we must serve ourselves through self knowledge.

Through the ages some men have always had greater insights into their own minds and the minds of others than have their fellows. Such persons have an inherent advantage over their fellow man because better understanding themselves, they are more likely to understand others with whom and before whom they bring their arguments. And with such understanding they are likely to gain the margin of advantage needed to prevail.

And where does such a voyage of discovery begin if it doesn't begin with understanding the mechanism of the human mind, the human brain? For it is here that everything we may hope to achieve on our behalf must begin and end. Therefore, to ignore that which must be understood about the very seat of the self is to engage in the ultimate form of self denial -- denial of self itself.

The mechanisms of argument to include the business of man's language vehicles with their strengths and limitations as reviewed on such platforms of analysis as "general semantics" and fallacy cannot be as successfully incorporated into understanding without understanding something of the working of the human brain. In such manner, we will

better understand our selves and our fellow man. And that means all of our fellow men -- those who wish to totally dominate us as our self-appointed rulers, those who only wish to cower in total submission before such rulers, and all those who presume to dwell somewhere between being totally dominating and being totally submissive.

Therefore, our first stop on our journey of discovery into the secrets of oral and written arguments must be to our individual "three pound universe."³ From there we will discover that here on our own planet there are as many "three pound universes" as there are living members of humankind.

If we do not discover this secret, then we will never discover another of the **mega-secrets of successful arguments**: The necessity of entering and mapping within each of these universes we encounter when our cause becomes their cause.

And when does our cause become theirs? Whenever they have a stake in the outcome.

When you are a plaintiff or defendant, does the judge have a stake in the outcome?

In "theory" he doesn't, but only fools imagine judges do not have huge stakes in the outcome of our cases no matter how minor or major.

Likewise, every attorney has a stake in every proceeding.

And every jury has a stake in every proceeding.

And every accuser. And every adversary. And every witness.

What goes on in these individual universes?

The secrets to winning our causes are in understanding the answers to such questions.

³ Judith Hooper and Dick Teresi coined this phrase as the title of their book *The Three Pound Universe*, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, N.Y., 1986, ISBN 0-87477-650-3.
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CHAPTER 4

MIND OVER MATTER

"I am not young enough to know everything."

James Matthew Barrie

"Understanding the mind may not be as intricate as our vanity hoped or our intellect feared."

Rodolfo Llinas, 1986

"As long as our brain is a mystery, the universe – the reflection of the structure of the brain – will also be a mystery."

Santiago Ramon y Caja, ca. 1898

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments will be vastly augmented by your understanding of the organizational functionality of your brain. Your misconceptions and outright ignorance of the real nature of your mental capacities will positively be your undoing.

MEGASECRET: The power to make effective oral and written arguments grows with the growth of the individual brain -- a physiological fact of brain function being that the brain literally becomes more powerful/functional with use and atrophies and even is more subject to degenerative diseases for lack of meaningful stimulation/activity.

We are each born seemingly without knowledge, seemingly a clean slate or so some schools of thought have argued. Others have argued that we are the product all together of prepackaged programming – "hard wired" to go through our respective lives.

These ideas have manifested themselves in many theorizing formats from the ancients until the recent past. The idea of determinism, a.k.a. predestination doctrines, for example were attempts to explain man's behavior.

Your individual studies of man's history through many evolving local cultures past and present will all contribute to your appreciation of the empirical discoveries of the actual workings of our brains such as the present state of neuroscience discoveries brings us.

And there is much that is understood now, or better understood, which was only guess work not so long ago, notwithstanding through the ages, some men have made some very insightful guesses. After all what is a good guess, but a conclusion arrived at from careful analysis of empirical observations. Man's progress can be measured by his best insights taken from his best empirical observations.

Regarding these matters, *The Three Pound Universe*, by Judith Hooper and Dick Teresi, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, N.Y., 1986, ISBN 0-87477-650-3 provides a most worth while introduction to the human brain.

Also get and read *Megabrain: New Tools and Techniques for Brain Growth and Mind Expansion* by Michael Hutchison, Ballentine Books, New York, N.Y. 1986, 1991, ISBN 0-345-41032-7. You will further your understanding not only of the working of the human brain, but what some researchers are doing with all sorts of goals and objectives to include developing ways of expanding the powers of the human brain and also of controlling the behavior and thoughts of individuals and whole nations. Yes, a lot of this work is being done all over the globe with military and political objectives in mind.

Make no mistake, you will be at a disadvantage in learning the secrets of oral and written arguments if you do not introduce yourself to your own brain. For there lies our introduction to the mechanisms of our individual minds, thus of all mankind with whom we must deal.

The great pity is that not every person who endeavors to acquaint himself with this subject is going to have the same degree of success as another. There can be many reasons for this.

Among them prejudices which deny access to the ideas of neuroscience and other sciences because the seemingly conflict with other ideas already entertained as facts which dare not be questioned.

When ideas cannot be evaluated on their own merits, access to reason is lost. When the powers of reason are unavailable, there is no hope the individual will be able to develop his arguments and skills of argument to the level needed to assure the outcomes he desires where adversarial matters are concerned.

Further we shall learn there are inherent limitations to knowing – our means and mechanisms for knowing – for comprehending so-called facts as knowledge. We will discover that (1) some of these limitations are inherently within the structure of our

language and (2) some of these limitations appear to be inherently within the structure of our brains.

Being conscious of these neural and linguistic structural limitations can facilitate our being able to avoid the epistemological/semantic pitfalls of fallacies – subjects which will be introduced in the following chapters. Such knowledge will ensure that adversaries do not gain advantage over us by default merely because we fail to comprehend our own fallacies and theirs. Thus fail to challenge each of them as they appear, and force acknowledgment they are fallacies.

Through an ongoing process of exposing our adversaries' fallacies for the empty shells of verifiable facts they are, and then compelling them by appropriate rebuttal to acknowledge their arguments are nothing more than unverifiable, irrelevant, and nonsensical fallacies proving nothing we are able to prevail in our cases.

To discover fallacies which prove nothing we must comprehend the limits of language in communicating.

And to comprehend the limits of our languages in communicating, we need to have understanding of the functionality of our brains which pose limits to our powers of awareness to include our linguistic powers.

Many factors come into play regarding the prospects of our expanding our individual universes of knowledge, not the least being the extent of our use of our brains. It is after all, a use it or lose it proposition no differently than the other organs of our body. Those who do not appropriately engage in physical exercise may delude themselves regarding how well they are maintaining themselves as living organisms, but the realities of their physical world will ultimately prove the contrary. It is no different with our brains. It is a mistake to be mentally inactive as it is to be physically inactive.

In the book, *The Three Pound Universe*, the reader is given a survey in man's studies of his brain and the business of his mind beginning with brief historical insights of man's progress from the time of the classical Greek civilization. One is introduced to the subject from many so-called science disciplinary points. Most separate scientific disciplines within the so-called neurosciences have something to offer to the others. It is no different than any other area of man's knowledge of any consequence, hence but another example of the importance of acquainting one's self with many subjects – often at first seemingly unrelated – from which associations develop which ultimately interact with existing associations to create new insights and levels of associations which serve the individual in furthering his levels of "knowing."

Knowing how to successfully argue at a nonverbal level and at the verbal levels will be significantly enhanced by understanding the mechanisms of the human brain – the “*crown of creation.*”¹

By reviewing neuroscience, you will learn that the human brain is actually three brains. Neuroscientist Paul Mac Lean coined the phrase “triune brain” to describe the human brain.

Understanding the functionality of the different brains and of regions within them will enlighten regarding how sensory information is received and processed (input to the system), how so-called motor control functions are generated and transmitted (output of the system), and how all the higher level cognitive processes are performed which directly or indirectly relate to “input” and “output.”

In general, one should introduce himself to the many forms and levels of mental activity which make possible our existence and our many levels of consciousness – our many mind states -- and how the many parts of the brain interact. We must understand not merely how neurons work, but how “large collections of neurons” work as units of brain functionality.

We will discover that while certain functions are mapped early in our development before and in the months after our birth, that those things which we presume make us uniquely human are mapped and re-mapped as our experiences unfold. All human behavior is not learned, much of it is “wired in” – so to speak. Some of this behavior can be and is modified by training or other neurochemical events and the like while other manifestations of our behavior are altogether the product of our training. But we are capable of no behavior which is not within some genetically encoded schema of behavioral functionality found preexisting in the brain.

What has just been said about our behavior also applies equally to our mechanisms, hence powers, for reason, for thinking.

For example the neurological mechanisms which account for our powers of verbal languages. It seems man is hardwired with a “universal grammar” mechanism which makes it possible for him to learn only those tongues which fall within hardwired language constructs. This means that aliens could arrive from elsewhere in the Universe speaking languages having a different “universal grammar” mechanism, that is a different linguistics platform, and man would be unable to “pick the language up” as an English speaker can learn French or Swahili or Ute.²

¹ The apt phrase used in *The Three Pound Universe*, Judith Hooper and Dick Teresi, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, N.Y., 1986, ISBN 0-87477-650-3.

² Ibid.

Much of our perceptions and understandings of the world are consequently shaped by a particular human culture to which we are introduced by chance in an unfolding time and space continuum in our happy little corner of the universe, yet there are hard-wiring factors behind all of that. What do such things mean?

It all means there are limits to modifying behavior and to modifying capacity to comprehend. In short, there are limits to man's capacity to deal with and comprehend the world he lives.

It means there are genetic reasons why men seem predisposed to use fallacies in making their arguments. And it also means we must recognize this predisposition in order not to become victims of fallacious arguments made by ourselves unwittingly and by those made by others either on purpose or also unwittingly.

In this workshop we will address the use of our language to construct fraudulent images, fraudulent ideas, fraudulent reasoning, etc. These are the subjects of subsequent chapters. But firstly, you must discover great benefit can be had from developing an understanding that:

- There is a neurological basis for a human propensity to construct and act upon abstractions with no correlative features to external reality.
- There is a neurological basis for a human propensity to confuse objects ostensibly observed by his senses in the "real world" with abstractions constructed in his mind from his personal mental library of symbols using his symbol generating mechanisms, a.k.a. his language generating mechanisms and all the related neural paraphernalia.
- There is a neurological basis for a human propensity to confound syntactical relations of his language with words and their meanings creating ideas which seem reasonable and the product of reason, but which are nothing more than nonsensical musings.

Such are the stuff of metaphysics. Such are the stuff of the many forms of mischief which man gets himself into all because of the very nature of his brain. The human brain has remarkable powers of information processing, but it serves as well as a generator of nonsense as it serves as a generator of acceptably verifiable facts.

Understanding this will vastly augment understanding of how to argue at both the nonverbal and the verbal levels of communication.

The human brain has no built-in, a.k.a. hard-wired, mechanisms for rejecting nonsensical thoughts in favor of factually verifiable thoughts. Hence the human brain has an infinite capacity for creating self-illusions and self-deceptions, and, therefore, it is the perfect generator of self-delusions. The business of being human is an infinitely tricky business.

Victims and victimizers are hopelessly entangled when our three pound universes collide.

When we endeavor to communicate for whatever reason we must recognize why we are predisposed to be a part of such disastrous activities, by turns either as transmitters either unwittingly or with conscious knowledge of our fraud or as willing acceptors either unwittingly or with conscious knowledge that we are accepting fraudulent arguments. This universal problem begins and ends in our respective human brains.

It is a root cause of our problems as individuals and as societies. All man's institutions are fever beds of metaphysical nonsense because they are conceived and exist only as creatures of his indifferent bio-computer.

Man's institutional creations can be logical or illogical, it is of no consequence to his brain for it is not hard-wired to be inherently logical about what man conceives. It is only designed to process information.³ Only the individual can endeavor to organize his brain to reason. When we leave this task to others, only chance decides our fate and another tragicomedy unfolds.

Every maniacal jackass who envisions his message to be the one-true-message-of-the-universe and his vision as the one-true-vision has the benefit of his human brain to process his messages and develop them into a form which will be acceptable to others who unwittingly fail to recognize there is nothing within the inherent design of their human brains to protect them from the crap.

By every maniac's own success in attaining power he receives feedback from his followers which result in neurochemical secretions which reinforce his sense of power and result in continued mental activity designed to further his dominance. The process is compelling because the secretions are literally additive drugs. By such biological means we have the stuff that drives men to seek power and when they obtain power to do what ever must be done to maintain it. We will learn from introducing ourselves to neuroscience that lusting for power and obtaining power have a neurological, electrochemical basis.

³ Man's recent creation the binary computer is wholly dependent in its hardware design on Boolean logic as the schema for its hardware-level information processing powers. It is only concerned that there also be a Boolean logic format in the design of the software employed by it in order to produce useful computing results. None of this means there is necessarily anything logical about the data, or information, which man's binary computers process through their marriage of hardware and software functionality. The only logic in binary computers is in the way the circuits must be organized in order to function and in the way the software must be "programmed" in order to process "input data" in order to get "output data." Therefore, it is appropriate to say man's binary computer creatures are also indifferent to any logic in what they process.

As aforesaid, we will learn from a study of neuroscience that man has distinct three brains: a “reptile” brain, a “paleomammalian” (old mammalian) brain, and a “civilized neocortex” brain. They are separate “biocomputers,” but interconnected. Importantly, they each have their own special intelligence, their own subjectivity, their own sense of time and space and memory.⁴

The previously referenced Paul Mc Lean describes man’s reptile brain as “*the troll living under a bridge in a Scandinavian fairy tale.*” Of man’s three brains, it is truly “hard-wired.” Its functionality is described as the “R-complex” in which are contained “*many of the same ‘archaic behavioral programs’ that motivate snakes and lizards. Rigid, obsessive, compulsive, ritualistic, and paranoid, it is ‘filled with ancestral lore and ancestral memories.’*” By its functionality it can learn nothing, but rather is “doomed to repeat the past over and over again.” *The old reptile brain doesn’t profit much from experience.*”⁵

Do we all know people who seem to learn nothing from experience, but repeat the same mistakes over and over? Does this sound disturbingly like the story of mankind?

Regarding man’s second brain, the “paleomammalian” one, “*The ‘old mammalian brain’ resides in the limbic system, the headquarters of the emotions. A throwback to mice, rabbits, and cats, the limbic system is hooked on survival, the preservation of self and the species, and its behavior revolves around the ‘Four F’s’ feeding, fighting, fleeing, and sexual behavior (as one neurobiological joke goes). ‘One of the peculiar characteristics of the emotions,’ Mc Lean observes, ‘is that they are not neutral: Emotions are either agreeable or disagreeable.’ We mammals are built so as to feel pleasure when we behave in ways that enhance our self-preservation or that of the species, and pain when our survival needs are thwarted. Pain and pleasure are the limbic system’s yin and yang, and it judges all experience accordingly.*”⁶

Do we all know people who seem to be driven by nothing but their emotions? Does this sound disturbingly like the story of mankind?

The third brain and most recent one, the neocortex brain surrounds and envelops the other two brains. It has many subregions, as to a lesser degree do they. The neocortex “*as McLean describes it is ‘the mother of invention and father of abstract thought,’ ... [f]oresight, hindsight and insight are some of its products. It reasons, plans, worries, writes memos and sonnets, invents steam engines, and drip-dry fabrics, and programs artificial brains called computers. Through its centers for vision, hearing, and bodily sensations, we traffic with the external world.*”⁷

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid, page 45.

⁶ Ibid, page 44, 45.

⁷ Ibid, page 43.

CONCLUSION

We are both beneficiaries and victims of unique information processing powers received ostensibly as the "*crown of creation*."

What ultimate irony to realize that in consequence of the evolutionary nature of man's neurological progression, there lies inherent organizational flaws directly because his brain is actually several brains, each an evolutionary progression beyond an earlier more primitive one dedicated to more primitive levels of functionality.

Within this irony lies the too often ignored or unmentionable consideration that man's brains comprising his whole brain are ultimately incompatible in sufficient manner and degree that there may yet prove to be "irreconcilable differences" assuring eventual self destruction of man as a member of the community of living things on Earth.

Where such eventually should prove to be the case, the only question left open regarding the subject of extinction of species may be: How many others is he destined to take with him?

It is a fact that in the past 120 years or so, the greatest "die out" of plant and animal species has been ongoing presumably since the close of the Mesozoic Era. And matters have accelerated as the technological means for extinguishing flora and fauna species has accelerated.

The history of man is as much, if not likely more so, a history of the abuse of man and all else found in his "corner of the cosmic universe" in consequence of his witless employment of his "gray matter" as it is a history of the triumphs of man in consequence of his special gift—his brain.

What is the meaning of the phrase "a meeting of the minds?" The meaning must become self evident. It begins with understanding that where matters concerning man are concerned there are essentially an infinite number of universes.

You must learn how to create a convergence of your and your adversaries' universes or you will fail to get resolution in your individual case in the manner which you desire.

CHAPTER 5

THOUGHT, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION

“Whoever controls the language, the images, controls the race.”

Allen Ginsberg (1926-) in a
contribution to the *New Yorker*
magazine August 24, 1968

“Few can hope to be immune to all the tricks of persuasion since, like
viruses, there are too many of them. People are daily exposed to
appeals to blind faith, self interest, fear, prejudice, fancy.”

*W. Ward Farnside and William B.
Holther, in Fallacy: The
Counterfeit of Argument, page 1*

**MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments
requires recognition from the outset that all meaningful
communications must be verifiable with respect to the
content of the messages and the context in which the
messages are sent and received.**

FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE

All adversarial proceedings to which we may become parties in our American scheme of governance depend wholly upon presumptions of authority and law. Few ever challenge those presumptions and those who do are too often met with evasive, nonsensical arguments, to include fallacies, but fail to realize they have been offered no verifiable proof of authority at all. At the core of these individual tragicomedies there lies both intentional and unintentional failure to communicate.

This workshop addresses the nature of that failure and how to correct it. There is no reason why the majority of American citizens cannot successfully master the art of challenging fraudulent authority. It's all in understanding our language and its use.

We spend our lives and seldom actually get our intended messages across to others not just in the courtroom, but everywhere else.

**CONTINUOUS AWARENESS
OF
THE PROBLEM IS ESSENTIAL
IF YOU ARE TO COMMUNICATE SUCCESSFULLY**

Being consciously aware of this problem not only increases the chances of successfully communicating, but of getting meaningful acknowledgments from the receivers. By acknowledgment is meant they not only understand our communications, but we get confirmation in the form of agreement with our statement or in the form of a rebuttal. This is the true meaning of acknowledgment. There can be nothing silent about acknowledgment. Where dealing with public servants is concerned, what could be more important than agreement that will stand without ambiguity in the public (or court) record under penalties of perjury?

But we must understand our own messages may have unintended meanings and they may have no verifiable content. There are several reasons for this beginning with structural reasons built into the very mechanisms by which we are committed to receiving, processing, and sending our arguments.

It begins with understanding the nature of functionality of the human brain itself more especially its inherent limitations as we have reviewed in Chapter 4.

A great deal more insight can be gained when we better understand this business from the point of view of epistemological analysis of our language/communication difficulties which the general semanticists can reveal to us. This we shall be introduced to in Chapter 9.

And then we shall look at many types of our faulty messages by reviewing them under the description of "fallacies." Chapter 10 introduces this subject.

Appreciate that since at least the time of classical Greek civilization, men have been cataloging and describing illogical or faulty classes, types, or varieties of language structures which convey illogical and nonsensical messages and require illogical and nonsensical conclusions.

**YOU ARE BEING INTRODUCED TO THE
"TRUE" SECRETS OF
WINNING ARGUMENTS**

Why so much interest in this subject? Because a great deal of man's social interaction is committed to propagating and accepting fallacies for truth or verifiable facts. Institutions and empires have been built on fallacies. Institutions and empires have collapsed upon the dead weight of fallacies no longer sustainable in the face of realities.

Faulty reasoning and arguments may be described and cataloged no differently than artifacts of any other part of man's cultures.

Every message if it is to represent or convey something more than an illusion or deception must have verifiable meaning at its "face value." Too many messages have little or no verifiable meaning. Appreciate the linguistic impossibility of getting a meaningful response to a message itself having no verifiable meaning.

The receiver may recognize he has received a meaningless message and consequently ask for clarification. It will often happen the sender is incapable of clarifying his message. In such cases it becomes apparent the sender, himself, doesn't understand the face value content of his message. Can a sender expect to get the answers he believes he seeks in such cases? Such are the stuff of communication failures.

Or it may happen the sender is making verifiable statements, but the receiver's responses have little or no verifiable meaning. Now it is the original sender who must coax a verifiable answer from the original receiver in the communications exchange.

The business of communicating takes knowing both what is to be said and adequately developed skills in verbal and nonverbal communications in order to say it.

Yes we must also understand and give proper due to nonverbal communications. This is the business of body language and includes even the tones and inflections in the oral utterances of the speaker. Much of what goes on here is almost certainly the product and influence of man's paleomammalian brain performing via neural feedback in concert with his neocortex brain.

There is nothing new about the idea of "body language" and its significance and it has been given its due by man from his hominid or earlier beginnings undoubtedly. Regarding the importance of body language, take notice of the following statement from the following law textbook circa 1926:

"The subject of note taking in court is a matter of sufficient importance to warrant some attention by a law student. With many attorneys the unskilled effort to make voluminous notes prevents them from hearing the testimony and learning what is being done. The poorest note taker usually is the one who makes fullest notes. One cannot listen intently and grasp the essential ideas and delicate qualities of any discourse while frantically trying to write down in illegible long hand what a speaker says. Another objection to note taking is that it prevents the hearer from looking at a speaker. It is surprising how much of the real meaning and significance of spoken language is lost if the speaker cannot be seen. *The Problem of Proof: Especially as Exemplified in Disputed Document Trials*, by Albert S. Osborn, The Essex Press, Newark, N.J. (1926)

During any exchange of communications, an acceptable level of confidence must be established by sender and receiver that each of their message exchanges have and continue to have verifiable meanings at face value. Any time during an exchange a message is received having questionable verifiable content, it is necessary for the receiver to challenge the sender to further explain. This means, literally to reappraise the thought in the message making it verifiable, then resending it.

It is essential to understand there is nothing automatic about meaningful communications. Meaningful communications require considerable analysis of message contents to separate verifiable meaning from illusory meanings.

The whole business of fallacy is built on language constructs which are illusory where verifiable meanings are concerned. Illusions and deceptions depend upon fallacies.

Often statements are made which are so nonsensical they don't qualify even as fallacies. All varieties of unintentionally nonsensical statements are the products of uncritical thought processes. Critical thinking produces messages of verifiable meaning, notwithstanding intentional and unintentional deceivers employ fallacies in order to gain some advantage from their uncritical message receivers.

In the courtroom setting, we must "help" the judge, prosecutor and the accuser, see why their arguments (messages) contrary to our arguments (messages) are the superior arguments in our case.

If their arguments can be verified as the most meaningful – the superior argument, then we are likely to find we must accept their arguments.

But, if our arguments can be verified as superior, then they must yield to us.

There is no reason why the state and federal political trustor cannot produce arguments having greater verifiable meaning in more instances than not. Every American citizen, as a political trustor, holds the political metaphysical high ground. Our fellow Americans proceeding by self appointment as our rulers cannot produce a verifiable superior argument in support of their *de facto* powers and privileges. Their authorities are limited. But, the political trustor must be capable of forcing the issue by meaningful communication exchanges. In the courtroom setting, communications, hence proceedings, must always resolve to who will hold the "high ground."

We have the better arguments only if we are capable of communicating them. The long standing tradition of state courts is to rely greatly upon arguments made orally. Whether as plaintiff or defendant, we must be able to orally argue in order to compel the attention and acknowledgment by the court and our adversaries of our written arguments. We must file with the clerk of court our written arguments – comprising our notices,

demands, motions, objections, affidavits, memos of law and the like -- in order to set the record of our case with all the substantive and procedural points and issues we wish preserved in the record and we must be prepared to make our oral arguments to ensure there is acknowledgment of our written points and issues.

Proper acknowledgment of our messages in any judicatory, or so-called adjudicatory, proceeding must always be obtained before proceeding further. As we proceed we must get agreements with our points and issues or we must have disagreements. Disagreements must be meaningful statements in rebuttal. Meaningful rebuttals are those which are capable of being sustained by reasoning and not by mere fallacy.

Upon a sufficient and thoughtful study of the business of the courtroom we each will discover lawyers and judges are practiced at arguing fallacies more often than verifiable facts to include rebutting their opponents' arguments employing fallacies most always.

No where is this more practiced than traffic courts which by design are summary proceedings usually of "no record." It cannot be otherwise since in the first place our public servants in traffic courts presume that all holders of the inherent political power are subject to their jurisdiction when in reality they never are and not on just one argumentative ground, but several as reviewed in the author's TAOR workshop materials. Since their authority is bogus, all arguments for it rely upon fallacies.

We make them "courts of record" by our written filings, but we must be able to argue them. Ironically, this doesn't mean having to orally argue every line found in those written arguments. Instead oral arguments begins where the written arguments leave off. We must orally force admission that the only facts in the record are those we have filed in unless our public servants specifically rebut them.

With our written and oral arguments, we must challenge every fallacy in traffic court as elsewhere and get answers to our challenges. Since we challenge fallacies in such cases, we seek admissions that our public servants proceed without authority. The admissions are self evident when the fallacies in their arguments are exposed and they are compelled to acknowledge they speak in fallacies.

This is a tough exercise for the beginner to be sure. Many are the individuals who go to traffic court with no more ready communication skills than ability to recite words they may have filed in the record. In the TAOR materials case, the author finds individuals will copy the various demands, motions, memos of law and the like and then attempt to read them into the record at the traffic court hearing. This doesn't play.

Then some are want to complain "this stuff doesn't work." There are no magic incantations that work.

Instead there are “magical arguments” – as Gerry Spence ¹calls them – which spring forth from within us because of our intimate understanding of our subject and because we understand our arguments are based upon the political metaphysical high ground and are able to meaningfully communicate these facts. There are only proper substantive arguments argued effectively which work. It is all in the communication – written and oral.

When it comes to traffic courts, there are “judges” who seem at a loss in what to do with written motions, demands, memos of law, objections, and all the rest. Yet you must do all these things in order to establish a record such as you want to be established. But when you get to traffic court, the so-called judge may seem to ignore your written arguments filed with the clerk of court. It often happens they haven’t even bothered to read your filed documents in the case. In all cases, these judges size you up when you appear using their personal experience as their guide. This means if you can’t be effective in oral argument, literally something like a fencing match, then he will conclude you aren’t really up to courtroom dueling and we all know where that leads.

It simply isn’t possible to mount effective and winning arguments against fraudulent governing authority if we have no conscious knowledge of our language and its limitations as the necessary medium for all thoughts we consciously and unconsciously form, organize, and convey. Without such knowledge we have no way of recognizing the difference between meaningful thoughts and nonsense. We are incapable of discriminating between things meaningful and things illusory. We are unwittingly made the subjects and objects of every kind of manipulation which may be conceived by others. We are bamboozled at every turn, but are helpless to defend ourselves. Usually we cooperate with our deceiving manipulators out of ignorance of our circumstances as communicators. Usually we are willing accomplices to the many shams attendant to our day-to-day lives, blissfully ignorant that many of our most cherished customs and institutions are shams.

But, we are manipulated and controlled by others only so far as we lack understanding of our verbal language as the medium of our higher-level thought processes and of our conveyance of those thoughts to others using the oral or written word.

When we think about “law” we are forced to think in terms of the language which the “law makers” and all individuals dealing in the “law” subject matters are compelled to employ in order to express their thoughts on law. Why?

Law does not exist as concrete objects observable to the senses. Therefore, it is unlikely that any one thinks of law in images having any form of likeness to anything perceivable to the senses. You can neither see, hear, smell, taste, or touch law. Of course, you can hear the words of law and you can see the words of law. If you are into Braille, you can feel the words of law.

¹ *How to Argue and Win Every Time*, by Gerry Spence,
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Law exists as metaphysical constructs crafted by the artful use of language. By deft employment of syntactical constructions of words whose meanings are devised more or less ingeniously depending upon the creative skills of the law maker, laws are manufactured.

Therefore, must it be surprising to realize that men think of law in terms of language and not images or some primitive symbolism intended to represent real objects in the real world?

Thus language is the shaper of law thoughts. Reflection on the features of law thoughts reveals there is nothing to it but high levels of abstractions none of which have directly or indirectly verifiable truth value which can be directly or indirectly linked to any verifiable objects in a verifiably real world.

Because there can be no observable or verifiable truth found inherently in "law," the individual at some point in his studies of the so-called Science of Jurisprudence must take pause to reflect regarding the truth intentions of those who set themselves up as our law givers.

Must it come as a surprise if one comes to the realization that more often than not great mischief transpires when man conjures his law concepts, ideas, etc. because of the very medium in which he works. Must it be a surprise to discover that the human brain may be nothing more than a whirlpool for swishing up an infinitude of abstractions and agglomerating them into statements, but that those statements under analysis have no verifiable content?

It is said that it can be mathematically demonstrated that twenty chimpanzees hammering tirelessly away on twenty typewriters could eventually produce a copy of *Gone With the Wind* or some other novel given enough time – possibly something approaching infinity.

If this can be true, is it unreasonable to presume that twenty lawyers hammering away on twenty typewriters could come up with a Negotiable Instrument Law or some other like kind of body of law, say an income tax code in a period of time considerably less than something approaching infinity?

Yes, such propositions could make sense. Especially if one understands something about the more advanced capabilities of the human brain with its much greater neocortex brain structure versus that of our far distant cousins – the chimpanzees. After all who would care to argue that lawyers as a class are not more intelligent than chimpanzees as a class of our fellow primates?

Thought, Language, and Communication

Therefore, what are our prospects for superior thinking relative to our lower animal kingdom fellow travelers and even including "trained" lawyers as a class?

We must proceed further in this instant discourse intended for citizens of the American republics....

CHAPTER 6

WHOLE BRAIN/WHOLE SELF
THINKING AND ARGUMENT

“Among animals, as all evidence shows, the enormous majority have, without human interference, nervous systems working usually in the ‘normal’ way; that is, according to the survival structure. ‘Insanity’ and kindred nervous disturbances are known only among ourselves (however, see Part VI). Apparently, the cortex, through its enormous internal complexity, which provides many more pathways, and through its complex interconnections, which offer many more possibilities, with a greater number of degrees of ‘inhibition’, of excitability, of delayed action, of activation., introduces not only a much greater flexibility of reaction, but, through this flexibility, a possibility for abuse, for reversal of manifestations, and so for a deterioration of the survival activity of the nervous system as-a-whole.”

Alfred Korzybski from his book *Science and Sanity*, first published in 1933, see page 177 of the 4th edition.

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments require whole brain thinking wherein the undivided self is in control.

MEGASECRET: Whole brain thinking engaged long enough to master the subject(s) relevant to the issues of the case result in so-called “magical arguments.”

THE DIVIDED SELF CANNOT
ARGUE EFFECTIVELY

In his book *How to Argue and Win Every Time*, Gerry Spence introduces the reader to secrets of successful arguments which as it turns out are predicated upon the arguer using nothing less than his whole brain, hence engaging his whole self.

Gerry does not use these terms, but in reading his book you will realize this is his meaning. The entire focus of his book is in leading you to understanding the power of the “*magical argument*” as he puts it and, thus, how you are empowered by it.

**THE INDIVIDUAL ARGUES
FROM HIS DYNAMICALLY EVER
CHANGING SELF,
BUT TO MAKE SUCCESSFUL ARGUMENTS
IT MUST BE HIS DYNAMIC WHOLE SELF**

Magical arguments win cases, or acquittals, or what-have-you. In reading his book you will come to find upon reflection on his words that magical arguments are made possible only by using the whole brain undivided from its self.

But, there is more that needs to be expressly said which will give further insights how one arrives at his own magical arguments in his own actual moments of truth – his own cases.

These insights, these realizations, may not be sufficiently self evident to the reader not adequately versed in knowledge of the functionality and functioning of the human brain.

One of the great ironies of human development -- both as a species and as individuals in our own lives -- is that what we are capable of knowing, of learning, of discovering, of being able to accomplish because of what we do “know” and what we can “know” is a function not only of the brain we were born with, but of the brain which we literally create by our own experiences. It is not all instinctually known -- all “hard-wired” at birth or shortly thereafter. This point, in itself, is another of the **megasecrets of successful arguments**.

The secret here is that you brain becomes more “powerful” through using it. If we engage ourselves in predominantly mundane and trivial experiences, then our brains are less developed, than the brains of individuals who accept and engage in challenging intellectual experiences. Our powers of argument are not accidents of birth. It is in our power to develop our ability to argue.

From the earliest ages of mankind, there have been men who understood they could master any subject to which they set their minds. They didn’t understand the mechanics of the brain which made it possible, but the concept of how to master new subjects and skills is not new.

In this matter, the difference between the past and the present time is that in recent decades – in growing exponential fashion -- discoveries based upon empirically derived facts coupled with powers of reason to comprehend those facts reveal the working mechanisms of the human brain.

And the revelations, of modern neuroscience, are that the human brain grows with use and atrophies if not used. Literally, it boils down to “use it or loose it.”

It is clear from reading Gerry Spence, he has knowledge of this subject, although he doesn't directly reference the achievements of the neuroscience disciplines.

Nether does he directly reference the general semantics discipline.

But, if you have knowledge of these subjects you will see he draws from these subject fields, albeit his study of the neuroscientists' and general semanticists' contributions do not appear to be extensive.

If you have ever read any books written by trial lawyers elaborating upon their craft to students of the subject of trial practice, then you are acquainted with their osmotic insights regarding the workings of the human mind and how to play upon that working to include their pragmatic grasp of things which the general semanticists elaborate upon.

An example of just such a work of revelation is the four volume *Trying Cases To Win* by Herbert J. Stern, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Wiley Law Publications (1991). Stern references in his volumes the works of a number of earlier trial lawyers who preceded him.

As an example of how we can be right in principle on a subject, although wrong in some of the substantive details, if for no other reason than that the information simply has not expressly reached us and not because we intentionally withhold facts which are relevant, consider for illustrative purposes a statement Gerry Spence makes in *How to Argue and Win Every Time*. It is one of his many powerfully communicative and insightful anecdotes. He states:

"When Harry Truman took the presidency he did not become magically wiser, suddenly more intelligent. His elevation to the presidency did not cause an inexplicable burst of brain-cell growth. His transformation from a haberdasher to a great president came about in the man's altered perception of himself. But he was always the same man with the same education, the same experience, the same genetic bank, the same number of brain cells. The chief difference between the haberdasher and the president was the power he gave himself, and, from our viewpoint, the power we gave him." *How to Argue and Win Every Time*, Gerry Spence, St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y., 1995, page 37.

We know from the present state of knowledge gathered through the interdisciplinary endeavors of the neuroscientists that Truman very well may have, seemingly overnight, become magically "wiser" and more "intelligent." We know now that not only is the human brain capable of "bursts" of brain-cell growth, but that the human brain "grows" through the process of accumulating experiences and associations from experiences resulting in the growth of more "interconnections" between "brain cells" in part because of an "*altered perception of himself*."

For your further information and with no disrespect to Gerry Spence's above commentary, Harry Truman was more than merely being in the clothing business before becoming President of the United States. ¹ After returning from WWI and with the help of "Boss Pendergast" who controlled the Missouri state-wide political machine in that era, he entered "politics" as a county judge in 1922 and became presiding judge of the county seat through 1934. Rising in the esteem of the "Boss" he was elected and entered the U.S. Senate in 1935. He became F.D.R.'s "running mate" when Roosevelt ran for his 4th term as President to become President of the U.S. when F.D.R. punched out in 1945. He is supposed to have had a "high IQ" and he was an extensive reader. There is no doubt he was likely one of the best informed Presidents of this century, not that this is to be equated with any notion that his policy decisions were more satisfactory, which is perhaps to say optimal, to the nation's "common good" whether taken in the short or long term or on any terms whatever.

For such is the nature of knowing, knowledge, and acts made in consequence. Such is the course of mankind's collective and individual progress wherein neither fool nor genius can fully recognize or understand all the consequences and outcomes of decisions set in motion.

The point is, we should know, assuming we have acquainted ourselves with the revelations of the neuroscientists and, very importantly also, from the general semanticists, that Harry Truman was not the same man, with the same education, the same experience, following his transforming experience. The point is, we should realize his "brain" did "grow" even to include the possibility of more new brain cells.

Similarly, what we can learn from the general semanticists is nothing less than revelation reincarnate.

Unlike many quests for understanding and knowledge of the boundaries of human "knowing," general semantics is not concerned with creating merely metaphysical explanations of man's powers.

They engage in developing means of understanding the perplexities inherent in comprehension, to include the perplexities in theories of meaning. They engage with awareness of the necessity of understanding the whole individual, in every physically objective and subjective respect more especially that which differentiates humans and makes them different from apes or any other creatures – and thus infinitely more dangerous to themselves and all other creatures.

As Korzybski stated:

¹ The point being made here is an instant example of how we can be persuaded to an idea or belief on a subject from what we are being told because we take what the communicator is saying at face value not realizing there is much more to the story which if known would lead to different conclusions.

“There is no doubt that a civilized society needs some mature ‘morals’, ‘ethics’, etc. In a general theory of evaluation and sanity we must consider such problems, if we are to be sane humans at all. Theory and practice show that healthy, well-balanced people are naturally ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’, unless their educations have twisted their types of evaluations. In general semantics we do not ‘preach’ ‘morality’ or ‘ethics’ *as such*, but we train students in consciousness of abstracting, consciousness of the multiordinal mechanisms of evaluation, *relational* orientation, etc., which bring about cortico-thalamic integration, and then as a result ‘morality’, ‘ethics’, awareness of social responsibilities, etc., follow automatically. Unfortunately our educational systems are unaware of, or even negativistic toward, such *neuro-semantic* and *neuro-linguistic* issues. These are sad observations to be made about our present educational systems. *Science and Sanity*, Alfred Korzybski, The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Co., 4th Ed, 1958, page xxxi from the Introduction to the Second Edition of 1941.

Having made the foregoing commentary, it nonetheless is precisely the point that Spence in his entire treatment of the subject of “*how to argue and win every time*” is unequivocally talking about whole brain thinking and argument. He is talking about thinking and argument which are manifested from the whole self.

The importance of Spence’s book cannot be overstated. Everything he has to offer the reader are treasures of insight and understanding on successful mastery of argument.

He says “*The first trick of the winning argument is the trick of abandoning trickery.*”

Indeed, credibility is everything. Deception and deceit become nothing once they are exposed. But it will be you who will have to master the arts of such exposure when it is your individual life, liberty, and property at risk because of the deceptions and deceits of others moving against you.

Because make no mistake about this, the bulk of modern America’s social institutions are now committed to agendas which require the continuous use of trickery in order to persuade to their causes.

We know that modern government is for all practical purposes wholly dependent on illusions of authority which can only be maintained by “deception” and “deceit” -- words which both connote and denote “treachery.”

Therefore, how are we to defend ourselves against a total onslaught of persuasion intended at every turn to alter our lives, alter or suspend our liberties, and alter or suspend our relationships with our property – a continuous attack on our unalienable rights to privacy, due process, and all the rest, to be converted into merest objects of every salesman, every hustler, every preacher, every educator, every politician. To be dealt with disdainfully and contemptuously by all the importuning private interests and by your public officials/public servants/bureaucrats?

We must understand the whole of the issues. This will mean understanding the whole of our selves and of others in relationship to the whole of our civilization/culture in relationship to the whole of our ecosystem of universe. For nothing can be compartmentalized – separated and divided – and still be understood. Nothing can really be understood outside of the context we find it or are using it. We must not allow ourselves to be divided either internally or externally. Without context there is no frame of reference and no meaning. Without context there can only be the nonsensical notion – the disembodied idea. Sustainable arguments are not possible without contexts.

How are we divided? In every way and at every level of consciousness and unconsciousness we are divided.

We are divided because we unwittingly allow the division. How can it be otherwise if we are ignorant of what we must know in order to be able to make the whole arguments in our lives?

How many of us realize there must be a whole argument, much less what comprises it?

Curiously our “primitive” ancestors understood there must be whole arguments by the whole self. Our “primitives” knew they were “as one with the universe,” also described as with “nature” and “nature’s laws” and like kind expressions.

It is civilized man who has learned to divide his arguments and, thus, to divide his self. In consequence he chases disembodied spirits and cannot recognize the whole spirit of himself. He rarely grasps the whole argument, thus he rarely makes the whole argument when circumstances demand his argument.

The whole argument includes everything Gerry Spence talks about in *How to Argue and Win Every Time* and it includes more. Ironically the more may include subject-matters – knowledge – which if already a part of our own unique human brain, would make the words of Gerry Spence even more significant and more meaningful.

It is possible that a reader may even get “more” out of some statements made by Gerry than he was conscious of himself when he made the statement. Does that sound

strange? There is nothing strange about it. It is inherent in the nature of the human brain – a device that can know “more” than it “knows” that it “knows.”

Gerry Spence talks about the words which we use in argument. He says there are “physical words” – these are our body language. He tells us that our “physical words” often contradict our message. What is the “message” he is referring to? They are the “verbal words.” But he identifies two categories of these words. He calls them the “chosen words” and the “sound words.” Astonishing. When we orally argue, we must comprehend the verbal words we utter are delivered through the neurolinguistic, neurosomatic mechanisms of our human brain. Every uttered word carries with it an infinitude of qualities to include matters of tonal quality, inflection quality, timbre quality, volume quality, etc.

Guess what? When we stand in a courtroom and make our statements we declare ourselves simultaneously on at least three levels of words firstly and they are by what Gerry Spence calls our “chosen words, our “sound words,” and our “physical words.” Those three sets of words must reach our audience in resonance. They must each confirm the other. If they do not, then our audience through the astonishing information processing powers of their individual human brains will either accept or reject our “message.” Gerry Spence describes this as our “credibility detectors.”

Thus, we speak to our listeners in three separate words simultaneously.

If we are to have our oral arguments accepted, then their content must be credible.

And if they are to be credible, then they must be acceptable as three words uttered simultaneously. Might we say our oral arguments are made in tripartite words? Might we give recognition to the simultaneous utterance of a “physical” word, a “sound” word, and a “chosen” word as a “tripartite word?”

Thus in oral argument our messages are being delivered at three levels simultaneously just in terms of the uttered words. But in all arguments, written and oral, there are more language levels to be considered. These levels pertain to the very essence of our “chosen” words whether spoken or written.

We must understand these levels if we are to understand how to construct messages, hence arguments which will be accepted by our audience as valid or at least more valid than the arguments tendered by our adversaries, or others. These are levels of abstractions – verbal and nonverbal. The words and phrases we use have denoted meanings and connoted meanings. There are inferences and implied meanings. There is objective meaning and subjective meaning. There must always be a specific context or there can be no relevant meaning. Our arguments must always encompass contexts within which messages are conceived and framed – our thought processes and the external processes which are influencing our thought processes as we frame our messages.

In all this the general semanticists provide insights of inestimable value in our message manufacturing endeavors to include our decrypting messages we receive from others. This is the domain addressed by the general semanticists. Their work complements and augments the work of the neuroscientists.

To ignore the business of the neuroscientists will be a mistake because their work vastly supports and leads to greater understanding of the work of the general semanticists. These separate bodies of knowledge complement and augment each other in providing keys to understanding the origins of magical arguments. And from which, with practice, will follow your magical arguments in your instant cases.

Further to the point, to ignore the work of the general semanticists will be a mistake because their work directly supports and leads to greater understanding of the arguments made by the great practitioners of the art of argument such as Gerry Spence and of Herbert J. Stern the author of *Trying Cases to Win*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, N.Y. (1991), in 4 volumes. And other "jurists" who have written important expositions on the art of argument where law is concerned.

CONCLUSION

Some individuals spend more of their time thinking in terms of visual images. Some in terms of aural images. Some in terms of their instincts or their intuitions at mostly nonverbal levels or with some verbalization. Other by thinking in terms of abstractions either as nonverbal images or in verbalized images. Whole brain/whole self thinking will involve using all of the senses. This means allowing total mind consciousness by allowing receptive flow and processing of all the potential information available to us moment-to-moment arising from:

- o our senses that perceive the external world,
- o our senses that perceive our internal world, and
- o the state of our minds at any given moment in time which is the summation of:
 - o our instincts arising from our reptile brains,
 - o our intuitions arising from our entire "triune" brain processes, and
 - o all of the feelings arising from our paleomammalian brain and
 - o our thoughts arising from our neomammalian brains.

Everything will depend on understanding one's whole self.

This will mean understanding one's individual self doesn't exist alone separated from the rest of the external world. Nor does it mean that one's individual self exists only in community with all the rest of mankind. But rather it means that one's self and all mankind exist as part of an ecosystem of universe in consequence of which everything is connected. And from which it follows that one's self and one's thinking along with the being and thinking of the rest of mankind are affected by everything that is happening in the ecosystem of universe. When balances are upset elsewhere, they affect the balance and thinking of the self.

To be successful in argument, one must use his whole brain instead of allowing his "several" brains to contradict him and thus divide his self. From the division will come his defeat – he will lose his argument.

Understanding how our brains work will prove a great advantage. For this knowledge we must acquaint ourselves with the work of the neuroscientists. This is understanding of functionality of mind.

Understanding the mechanisms of our language is equally important. For this knowledge we must acquaint ourselves with the work of the general semanticists. This is understanding the functionality of language.

Of course, there is more. Failing to understand we are affected by everything that happens to our ecosystem universe is equally important. This is not mere environmentalist hand wringing. It is a point that must be understood, if we are to understand why our adversaries often are hell bent on suppressing our individual rights of sovereignty.

As mankind alters his ecosystem universe, he, himself, is altered by the alterations. In time, he displaces or destroys so much of the natural balances of his ecosystem universe that new forces of imbalance are set in motion which he cannot control. A vicious cycle sets in wherein as new forces of imbalance become greater, man struggles yet harder to keep control.

Thus mankind separates himself even more from his ecosystem universe and becomes even more obsessed with not losing control over forces he simply doesn't fully comprehend or can ever really control. Man obsessed is man unbalanced. Man obsessed is man intolerant.

Intolerant man sees all who appear in opposition to his obsessions as his adversary.

Obsessed with losing control of the ecosystem universe which sustains him, he becomes more demanding of it, more obsessed with altering and destroying it, more committed to socio-politico-economic institutions dedicated to control of his external world. He fails to recognize that attempts to conform the external "real" world to match

his ideal world will destroy the environment he depends upon for survival. And all because of his fears for his survival on his own inadequately conceived terms and conditions.

And so he comes to fear and to set himself against any persons whom he perceives to be in opposition to his ideas of control, notwithstanding he is set on a course of alteration and destruction for failure to recognize his ideal world doesn't exist except in his own head.

This is the man whom you find as your adversary when you attempt to assert your unalienable rights as a sovereign American.

This is the man whom you find as your adversary when you find it necessary to defend your self in any civil or criminal matter within your American society.

This man fears you because you assert your wish only to control yourself and your property, yet he is committed to controlling everything for fear of losing control.

You are the enemy if you oppose your fellow citizen obsessed with control whether in his private capacity or those who hold public offices when you assert your right to control yourself and your property. Those who fear they cannot control their external world become obsessed with controlling it. This means obsession with controlling all others

If you do not understand the thinking of your adversary and your own self, then you will not understand how to prevail when your self interests are at risk.

But one last thought, one last question, you must address is what are your self interests?

If your self interests are contrary to the balance found in our mutual ecosystem universe — what some Western world thinkers earlier described as “nature” and “nature’s laws,” then you must give renewed thought to what you think are truly your best self interests.

You must realize your “unalienable rights” are no license to contradict the so-called “laws of nature.”

CHAPTER 7

ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE THINKING

“Man is the only animal that knows nothing, and can learn nothing without being taught. He can neither speak nor walk nor eat, nor do anything at the prompting of nature, but only weep.”

Pliny the Elder (23 - 79 A.D.)

**MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments
require active thinking.**

INTRODUCTION

As we introduce ourselves to the operational characteristics, functions and features -- so to speak -- of our own human brains, we shall also discover that there are “ways” or “manners” of thinking. We shall discover that every individual develops his “powers” of these different kinds of thinking to different degrees. This is one of those things which make each of us absolutely unique.

Furthermore, at different times in our respective lives, each of us may become more focused on certain forms or modes of thinking which previously were not within our personal attentions in any degree or to the same degree and, likewise, we may ignore or give less attention to others previously of more interest.

No less also, we must know that how we perceive the world is necessarily a function of how and what we think.

Much of our thinking, if it is to be of meaningful service to us, will involve development of thinking skills and motor skills in consequence of the thinking.

When individuals study bookkeeping, law, mathematics, carpentry, metal working, or farming, they progressively develop skills in bookkeeping, law, mathematics, carpentry, metal working or farming, which will serve them in the practice of those subjects, but how comprehensive and useful those skills prove to be will be a function of how the study is undertaken.

This brings us to another facet of human thinking which has always been intuitively understood undoubtedly from the time man acquired his present neocortical condition. It is the fact that man may acquire knowledge and think in what we shall describe here as passively and actively.

We will consider here that knowledge of anything worth knowing in order to effectively use it must be acquired in the active mode. In using such knowledge man must actively think both in the acquiring of the knowledge and the subsequent use of it. Acquiring and subsequent use of knowledge are not separate events in matters of active learning, instead they are a continuum of experiences addressing that body(ies) of knowledge at issue.

MEANINGFUL FEEDBACK IS KEY TO ACTIVE LEARNING

There must be a feedback loop between the whole brain and the external world when knowledge is being gained actively. This to say there must be a continuous process of "information error correction" ongoing between the brain and the external world. In this manner is information verified for its potential "truth" value. In no other way can information from the "real world" be "proven" because the brain does not inherently recognize "truth" from the external world — the "real world."

Therefore, only by an active feedback loop with the real world can there be verification of facts from the real world, notwithstanding we are also constrained to deal with our inherent sensory limitations for collecting, that is gathering, real world facts via our senses.

Because of our sensing and processing limitations, there can be the illusion of active thinking when information is being processed from elsewhere than the external world of reality. Experience and learning from books or from oral expositions are long time examples.

How does man acquire knowledge?

Man has passed down knowledge by spoken recitals — described as "oral traditions," or as "myths," or as "story telling" and the like -- since the beginning of man.

Passing on knowledge using the written word is more recent.

Oral and written knowledge simply accepted at "face value" is knowledge acquired by passive learning. Receiving it is a passive experience.

When knowledge received as the words of men, whether oral or written, is "tested" by putting it to practice in the real world, then man engages in active experience. The knowledge is reacquired as active thinking processes engage in an active learning experience. The knowledge is altered according to the testing it undergoes in active thinking and learning processes through application of the knowledge to the external world. This is a knowledge verification process.

Active Versus Passive Thinking

Knowledge which “proves out” has meaningful “truth” value. Knowledge which does not prove out, is false knowledge. Such is the essential “nature” of “truth.”

Often passive learning experiences are taken to be active learning experiences. This is presumption. This is self illusion which can lead to self deception and, if allowed to run unchecked, self delusion.

When passively acquired knowledge is tested by actively “putting it to” the real world for verification, the potential arises for more than just the illusion of an active experience and learning. The passive learning, hence experience, can be converted to active knowledge, meaning verified knowledge which can be used with confidence.

This includes motor skills. Motor skills are a summation of active knowledge continuously tested through the feedback between the external world and the whole brain, to include its senses, with the rest of the body.

This includes all the other skills acquired, to include the skills of argument. These skills are acquired similarly through continuing experiences of testing knowledge acquired passively and actively by using it in the real world and analyzing the results of using it, then making alterations in the knowledge until its “truth” content is high and its “falsity” content is negligible.

When via neural events we have an experience, thus learn, through a book or an oral recital, but there is no meaningful feedback loop providing “testing” of the experience, between our brain, the external world, and the book or the oral recital, then we engage in a passive experience. We engage in passive learning. Notwithstanding, we may simultaneously experience the event as though it were an active experience, meaning occurring in the real world of external events – an active learning event. Such is the nature of illusions – of virtual reality.

Of such are the illusions of active experiences and learning events. Thus active experiences and learning can arise from “book learning,” but not directly in consequence of the experience of reading from the book itself. It happens when the individual puts the reading experience of the book to work in the real world.

This is another example of something which has long been understood intuitively. There have always been members of the community who were want to ridicule “book learning.” For good cause, it was understood that the knowledge found within books or in oral recitals did not automatically translate to useful knowledge or skills in the real world, or to “truth.” In fact, often times such knowledge was found unverifiable on any terms or it was understood that it was never intended to ever have verifiable meaning in the real world. In such cases, the knowledge is “false” knowledge – virtual reality knowledge.

Where there is a feedback loop via the senses to the brain with the external world there is in process, continuous information error correction between the brain and the external world to ensure that the learning experience is based on facts existing in the real world. Or, at least, upon acceptable illusions of facts simply because the information being processed is not discovered at some point during ongoing and subsequent experiences to be contradicting itself. In such manner is information, and thus knowledge, verified for meaningful "truth" value.

**KNOWLEDGE/EXPERIENCE GAINED
THROUGH MEANINGFUL FEEDBACK
WITH THE "REAL" WORLD
EMPOWERS YOU**

Confidence in the knowledge so gained is reinforced because it proves to have predictability. This is a predictability arising from continuous testing of the knowledge with the external world.

Therefore, active knowledge is simply experience gained from the external world through interaction of the human brain with that world that continuously proves to be verifiable. And the mind, and thus the person, becomes empowered to serve the self with predictability using that knowledge.

But again it must be repeated, the brain itself does not automatically detect verifiable facts as information by some hard-wired inherent process nor does it gain inherent confidence in any information which proves verifiable and predictable. Yet through continued verification of "truth" in external facts received, the mind/self may be said to gain confidence in the facts. And to further state this point, the brain only provides the processing medium whereby neural processes will at some point manifest a "sense of confidence" in a particular ongoing experience as part of the brain's totality of experiences with the particular subject events in which confidence is gained. This is so simply because the subject events, moment-to-moment, appear to offer no contradictions to the "truth" thus far seemingly unfolding in this stream of events.

Therefore, when man acquires knowledge and presumes to think in the passive mode his performance ranges between ineffective to useless. This is because the knowledge is not "tempered in the crucible" of testing in the real world. It is not knowledge gained through an ongoing process as can only be afforded by a verification feedback loop between the brain and the external world.

Instead, such knowledge is simply fed to the brain where it is accepted as factual and processed as factual, but with no actual feedback to the external world wherein testing of the factuality of the knowledge occurs. This is the meaning of taking things "at face value" or "on blind faith."

**MEDIATED EXPERIENCE/PASSIVE KNOWLEDGE
ARE THE MODERN PREOCCUPATION**

An ever increasing total percentage of the education – as knowledge – fed to individuals in our modern, high tech-oriented civilization/culture is such passive knowledge.

With each passing year, a larger proportion of the American civilization are experiencing an ever increasing proportion of their actual, waking, daily lives in what author/publicist/advertising executive Jerry Mander described as “mediated experience.”

In the past, the written word and the spoken word as oral recitals provided what Mander describes as a “mediated experience,” but modern electronic technology has introduced whole new dimensions to this world of virtual experience, learning, and knowledge. It all began with radio in the twenties, went into high gear with TV in the fifties, and into double overdrive/hyperspeed beginning in the eighties with PCs and other recent electronic media goodies.

“Mediated experiences” are experiences gained wholly from some media, not from the directly observable and verifiable external world – the “real” world.

In his book *Four Arguments For the Elimination of Television* published in 1978 by Morrow Quill Paperbacks, Jerry Mander draws from his experiences as a highly successful advertising man whose advertising agency, Freeman, Mander, and Gossage, dealt in major accounts. Mander describes the medium of television as vehicle for the transforming of life experiences into what he calls “mediated experience.” Mediated experiences become the individual’s life experiences. To the brain they, literally are real experiences. Such are dreams, visions, hallucinations, and the like. The individual must have a good grip on his consciousness of his experiences if he is to know the difference between the “real” and the “imagined.”

The more television experiences the individual has, the less experience the individual has with life in the external world – the ecosystem universe where his person must exist. He confuses and confounds the mediated experience with his other experiences until his “real world” experiences are illusory reflections of his mediated experience. His ever decreasing number of real world experiences become wholly influenced by his predominantly mediated experiences and he begins to “see” the real world as nothing more than an extension of the virtual worlds he is more familiar with.

Mander was drawing from his observations from the fifty’s into the late seventy’s – the first three decades of TV’s presence in our nation. A period when the so-called personal computer (PC) had yet to enter the daily lives of the citizenry-at-large as yet another vehicle for mediated experience. Mander’s book is a must read and is even more

relevant today with the ubiquitous PC and other electronic media augmenting the TV as usurpers of life itself.

For your appreciation of the import of this book and its significance for your personal attention, consider the following from a book review at the time:

“A total departure from previous writing about television, this book is the first ever to advocate that the medium is not reformable. Its problems are inherent in the technology itself and are so dangerous – to personal health and sanity, to the environment, and to democratic processes – that TV ought to be eliminated forever.

“Weaving personal experiences [as an advertising industry manipulator of the public mind] through meticulous research, the author ranges widely over aspects of television that have rarely been examined and never before joined together, allowing an entirely new, frightening image to emerge. The idea that all technologies are “neutral,” benign instruments that can be used well or badly, is thrown open to profound doubt. Speaking of TV reform is, in the words of the author, “as absurd as speaking of reform of a technology such as guns.

The case against TV has never been made more effectively. It should be read by all addicts and anyone contemplating participation in the desertification of the mind to which TV leads.”

Ashley Montague, anthropologist and author
of *The Nature of Human Aggression*

Everything which is said in Mander’s book applies equally to the mediums which PC, and other audio and video technologies of the past twenty years have made common place. Modern technology has made Mander’s “mediated experience” the dominant life experience of most present day Americans.

Few comprehend the circumstances of the lives they now live. Few comprehend that “mediated experience,” hence “mediated learning,” now dominate the life experiences generally to include the educational experiences of almost all Americans.

Few comprehend the implications of all this. Mediated experiences are passive experiences. Mediated education is passive education. Mediated learning is passive learning.

In such worlds there is no need for accountability.

When these virtual worlds collide with the real world there can be no accountability because accountability is an unlearned experience for those who dwell primarily in these modern electronic, virtual worlds.

Thus when the real world interrupts and demands accountability, there is no ability to be accountable.¹

Why?

Because, there is no ability to engage active thought because it is an unlearned, unpracticed skill, thus there is no ability to face the real world when it makes its demands. Where there is no familiarity, nor abilities for want of knowledge and skills, there is fear.

Thus the majority of present generations of the American nation-state fear the real world. Fearing the real world, they are easy marks for every charlatan, preacher, politician, advertiser, salesman, educator, authority-figure who comes down the pike offering certainty and railing against uncertainty.

To further appreciate how totally committed Americans are to their virtual worlds to the exclusion of the real world you owe it to yourself to read *The Pyrotechnic Insanitarium: American Culture on the Brink*, by Mark Dery, first published in 1999.²

Most modern Americans are now living predominantly in electronically induced virtual worlds. Their lives are primarily mediated experiences as Mander's described. Their lives are dominated by passive experiences to such degree that their active experiences are but shadows of their mediated experiences.

In all such passive experiences there is no feedback loop between the human brain and the "real world." Instead it is all feedback between the brain and the media. But the media is not the real world. Instead it is a fabricated world. It is a world presenting only illusions of context with the real world. With these illusions, the human brain is wholly dependent for feedback. And so from these illusions arise the deceptions of reality. Deceptions made manifest by the all-to-willing human brain, because there is no inherent detector of real world contexts in the human brain.

And so man individually and as a community becomes deluded. Separated from the real world – the ecosystem universe – in mind, while inseparably a part of it in body,

¹ Our modern technology has created the illusion that the "real" world no longer matters. There are very few present Americans who have not already fallen victim to the spell. If for no other reason, our modern technologies assure an ultimate collapse of our current civilization. Ironically, embedded in the consequences of said technologies there are other reasons why our civilization is doomed.

² Scientists from diverse science disciplines are now writing revealing books regarding the implications for consequences beyond man's control which loom as a result of over exploitation of various bodies of scientific knowledge in technological applications. The law of unintended consequences writ larger and larger with each passing year. Not all problems can be solved with money. What happens when confidence in the world's present monetary system irreversibly snaps? The presumption that "they wont let" such things happen is the ultimate expression of naiveté by people already overcome by virtual worlds.

we find our late 20th Century man to be estranged from his whole self -- his body forced to live in a real world turned upside down by his technology while his mind lives in an infinitude of virtual worlds made possible by his technology.

The estrangement produces a self divided from itself -- potentially without limit -- because there is no feedback between the brain and the real world, hence over time the mind manufactures many selves reposing in one brain. There may appear to be no conflict because these multiple selves have no accountability with the real world through feedback loops to that world. Instead feedback exists only between the brain and the virtual worlds which technology provides as "mediated experience" as Jerry Mander phrases it.

But the divided self created by interacting with virtual worlds and denying interaction with the real world cannot be maintained indefinitely without the destruction of both the mind where these divided selves exist and the body which provides the platform for existence. When these divided selves from virtual worlds becomes one's only friends and allies, then one has only adversaries -- enemies. Why? Because the self separated from the real world can neither know or comprehend the real world and so it comes to fear the real world. But fear of the only world available to us for life, leads to our destruction individually and as community.

WHEN VIRTUAL WORLDS COLLIDE

The fate of our civilization is sealed in our technology.

Neither can the leadership restrain themselves from the electronic and other technological attractions, nor can the rank and file.

In events now unfolding, only the individual may chance to survive the certain collapse.

Virtual worlds are colliding with the real world. There is no substance in these virtual worlds. So what is the likely outcome? ³

Experiences and knowledge gained from "mediated experience" are passive experiences and knowledge. Not being acquired through active feedback processes with the real world, they provide little or no service in dealing with the real world.

Thinking while engaged in passive experiences is passive thinking.

³ For a positively necessary overview and "virtual" insight overload regarding this collision, you are urged to read *The Pyrotechnic Insanitarium: American Culture on the Brink*, Mark Dery, Grove Press, N.Y., N.Y., 1999, *War of the Worlds: Cyberspace and the High-Tech Assault on Reality*, Mark Slouka, Basic Books, N.Y., N.Y., 1995, *Data Smog: Surviving the Information Glut*, David Shenk, HarperEdge, N.Y., N.Y., 1997, and *Ideas and Information*, Arno Penzias, Simon & Schuster, N. Y., N. Y., 1989.

Understanding this and what must be done in consequence of this understanding must be recognized as another of the **mega-secrets** of oral (and written) arguments in the courtroom and elsewhere.

Knowing the difference between active versus passive learning, and consequently, active versus passive thinking, is at the core of understanding how to proceed in developing the working knowledge and skills needed to become successful in arguing your causes.

AMERICA'S EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENT LOST

The institutions of "education" in America are presently collapsing because today's self-styled professional educators, with rare exceptions, either do not know or do not care to know the difference. By predominantly offering passive learning modules -- mediated learning -- to their student charges, educators create illusions their charges are receiving meaningful educational experiences. Educational illusions are more easily, hence efficiently, created and maintained than are genuine educational experiences.

There is an inevitability in the virtual events that define and are our modern culture/civilization.

When, in time, America's self-styled professional educators discovered educational illusions served their self-needs-as-bureaucracies better than the real thing where economic justification of their continued bureaucratic existence was concerned, the present degenerated condition of our educational institutions became fulfillment of bureaucratic destiny.

Why should Americans be surprised to find their educators serve only themselves? Why should Americans be surprised to find each new generation of American society is more functionally illiterate by any meaningful measure and more devoid of critical reasoning skills than the last? Given their collective lifestyles as predominantly mediated experiences, how many Americans are capable of even noticing much less caring?

When *The Closing of American Mind* was published in 1987 the words of the author, Allan Bloom, a political philosopher and professor, were both *post mortem* and obituary of a people, hence their civilization lost with no prospect of recovery if you understand the inherent momentum of a nation now committed to lives wholly defined as consumers drawing all sustenance from mediated experiences.

Human brains serve their owners effectively when they are programmed in the active mode and only appear to serve when programmed in the passive mode.

Within America's education institutions, fewer and fewer subjects are taught in the "hands on" mode required for active learning. Instead there is simulation of learning using "multiple choice," "true or false," and "go to screen B" teaching schemes.

Drill is minimized even for teaching the beginning fundamentals of "reading," "writing," and "arithmetic." Past the "3Rs" active learning is minimized and even actively discouraged, with rare exceptions. Drill in grammar, a.k.a. syntax, is minimized to nonexistent. Work in English composition is effectively nonexistent. Drill in mathematics is minimized to nonexistent.

Likewise for every other "tool" subject and all other subjects upon which knowledge foundations are necessary if a civilization is to be sustained by succeeding generations. Modern technology has facilitated and hastened the substitution of passive learning for active learning.

Short term there are many benefits in such a system. No one learns to think actively, hence no one learns to think critically – a topic which will be further reviewed in the next chapter. No one challenges or questions private or public policy or the consequences of those policies. Therefore, few if any individuals will be found in a community dedicated to passive learning who are likely to have developed meaningful skills of critical thinking requisite for making such challenges.

When such individuals are found, they are considered flukes, outcasts, outsiders, nonconformists, social anomalies and even dangerous.

And it is for certain, they are most likely found to be individuals who somehow "slipped through the cracks" of the education system and somehow accidentally self educated themselves.

**AMERICA'S ELITIST CLASSES
ARE NO LONGER ABLE TO
PRODUCE "LEADERS"**

There is an old saying – that is an aphorism, adage, or maxim, if you please – which goes "*The road to hell is paved with good intentions.*" For every fool who believes that the present "politically correct" modes of education are for everyone's own good, there is the reality that even "dumbing down" has limits.

At some point an entire nation "looses the bubble" and the submarine of nation-state sinks to the floor of an abysmal sea -- unrecoverable.

A society dominated with a citizenry, to include the members of their self appointed, elitist classes, whose individual education experiences derive primarily from

passive learning schemes wherein matters of political, economic, law, cultural, and other societal subjects are concerned, can be expected to conceive and implement political, economic, law, cultural and other societal policies which will lead inevitably to said citizenry's individual and collective destruction.

All goes well for the "powers-that-be" until events beyond their comprehension sweep them away along with the rest of the pacified multitude.

For any "advanced" civilization, the moment of truth inevitably arrives when even the elitists of the community are as pacified as their citizen subjects in their Brave New World they conceived and set in motion.

The moment always comes when the elitist members of society are equally found without the critical thinking skills needed to analyze unfolding events avalanching towards them -- many which they unwittingly set in motion -- and all because they too are also programmed by predominantly passive learning experiences.

The moment arrives when the elitists perish with the multitudes -- victims of their own all-smothering propaganda mills.

The moment always comes when dogma and propaganda -- no matter how "packaged" and by whom -- pass for preferential knowledge and learning focused upon experiencing the business of life in the "real world" -- the external, experiential world. The moment arrives when meaningful "real" world knowledge and experience is mocked and discouraged. Dogma, to include propaganda however promoted in the community, eventually becomes "truth" even for its creators. But it is all "truth" gained through passive learning. Passive learning requires accepting the information at "face value" without questioning it or attempting to verify it in any meaningful way.

**POSTITIVE FEEDBACK/NEGATIVE FEEDBACK:
HOW DO YOU CONNECT YOUR POWER
TO ACTIVELY THINK?**

Active learning entails an external, experiential world "feedback loop" inherent in the learning experience. This feedback loop is ongoing active learning and encompasses processes of verification of the validity of the information. This verification loop necessarily employs the human brain's cognitive and sensory functions with the senses receiving "real world" information from the external, experiential world.

Even here the brain can be fooled and illusions of sensed data from the real world are not only possible, but may be common. The magician's visual sleight of hand tricks are not the only source of illusions and deceptions where contact with the external, experiential world are concerned.

This problem is now compounded in ways undreamed before this century because of the modern miracles of science and technology. Radio, then television, and now the ubiquitous computer make possible illusions and simulations of reality which seemingly blur the lines between passive and active learning, but generally represent nothing more than vastly expanded means for promoting passive learning at the expense of active learning. It should be no surprise, then to discover that much that passes for reasoning, or critical thinking, is without a reference data base of knowledge, a.k.a. information, a.k.a. data, drawn from the "real world" of experiential input data.

The thinking is made easy because the input data for thinking is merely simulation and abstractions of real world data and experiences. The feedback between decisions and conclusions based on the data makes no serious demands on the thinker because there is no moment-to-moment verification that each decision or conclusion as it is made is either "on the mark" or "off the mark." Instead there is neither testing of the "truth" in the decisions or conclusions at the instant moment, nor at any time in the future.

In modern education and our other socio-politico-economic institutions, much of the reference data used for analyzing experiences and abstractions of experiences are merely illusions, simulations, and abstractions of reality. Consequently the thinkers' conclusions drawn from such data are not derived from "real world" input except marginally, but rather from images, abstractions, and simulations of "real world" input derived from man-created, techno-world emulator/simulator/stimulators.

Therefore, their thinking only emulates or simulates active thinking processes wherein the faculties of the human brain will make no distinctions. It will seem that a feedback loop producing a genuinely active learning experience is operating with the result the individual is improving his understanding, abilities, or skills regarding the subject, but in fact the learning loop connects to non-real world data inputs from the senses.

In such circumstances conclusions are being drawn and actions may result which have no basis in real world experience. Because the feedback loop itself is processing images, abstractions, and the like which are "man-made" it follows that the input images do not begin to have the "granularity" of "real world" input, hence the learning experience is not as active as the individual imagines it to be.

Dependent upon the levels of abstractions⁴ and metaphysical origins of such input data, the learning may be altogether passive while seeming to be active. And of course its "truth" content may be non-existent or, at best, infinitesimal.

We now find ourselves overwhelmingly dependent upon virtual reality experiences because of the marginal, verifiable "truth" content of the information and experiences we work from in order to draw conclusions and make decisions in our lives.

⁴ In Chapter 9, you will get an introduction to this business of "abstractions" and "abstracting."
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**SAY HELLO
TO
ENGINEERING'S
CONTROL THEORY**

There is a sub-discipline of the engineering "sciences," known as "control theory." It introduces and instructs the engineering student to the "fact" that there are two kinds of feedback inherent in many engineering design endeavors. The one often naturally occurring is described as "positive feedback." The engineer is trained to ensure the object of his design work does not incorporate this kind of feedback or it will self destruct or otherwise malfunction.

Engineered components or systems, whether mechanical, hydraulic, electrical, electronic, or the like, are inherently likely to be subject to "positive feedback" when they are put in operation. Positive feedback is defined as forces or energies at work in the component or system when set in operation which under certain conditions resonate. When these forces or energies achieve resonate frequencies, they reinforce themselves by adding to the force or energy in the component or system with each cycle of operation until the component or system breaks apart in destruction or as in the case of electrical and electronic circuits, the signal being processed goes outside of the frequency range becoming meaningless noise or there is an amplitude swing in the nature of a power surge which destroys the circuitry.

Within the disciplines of engineering and the "hard" sciences, positive feedback is defined as an undamped oscillatory force or energy which leads to destruction or other undesired design effect. These undamped oscillatory forces or energies increase in non-linear, a.k.a. exponential, manner accelerating quickly into destructive, counter-functional, destructive forces or energies.

Therefore, the engineer is educated to design components and systems in his respective engineering discipline which incorporate "negative feedback loops." Negative feedback loops are design features which dampen out any inherent component or system tendencies to produce so-called undamped, oscillatory forces or energies which produce undesired effects.

Naturally occurring positive feedback tendencies producing nonlinearly increasing force or energy oscillations which cause destruction or other undesired effects in components or systems are counteracted, a.k.a. dampened, by design features which introduce negative feedback characteristics into the component or system just sufficient to "zero out" the positive feedback characteristics under all designed operating conditions.

The phrase "positive feedback" in the non-engineering world has come to mean "good" or "beneficial" type of feedback, for example, when used to describe "positive" reinforcement in learning or communication. What irony to realize that often the very

behaviors often presumed to benefit the individual or the community and thus promoted as providing "positive feedback" may indeed be found more destructive than constructive upon critical analysis.

CONSTRUCTIVE VERSUS DESTRUCTIVE FEEDBACK IN MAN'S LEARNING EXPERIENCES

So-called rote learning of tool subjects incorporates a constructive feedback process in the learning experience. Of course individuals can be and are drilled to accept "false" information as "true," and this incorporates feedback processes in learning which eventually prove to be destructive.

But given the necessity of testing their drill work with the "real world" they discover their "learning" conflicts with their experience, if the subject of the drill should happen to deal with matters concrete and verifiable.

An example, would be a child learning arithmetic. Unquestioning, he learns that " $2 + 2 = 4$." The entire arithmetic work constituting "addition," "subtraction," "multiplication," and "division" is learned without doubt or suspicion that the "number facts" he is learning are only valid if the presumption is first made that they apply to a number system, a.k.a. scheme, in which there are at least five distinct number integers, namely 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. Such a numbering scheme would be described as being to the "base number 5," or "modulo 5" — as mathematicians describe it. Our number has 10 distinct number integers and is described, therefore, by the mathematicians as being "to the base 10," a "modulo 10" number system. If the number system is at least base 5, then " $2 + 2 = 4$," but if it were a "base 4" system, for example, then " $2 + 2 = 10$." Can you see this?

If the society the child lives in uses a "base 10" number system for example, then he will discover as he uses his arithmetic that it never fails him by producing a "wrong answer," assuming he follows its "rules" properly. He could grow to old age and never question his society's arithmetic as being "false" because whenever he used it everyone agreed with the results he obtained and he found he could "trust" the results which others in his society obtained when they followed the rules.

But if later in his life he undertook the study of "mathematics," he would have learned that number systems can be "invented" having all sorts of other "bases" or "modulos." He would have found that that " $2 + 2$ " does not equal "4" in a number system whose modulo is "4." Instead it equals "10." He will learn that in the "binary" number scheme upon which digital computers operate, " $1 + 1 = 10$."

In many other societies of times past, number systems have been used where the modulo was "5," "12" or even "20." Russian peasants used a base number "12" system

until the so-called Bolshevik revolution of this century ushered in a "Westernized" state-education system.

When drill work conflicts with the "real world" and the student makes the discovery, then the credibility of the teacher may fall in question and the subjects being taught become suspect. Many subjects which are the object of education programs, however, are not easily verified or may be unverifiable to the senses altogether. Such subjects must be learned on "faith."

This is all fine and dandy, but such learning is dependent upon passive acceptance rather than any feedback through the senses with the outside, a.k.a. real, world which reinforce the factual meaning of the subject being learned — a continuous process of validation of the facts being learned.

Constructive feedback from the real world in any learning process may be deemed as active learning because of the ongoing contact between the student with the real world as the learning progresses.

Useful skills are learned in this way. An individual can study the theory of music, but will never play the piano until he practices at length. Furthermore, there will likely be nuances to the theory of music which will escape him until he seriously works with one or more musical instruments.

When it comes to subjects dependent upon higher levels of abstractions of thought, things of a metaphysical nature and the like, learning will be passive out right when no thought is required regarding the subject other than accepting the abstractions or metaphysics of the subject at face value with little or no attempt to analyze the abstractions or metaphysics upon which the thoughts are dependent.

It is possible to get "advanced degrees" from institutions of "formal education" in many metaphysical subject spheres and never engage in active thought along the way. In such subject areas, it is only necessary that the student accept the knowledge "at face value" as required in order to get the approval of his teachers and he is on his way.

In such matters, whether the subjects are metaphysical or otherwise, learning becomes active ONLY if the individual undertakes to analyze the subject at length. This means, testing it for verifiable meaning, questioning the elements of its construction, the presumptions, the premises, the conclusions which are represented to comprise the subject as a closed system of abstractions or metaphysics.

Law, religion, philosophy, pseudo sciences, myths, etc. all comprise closed systems of abstractions, which is but another way of saying they are metaphysical schemes. There is nothing inherently wrong with such schemes so long as individuals who study, and otherwise subscribe to them, recognize they are "not of" the external, real world, hence do

not confuse them with "reality." To the degree that individuals are educated in such subjects and simply accept the "man made" facts generated in those systems at "face value," that is as rote dogma, then such learning is passive and "untested" in any reality sense.

**SELF EMPOWERMENT
IS THE REWARD
FOR PRACTICING ACTIVE THINKING**

To the extent that individuals are introduced to various "bodies of knowledge" which man has devised and proceeds by endeavoring to analyze such knowledge for verifiability or recognizing at the outset it cannot be verified in the external, or "real" world, by analyzing its presumptions and premises in order to "see" the "closure" inherent in the system, then by such endeavors the individuals attack their subjects actively and they acquire their knowledge by feedback processes of active learning.

In such manner, they will discover the "flaws" as well as any useful "facets" in the system.

In such manner, they will not harbor false expectations for the performance of the "body of knowledge" in question, but instead will recognize it for what it is.

Namely, knowledge which may have usefulness in a particular context, but which can be made to either serve them to their supposed benefit or not serve them to their detriment depending on how they use it when dealing with others and how others use it when dealing with them.

If they are wise, they will know the knowledge may have unintended consequences even when they suppose they can use it for their own benefit and they will know how to nullify its use when others employ it for their own purposes upon realizing the others' use of the knowledge will prove disastrous.

CONSEQUENCES OF PASSIVE THINKING

When humankind employs metaphysically derived bodies of knowledge which too many members of the community have accepted as passive learning and do not have active knowledge of, then it is only a matter of time until the so-called "Law of Unintended Consequences" manifests itself in ways surprising to the unwary and too often ultimately devastating.

The "real world" eventually presents a test for which their undeveloped skills in active thinking are no match. Passive learning produces no skills for solving real world problems. Keep in mind, all forms of dogma and propaganda are simply passive learning exercises.

Active Versus Passive Thinking

When the institutions of education are found to be primarily dedicated to teaching by passive learning techniques as we now find in America, they are no longer institutions dedicated to teaching the necessary skills for critical thinking, but rather they are merely propaganda mills intended to serve dying elitist classes in a dying civilization.

Always and finally the world turns on the passive thinkers.

Must you be among the fallen?

Must you be the constant object of self assuming elitist classes' petty and grandiose schemes for dominating the political and economic resources of your community always with a duty to serve and obey pursuant to their definitions of service, without ever questioning their power to dictate what will be the Rule of Law on any given day?

**ACTIVE THINKING
IS
CRITICAL THINKING**

By any other name can active thinking be anything less than critical thinking?

CHAPTER 8

CRITICAL THINKING

“A man who does not think for himself does not think at all.

Oscar Wilde (1854 - 1900)

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments require development of critical thinking skills. Critical thinking is learned. There is no genetic/hard-wired predisposition of the human brain for critical thinking, yet nothing enhances the “growth” of the brain like critical thinking. Critical thinking is active thinking and active learning. Critical thinking can unlock knowledge passively learned, but there is nothing passive about critical thinking.

MEGASECRET: The powers of critical thinking are developed through learning how to ask good, meaningful questions and then seeking good, meaningful answers to those questions. This is a feedback loop process in which answers to earlier questions lead to new questions. Often the new questions are simply better framed restatements of earlier questions wherein the analysis of the answers to the earlier questions reveals the earlier questions were not sufficiently well stated to reach the best possible answers within the seeming limits of knowing given the context of that moment – in other words, the most meaningful answers seemingly available within that moment’s context of time, place, and all the knowable circumstances of the moment.

CRITICAL THINKING VERSUS THE ALTERNATIVES

Critical thinking can be painful, yet offers a liberation of mind and spirit that can never be realized by those who dare not open their minds to its possibilities.

Critical thinking requires questioning, unrelenting questioning. But there must be reason in the questioning and not mere mindless tossing out of questions uncritically appraised. Mindless questioning simply presents an open loop of mental engagement in which only illusions of issue resolution are possible.

Pointless, irrelevant and nonsensical questions are easily dismissed by anyone capable of recognizing the questions are pointless, irrelevant, or nonsensical. The questioner who poses mindless, irrelevant, or nonsensical questions in a given situation reveals himself to those being questioned as unprepared/unequipped for the engagement if they are smarter than he about the actual substance of his questions.

Of course, if those to whom the questions are posed are equally unable or incapable of knowing the difference between meaningful, relevant questions and mindless, irrelevant, or nonsensical questions, then you simply have a meeting of fools.

The typical American traffic court scene presents just such an engagement. In such cases, the fool with the bigger stick is the one who prevails.

Traffic court proceedings are most of the time simply encounters between ignorant fools matched off against each other from opposing sides of the bench. Such episodes can hardly be characterized as judicial/adjudicatory proceedings in any political, jural, or intellectual sense. Instead, each such occasion, where neither the judge, the prosecutor, nor the defendant understand either the law of the case or the court's want of constitutional authority, becomes just another episode of Bozo meets Bonzo. Upon the face of the daily record of traffic courts across the land we find ignorant, naïve citizens faced off in *Star Chamber Encounters of the American Kind* with lawless, ignorant hooligans representing themselves to be the people's keepers and protectors.

The author recalls a story about a Nobel Prize winner in physics [his actual name escapes just now] who recounted how as a boy in the ghetto his mother would ask him on coming home from school each day, "*Did you ask the teacher any good questions today?*" The significance of this kind of mothering cannot be overstated. Few indeed are the children who are born into a culture where the meaning of this kind of "nurturing" is understood and practiced. The significance of a childhood spent where parents actually understand the root basis of critical thinking and consider the practice of critical thinking a primary matter in the development of a human life is beyond measure.¹

¹ In spite of the knowledge that envy is an unaffordable luxury, the author admits his envy regarding such a parental attitude. The kind of upbringing most often witnessed by the author as both a youth and an adult has been parental nurturing by way of intolerance for a child's questioning of or on any subject either at home or in school coupled with general indifference to the child's schooling expressing only concern that the child conform to school policies and make no trouble for his teachers. On such cultural values are great nations brought down.

Critical Thinking

Learning how to ask good, meaningful questions and then seeking the answers is the secret of developing your powers of critical thinking.

To question one's own beliefs no matter the issue or subject opens the mind to review of the past in order to better understand the present. By understanding the meanings of the past the individual's prospects for a more fulfilling life in the present are improved and, likewise, his prospects are improved for better comprehending, anticipating, and planning for the future. Neither the present nor the future may be adequately considered for their possibilities without the fullest available exercise of one's powers of reasoning.

In engaging our potential powers of critical reasoning, we gain the advantages of foresight. Often we can neither explain how or when new and fresh foresight in matters comes to us, such is the nature of our astonishing brains. But such events do not come at all, if we do not firstly and unreservedly engage our powers of reasoning. And no such engagements begin if we do not question that which we believe we already know, firstly.

In the alternative, when we deny ourselves the questioning of ideas, beliefs and facts we already accept as "truth" or are considering for their "truth" value on the supposition they are off limits for critical review, we unwittingly entrap ourselves in daily and lifetime situations where others have influence and control over our lives with consequences which, because of our unquestioning orientation, we usually fail to comprehend. Thus, not comprehending, we fail to anticipate or recognize when our unquestioned ideas, beliefs, and facts do not serve us well, or at all, though we be thus deceived into thinking our circumstances such as we are served by our unquestioned ideas, beliefs, and facts are for the best.

CRITICAL THINKING BY THE MASSES DISCOURAGED

There have been many cultures or subcultures where critical thinking regarding certain subject matters was seriously discouraged, even classified variously either as commission of sins, or of crimes, or of taboos, or a combination of these. Those who would question such off-limit subjects in such communities were thus marked for censure in one of many possible forms depending on the culture with all the penalties attached thereto.

Like Japanese women in feudal Japan whose feet were bound tightly as young children in order to prevent their growth to adult-sized limbs in order to comply with a cultural code dictating dainty feet for women, America past and present has entertained numerous subcultures wherein certain subjects were off limits for questioning. Such practices discourage development of the powers of critical thinking and often encourage the development of irrational behavior in individuals and the community-at-large. By such

discouragement, members of the community for want of developed powers of critical thinking and reason invariable become putty in the hands of the community's manipulator classes.

After the fall of the Roman Empire -- the end of the period of the so-called "classical civilizations" -- the Western world resolved itself into two recognized forms of authority:

- o The one being religious authority manifested under the self-appointed, self-aggrandizing, property accreting, body politic of elitists styled as the Roman Catholic Church, and

- o The other being princely authority manifested under a multiplicity of self-appointed, self aggrandizing, property accreting, body politics of elitists spread across Europe in innumerable kingdom/fiefdom/principalities.

If you were not a member of one of these body politics, then you were one of the unpropertied, landless masses without rights in your own right. You were beholding to your lords and masters for your rights to exist. You were a serf, a peasant, or a commoner.

If you did not belong to one of these two recognized estates/body politics, then you were the subject of two sets of lords and masters:

- o The religious authority, also styled as the Lords Spiritual, at least in England/the British Isles and

- o The "earth-bound" princely authority, also styled as the Lords Temporal, again at least in England/the British Isles.

The "earth-bound" princes, the Lords Temporal, held the political power of their respective communities. Each kingdom/body politic was organized hierarchically, with one "top dog" prince, and a hierarchy of lesser princes, or lords, below the prince of the realm. Titles, privileges, and immunities, to include property depended on ranking within the aristocratic hierarchy and were subject to "the pleasure" of the prince of the realm. In fact, everyone's life, liberty, and property were at the pleasure of the prince of the realm.

The "spiritual" princes, the Lords Spiritual, held absolutist sway over their spiritual jurisdiction. This spiritual business overlapped into matters temporal resulting in a considerable amount of earthly jurisdiction.

The rules, customs, and beliefs of Christianity have never been constant and are subject to revision continuously no differently than are the rules, customs and beliefs of our present day self appointed, so-called secular rulers because of their constantly

changing notions of so-called political correctness which we witness in the ever changing policies and practices of our state and federal legislative, executive, and judicial departments.² This meant that in some matters even the Princes Temporal were not immune from the wrath of God meted out from within the earthly domains of the Lords Spiritual by way of their ecclesiastical jurisdictions.³

The Catholic Church⁴ ruled the people in matters religious as their Lords Spiritual. The spiritual body politic, masquerading as the people's religion of choice, had their own ecclesiastical courts and many matters considered nowadays to be civil and criminal matters or no business of the court's at all were entertained by these courts. The basis for their jurisdiction arose when accused/defendants were presumed to have committed crimes against the laws of the God.

Keep in mind these ecclesiastical laws were legislated by the Lords Spiritual who presumed to be God's servants while performing their Spiritual Offices as spiritual overseers of His subjects – the people. Therefore, the Lords Spiritual presumed to have authority to adjudge crimes against the church and its authority because they were presumptively crimes, also often styled as sins, allegedly committed by the subjects of the spiritual Master – the Christian God.

Furthermore, those accused were presumed to be guilty until they could prove their innocence. For many classes of crimes/sins the trial was by ordeal, until ordeals were done away with, and was rigged in such a way that usually only an "act of God" would "prove innocence" in a case. For example, an individual might be dipped in boiling water, if they were not scalded to death, then they were innocent of the charges.

Other enterprises which we presently think of as independent social institutions or major departments of government in their own rights such as the law business, the education business, the military business operated at the pleasure of the Lords Spiritual and the Lords Temporal.⁵

² For example, in 13th Century Europe, it was a mortal sin to believe that witches could not fly. But in the 15th Century, it was a mortal sin to believe that witches could fly. Appreciate in neither case is the presumption challenged by anyone of the existence of witch creatures. That issue is a foregone conclusion. Everyone accepts that witches not only exist, but that they commit all manner of sins/crimes against God. The dilemma of a woman accused of witchcraft and dragged into her local ecclesiastical court is without resolution. She has no recourse, because, once accused, she is presumed a witch and must prove her innocence. Appreciate the convenience of such a system for getting rid of anyone whom you don't approve.

³ Appreciate these ecclesiastical jurisdictions existed on earth and not in some spiritual world.

⁴ And the Anglican Church in England after the English rulers pitched the Catholic Church out.

⁵ Students of history understand that for centuries the Catholic Church had its own military machine with the Pope as commanding general. Likewise each Prince of a Realm had his own army with members of the aristocracy as his lieutenants and the peasant masses as his rank and file soldiers. Service in these armies was a necessary condition of fealty to the local prince of the realm. Of course, as Europe began to "come out of the Dark Ages," consolidation/mergers of realms began to unfold and the emerging bigger princes acquired navies also.

The early colonization of North America coincided with a period when the Lords Spiritual were loosing much of their self assumed corporate franchise to rule on earth. In part this franchise was transferred, at least temporarily to the Lords Temporal, but during this same period, they too were in the process of losing their monopoly rulership franchises for domination of people and property. New classes of elitists were emerging in a new kind of society. The new elitist classes were bankers, manufacturers, planters and merchants in a new kind of economic federation attended by a lawyering class growing and transformed by the need for more laws to include entirely new bodies of law to rationalize the many new kinds of estates and empires now unfolding.

With it all, new political and economic ideas about power, rights, privileges, crimes, property, you-name-it were being metaphysically concocted and projected for public consumption by a new breed of political/economic philosophers.

America as an independent nation/state was the creature of these new metaphysical musings. America became the first nation/state established presumptively by the people, of the people, and for the people. The people were to be the holders of the inherent political powers formerly held by an earlier Europe's Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal.

Each American citizen was to be a prince. Citizens in public offices were simply serving the people, in contrast to the European world where they served a prince of the realm.

But no sooner was this new idea of the people as the nation/state -- the people as the body politic -- being set in constitutional stone, than the ideas of another body of European political philosophers was conjured up and promoted as counterpoint. Rousseau's works went farthest towards popularizing the notion of a metaphysically existing super being -- a secular version of God. This secular God, which was philosophically styled and characterized as "**The State,**" was to be the source of all political authority in the **Brave New Post Monarchical World.**

This new political authority was metaphysically ascribed as having benevolent features and characteristics and was philosophically said to be the embodiment of something called "collective will" of all the people of a given nation -- a trusting and innocent proposition indeed.

The French Revolution which followed directly on the heels of the American Revolution was promoted under this statist banner. The French Revolution ended in disaster for the French and for Europe.

As European monarchs fell in consequence of kings no longer being able to effectively argue their authority came directly from European's Christian God, they were replaced by statist regimes premised upon the supernatural existence of "the state." No

European post monarchical nation-state was or has ever been established upon the premise that the people are the nation-state and the holders of the inherent political power.

As things turned out, America was the only nation to be founded upon the notion that the people are the holders of the inherent political power. This event occurred with the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and was confirmed by successful prosecution of the American Revolutionary War.

But that exclusive and solitary political premise upon which American governing authority is wholly dependent remains so to this very day. However, it has long been masked over in the popular mind. This continuous masking process is made possible through suppression of development of critical thinking powers in the minds of the people-at-large.

As a matter of long standing public policy exercised in the hands of America's self appointed, self aggrandizing elitist classes, critical thinking as a common practice is discouraged.

It cannot be otherwise, if the *status quo* of a presently empowered, elitist, privileged classes are to be preserved. No good ends are served in the minds of the elitists of the nation in having the general public engaged in critically analyzing every facet of their presumptions of authority, their presumptions of right to their monopolistic economic franchises, *etc.*

After all, everyone knows, not every one can have his own bank creating his own money "out of the thin air" as he needs it, his own investment bank issuing his own common stock as he feels the need to buy more real assets with "Chinese money,"⁶ his own assigned radio frequency over which he can broadcast his own version of the news that's fit to hear over the airwaves, his own monopoly control of genetically altered seed corn so that everyone must buy his seed corn from him each year because the crop produced by his seed corn does not produce regenerative seed, *ad infinitum*.

Everyone with elitist pretensions knows that not everyone can have access to the limited political and economic resources of the community, therefore, there are those who believe it is necessary that not every one be capable of critical thinking or even be interested in critical thinking.

To understand this, one must understand the social/cultural facts of his own American history and the European history preceding and continuing to unfold from the

⁶ In post Civil War 19th Century America, Wall Street insiders often described common stock as "Chinese money" because of their appreciation for being able to create common stock with little or no real assets backing it which they could then use to buy real assets without ever actually taking any real money out of their own pockets – something for nothing. Nothing has changed, in spite of illusions and delusions to the contrary.

time of Westernized American experience beginning in the 16th Century until the present time. Briefly, one should understand the following:

The business of suppression of critical thinking was a primary preoccupation of the Lords Spiritual and the Lords Temporal through all of the European ages following the collapse of Rome. It remained a primary preoccupation as Europe entered the so-called Age of Enlightenment, a.k.a. the Age of Reason. Inability to maintain a continued tight suppression on critical thinking resulted in eventual collapse of the “old estates” and the rise of the “new estates.”

But the business of suppression of critical thinking was hardly abandoned merely because the old franchise monopolies were lost to the former privileged – the Lords Spiritual and the Lords Temporal.

Instead, the new estates comprised of a banking class, a manufacturing class, an agricultural class, and a merchant class took over as manipulators of public opinion, the public mind, the public from the old estates.

These new estates employed the instruments of their nation’s respective governments as their servants to protect their self assumed privileges and franchises to include the use of their government’s arms of the law, of the military, and of education and these services for these new privileged classes. In America, these services are performed in the name of the People.

These new ascending estates also employed the leaders of the Western world’s Christian religion to aid them in the business of suppression of critical thinking. No longer enjoying their former station and highly privileged status as earthly rulers in the name of a Christian God, they now served the new propertied classes continuing as before their business of suppressing critical thinking. But, no longer, just for their own benefit but also for the benefit of their new earthly benefactors upon whom they depended more than ever for their earthly sustenance because they had lost all their former earthly properties and hereditments.

These preoccupations with suppression of development of critical thinking among the masses is reflected in use of the phrase “preserving the *status quo*.”

**MIND MANAGEMENT
BECOMES
AMERICA’S CENTRAL ENTERPRISE
AND
MAJOR EXPORT ENDEAVOR**

A primary preoccupation of American elitist classes from the beginning of independence has been “preserving the *status quo*” using their state and federal

governments and other evolving social institutions as instruments for suppression of critical thinking excepting certain politically correct fields of knowledge thought to advance the interests of the privileged. This was traditionally accomplished through the education departments, the nation's licensed religious institutions, through the exercise of law making and enforcement powers, and on occasions by use of the military department.

But emerging in the so-called modern age has been an entirely new dimension to channeling people's thinking, hence controlling them.

It began as the so-called advertising industry in late 19th Century America. From this kernel, there emerged a new breed of hired manipulators who were first employed as part of the Woodrow Wilson administration's WWI promotion efforts wherein a subspecies of advertising men were spun off styled as "publicists." Hired by Wall Street and subcontracted out to the federal government, Madison Avenue began perfecting new tools of mind management from those they had acquired through their advertising experiences.

Then, when the "war to end all wars" proved insufficient, and it became necessary to give the first big war a number, namely, WWI, and entirely new kind of consortium came into being. With WWII and the post WWII period— America saw the merger of Madison Avenue, Wall Street, and Pennsylvania Avenue for mind management on a scale never witnessed in the history of mankind.

Management of the public mind and, hence the public will, has been transformed in the post WWII period, blurring all lines between the interests of bankers, manufacturers, merchants and their lackeys and stooges serving within the American people's state and federal governments. All are bonded in alliance of themselves against the people. The people-at-large are to be the subjects and objects of their merged private-public franchises and interests. The people are to be consumers of private and public goods and services with those holding and controlling the merged private/public franchises receiving the profits, privileges, and benefits accruing from their exclusive franchises.

For this the people can serve best only if they feed, when programmed to do so, at the private and public troughs without questioning anything at all of consequence regarding their circumstances and conditions.

Therefore, this business of suppression of development of critical thinking has been a marked feature of America's lower, lower middle, and middle classes all along.

MAN THE MYTH MAKER

But there is more which must be recognized regarding our modern elitist classes endeavors to control their always precarious monopoly advantages over their community's political and economic resources.

We must understand the role myths play in our behavior and, therefore, in their behavior. This is part of understanding how a nation's manipulators – our modern corporatized story tellers -- our myth makers for profit and political advantage – become manipulated themselves. This is part of understanding why no pretenders to rights of monopoly in the enjoyment of privileges, to include a presumptive privilege to rule, are able to sustain their advantages for long. This is part of understanding how to disarm America's **Black-Robed Pretenders to the Bench** using their own arguments. Therefore, it is part of understanding how to prevail in the courtroom and elsewhere – another one of the megasecrets of argument in the courtroom and elsewhere.

By all appearances there is something deeply ingrained – hard-wired – in the mind of man which predisposes him to structure his understanding of the world in which he lives by organizing his experiences in terms of myths.

Terms such as “legend,” “folklore,” “tale,” “fiction,” “figment,” “story,” “parable,” are equally applicable as labels for the term here used “myth.” All these terms apply equally for referencing the mechanisms of myth and the manufacture of myths for creating images of ideas as though they exist or could exist, when in fact they never existed in reality.

This is not to say that many myths originated as statements and restatements of actual events which did occur. Myths are the recountings of the deeds and acts of gods and heroes and all sorts of other characters who are allowed to play a role in the making of a point, the conveying of an idea. And wherein the purpose of the idea is to convey a message considered worthy of others “knowing” where in their knowing they may act upon the knowing for good or for bad or for other subjective or objective purposes.

Myths may be conveyed also in a single symbol, which may also be described as a totem, icon, or simply referenced as an image. For such a brief statement to convey its message, there must already be mythic history stored in the individual minds of the community, or the message of the myth is lost. Such myths can be a religious icon or a corporate logo. Their power of myths in these abbreviated forms depends on the state of mind of the individual viewing the symbol.

Of course, the power of all myths, depends upon the state of mind of the individual and that is a direct function of the “history” relating to the myth already stored in his mind.

Your insights regarding this facet of the human condition can be considerably enhanced by your readings of the discoveries of the neuroscientists.⁷ Your understanding of the methodologies of the general semanticists will be your key to unraveling the mysteries of myths no matter their form of presentation.

⁷ Again the neuroscience-related books named in the fore matter of this text titled “*Additional Course Materials*” must be considered a part of this workshop. Without understanding of these subjects, your ability to “carry the day” in the courtroom and elsewhere will be impaired.

And your success in being able to defeat the arguments of your adversaries in the courtroom and elsewhere will be directly proportional to your understanding of the foregoing statements and the subject matters relating to those statements.

A particularly insightful book regarding myth process has been written by an anthropologist whose studies of earlier societies of man in the Western and Arabic regions of the world was directed towards the role of myths.

The book is *Myth and Modern Man* by Raphael Patai, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972.

Dr. Patai observed that their myths figured in and determined everything about a given people's lives and cultures. Nothing has changed.

Why?

We have the same brain structures our ancestors had. Therefore, it is important to understand what myth making and myths are all about. It is part of gaining insight into human functionality.

One of Dr. Patai's brief definitions of myth is:

"A traditional religious charter which operates by validating laws, customs, rites, institutions, and beliefs, or explaining socio-cultural situations and natural phenomena, and takes the form of stories, believed to be true, about divine beings and heros."

It must be understood the above "definition" is but a brief and incomplete explanation of what man's myths are. Dr. Patai's entire book is actually an extended and extensive definition of myths. As example of one point made about myths and their roles is the statement on the inside flap cover of the book stating: "*An outstanding characteristic of those stories that qualify as myths is that they have great potency – they exert powerful influence on a society's values and goals, and even shape its institutions and channel its activities.*"

There is understatement if ever you shall encounter it. America's current corporate and "politically correct" institutions are founded on their own set of manufactured myths. Further, they depend upon those myths to sustain the public's confidence in them. And not lastly, you must discover, they are also at the mercy of their own myths – their Achilles' heel.

An example of an American myth, no longer taught to every school child, is the story of George Washington chopping down the cherry tree and on his being confronted about it his statement "*I cannot tell a lie.*"

For insight here, consider the fact that many of the present young adult Americans have never heard this story. And in the last days of its regular circulation it was looked on with bemusement. But for over 100 years, this myth was "real" and it was a factor in shaping many lives to include "public policy."

A new array of myths now dominate. We are no more an enlightened, myth-free society than were any of the earlier societies of mankind.

The joker we live with today is that many of the present citizenry who presume to hold positions of advantage in the new American Institutional Autocracy and who imagine their ideas and judgments are "value free" and all the rest of their "politically correct" horse pucky are unwittingly caught up in old myths simply reconfigured. They function no differently than their ancestors in needing myth structures from which to operate.

In fact the joker is wild in America now. If you are to fully understand this, you must read *The Pyrotechnic Insanitarium: American Culture on the Brink* by Mark Dery, Grove/Atlantic, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1999. Find out how the commercial world coupled with the hi-tech world still unfolding, have created runaway myth fantasies totally detached from the traditional function/role of myth making. Understand the extent to which the Western world, with America in the forefront, are now careening into a void of virtual worlds where new myths are raised and torn down at an inhuman pace. Understand why Americans are now totally preoccupied with mindless indulgence in fantasies of senselessness and valuelessness.

Mark Dery will give you another insight into why things are as they are down at the courthouse, and at the state house, and on Pennsylvania Avenue. But instead of concluding from what you learn, that all is lost and that there is no chance for rational survival, you may just be able to see how it is possible to recover your own rationality and deal with others who are unwittingly irrational for want of any meaningful degree of contact with the external world of reality.

It is important to understand the difference between mindless presumptions that there are "hidden meanings" in every thing and then jumping to conclusions about what they are, as opposed to, understanding that the significance of meanings in things merely depends upon a preexisting "history" recorded in the individual mind and that all such "histories" amount to nothing more than presumptions made by each said individual. And that all presumptions can be challenged, both yours and those of all others. In your thoughtful, well constructed challenges lie your ability to banish hysterical runaway ideas of "hidden meanings" lurking under every rock and behind every symbol. There are no "hidden meanings" in anything excepting those you allow to go unchallenged and continue to harbor in your mind as your own private phantoms of conspiracies, evil, good, bad, ugly, you-name-it.

For you, dealing with “hidden meanings” and all “meaning” becomes simply exercises in the methodologies offered by the general semanticists. Codes can be deciphered. Since the codes only exist in individual heads, it is simply necessary to challenge the code/notions/ideas actually harbored as historical information existing in the individual other’s head. Keeping in mind, that “historical information” may have originated in part from external, real world input or it may have wholly originated from virtual worlds. Remember the brain itself doesn’t know the difference and doesn’t care because the brain has no inherent capacity to “care.” It just has remarkable powers of processing.

Understanding that your adversaries are myth oriented and being able to recognize their myths as fallacy constructs upon which they depend in order to function as they do, will be a part of your being able to challenge their presumptions of authority and win the day for yourself. Your self-styled elitist rulers are wholly dependent on their own myths to function. The same basic myth patterns continuously re-circulate in every society.

THE MIND MANAGERS LOSE CONTROL OF THEIR MANIPULATION MEDIUMS

What Faustian irony, many members of the very elitist classes who are to benefit from exercising total control of the national community’s political and economic resources are themselves falling victim to their own hidden persuader/manipulator schemes. More and more commonly the offspring of these elitists are, themselves, untutored in developing their critical thinking powers.

This is happening for a number of reasons, not merely some single cause.

One of these reasons is the unfolding of an unprecedented collage of mediums/media based upon electronics technologies – and soon to include optic technologies which will likely eliminate the electronic technologies as a platform for these new mediums/media. Jerry Mander’s *Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television* (1978) as previously mentioned gave astonishing insights on the hazards to human mental health/development of TV. The points he raised regarding the devastating effects of the first three decades of TV applies in spades to what has happened with the electronic gadgets which computers-on-chips made possible to include the PC and all the other crap such as the Internet.

Here are three other books recommended for your insight into what the high-tech world is doing to mind control and the state of mind of everyone including the highest ranks of our self-appointed elitist masters:

Ideas and Information: Managing in a High-Tech World, Arno Penzias, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1989. A Nobel prize-winning physicist, Penzias will give you a quick and comprehensive picture of a “scientists” view of developments in cyberspace and the consequences seen from his “ivory tower” vantage point.

Data Smog: Surviving the Information Glut. David Shenk, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1997. Will considerably aid your appreciation of the immediate and long term significance of our modern high-tech capacity to puke information into the breach of humanity in infinite volume.

War of the Worlds: Cyberspace and the High-Tech Assault on Reality. Mark Slouka, BasicBooks, Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1995. The title says it all. Don’t read this book and be the lesser for not realizing what we all face.

Game Over: How Nintendo Zapped an American Industry, Captured Your Dollars, and Enslaved Your Children. David Sheff., Random House, New York, N.Y. 1993. Here also, the title says it all. Likewise for this book, don’t read it and be the lesser for not realizing what has already happened and why.

Further to the gaining of multiple insights at truly ramp speed progression into how all members of the American community have fallen victim to an exploding smorgasbord of virtual realities, Mark Dery’s above referenced book is here also recommended as essential reading.

Herbert I. Schiller wrote the first book providing a comprehensive look at the post WWII mind management apparatus with his ***The Mind Managers*** published in 1973. This is another must read for understanding in nitty-gritty detail how the above commented post WWII consortium came to be and who it serves, how it serves, and why it serves. Schiller doesn’t coin the phrase “Institutional Autocracy” – that appears to have been coined elsewhere in the following decade or so, but his book is the first describing comprehensively the arrival of this new estate of American rulership – the Institutional Autocracy.

All this institutionalized apparatus is now running out of control. The children of its creators are as subject to its devastation as are the washed and unwashed masses. Not even the presently evolved apparatus of the Institutional Autocracy has control of its proceedings or the consequences of its proceedings. Notwithstanding a wide spread hysteria across parts of America to include the self-styled Patriot community, no one is in control. A societal thermonuclear chain reaction is underway. Chaos is now. Greater chaos is coming. There is nothing linear about it. It approaches at ramp speed.

A truly democratic event is unfolding.

The whole people are destined to go down, their elitist-minded manipulators with them. The wizards discover they get to eat their own epistemologically arsenic-laced lunches. Madison Avenue, Wall Street, Pennsylvania Avenue and Main Street merge into the black hole of chaos.

Schemes to eviscerate all social meaning, values, and short circuit development of critical thinking skills within the general community have succeeded in denying development of these skills even to succeeding generations of America's ruling class.

A great elitist classes tragedy is in the making as the guardians of the *status quo* are already no longer able to efficiently, or on any terms, manage the minds of the millions while training replacement guardians capable of perpetuating the reinforcement and maintenance of said *status quo*.

And all because the forces of suppression have migrated into the halls of America's colleges and universities, from the formerly most prestigious to the lowest ranked, where the lamp of critical thinking is now extinguished.

Now even most college and university departments discourage critical thinking as politically incorrect and, in consequence, have ceased to meaningfully function as institutions of "higher learning" in any traditional sense of the phrase, notwithstanding there are engineering and science departments, for example, which continue to crank out fresh candidates some how manageably suitable for employment in the technocratic specialties of our modern society.

The thesis of the previously mentioned book *The Closing of the American Mind* sets the argument from the view of a "professor of social thought," wherein as stated on the inside flap of the book's cover:

"Alan Bloom ... argues that the social and political crisis of twentieth-century America is really an intellectual crisis. From the universities' lack of purpose to their students' lack of learning, from the jargon of liberation to the supplanting of reason by 'creativity,' Bloom shows how American democracy has unwittingly played host to vulgarized Continental ideas of nihilism and despair, of relativism disguised as tolerance.

"What do we see today, according to Bloom, is young people who, lacking an understanding of the past and a vision of the future, live in an impoverished present. And our universities, entrusted with their education, no longer provide the knowledge of the great tradition of philosophy and literature that made students aware of the order of nature and of man's place in it. Higher education fails to arouse or to nurture the self-knowledge that has always been the basis for serious, humane learning."

It is ironic that the imported virus of “nihilism” – a form of intellectual mindlessness, epistemology reduced to circular reasoning, the ultimate philosophic cop-out – has been adopted by America’s highest citadels of education just as the effects of “mediated experience” has replaced meaningful real world experience for the masses of today’s students no matter what socio/economic strata they come from

CONCLUSION

In case you haven’t guessed by now, only you can develop your powers of critical thinking.

And only if you are capable of critical thinking will you be able to sort the nonsense from the facts which you must know along with developing the skills to argue those facts. This is a single, inseparable endeavor. It is the feedback loop in practice. It is the difference between mindless circularity of reasoning in consequence of linguistic illiteracy and linguistic sanity resulting from an adequate understanding of the nature of human brain functionality coupled with a methodological means such as general semantics can provide in order to establish feedback loops of reasoning which serve the user to his rational benefit.

The outcome of the effort is the ability to make the “magical argument” in all your causes.

Astonishingly, you will have to do it on your own.

In a land turned into pacifists, fanatics, hysterics, and all manner of incompetent citizens whose primary programmed mission now is mindless consuming and who are totally uprooted from the real world of their planet, you can’t even buy an education in critical thinking by going to some university or college.

But, you can do it the same way that all the world’s original thinkers have done it in the past. You can do it on your own.

To be a critical thinker is to be an original thinker.

CHAPTER 9

SEMANTICS, GENERAL AND OTHERWISE

“The theory of relativity has resulted from a combination of the three elements which were called for in a reconstruction of physics: first, delicate experiment; secondly, logical analysis; and thirdly, epistemological considerations.”

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments require genuine understanding of the epistemological strengths and limitations of the language in which we are compelled to receive the arguments of others and to frame our arguments and general semantics provides insights into our language the likes of which are available no where else.

MEGASECRET: Linguistic fallacies are a major pitfall in argument with which we find ourselves confronted both in our arguments and everyone else’s arguments which must be recognized and overcome in order to prevail, and general semantics provides powerful keys and tools for recognition of the many forms of fallacy and the internal elements found in each form of fallacy.

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS

If one intends to master the business of argument in the courtroom and elsewhere, he will be well advised to consider the words of the English mathematical logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell. What Russell had to say about the conceiving of the Theory of Relativity by Albert Einstein and the “proving” of it by his associates of the physics and mathematics communities applies equally to all man’s endeavors.

From the neuroscientists we learn the individual brains of today’s individual members of mankind are potentially more developed than his ancestors because of their access to knowledge built upon the ever expanding experiences, to include those we often label as discoveries, of mankind who have preceded us. Note we are saying “potentially more developed.” Individual human brains develop or remain undeveloped strictly according to the quantity and quality of experiences they are allowed to process. Therefore, there is no mystery regarding how it is possible to produce human brains having functional capabilities ranging between cretins and wizards. It’s all in a given brain’s engagement with it’s owner’s individual life experiences. It doesn’t happen just

because Citizen Z drinks an over-the-counter or prescription-only tonic with a secret formula having brain growth powers, or because Citizen X -- by the luck of the draw -- got a better bag of chromosomes than Citizen Y.

The major breakthroughs of man's continuously evolving mind, and consequently his cultures/civilizations, have come in consequence of (1) empirical observations of the world wherein he finds himself using his senses, (2) his continuously unfolding and evolving powers of logical analysis and (3) upon so-called epistemological considerations.

All this notwithstanding, no less an observer than Albert Einstein, himself, is supposed to have stated, it can all be lost in a generation. Indeed, man continuously acquires often valuable and useful knowledge which is subsequently lost, sometimes to be rediscovered, other times not.

And what was true regarding the development of the theory of relativity is true for all man's discoveries including what he is discovering about his brain and; thus the mind of man. Why? Because, we can blow our civilizations away in one of a thousand ways leaving the Theory of Relativity to be rediscovered by our survivors 30,000 years from now. This assuming the cockroaches don't beat us out all together in our race to extinguish all other species and gene pools of flora and fauna on the planet. (That being sort of an updated version of the old Tortoise versus Hare tale.)

And so it is true about the discoveries we must make about the business of communication, if we are to become sufficiently skilled in the art of argument for our causes.

Why should we be concerned about developing our personal skills of argument?

Surely, if we learn nothing else with age, we learn that no one else can be depended upon to argue our causes for us. If we have any causes which are important enough to us that successfully defending them and practicing them matters to us, then we must determine to become our own sufficiently skilled advocates. No doubt, Leona Helmsly can testify to this, inasmuch as, she reportedly spent several million dollars for her defense of criminal income tax charges and as we all know she was found guilty of criminal tax evasion and spent several years in prison for that *prima facie*, fraudulent conviction.

REGARDING EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

It is appropriate to realize the nature of man's circumstance. Namely he possesses a brain capable of astonishing levels of information processing, but that brain can process nothing if it receives nothing from man's senses firstly. As reviewed earlier, some sensory inputs originate from within man's own body while all other sensory inputs originate

outside of his body. His brain develops knowledge of an inside world and an outside world subsequent to the kick off of his individual biological clock, so to speak.

It should be self evident that all man's knowledge of the outside world is empirical.

Thus when Russell referenced the early 20th Century revolution in the science of Physics being in part dependent upon "*delicate experiment*," he was referring to developing skills in empirical observation using then state-of-the art tools available for observations of the business of matter, energy and the conundrums related to man's attempts to understand matter and energy.

Appreciate there is a feedback between man's expanding capacities to perceive his inner and outer worlds with his senses which is ongoing between his sensory capacities and his capacities for reason and logic. Interlocked with these and also a part of the feedback loop between sensing and reasoning are what Russell alluded to as "*epistemological considerations*" – of which more will be said momentarily.

We must understand the relevance of empirically based facts when we deal with our arguments and the arguments of others.

The Rules of Evidence in judicial proceedings and adjudicatory proceedings must primarily attend to rooting out empirically based facts in every case where the issues pertain to a claim of a wrong done for which redress is in order whether of a civil or criminal nature. This means the "facts" in a case must be verifiable in the external, so-called real world. There is of course, a class of facts which exist strictly as metaphysically conceived ideas. These are abstractions existing nowhere, but in the minds of men – too often "clouded minds." This class of facts includes what are called "law facts" – laws of every sort.

Keep in mind there must also be provisions in Rules of Evidence for being able to argue and prove or disprove these other species of facts which are of purely metaphysical origin where law matters are concerned. This, of course, is necessarily the case since law is purely a metaphysical creature, not empirically observable in man's exterior world. It is not only fair to say man's laws dwell solely in the universe of man's mind, it is the only plausible explanation for the existence of laws. Thus when one argues a challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction, for example, all the facts in the challenge can only pertain to metaphysical issues – some described as political facts and others as law facts. (Further to this, never lose sight when making subject-matter jurisdiction challenges that within the American scheme of governance, political facts are paramount to law facts pertaining to presumptions of authority to govern."

To argue any specie of metaphysical fact one cannot rely on empirical knowledge as his source of verification for the fact. Instead he must rely on his logical analysis

knowledge and his epistemological/semantical knowledge in order to establish his case, if he is to compel resolution of his cause in his favor by force of his skills of argument.

LOGICAL ANALYSIS

If there is any endeavor more neglected by the bulk of mankind, it is the exercise of logical analysis, or critical analysis. The fields of logical analysis which are open to modern man are numerous, but largely unknown to the general populace, except for such fragments as some learn coincidentally with other learning experiences. Formal studies where logical analysis plays a central part in the subject matters are not pursued by the masses.

It is appropriate to realize that man's increasing powers of logical analysis are a consequence of an expanding body of knowledge (culture/civilization) already gained in consequence of earlier episodes of reasoning using his existing powers of perception, logical analysis and epistemological considerations.

And also to realize that for the individual brain to become part of all this, the individual must experience these preexisting bodies of knowledge through his senses. And for it to become actively learned he must experience feedback processes between the knowledge he is learning through media wherein he verifies the knowledge with real world experiences which do not contradict the knowledge.

And not lastly to realize that all this involves neural processing in a brain which has definite "hard-wired" limitations that constrain man's epistemological capacities. This means we have inherent limits for knowing, understanding, and learning.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the study of so-called epistemology we find individuals endeavoring to understand how man comes to have knowledge and how he comprehends its meaning.

Epistemology whether first viewed as so many separate bodies of science or even merely as collections of doctrines and theories has metaphysical origins as a "*study or theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity.*"¹ Much of man's musings about self and universe from so-called ancient times to the present which are popularly cataloged into so-called schools of metaphysical thought under the label "philosophy" are also appropriately cataloged under the label "epistemology." Speculations about the nature and limits of knowing and knowledge have historically been purely metaphysical, but now it is important to add that this "field" of knowledge also draws from the "hard" sciences. Particularly it is important to recognize

¹ Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary at page 280.
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the breakthrough discoveries in neuroscience in gaining new understanding about the dynamics of knowing and knowledge. More especially to understand how we know and our limits of knowing.

When it comes to developing our skills of argument in defense of our unalienable rights and, thus in defense of ourselves as individuals with rights of individual sovereignty, our knowledge of things epistemological to include things semantical will be of inestimable importance. It will be the difference between winning our rights which were never to be vanquished ² in the first place and losing those rights by default through inadequate skills of argument.

A review of the *Epistemology* article in the Macropaedia Volume 6 of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* ³ (EB) would be most rewarding for the individual intent on coming to a greater degree of understanding the challenges in truly communicating one's messages with the meanings one believes he intends intact and compelling answering communications which verify the meaning is understood and accepted. Imagine the importance as this when one wishes to get acknowledgment from another that his statements are not only truth, but the paramount truth in the instant engagement.

Appreciate this paragraph near the opening of the EB article:

"EPISTEMOLOGY AS A DISCIPLINE"

"If 'the proper study of mankind is man,' then epistemology or theory of knowledge is a worthy part of that study, for it deals with an aspect of human life that is of fundamental importance. To act wisely in the world, it is necessary to know that world and understand it; this is not say, however, that, if a man knows, he will inevitably use the knowledge wisely. It is true that the past several centuries have witnessed rapid advances in knowledge that have made possible higher standards of life; but it is equally true that this very knowledge has frequently been misused, increasing man's misery. Moreover, the new knowledge has sometimes provoked a sense of insecurity, even a certain loss of morale. The universe has been shown to be incomparably vaster and man's role in it less significant than had been

² The phrasing in our American political doctrine is "unalienable rights" adhering to each of us as individual holders of the "inherent political power" and this means that said rights can never be "derogated" or abrogated." That means our nation's "political facts" are "paramount," meaning supreme facts in relation to any and all "law facts" which our self assuming rulers attempt to claim are supreme whenever there is conflict between these two classes of "facts."

³ The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* was the authoritative encyclopedia. It's main articles were always prepared by the most notable authorities on the particular subject. For some idea of the importance of this subject, consider that the *epistemology* article in EB ran to 22 pages. Sadly EB went into liquidation several years ago succumbing finally to the CD ROM disc of the computer age and the continuing demise of interest in serious reading by the masses.

assumed. Advances in astronomy, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology have in many respects been disturbing. Yet, paradoxically, men are proud of these achievements. If the world seems now less cozy than it used to be, if its very vastness is forbidding, it is man himself who has discovered the truth about the world – if it is the truth. Indeed, man is also uneasy about his liability to error. Men assert confidently what they take to be the truth, only to find later that their assertions frequently have been false – hence man’s great need not only to know the world around him but also to know himself better and, in particular, the need to understand the character and reliability of his own cognitive powers. The epistemologist seeks to provide an urgently needed knowledge about knowledge.” *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia Volume 6, page 925, 1977 edition.*

This full EB article is included in this workshop as Appendix I. Do not expect to digest this business in one gulp, but do not deny yourself the opportunity to review this subject as long as necessary until you come to understand even from within your viscera⁴ that almost everything which bombards you from Madison Ave., to Wall Street, to Pennsylvania Ave, to your Main Street is information almost never of meaningful or verifiable content and is usually designed for only one purpose. To persuade you to the cause of persons whose agendas are never truly revealed and which almost always should be suspect.

**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENERAL SEMANTICS
TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING
THE CHALLENGE
OF
COMMUNICATION**

From the *Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles* we learn that the word *semantic* became recognized circa 1895 as in general usage in adjective form and meaning “*relating to signification or meaning.*”

Endeavors to understand the “meaning of meaning” became a great preoccupation from the turn of the century. As EB puts it in a part of its introductory statement to the article on semantics:

⁴ Guess what? It turns out we have a “second brain.” This is no mere play on words. It is our “enteric nervous system” located in our guts. The phrase “gut instinct” has more meaning than we realize. The story is astonishing and important. Get a copy of *The Second Brain*, by Michael D. Gershon, M.D., Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 10 East 53rd St., New York, N.Y. 10022, 1998, ISBN 0-06-018252-0. The author’s dedication is intriguing: “*To the United States Government and its politicians, whose faith in science and unflagging support of research have made possible the discoveries described in this book.*”

“**** Semantics is a relatively new field of study, and its originators, often working independently of one another, felt the need to coin a new name for the new discipline; hence the variety of terms denoting the same subject. The word semantics has ultimately prevailed as a name for the doctrine of meaning, in particular, of linguistic meaning. Semiotic is still used, however, to denote a broader field: the study of sign-using behaviour in general.” *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia Volume 16, page 506, 1977 edition.*

This full EB article is included in this workshop as Appendix II. It is included in this workshop as an appendix for the same reasons stated above for inclusion of the EB article on epistemology as Appendix I.

When you read these articles keep in mind what is now better understood about the very nature of human brain functionality itself. For example, the realization that human brains have a hard-wired “universal language” neural mechanism which with other neural mechanisms interacting as the whole brain place limits on man’s natural abilities in linguistics and his capacity to grasp the “meaning of meaning” so to speak. Appreciate that everything in the human brain influences everything else. Thus the reptile brain influences the paleomammalian brain influences the neocortical brain. All the while the paleomammalian brain and neocortical brain probably influence the reptile brain very little, but instead they must somehow override its hard-wired instinctual nature if they are to prevail.

Obviously, as you should anticipate, there is feedback between the various disciplines of neuroscience and the various disciplines of epistemology and semantics and in fact some disciplines are neuroscientific, epistemologic and semantic in their work. The various schools of semantics are divisions of philosophic/metaphysical speculation within epistemology.

All of this has significance if we are to understand ourselves and our adversaries in a courtroom or elsewhere in order to prevail in our encounters, engagements, and experiences.

You will note for example, a reference on page 507 of the EB article on semantics to Alfred Korzybski as “*the founder of the movement called General Semantics.*”

The author of this workshop was introduced to Korzybski’s definitive work on his “general semantics” which was titled *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics* in the summer of graduation from high school in 1955 before going off to college that fall. This book which was first published in 1933 greatly influenced the author and was instrumental in his determining to get a degree in mathematics among other things. Korzybski founded the Institute of General Semantics. In 1967 the author curious to get his own copy of this book and wondering if

it were still in print discovered the institute to be alive and well and ordered his own copy of that book. Last year, again curious whether this organization still existed these many years after Korzybski's death, the author learned that the organization continues active and has a web site: www.general-semantics.org/text/books/bklstrev.html. Appendix III is included herein as a complete booklist from that web site.

General semantics addresses the problems of language structure, word meaning and confusion of words with the things they are to represent, and the like. Important keys to understanding how people create illusory and delusional thought ideas having no bearing to verifiable realities or having no bearing to reasonably logical abstracting processes.

The most satisfactory book for an introduction to the concepts and methodology offered by general semantics is *People in Quandaries: The Semantics of Personal Adjustment*, Wendell Johnson (1946). Korzybski's books, this book and a number of others are available from the Institute of General Semantics. Check their booklist included herein as Appendix III.

General semantics addresses the inherent difficulties built into languages which include such linguistic problems as:

- o Taking meanings of words, symbols, and the like out of their appropriate contexts and thus misusing them,
- o Taking abstractions to higher and higher levels with all the risks of maintaining any verifiable meaning or coherence as one moves from one level to the next higher one,
- o The two-valued orientation of thinking inherent in "either/or" language and thought processes,

the problems of denotation and connotation in the meaning of words and other symbols, *etc.*

When one today reads Korzybski's book, published initially in 1933, after having first introduced one's self to some of the present state of knowledge about the human brain, one can be frequently astonished at Korzybski's insights regarding the seeming nature of human reasoning powers as expressed in his reflections on the likely mechanisms of the human brain. He speaks of neuro-semantic and neuro-linguistic mechanisms with often remarkable insights.

But he also holds out hope for curing deficiencies in human thought processes and resulting actions, which is optimistic without adequate grounding in facts of neural topography so-to-speak. Factual brain knowledge available now because of 50

intervening years of brain research which have transpired since 1933 should now give any one pause to expect wholesale transformations in man's behavior and his propensity for faulty reasoning. The fact is that each individual must tackle the problem as his own individual self improvement project. The benefit is that he can liberate himself from many of the hobgoblins which bedevil most people and gain control of his life in ways that must remain out of reach for those who don't realize how victimized they are by their own linguistic habits coupled with their inherent neural capacities.

There is irony in the historical fact that a lot of the work in epistemology, to include semantics, in the closing decades of the 19th Century and the opening decades of the 20th were driven by aspirations of creating the perfect language which would be fallacy free. This was a Utopian vision of a fault free linguistic scheme for communicating knowledge of any and all disciplines which man might devise.

Such visions of perfection are better understood now. There is now realization there are limits. There is now realization those limits appear to be hard-wired in the human brain. There are limits to man's being able to express himself without being misunderstood. And limits of his knowing and his knowledge.

The apparent facts may be that man is predisposed to self destruction because of his brain – or should we say in spite of his brain. Conceptually, there may be usefulness in efforts to analyze this apparent predisposition as being in the nature of an inherent positive feedback problem.⁵

Fallacies as partially cataloged by Fearnside and Holther in their book *Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument*, are distortions of language structure (syntax) along with distortions in the use of words to create misleading, irrelevant, nonsensical, or otherwise meaningless statements. The harm comes when such statements are accepted as verifiable or "true" statements of empirical fact and the like.

General semantics deals both with semantics (the problems inherent in word meanings) and with all aspects of the constructs of language (syntax) and all other identifiable linguistic problems inherent in humankind's employment of his verbal language as a symbolic logic scheme and all symbols and symbolic logic used by humankind.

Fallacies are an extensive subset of individual problems found within the subject field addressed by general semantics as envisioned by Korzybski and others who have followed his methodology and its offshoot disciplines.

⁵ Recall what is said about "control theory" of various engineering disciplines and the meaning of positive versus negative feedback as defined by engineers in solving their "real" world engineering problems.

Obviously, a great deal of humankind's communication endeavors are dedicated to fallacies for the very purpose of persuading individuals to specious arguments. The more is the irony that quite often the communicators are as ignorant, or only casually aware, they are speaking in fallacies as are the receivers of their messages.

From individual self illusions and self deceptions do both small and great illusions and deceptions spring forth and propagate upon the face of the earth. All because of inherent limitations in our languages and our brains functionality in processing our languages.

But the ideas and methodologies of general semantics provide means for the individual to become consciously aware of the communication challenge arising from these facts and to improve his performance in communications. Vastly improving one's skills in argument is certainly one example of the benefits of an honest personal exposure to this subject.

Another book which you are strongly encouraged to get and study is *Brain Power: Learn to Improve Your Thinking Skills* by Karl Albrecht, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1980). Albrecht does a splendid job of introducing the reader to improving his powers of critical thinking using the methodologies of general semantics which Korzybski so awesomely formulated coupled with understanding of how our brain's function as revealed by neurological science. This book is a must read.

As a final pass to Korzybski for now, consider these words about "democracy" stated in his 1939 *Introduction to the Second Edition of Science and Sanity* when Hitler was already overrunning parts of Europe:

"We argue so much today about 'democracy' versus 'totalitarianism.' Democracy presupposes intelligence of the masses; totalitarianism does not to the same degree. But a 'democracy' without intelligence of the masses under modern conditions can be a worse human mess than any dictatorship can be. Certainly present day education, while it may cram student's heads with some data, without giving them any adequate methodological synthesis and extensional working methods, does not train in 'intelligence' and how to become adjusted to life, and so does not work towards 'democracy.' Experiments show that even a root can learn a lesson (see p. 120), and animals can learn by trial and error. But we humans after these millions of years should have learned how to utilize the 'intelligence' which we supposedly have, with some predictability, etc., and use it constructively, not destructively, as, for example, the Nazis are doing under the guidance of specialists." *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics*, by Alfred Korzybski, page lxxv of the Second Introduction to the 1939 edition also by A. K., from the 1959 edition.

Neuroscientists today better understand man's intellectual dilemma.

The tragedy of mankind is that reptile/paleomammalian brains rule the world today as yesterday and their schemes are invariably structured in positive feedback ways implying their rulerships invariably lead to disaster.

The tragedy is exponentially compounded because their follies are augmented by the works of specialists in scientific and engineering disciplines whose respective science specialization and attendant technological endeavors require they preoccupy themselves within their neocortical brains producing tools, equipments, weapons and systems of all kinds, ironically dependent upon built in negative feedback loops for their reliable functionality; whereupon, these products of the scientists and engineers -- the fruits of their neocortical endeavors -- become the tools, toys and weapons of the reptile/paleomammalian brain-oriented rulers and their sponsors to be used for their reptilian/paleomammalian brain-oriented political and economic purposes.

<Here you may wish to use your pencil, pen, or crayon to draw a "happy face." If you have a yellow crayon or marker handy, you may also wish to "color" the face you have drawn.>

**BRIEF EXAMPLES OF USE OF
GENERAL SEMANTICS
IN COURT CASES**

A man appeared in a Florida county court hearing traffic court business to challenge his being charged with a municipal ordinance styled as "reckless driving." In the process of his challenge of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, he gets the judge to say the ordinance is being enforced on grounds it is "municipal policy."

The words "*municipal*" and "*policy*" are high level abstractions of a purely metaphysical origin. Each must be analyzed on its own merits for meaning as

metaphysical abstractions and, then analyzed on similar merits joined as the phrase “municipal policy.” In making the analysis it will be necessary to realize there is no possibility of pinpointing any “meaning” if the specific context of the use of the word is not clearly identified and established.

This means the individual must first put the question to the judge what he means by “*municipal*.” Said individual raising these questions should already have a comprehensive understanding of the political facts which must precede any sustainable presumption regarding the lawful existence of the judge’s municipal government, hence his presumption of any municipal authority and the presumption that the individual in court could be subject to this. The reasons must be obvious, namely, how can a questioner direct and focus his questions, thus ask well considered questions, if he doesn’t understand something of the context of the use of the words in his instant case? In this – a “traffic court case,” these are political and law fact subjects which are reviewed at length in the author’s Volume 1 of his *Travel as of Right* workshop materials.

Briefly it all comes to this:

In Florida, municipal charters are issued by the state legislature. But state legislators have no authority from the people to redelegate their legislative powers. This would a presumption of authority they can “clone” themselves. No constitutionally delegated “legislative officer” can redelegate his legislative powers. This is a fact of long standing pursuant to the people’s common law of agency. Likewise, neither can said delegates create executive or judicial offices for this would not only a violation of the common law of agency, but a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine – another cornerstone of our American scheme of governance. But when they created the charter, they also presumptively granted authority for a municipal legislative authority to create local ordinances. They don’t have any such authority. Therefore, the laws (ordinances) passed by that local body have no authority of law.

Further, they have no authority of law because they are not enacted in the manner prescribed by the state constitution in Article III, Section 6. Since the only powers and conditions of governing are those ordained by the people as evidenced by the Articles of their written state constitution, no municipal ordinance in the State of Florida has the authority of law on any holder of the inherent political power. Therefore, municipal ordinances are private laws, no differently than the by-laws of a corporation are private law. Are you subject to such municipal laws? Of course not. But, you can easily be connived into believing you are.

Therefore, on two separate grounds, the municipal ordinance is not law to which the person making the challenge could possibly be subject.

Firstly, because on no terms can a municipal legislative body have powers from the people to act as legislators.

to create judicial offices. And there are several other grounds which will not be pursued here.

Interestingly, there no longer are any “municipal courts” in Florida, and municipal ordinances are “heard” by county judges.

Appreciate when a “county judge” hears a matter regarding “municipal ordinances” he has no authority to hear and make rulings regarding the law because said ordinances can have no “force and effect of law.” All the individual has to do is properly make his challenge he is not subject to the jurisdiction of said private law.

Further, to this is the word “policy.” *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 6th edition defines the word in this context to mean “*The general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures.*” We could spend a while discussing the particular elements of this definition. For now the point will be simply made that a fundamental political principle of American governing authority is that there can be no law making or rule making which derogate or abrogate the rights of the citizen.⁶

So by his use of the phrase “*municipal policy*” as his explanation for his authority to proceed against the defendant, the judge has just admitted that there is no constitutional empowerment from the people in his instant proceedings, but rather he is proceeding in private capacity as a matter of the privately arrived at policies of the particular corporate creature of the state legislators, namely, that particular municipal government.

It means the defendant need only understand how to ask properly framed questions on the judge will have to admit the defendant isn’t a party subject to the charge of “reckless driving” as defined by that particular private municipal legislative body. This is the methodologies of general semantics in action.

This means there can be no presumptions of authority made merely in the name of “*municipal policy*” that a law not duly enacted pursuant to the express constitutional requirements set down by the people can be enforced against anyone or anything, much less one of those holding the inherent political power in the first place. It will also be important to realize the judge may very likely not fully understand what he has walked into. Few government officials nowadays really understand the nature of their official powers.

It is necessary to demand a full statement of facts proving this act of enforcement is indeed official “municipal policy.” The judge should be held to a full accounting of what

⁶ This point is made for the record by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U. S. 436 @ 491.
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It is necessary to demand a full statement of facts proving this act of enforcement is indeed official "municipal policy." The judge should be held to a full accounting of what he means by "municipal policy." At some point he will have to admit he talking "metaphysical flimflam" – the language of all "pretenders."

Further this entire challenge should be made with the additional notice and demand that the judge respond and account for his answers in good faith.

Another example brought to the author's attention, within days of the "municipal policy" example, was from a California citizen who related an episode in federal district court where the judge explained the court's decisions were usually based on "constitutional policies."

What was the judge saying? He was saying the express words of the federal constitution are to be interpreted by anyone and everyone in a public office. In the beginning it was considered to be the domain of the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret the "meaning" of the constitution as individual cases were presented to it.

But this semantic chestnut is simply one of the more enduring myths still mouthed by politicians, judges, and all the rest.

The truth is that no public official, to include no state or federal court including the U.S. Supreme Court, has power or authority to "interpret" the state or federal constitutions in ways that their currently fashionable opinions may dictate and as influenced by the currently fashionable political and economic agendas of America's self-appointed ruling classes.

We are now to a point where all sorts of governing liberties are taken in the name of "constitutional policy." Realize the term "public policy" is simply a code name for "constitutional policy." Why? Because all public authority arises from the constitution. If it is not granted by the people via their national political trust-deed, the U.S. Constitution (in this particular instance), then there is no public authority.

Every day, thousands of public officials and bureaucrats make decisions in the name of "public policy" which simply can't be implied or inferred from the text of the constitution. More especially when those policies violate the people's unalienable rights.

When an individual goes into a federal court, he must understand the points of his individual case and be able to argue them in terms of the limitations of any power granted by the people to the government in the first place. This is the political argument, which "they" never want to hear. He must understand how to make this argument. Why?

Because once he understands the political arguments and their primacy to all other arguments, then he will understand how to run arguments of "public policy" and "constitutional policy" to ground.

And how will he do this? He will do it by asking a series of questions which his adversary is constrained to answer on pain of failure to act with him in "good faith" where in doing so he is expressly noticed that he can neither hold silent on the question nor answer evasively. This is all the business of a working knowledge of man's brain functionality coupled with the methodologies offered in general semantics to include recognition of the many forms of fallacy.

CONCLUSION

You will find the insights provided by the general semanticists to the epistemological pitfalls of our languages and their methodologies for overcoming those pitfalls in your instant circumstances to make the difference between being just another victim of your own society/culture/civilization/nation versus being an empowered American citizen.

In this workshop we will pursue this subject further from the point of view of the "fallacy" concept.

CHAPTER 10

RECOGNIZING FALLACIES/ REBUTTING FALLACIES

“When a person cannot deceive himself the chances are against his being able to deceive other people.”

Mark Twain

“The purpose of this essay is ... an attempt to understand the times in which we live. One might think that a period which, in a space of fifty years uproots, enslaves, or kills seventy million human beings should be condemned out of hand. But its culpability must still be understood. In more ingenuous times, when the tyrant razed cities for his greater glory, when the slave chained to the conqueror’s chariot was dragged through the rejoicing streets, when enemies were thrown to the wild beasts in front of the assembled people, the mind did not reel before such unabashed crimes, and judgment remained unclouded. But slave camps under the flag of freedom, massacres justified by philanthropy or by the taste for the superhuman, in one sense cripple judgement. On the day when crime dons the apparel of innocence — through a curious transposition peculiar to our times — it is innocence that is called upon to justify itself.

A statement attributed to Albert Camus presented in the frontispiece to the book “The Manufacture of Madness (1970) by Thomas S. Szasz.

“What wrath of gods, or wicked influence
Of tears, conspiring wretched men t’ afflict,
Hath pour’d on earth this noxious pestilence.
That mortal minds doth inwardly infect
With love of blindness and of ignorance?”

From “Spencer’s Tears of the Muses as quoted in Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1857) by Charles Mackay.

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments will require the recognition of fallacies in argument, of which there are many forms, both in your arguments that you may guard against their unintended use and in the arguments of others that you may challenge the falsity in each of them and

each of them and by your rebuttal of them force your adversary to explain them. In explaining them, he will have to admit they are either nonsensical, irrelevant or otherwise have no bearing in support of the arguments he attempts to make in favor of his cause.

BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION

Whether in government, commerce or societal institution there is little activity in today's America which is not wholly dependent upon manipulators' illusions and deceptions practiced upon a host body of the manipulated. Linguistic and other symbolic fallacies serve as primary ways and means for fraudulent arguments. We fall victim to these devices through our linguistic illiteracy.

Through developing critical analysis skills we discover the messages which inundate us daily are almost exclusively nothing more than the practice of fallacy wherein fallacies have been characterized as the "tricks of persuasion."

We have reviewed subjects of which we should have active knowledge – meaning be able to actively employ in order to sufficiently develop our skills of recognizing and rebutting fallacies. These include:

- o The knowledge of our neural functionality such as the discoveries of neuroscience makes available,
- o The insights provided by general semantics regarding the structural limitations of our languages we must used to convey our thoughts,
- o The insights provided by understanding the nature and role of myth making such as certain members of the anthropological sciences are able to relate to us.

Recognizing fallacies in arguments is the key to dismembering your adversaries' arguments. At least if he uses them. And it would be difficult to imagine an occasion in the courtroom or elsewhere in the hallways and offices of governance when you might face an adversary who did not routinely practice the use of fallacies in his arguments.

With such insights we are aided in the mastery of the art of critically analyzing – dissecting so to speak -- every argument presented in order to reach the verifiable content of the argument. Literally to determine the truth content versus the fallacy content of an argument. And we can rebut the fallacy by forcing an explanation of the elements comprising the fallacy. If our adversary can offer nothing more than fallacy as grounds for his cause, then he must admit we are neither the subjects or the objects of his cause or that his cause has no merits – as the individual case may be.

Most endeavors in persuasion rely heavily or altogether on fallacies to succeed. By all appearances, most endeavors by one class of men to exercise dominion over their fellow men are wholly dependent upon fallacies in order to justify their rights of rulership – their authority.

Just as importantly, the myth maker/deceiver/rulers often come to believe their own ka-ka signifying they are functionally delusional either prior to or after entering their offices of rulership.

As an example, consider the story of King James I (1566-1625) first ruler of both England and Scotland and "a strong advocate of royal absolutism." He was the fellow who authorized a special revisionist version of the Christian Bible following the successes of the so-called Geneva Bible because that Bible focused upon the Christian's God as their only proper sovereign with no earthly king given adequate due as sovereign over men.

The King James Bible was specially drafted to redress this unacceptable deficiency, and the Geneva Bible became a treasonous document.

James so thoroughly believed in himself as the head of the government of Great Britain that he believed that if he were deposed the government itself would automatically collapse because "*it would have no head.*"

This is a great example of fallacy in action. The man promoted a semantic fallacy for self serving reasons, apparently actually believing the fallacy to be "true" by evidently confusing a figurative or metaphorical expression with a verifiably, physically existing, organic head of a verifiably, physically existing, organic body, The metaphysical "head and body" of "the State" existed only in consequence of the hyperactivity of that unique human gland – the human brain, yet was confused with the organic head and body verifiably existing in his external, "real" world.

If the psychiatric profession had existed then they might well have observed James was clinically delusional.

This same problem is as epidemic today as it ever was. Today it is the "corporation" which has "been enthroned" as Abraham Lincoln phrased it a few weeks before his fateful moment at Ford's Theater. Corporations, of course, are nothing more than metaphysical, a.k.a. fictional, creatures but now they control peoples' lives, liberty, and property. Corporations now have more "rights," thus get more respect than the nation's holders of the inherent political power. The peoples' fates are controlled by corporations. Corporations are the primary constituency of the now emerged Institutional Autocracy – our dictatorship. The idea of corporations is one of the major delusions undermining and destroying our present American civilization.

Adolph Hitler is another classical example. Analysis of writings and speeches by appropriately trained individuals in the neuroscience and epistemology evidence a man who confused metaphysical fancies with reality. Myth making running at flank speed. His speeches and writings are like semantic treasure troves of fallacy. The same can be said for any other of the world's past and present politicians/rulers.

Within the American scheme for governance, most governing authority is found to be fraudulent. Hence the difficulty for the political trustee when the political trustor comes forward asserting his right to challenge authority having no basis in verifiable political and law facts.

Never fail to keep in the forefront of your mind, in America the political facts are paramount to all law facts pertaining to presumptions of authority to govern. No law fact can be produced as sustainable evidence of authority if it cannot meet the test of the political facts unique to the American republican form of government firstly. Americans political trustees have become so "fat, dumb, and happy" feeding off their host American body politics that they themselves can no longer distinguish between their illusions and deceptions of governing authority versus the limitations of their public trusts.

Should it be so difficult to unseat them when they presume to exercise unwarranted authority in our individual cases? Not if we are able to identify and rebut their fallacies.

STUDY MATERIALS IN FALLACY

The books which address general semantics are themselves study materials in the subject of fallacies. They also provide keys and methodologies for recognizing, deciphering, and exposing fallacies. Therefore, they are necessary study materials. In addition the author is aware of two other study material sources to which you should get access, namely:

- o *Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument*, by W. Howard Fernside and William B. Holther (1959) hereinafter to be referenced as F and H. This is an introductory catalog of types of fallacies.¹ You are urged to get a copy of this book and study it carefully.

- o *Mission: Critical*. This is a course, apparently authored by David Mesher and offered for credit at San Jose State University. From the course outline it is evident this material addresses a number of major forms of fallacies and addresses them often using some of the terminology of the general semanticists. See Appendix IV for a copy of the home site and main menu pages.

¹ You are reminded this book is no longer in print, but you may obtain a reprint copy from the author for \$20.00.

THE MANY FACES OF GENERALITIES AND ALL MANNER OF FALLACIES

Regarding the linguistic, hence neural processing, pitfalls inherent in generalities and the inescapable presence of generalities in all our endeavors beginning with our receiving and processing our sensory inputs from our inside and outside worlds, and then by our neocortex brain's processing the inputs for comprehension of the meaning of those inputs to what-ever degree to include our efforts to communicate our thoughts regarding those inputs, consider the following excerpt from Korzybski's *Science and Sanity* taken from the first chapter:

"The present enquiry is limited and partial, but because it deals with linguistic and semantic issues and their *physiological* and psycho-logical aspects, it is, as far as it goes, *unusually general*. I found that, in writing, it is extremely difficult and impractical always to state explicitly the limitations of the statement. It seems most practical to say here that, in general, *all statements here made are limited* by further considerations of the actualities of an analyzed problem.

"Thus for instance, a 'theory of sanity' deals with the most important semantic issues from limited semantic aspects, and has nothing to do with forms of 'insanity' arising from different organic, or toxic, or other disturbances, which remain as serious as ever. The statements made cover just as much as further investigations will allow them to cover — and no more.

"The reader should be warned against undue generalizations, as they may be unjustified. It is impossible, at this stage, to foresee all the ramifications of the present work. The verbal issues, which correspond roughly to the older 'mental' issues, seem to pervade all *human* problems to some extent, and so the field of application and influence of any such inquiry must be very large. Most of the results of the present work involve factors of unusual security of conclusion, though they may violate canons of our 'philosophical' creeds.

"The explanation is astonishingly simple and easily verified. The present non-aristotelian system is based on fundamental *negative* premises; namely, the complete denial of 'identity', which denial *cannot be denied* without imposing the burden of impossible proof on the person who denies the denial. If we start, for instance, with a statement that 'a word is *not* the object spoken about', and some one tries to deny that, he would have to produce an actual physical object which would *be the word*, -- impossible of performance, even in asylums for the 'mentally' ill. Hence my security, often 'blasphemously cheerful', as one of my friends calls it.

"This general denial of the 'is' of identity gives the main fundamental non-aristotelian premise, which necessitates a structural

treatment. The status of negative premises is much more important and secure to start with than those of the positive 'is' of identity, found in the aristotelian system, but easily shown to be false to fact, and involving important delusional factors." *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics*, Alfred Korzybski, The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Co., 4th Edition, 1958, pages 10 and 11.

Appreciate "insanity" can have organic and clinical basis; neuroscience addresses this form. So much more is understood now about how "insanity" arising from neurochemical and other organic causes.

But "insanity" can also have a functional origin, notwithstanding functional insanity can eventually also result in organically recognizable "insanity" because of the astonishing feedback mechanisms of the human brain — so-called psychosomatic illnesses and the like. Much of the "insanity" of functional origin has its roots in the inherent structural limitations of man's "universal language" and associated neural processing mechanisms of his brain in combination with the limitations of his logic symbology systems — his language tools which limitations arise because of the limitations of his "universal language" neural mechanisms compounded with his conscious and unconscious misuse of his language tools.

General semantics addresses the epistemological/semantics factors contributing to man's self-inflicted functional "insanity." There is no "silver bullet," all encompassing remedy to this problem. Instead, there is the prospect that each individual may enlighten himself regarding this business to sufficient degree that he has more control over himself, his circumstances, and, thus, his prospects for survival and prospering than that which his less informed fellow man may have.

There is nothing inherently superior in this knowledge making the individual who has and uses it superior to his fellow in any moral or ethical sense. Rather the individual will have the potential for being able to sustain himself on principles which may be said to have a moral and ethical basis.

If one learns nothing else from general semantics which will be greatly augmented by understanding the organizational/structural features of the human brain and related, it is that notions of the need for recreating man as a "value-free" creature is absurd, impossible, and delusional in the extreme.

What a pity that the "value-free" fantasy is precisely the state-of-mind and the objective goal of America's present torch bearers of knowledge, most politically aspiring puds, corporate heads, government bureaucracies, and every American institution presuming to serve the public, *ad nauseum*. This fantasy is now wholly embraced and reflected through all the halls of the academic world, the public and private corporate

world, and every other institution having any kind of purse whatever to pursue its self-deluded mission. Such is the current state of our American civilization.

Man is in the business of manufacturing madness as Thomas S. Szasz describes it. From his discipline, he is a psychiatrist by training, he has written a number of books. His book *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement*² takes to task the entire psychiatry profession, pointing out the follies and inconsistencies in their presumptions they have the knowledge necessary to cure the ills of man's mind paving the way for a world safe from madmen.

The functional disorders of man's mind are no nearer resolution in the hands of psychiatrists than if they were in any other "experts" hands. Understanding this is not possible without some understanding of the neural organization and limitations of the human brain and the many considerations which follow in consequence. Those considerations can be glimpsed by a thoughtful introduction to epistemological/semantic/general semantic considerations. Such considerations can provide an organizing format for personal success in comprehending the world of man in order to improve one's chances of surviving and prospering in that world.

Consider these comments from Thomas Szasz providing the reader with example of the degenerated state of the psychiatric profession :

"Although many psychiatrists have implied that the aim of psychiatry should be to replace morality by an ostensibly value-free mental health technology, G. Brock Chisholm, former director-general of medical services of the Canadian army, former head of the World Federation of Mental Health, and former director of the World Health Organization, has stated this so clearly and directly that his words deserve to be quoted. "The only lowest common denominator of all civilizations,' Chisholm asserts, "... is morality, the concept of right and wrong, the position long ago described and warned against as the 'fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.'" This concept, he believes, must be psychiatrically destroyed: 'The reinterpretation and eventual eradication of the concept of right and wrong ... are the belated objectives of practically all effective psychotherapy.' Incredible? Chisholm can't mean it? His conclusions and recommendations should leave the reader in no doubt about how deadly in earnest he is. 'If the race is to be freed from its crippling burden of good and evil,' Chisholm continues, 'it must be psychiatrists who take the original responsibility. This is the challenge which must be met.' His conclusion is: "With the other human sciences, psychiatry must now decide what is to be the immediate future of the human race. No one else can.

² *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement*, Thomas S. Szasz, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, N.Y., 1970.

And this is the prime responsibility of psychiatry.” *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement*, Thomas S. Szasz, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, N.Y., 1970, page 221.

Again, for your information, many other disciplines representing the academic community have taken up the same primary mission for their calling, each seeing their discipline as having “original responsibility” to eliminate all contextually meaningful concepts of morality, ethics and the like to be replaced by a value-free community of man. Because their vision of “value free” is without reference to any contexts, they each merely restate anew the nihilist notions.³ Consequently, the now dominating politically correct agenda and promotion of a “value free society” is simply another expression of mass linguistic illiteracy even in academic ranks and, *prima facie*, it is a fantasy sustainable only in virtual worlds.

That “value-free” ideas or any other ideas without highly specific contexts wherein they are used are simply meaningless nonsense becomes apparent with an appropriate understanding of the epistemological nature of these notional hang-ups. The methodologies offered by general semantics provides a means for analyzing these instances of misuse of the language. The importance of learning to recognize these misuses is to avoid becoming a victim of the nonsensical arguments. Trying to make sense of such arguments requires an unsane orientation to the real world. The risk of such intellectual posture, is that pressed hard enough one becomes at minimum neurotic, and at worse psychotic.

A study of general semantics will enable the student to see the inherent absurdities and impossibilities of this now all consuming delusion of the present age of man: the idea of a world in which everyone functions value free. The current mad vision of Utopia.

A PARTIAL REVIEW OF FALLACIES

A review of the partial catalog of “fallacies” provided to us by F and H is a useful starting point in our coming “up to speed” in recognizing fallacies in our arguments and those of all others with whom we deal. It simply isn’t possible to “win an argument” except by accident when one doesn’t comprehend the infinitude of “transmissions errors” embedded in his dialogs both within and without his own head, wherein these errors include the knowing and unknowing communication of fallacies and other forms of linguistic nonsense.

³ For an important introduction to this tragic fact, you must read *The Closing of the American Mind” How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students*, Alan Bloom, Simon and Schuster, New York, N.Y., 1987.

The remainder of this chapter is organized using some of the topical organization F and H used in *Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument* if for no other reason than to provide you an opportunity to review those particular varieties of "fallacy" by studying them in parallel.

But, from the outset do understand your reading and understanding of the semantic points made in *People in Quandaries* by Wendell Johnson will immeasurably augment your ability to recognize, decipher and rebut fallacies.

F & H divide their discussion of fallacies into three major classifications which are then addressed in Parts I through Part III of their book. Their explanation for this will not be repeated here, but do understand it. Their classification runs as" Part I, "material fallacies;" Part II, "psychological fallacies;" and Part III, "logical fallacies." The below listings numbered "1" through "12," are found similarly listed and named in their Part I.

1. FAULTY GENERALIZATIONS

F and H give an entertaining and insightful overview to the business of faulty generalizations. They appropriately make the point that in the daily affairs of their lives people operate continuously from statements of generalizations and many of their decisions come out well for them. Obviously more goes on at the unspoken level in making daily decisions of living which compensates for the absurdities of the verbally declared generalities.

But when it comes to issues where the outcome will depend upon running the generalities to ground, there is no room for allowing the generality to go unchallenged or unanswered. Such is the case with any adversarial proceeding. The generality must be objected to and the one making the generality must be required to explain his meaning. With generalities people are manipulated. Those who do not recognize the faults inherent in the generality stand to come to harm because of their acceptance of the generality on its face.

This is a major subject of general semantics and much insight can be gained regarding the problem of generalities by a study of that subject.

Generalities are a major feature of courtroom proceedings as elsewhere in our daily lives. They are employed by attorneys for their clients and by the judge. You must become conscious of generalities of their various manifestations to the point that you instinctively rise to challenge them. Skills in argument are honed on the unmasking and destroying of generalities.

When a judge says this court has subject-matter jurisdiction because it is granted by some statute-or-other which he then names or because it is granted by the state constitution, that is a generality until proven otherwise. It is up to you to know what kind

of case you have been summoned to appear in and whether you could possibly be a person falling within the class of persons who are subject to the law allegedly violated. Upon your knowledge you frame your challenge of his generality. And thus, your challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction when it is applicable.

Those who formulate, expound, and pontificate in the pseudo Science of Jurisprudence are well aware of this feature of subject-matter jurisdiction. They have long ago coined a phrase for this issue. It is the term *jurisdictional prerequisite*. Interestingly, it is not included in *Black's Law Dictionary*. However, you will find it in *Words and Phrases*. You will find it sprinkled all through law texts, cases in reporters, various provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code – which is the title addressing judicial issues in the federal court system, *etc.* This is one of the subjects discussed in the author's 3-volume *Travel as of Right* workshop materials.

As another example, federal district courts are granted authority by Congress to hear cases charging citizens with violating federal crime statutes by an act which is evidenced by Section 3231 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Those in the know describe this as a “general jurisdiction” statute. If an individual challenges subject-matter jurisdiction when charged with a federal crime, but instead of being cited the federal statute naming the crime he is merely cited 18 U.S.C. § 3231, this is a faulty generalization. Why? Because 18 U.S.C. § 3231 is merely a statement of general authority to hear and make rulings in matters of federal crimes, but no statute naming a federal crime has been named. Averment of a statute naming the crime allegedly committed is described as a jurisdictional prerequisite without which the court cannot establish it has subject-matter jurisdiction in that specific case.

Without adequately stated averments of the jurisdictional prerequisites, the claims of any court that it has subject-matter jurisdiction are generalities just for openers. Do you see the challenge you face in making successful challenges of subject-matter jurisdiction if you fail to understand these matters?

You must understand many things regarding dialog between man and man, if you desire outcomes which meet your expectations. And without doubt your expectations must themselves meet rational criteria which can only be arrived at by understanding the dialog between yourself and your self and the rest of mankind given the limitations of knowing from the outset.

All citizens are not subject to appear in a given court of their state merely because of some statement oral or written seemingly declaring that all persons are. Law is filled with statements which may even appear to be specific, but which are generalities. It is part of the shell game of law.

In the courtroom, one should learn to appreciate when the judge, the prosecutor, or whomever uses a generality and, thus, be able to expose it as fallacy. It is in just this

manner that the credibility of such persons may be damaged or destroyed. Lawyers, if they are well trained play this game successfully often without fully understanding the whole game themselves even. Typically, they are more like bulldogs, but effective even as bulldogs because they understand enough about the business of fallacies, semantics, etc. that they are able to outgun their less informed adversaries. Such is the human equation expressed daily everywhere man engages with himself and with his others.

2. FAULTY CAUSAL GENERALIZATION

This common form of fallacy involves a sequence of two or more statements, each involving generalities in themselves, and each of which statements are presumed to be associated with the same class of event or activity, when the presumptions are actually unfounded, that is in error because they are not always "true." From these erroneous presumptions there follows a concluding statement made on grounds it must follow from the preceding statements.

This is the "if" statements situation followed by "then" statements. The conclusion is "false," because the facts comprising the conclusion do not follow if the unspoken presumptions inferred as the facts of the preceding "if" statements are not factually related after all. This is another very common fallacy practiced in courtrooms and elsewhere in man's religious and secular arenas.

3. ASSUMING THE CAUSE: "POST HOC REASONING"

F and H translate the Latin phrase "*post hoc*" in case you didn't take Latin or have a Latin/English dictionary handy. It means "after this." *Post hoc* reasoning is a form of fallacy in which statements are made which are not proved, or verified in themselves and from these statements conclusions are made that a certain result or condition may be or actually is established as verifiable fact. In truth, nothing has been verifiably established because of any number of assumed, unaccounted for, and unproved variables existing in the statements leading to the conclusionary statement.

Keep in mind everything being said here and elsewhere about conclusionary statements made from incomplete, unverified, irrelevant, and nonsensical statements intended to be in support of the conclusion is the very quintessence of what we witness typically in courtrooms.

How can anyone effectively deal with the nonsense spewing from the mouth or "pen" of a judge, or a prosecutor, and the like when the individual really has no comprehension of the forms of fallacy and their significance to his circumstances whether in the courtroom or elsewhere? This problem is practically impossible to overcome if one is a linguistic illiterate. Why? Because he is unequipped to see the fallacies in the arguments. And neither is he equipped to counter those fallacies.

4. FAULTY ANALOGY

Analogies, to include the use of metaphors, and such are commonly employed to arrive at the desired conclusion, but the problems inherent in attempting to think and communicate in abstractions is compounded when using analogies because one abstraction is allowed to stand in for another abstraction as though they are the "same." The business of abstracting and dealing in abstractions is a major subject in "general semantics" and requires in depth comprehension in order to understand the problems inherent in using abstractions, hence the problems inherent in reasoning and communications.

Legal sophisticators shamelessly and intentionally employ faulty analogies, metaphors, and the like in constructing their law schemes as do the lawyers and judges intent on prosecuting those caught in the web of those schemes. Ditto for many other forms of fallacy.

5. COMPOSITION AND DIVISION

F and H include under the heading of faulty "composition and division" describe the business of "stereotyping." Stereotyping is described as the "fallacy of composition" where an individual or thing is presumed to be a member of a certain "class of persons" or things. The establishing of a "class" itself being expression of a high level of abstraction, unconnected to verifiability in the real world, but then because the individual or thing is presumed to be in that "class" they are presumed to have all the "attributes" that have been arbitrarily and virtually assigned to that class. Their "fallacy of division" is a form in which an assumption is made that what is true of the entire class is true for each alone or in some other way what is true for the "whole" must be true in proportion as one divides or separates the "whole" into "parts" or presumes in some way a subdivision of the whole.

Again, general semantics deals with this in terms of understanding the levels of abstractions to include the self reflexive, multiordinality and context problems inherent in presuming anyone or anything belongs to any metaphysically created "class." Individuals who do not understand this epistemological problem are forever hung up on trying to nail down "law definitions" which simply can't be nailed down because out of context they are linguistically meaningless — hence, they are meaningless as legal arguments.

6. ALL OR NOTHING

The all-or-nothing conundrum lies at the very core of what the general semanticists describe as the problem of the Aristotelian system of logic, reasoning, thinking, etc. It is the everything must be either "black" or "white," "for" or "against," "true," or "false," etc. Either you believe in Almighty God or you don't believe in Almighty God. Either you obey the law, or you don't obey the law.... *ad infinitum, ad nauseum*. This business appears deeply embedded in man's linguistic machinery. It is the cause of much unsanity as the general semanticists style it, or neurosis and psychosis as the psychological and

psychiatry "sciences" style behavior often resulting from indulgence in such linguistic orientation.

It is what the "general semanticist" call the "two-valued system." It is a major linguistic/language device for creating illusions and deceptions regarding the relationship of things existing in the real world and man's metaphysical worlds and, thus, a major factor in man's propensity to think and act in delusional ways. It is the high road and the low road to unsanity with the possibility of a side trip to insanity if the journey is pressed to hard.

It is possible that this tendency of language is an inherent factor in man's "universal language" mechanisms and related which neuroscientists have discovered.

Ditto for the business of creating and "operating" with "abstractions" and the problems inherent therein."

Understanding this problem and consciously dealing with it assuredly gives an individual an "unfair" advantage over those who don't realize it exists, much less that they employ it without understanding how it limits their problem solving powers and their prospects for persuasively arguing their causes.

7. THE FALSE DILEMMA

This is of course a major tool of manipulation. Two statements are made which raise a dilemma no matter what the outcome. But the dilemma proves to be false because one or both statements contain a premise or a presumption that will not hold upon analyzing it for verifiability. The general semanticist will recognize the nonsense inherent in the statements of the dilemma if in fact it is a false dilemma.

8. FAULTY CLASSIFICATION

F and H give an interesting introduction to this form of fallacy, but much more deserves to be said. In politics and law and everywhere else in man's daily life faulty classifications of people and things are common practice. Recognizing the limits of ordering things in classes, recognizing that each verifiably observable object is actually unique with respect to space and time is not simply nit-picking. The ability of the individual as observer (and whatever other roles in which he is obliged to engage) to best recognize the possibilities and circumstances of his situation at any given moment will be greatest because of consciousness that classifying things as being the same when they are not will lead to all manner of error in his actions to his often disadvantage.

When adversaries do this in the courtroom, the linguistic illiterate will be swept away by virtual nonsense based on purely arbitrary classifying schemes which have no

basis in reality. Being accused of being classified as a “taxpayer” by the IRS, for example, when no revenue statute is in evidence naming the subject or object of a taxable activity, hence naming nothing upon which a tax may be levied.

9. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CLASSIFICATION

Under the heading of “misconceptions about classification,” F and H review two subcategories after introductory comments including the statement: “*Classifications are expounded in general terms, the so-called universals.*” This business of attempting to create order through conceptualization of persons, things, and ideas at some higher level of abstraction considered as the level of a “universal” meaning for the class is a common feature and fallacy of many philosophic/metaphysical endeavors and enterprises. The law is full of this kind of thing as are all man’s other metaphysical endeavors whether in his religious or secular arenas.

The problems inherent in creating universal classifications is in failure to understand that abstractions, especially the higher they go, have no meaning once separated from verifiable contexts. Their meanings are presumed to be meaningful only through linguistic confusion brought on by failure to recognize abstractions are self-reflexive and multiordinal and can easily spin into context free nonsense.

Such is the virtual orbit of the “politically correct” so-called “value free society” idea so popular now. Those who profess to understand this concept and promote it fail to recognize they speak nonsense. They fail to know they are insane. Their arguments for a “value free society” are easily rebutted by any linguistic literate.

The two subcategories addressed by F and H in this regard are known by the labels reification and relativism.

9.a. Reification

“Reification” is described by F and H as a form of fallacy in which presumptions that things “named” or “labeled” must exist simply because they are named or labeled. Or that simply because someone has conceived of an idea and given it a name or label, therefore, it exists, etc. Or what is the same thing, the mind comes to classify it as existing, notwithstanding there has been no error loop verification testing in any meaningful, context-based way.

In law, doctrines, theories, principles, definitions, etc. are created in just this way. Then having been conceived they are presumptively validated as law facts when no real world verification is possible or even any virtual world justification other than the will of those who make the law as they see fit.

This linguistic fallacy is a common feature of myth manufacture, of law, of religion, of economics, of you-name-it. Yet any linguistic literate can see the fallacies in the indulgent form of human behavior. Merely because there is a word for something, or an idea is conceived and the conceiver is able to verbalize his idea, this is no basis for presuming existence of the verbalized thing or concept in the real world.

9.b Relativism – The Idea That Truth is a Matter of Personal Opinion

Fernside and Holther observe about their book *Fallacy” The Counterfeit of Reason* that if it has a general thesis “*it is that nobody is entitled to an irresponsible opinion on anything.*” This is a statement of the relativism fallacy which proposes that each individual has a right to his own opinion about what is true or false, or somewhere in between on any subject or issue. With an appropriate introduction to the methodological considerations such as general semantics can offer regarding the limits of use of language and symbols to understand and convey meaning and, thus “know” the “truth” about anything, one can see the self destruction inherent in entertaining this fallacy.

Relativism fallacies are rampant now. They arise from linguistic confusions arising from failure to realize that words have significant meaning only when used in a specific context-of-the-moment. Real world contexts are the only ones which justify assignment of value to subjects or objects which exist in the real world. Having an understanding that everything in the real world is connected in some way and has some significance in relation to everything else, it follows that everything has value relative to everything else, but only if there is a context for the meaning. Only if there is an actual event involving the application of the meaning. For otherwise, determining the “truth” value in the subject simply becomes nonsensical. In the middle ages of Europe, learned monks and other clerics would argue for hours regarding how many angels could stand on the head of a pin. There were arguments about how many teeth were in the jaw of a donkey. The arguments could be solved by inspecting the jaws of donkeys, but this method was frowned on in the “intellectual” circles where the debates raged. Do not suppose that things have changed much since then.

The notion that the meaning of things can be considered outside of any real context, thus is relative, is so much crap. But the modern world turns on more of this stuff than did the Western world of a few hundred years ago.

This is a major issue and hang-up of the nihilistic-minded who confuse metaphysically conjured things existing only in virtual worlds with things existing in the real world and then make comparisons regarding the value of these things. Truth has meaning only as it is verifiable in some way. “Truth” doesn’t exist in its own right. It is nonsensical to argue that “truth” is a matter of personal opinion without reference to facts related to some specific subject or object.

The significance of “truth” in anything is in the verifiability of facts pertaining to some subject or object either observable in the real world, or metaphysically existing in some virtual world of man – the Science of Jurisprudence, for example. Once specific facts are being addressed related to a specific subject or object, then more than mere personal opinion can be settled upon.

Individuals through communication, which is to say argument, can be committed to mutually agreeing to existence of at least some facts and the value of those facts pertaining to some subject or object by being compelled to “prove” their facts in some significant, which is to say contextual, manner. If the facts are metaphysical in origin, then someone must be able to show his metaphysical fact is paramount to the facts of opposing parties. In such manner a “truth” may be settled upon.

Whereupon, there is a resolution of the issue. And the issue of everyone having a right to his own personal opinion is dispensed with, at least for purposes of resolving the issue at hand -- a ruling for example in a court case.

The idea that “everyone is entitled to his own opinion” is nonsensical once properly understood to be nothing more than a mere high-level abstraction floating in virtual space for want of a specific context.

10. UNNECESSARY VAGUENESS

F and H give several examples to illustrate the fallacy of unnecessary vagueness. They should be carefully reviewed, but they do not begin to provide the degree of focus on this issue which use of the methodological tools of general semantics can offer. The individual familiar with the linguistic difficulties inherent in language and having a working knowledge of word and statement analysis as can be had using general semantics will recognize statements which lack specificity, hence are too vague to contribute anything to a meaningful argument.

“Unnecessary vagueness” is a common occurrence where individuals are charged with certain types of statutorily defined crimes, more especially when they are found in bodies of administrative law -- a prime example being traffic regulatory laws.

Such charges generally consist of averments containing nothing more than a recital of the statute number and its title or other words similar to the descriptive words of the title. Charges consisting of nothing more than this provide no specific facts as averments which can justify the making of the charges and are grounds for dismissal which will result in dismissal if argued by a defendant who is linguistically literate.

Regrettably most of the citizenry are not up to the task. For this reason, hundreds of thousands of such “unnecessarily vague” charges are brought into courtrooms across America every year and prosecuted without a hitch.

11. OVER-PRECISION: "LOGIC CHOPPING"

The "class" of fallacy F & H describe under the heading of "over-precision: logic chopping" is another example of words that are high level abstractions, hence actually meaningless, unless directly associated with a very express context in which such words are being used.

General semanticists understand how to evaluate these words giving them their due as figurative or poetic license devices, but recognizing they can't be given any significant amount of verification in the real world. This kind of semantics understanding is most important when such words are being used as part of an adversary's argument in a judicial matter and the like.

Recognizing the use of such words enables the linguistic literate to object to them, that is challenge or rebut them, and put the adversary in the position of having to explain them.

The problem of explanation will be insurmountable when the words are linguistically beyond any rational definition within the context of the case at hand.

The so-called "soft" sciences, such as political science, economics, psychology, sociology, the "science of jurisprudence," etc. are built on concepts, that is principles, theories, and the like which depend on these kind of words. It is one of the reasons why the linguistic literate can without too much difficulty rebut arguments which are built on arguments from various schools which address subjects within the "soft" sciences.

12 WORD MAGIC

What F & H describe as the "word magic" fallacy is but another expression of the linguistic problem long recognized by epistemology as the tendency for man to conjure in his mind a sense that an entity must exist if the word or phrase exists. F and H call this "hypostatization of entities_ -- an insightful characterization.

A prime example in politics and law is the use of the phrase "the state." There is a common tendency to think of "the state" as some god-head figure of authority when in fact it's only proper political meaning in American political doctrine is that it means the "body politic" said to constitute or be consisting of the "people."

Take notice the phrase "body politic" and "the people" and the word "people" are often confused this way also.

Thus the political "phrase of art," "State of Florida" means the people who are the holders of the inherent political power of a geographic region described as "Florida."

In turn, their state government, which they are said to have created, is merely “styled” as the State of Florida. By the process of “word magic,” if we use that label to describe the fallacy, many individuals confuse the state government as being the State of Florida and also confuse it as being some kind of god-head figure of authority. The phrase “reification” as fallacy is just as applicable here.

The linguistic literate immediately recognizes such fallacy and does not confuse himself regarding the meaning of the phrase “State of Florida.” Least of all does he confuse himself that the “state government” “is” the “State or Florida” or that it has some sort of metaphysically conjured existence as the source of governing powers and authority over the people.

Rather the linguistic literate who is also politically literate knows that the powers of state governance exist only within individual offices created by virtue of the powers and authorities of the people themselves to represent the people in matters expressly defined in that office by delegation from the people.

In other words the linguistic and political literate knows that the individual state citizen delegated by the people to serve them in an expressly defined state office serves the people as a political trustee while performing the duties of the office and that the people he serves are his political trustors.

Take notice of the several excellent examples of the “word magic” fallacy reviewed by F & H.

**13-39 EMOTIVE LANGUAGE: “COLORED WORDS” (13) through
ABANDONMENT OF DISCUSSION (39) – wherein all these are classified as the
“PSYCHOLOGICAL FALLACIES” by F & H**

The second categorization of fallacies named by F & H, they label as psychological fallacies. This is Part II of their book. Each of the sub-categorizations under this heading merits a full and careful review. Their insights will be immeasurably enhanced by a meaningful working knowledge of the linguistic methodologies offered by the general semanticists for comprehending the limitations and hazards we deal with in using our language to communicate, understand, and “know.”

A couple of examples will be touched on by way of appreciation of how the linguistic literate is able to deal with such fallacies.

By way of the first example, consider the following:

If you are old enough you will recall the Senator Joe McCarthy “witch hunt” days of the early 1950s. When individuals from the entertainment industry and federal

government offices to include the military departments were accused of being "communists." Many careers were ruined, but he was never able to "prove" a single case, and in the end the Senate itself censured him.

But the point to be made here is the word "communist" is a "colored word" — a label evoking emotional responses in many individuals who are programmed to react to the word in one way or another. The linguistic literate understands this word is a high level abstraction having no possible significant meaning if not used in a highly specific context. What is the significance of this point?

It means that the surest way to defend against an attack of accusations of being a "communist" is to ask the accuser a series of well crafted questions focused on getting him to explain what he means by "communist."

The more the individual understands about the arguments of those claiming to profess the "communist" faith and those who profess to abhor "communism," the better focused will be his series of questions. It will invariably develop that the accuser is "full of hot air" meaning he doesn't have a well developed understanding of his own charges.

A review of the history of "communism" from the original "teachings" of Marx and Engels to the present will reveal that "communists" can't even agree on what communism "is."

Further, the more contextual granularity one "reaches for" by forcing the accuser to descend back down the "ladder of abstraction" in order to explain what he thinks he "means," the more one realizes that what one individual thinks is "communism," another thinks is "socialism," and another thinks is "democracy." If this sounds far fetched, take time to seriously review this subject. Further to this particular on-going comedy, it is now "politically correct" to promote the idea that "communism" is dead having been vanquished by "capitalism." What nonsense!

Another example of this sort of psychological fallacy is found in the propaganda generated by the IRS labeling individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because they believe they don't have to as "tax protestors." If a revenue law naming the subject or object of a taxable activity can be produced to justify using the label, that is one thing.

But, if no such revenue law exists, that is another. It happens that there are few federal "income tax" types of taxable activities and no privilege, activity, event, or the like can be said to be subject to a federal income tax if the U.S. Congress has not enacted a federal revenue law naming said privilege, activity, event as one which the Congress has authority to tax. It happens that "income" is never the subject or object of a federal revenue law, but rather it is the measure of a tax where one is applicable. Never is one applicable if an individual has not engaged in a privilege, activity, or event which Congress has shown it's legislative intent to tax by enactment of a federal revenue law. This is a

classic example of the use of work trickery to deceive the citizenry. Only a small part of the nation's population understand that "income" no matter how defined or described is never the subject of a tax. There is obviously much more to this subject, but the object here is simply to show an important example of fallacy in action and the importance of every citizen being a linguistic literate.

Using word labeling to influence the citizenry while avoiding the real issues, the IRS propagandists use the label "tax protestor" to describe individuals who do not file 1040 tax returns without ever raising the issue that no enacted revenue law could have been produced to show a privilege, activity, or event in which these "tax protestors" engaged during the "tax year" in the first place. Few such individuals, in turn, actually know how to defend themselves against such charges when "push comes to shove."

An extensive propaganda about the necessity of "income taxes" in order to maintain our "American civilization," and the like, are promoted in all the media channels, but at no time do the propagandists ever show or discuss any revenue law actually identifying a taxable activity which accused "tax protestors" have violated..

So how does a linguistic literate accused of being a "tax protestor" and charged by an indictment with criminal tax evasion, defend himself?

The only way is to go is to the very words used to label him and begin by asking the prosecution's "witnesses" to explain what a "tax protestor" is. Similarly for what a "tax payer" is.

If the accused understands the arguments of his accusers, he will be able to ask questions which compel the "government's" "witnesses" to descend the "ladder of abstractions" until they reaches a contextual point where it is clear there is no basis for the label because there is no revenue law which can be produced naming an activity which Congress intends to be taxed.⁴ At that point the witnesses reveal to the jury and the court there is no legal reason, a.k.a. basis in law, for calling the accused a "tax protestor."

As another example, consider for a moment the fallacy which F & H label as "Lip Service" – numbered as "27" in their book.

They use as an example the linguistic problems, hence political absurdities, of the self-styled communists relating to the fact that "[T]he principles of orthodox Marxism

⁴ In the year 2000, the author will publish his book, *The American Pox: A Nation's Income Tax Scheme* in which the tragic fraud of the income tax scheme is explained. In addition, he will publish a workshop for individuals interested in challenging IRS presumptions they are "tax payers" to include setting up a "good faith" affirmative defense in the absence of IRS failure to produce, in good faith, a revenue law naming the taxable activity to which the individual is allegedly subject. This workshop will also address how to set up a "good faith" defense which will put the government's case in jeopardy if one is fraudulently charged with "willful failure to file" in a criminal indictment.

have been so enshrined in the Soviet Union that Lenin and his successors have constantly made obeisance to Marx even though departing widely from his notions." What could be more obvious to any linguistic literate who is also a student of this history and is familiar with the "journey of the proletariat workers." Communism like all the other 19th and 20th Century "isms" has been just so much metaphysical musings designed to persuade individuals to political causes which are purely virtual, hence totally illusional and delusional.

F & H then give another example which strikes to our very hearts when they say "In America, almost every group renders homage to the ideals of the U.S. Constitution, although it is quite clear that neither the communist, neo-fascist, nor superpatriot elements actually uphold the civil liberties essential to the plan of government which the Constitution provides."

How true. And much more could be said. Is there any public official, local, state, or federal, who does more than pay "lip service" to our written state and federal constitutions? Damn few. Are there any who really know or care anything about those constitutions? Damn few.

Does this mean that the peoples' constitutions are dead and that public servants can do anything they like pursuant to labels such as "constitutional policy," "public policy," "the common good," etc.? No. But, only a linguistic literate who is also a political and law literate will be able to force accountability in his individual case, when public servants walk on his unalienable rights, etc.

Again everyone of the types of fallacy reviewed by F & H under Part II of their book must be thoroughly reflected upon. These are primarily of the sort which are categorized in the *Mission: Critical* materials (see Appendix IV) under the heading of "Fallacies and Non-Rational Persuasions" to include the various forms of "appeals," to include appeals to authority, common practice, common belief, wishful thinking, fear, pity, spite, loyalty, prejudice, vanity and the like.

Not lastly, consider the "abandonment of discussion" fallacy described at number 39. Recognize the frequency of this tactic in the courtroom and elsewhere. This is the silence issue.

When a judge dismisses all comment to your questions, he is holding silent. No differently than when he answers evasively, the linguistic literate can make short work of such behavior.

The surest way to begin is by asking him if he as a judge while sitting as a judge, is he not serving as a political trustee for the people. He will have to answer "yes." Of course, he may be ignorant of the nature of his office, in which case the accused must be linguistically and politically literate enough to ask questions which put the judge in the

position of admitting he is incompetent. But, for now we will assume he answers “yes” to the question “Are you a political trustee when performing the official duties of your judicial office?”

The linguistic and political literate then asks him if while serving as a political trustee or when proceeding as a political trustor as one of the people is he held to a lesser political standard and law standard than the one to which the rest of the people, who are political trustors, are held to. He will “play hell” answering in the affirmative. He will have to say “no.”

Then the linguistic literate points out to the judge that defendants/political trustors in criminal matters cannot hold silent or answer evasively upon being asked “how do they plead” without empowering the court to enter a plea for them as a matter of criminal procedural law.⁵ He asks the judge if this is not true. The judge will have to answer “yes.” Then he will ask the judge how he has the right as either a political trustor or as a political trustee to hold silent when the accused/political trustor asks him questions regarding his case and, more especially, about his presumptions he has authority to adjudge the case, a.k.a. the court’s presumptions it has authority to adjudge the case.

At this point the judge will be “walking on his own tongue.” Only the linguistic literate, who is also politically literate and law literate, can “play these games,” however, and thereby enjoy the “protections” of the law meaning the “respect” of those who claim to have the authority of the people to uphold “the law.” For all other citizens, there can only be abuse at the hands of their fellow citizens who presume to have powers of rulership existing nowhere else but in their own minds.

**40-51 “THE UNDISTRIBUTED MIDDLE TERM” (40) through
“IDIOSYNCRATIC LANGUAGE” (51) – classified as the “LOGICAL
FALLACIES” by F & H**

The third categorization of fallacies named by F & H, they label as “logical fallacies.” Each of the sub-categorizations under this heading merits a full and careful review. Their insights will be immeasurably enhanced by a literate working knowledge of the linguistic methodologies offered by the general semanticists for comprehending the limitations and hazards we deal with in using our language to communicate, understand, and “know.”

⁵ Every State’s Rules of Criminal Procedure will have a rule which sets forth the authority of a judge to enter a plea of “not guilty” for defendant, if defendant stands silent, or answers evasively. In Florida this is found at Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170 (c). This is not the same issue as “every citizen has a right to remain silent when accused of crime – the self incrimination issue. Pleading “not guilty” is not making a self incriminating statement. Interestingly, no plea need be entered and the judge can be put in the box of not being able to enter one, if the defendant knows how to first challenge the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. This is reviewed in detail in Volume I of the author’s *Travel as of Right* workshop materials.

Everything F & H discuss in this part relate to many of the seeming conundrums, seeming paradoxes, seeming logical inconsistencies, found in classical schemas of philosophy, logic and the like, wherein the problems within the “philosophic” and “logic” arguments were caused by misconceptions about the epistemological flaws in the language mediums themselves.

This is where the epistemological observations of the general semanticists and their methodologies provide the “answers to the riddles.”

Likewise, understanding the human brain and its functionality is a critical factor here as elsewhere in deciphering all varieties of fallacies and communications foul ups.

Therefore, please consider carefully the importance of understanding the linguistic observations of Wendell Johnson in *People in Quandaries* in advancing your understanding of the arguments presented by F & H in Part III ⁶of their book.

You will find every one of the fallacies described in F & H’s Part III are employed in court cases by lawyers, prosecutors, witnesses, judges, you-name-it in order to “make their cases.”

In every such case the linguistic literate will recognize their use and will be able to rebut them through artful interposition of questions in rebuttal which reveal their individual fallacies for what they are, namely, irrelevant, frivolous, irrelevant nonsense.

By referring to the materials offered in the work of David Mesher, titled *Mission: Critical* on the Internet (again see Appendix IV), one will discover various forms of fallacious arguments dependent on linguistic confusions using language which result in logic nonsense whether they are nonsensical tautologies, nonsensical syllogisms, or other philosophic and logic problems/contradictions. And all arising because of confusions regarding the self-reflexive, multiordinality problems of abstracting, to include the problems of abstracting without adequate context to justify meaning, etc. All of which are issues which are easily understood and resolved using the methodologies offered by general semantics.

CONCLUSION

There is nothing magical about “magical arguments.”

⁶ Remember too, no less can be said about Parts I and II of F & H’s book, *Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument*.
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The magic is in the knowledge of the individual communicator. If he is a linguistic literate, he will recognize the misconceptions and confusions inherent in his arguments and others' arguments.

Recognizing these linguistic problems, he will improve his own communications in his endeavor to successfully communicate.

And he will be able to answer in meaningful rebuttal to the arguments of the "others" with whom he is dealing. Meaningful rebuttal means he will have the skill to decode the "others'" fallacious arguments and ask meaningfully for clarifications until the "others" are either able to make their points of arguments with verifiable statements of fact, or they find themselves unable to verify the points of their arguments.

Do not confuse this proposition with the craft of some legal wizards and other like kind of religious and secular wizards who use their skills in fallacy to create illusions they are answering and verifying their facts.

Or what is worse, it turns out they craftily shift the burden of proof on the individual of the first part in the instant matter. Never forget that in argument, the individual making the point must prove his point. This concept like so many others is beyond the comprehension of the linguistic illiterate.⁷

Is there any alternative, but to discover what it means to be a linguistic literate?

⁷ For more regarding the business of burden, see Chapter 13.
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CHAPTER 11

DEALING WITH FRAUDULENT AUTHORITY

“Many in positions of power take up such posts in the fulfillment of a neurotic need to exercise power over others – prison guards, police officers, some judges, some deans, some teachers, some parents, almost all politicians – you understand. Insecure, afraid, those who must maintain control are, indeed, lonely and frightened.”

Gerry Spence

“Given this knowledge of power, ought we not view the power entity with a certain *irreverence*? Ought we not take back the power we have abdicated?”

Gerry Spence

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments requires recognition from the outset that most local, state, and federal level office holders today are genuinely ignorant of the nature and limitations of their public offices. No greater mistake can be made than to presume your self-appointed rulers are moving against you knowing all along that they are without the authority they are asserting. Likely 85 to 90% percent of your public servants/officials really don't have a clue regarding their official authorities.

Gerry Spence speaks of “the biological advantage” in dealing in “truth.” He states there is a “*valid biological explanation why all cultures past and present hoist honesty to the top of the moral totem pole.*”

The likes of Fernside and Holther would properly point out that Gerry's statement is a generalization subject to exposure as a fallacy.

The general semanticists would point out Gerry's statement deals in high levels of abstraction and multi-ordinality, a statement of all inclusiveness which on analysis requires the individual -- for message verification purposes -- to avoid merely accepting it at full face value, but rather giving it conditional consideration recognizing it is unlikely there is unconditional truth value in it.

Proceeding in this manner, the individual conditionally accepts Gerry's message recognizing all statements of all inclusiveness are likely to be found wanting. In this

manner, the individual does not subsequently feel he was somehow abused through trust in the message as a statement of unreserved -- unquestionable -- "truth."

Therefore, when later the individual discovers there were, and are, other "*cultures past and present*" which did not, and do not, "*hoist honesty to the top of* [their respective culture's equivalent of a] *moral totem pole*," then said individual's confidence in Gerry Spence as a "truth-sayer" is not unnecessarily strained or damaged. All because the message was not foolishly accepted when first received as though it were -- at full face value -- a statement of an unconditional "truth."

The "truth" is there are many instances of cultures/civilizations, past and present, where honesty eventually is relegated to the bottom of the "totem pole" and treachery is esteemed and practiced by the self-appointed, self-acknowledged more "enlightened," a.k.a. "sophisticated," members of the culture.

Those societies eventually collapse as the people are no longer able to deal with each other on any meaningful terms. This was a primary factor in the collapse of the Roman Empire.

Gerry is correct regarding there being a biological explanation why individual human brains are capable of recognizing the difference between truth and falsity. But the issue does have its complexities. This feature is both learned and has "wired-in" considerations. Without even being consciously aware of the process, it involves the individual perceiving a "flood" of inputs through the several senses accompanied by automatic processing of these "signals" for matching and verification that they do not contradict or conflict regarding the meaning of the message.

There are languages where certain spoken words have different meanings depending on how they are uttered. There is no language whose meaning cannot be contradicted by the way the words are spoken along with the associated body language.

Hence the necessity of having some knowledge of the workings of the human brain such as the neuroscientists are able to share with us.

... coupled with the necessity of having a working level of knowledge such as the general semanticists can share with us at this time.

Gerry rightfully points out we have a powerful ally in our jury system. The American scheme for governance is not yet fully lost into the hands of fellow citizens who presume to have the right to rule us because they know better than we what is good for us -- the concept of the "common good," the "common weal," the "common wealth" turned upside down.

Most members of the self-styled Patriot community do not understand this. We hear arguments that it is better to go before a judge and forego the jury because if we go before the jury and they rule against us, we may lose all or most of our access to appeal.

What do such arguments admit to? Fear of the judgment of their own peers. Fear of their own judgment of the merits of their own case. Fear they don't really understand how to challenge authority, notwithstanding they may fail to realize the authority relies solely on presumptions of its right to power in the first place. Fear they don't really adequately understand what they are doing in any respect.

But, if the individual truly understands his own case, then he will welcome an opportunity to go before a jury. He will know our self-styled rulers fear the jury. He will know there have been continuous efforts from day one of our "republics" to do away with our jury system.

Jury Nullification: The Evolution of a Doctrine by Clay S. Conrad, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, N.C., (1998) is a must read. Already declared as likely to be the standard work on jury nullification, this only recently published book will give you a full understanding of the origin and role of the American petite jury system.

If you are to overcome all the hog wash with which state and federal judicial officers routinely get away wherein they instruct juries that "the court will decide the law" and the jury upon instructions from the court based on its interpretation of the laws "will decide only the facts," then you must read and understand this book. Such juries are merely "hommage" juries – puppets to the court. This scheme is not lawful in America, yet most juries function in just this manner.

Appreciate that in many instances, if the jury understood what law applied in the first place, they would know there is no case. We're saying that in many cases if the jury understood the law of the case they would know there are no issues of merit upon which they might decide the "facts" because there were no law facts even applicable to the case. If the judge can control what the "law facts" are, then anyone can be tried for any kind of charge that resourceful schemers may determine should be raised.

A society in which such a scheme is permitted, is neither a republic, nor a democracy in any so-called liberal or conservative sense of the word. Such societies are tyrannies in fact. Such a society is America, notwithstanding self delusion so widespread that denial of the obvious is an epidemic beyond any possible cure.

However even yet, the individual can obtain a proper jury trial when one is required. But only a few know this and understand how to "make it happen" in their individual cases.

If you understand the substantive law of your case versus mistaken fantasies regarding your case which you may be harboring. and

If you understand the procedural law which the court must observe, and

If you understand the political fundamentals upon which our state and federal governments are wholly founded and dependent, and

If you understand anything at all about the human spirit, psyche, and brain, and

If you have trust in your ability to make your case because you understand the things that Gerry Spence is saying in his book *How to Argue and Win Every Time*, then

You will demand a jury trial whenever you find it necessary and you will take your case to the people and you will put the judge where he belongs which is as referee over the proceedings, and as one whose job it is to inform the jury about the law of the case, but not to judge for himself what the law is and is not in the case.

In Chapter 14 we will discover the jury is our most important ally in our courtroom causes. We will also discover how to enlist the judge and the opposition's attorney to our cause literally making them our ally. When the matter pertains to some criminal or quasi criminal matter, we shall discover how to enlist the prosecution to become our ally. How can you fail to win your challenge or your case when everyone becomes your ally?

On the way to enlisting all these allies, we shall need to understand and deal with our presumptions regarding every aspect of our case and everyone else's presumptions who are involved in our case. This we address in Chapter 12.

Also on the way to enlisting all these "others," we shall need to thoroughly understand the business of burdens, for otherwise our other allies will serve us poorly. This we address in Chapter 13.

But first we must also understand the necessity of properly setting the stage for our individual dramas. We must understand the "what," "why," and "how" of properly setting up our cases so that the "others" who engage us in the name of the authority of the state may appropriately establish themselves in the role of our allies instead of the role of our adversaries.

Where challenging fraudulent authority is concerned, we shall discover the necessity of first making a good faith challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction, a.k.a. challenging the presumption of authority, while concurrently setting up our would be adversaries for charges of acting in bad faith.

A final point which is appropriate here regards the issue of good faith/bad faith viz-a-viz our public servants/officials/political trustees, namely:

It is a sad commentary regarding the state of ignorance and apathy of the present American state that a defendant in cases brought by "the state" – presumptively in the name of "the people" – would be well served by raising the tort issue of good faith from the outset of any engagement with his said political trustees. This point is reviewed at length in the author's 3-volume *Travel as of Right* workshop materials and will be treated further in a subsequent workshop on tort actions against said political trustees where occasions dictate the need.

The very reason for the political trustor, as a matter of personal prudent practice, to explicitly raise the tort issue of "good faith/bad faith" from the outset of all encounters with his political trustees is that the aforesaid American State of Ignorance is now so advanced that neither the public nor the public's servants understand anything at all about our unalienable rights generally and said right to challenge all authority, a.k.a. subject-matter jurisdiction in particular, and their absolute [MANDATORY] duty and obligation to make a proper answer to said challenges.

Instead, it becomes necessary to get our overreaching public servants' attention by properly noticing them they risk being sued for proceeding in bad faith if they do not deal with us in the manner which we should expect, to include duly answering our duly made challenges of subject-matter jurisdiction and the like.

CHAPTER 12

YOUR PRESUMPTIONS/ THEIR PRESUMPTIONS

"Nothing certain exists, and ... nothing is more pitiful or more presumptuous than man.

Pliny the Elder (23 - 79 A.D.)

"We are deceived at every level by our introspection."

F.H.C. Crick, 1979

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments requires never losing sight that every idea, belief, issue, and fact you entertain as "truth" is dependent upon at least one unspoken presumption which may come back to haunt you, if you do not recognize it and account for it. This means being able to argue your presumptions after first being able to recognize they may be explainable or justifiable only by definition in your metaphysical catalog because they are not verifiable as factually existing in the real world.

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments requires never losing sight that every idea, belief, issue, and fact your adversary entertains as "truth" is dependent upon at least one unspoken presumption which you can expose and then using it defeat him either because he fails to know and understand his own presumption(s) or because he fails to understand how to defend his presumption(s) once they are exposed by you to the awareness of all others.

There is an old adage/mnemonic used by salesmen and other varieties of hustlers that runs "When you 'assume' you make an 'ass' out of 'u' and 'me.'" Veteran salesmen/ sales trainers, and the like introduce new recruits in the ancient craft of selling to this nemonic tool during their sales training. The student learns the stages of a sales pitch: the "warm up" stage, the "qualifying" stage, the "presentation" stage, the "overcoming objections" stage, and the "closing" stage.

The student learns that the purpose of the "warm up" stage is to get the prospect's acceptance of the salesman's interruption in his life, getting him "at ease" with their mutual intercourse, but not too "at ease" that the coming presentation becomes an interruption in their seemingly innocent social exchange. The student learns that during the warm up he must be open to all "signals" from the prospect which relay "information" regarding the prospect's potential desire for the salesman's product — what-ever it may be.

The student learns he must move "seamlessly" from the warm up stage into the qualifying stage. Qualifying the prospect means determining as much as possible just what the prospect's "wants," "needs," "fantasies," or "desires" are which can be potentially "satisfied" or "fulfilled" by purchase of the salesman's goods. The student learns that "qualifying the prospect" means assuming nothing about the prospect because such assumptions, or presumptions, if unfounded will later "kill the sale" because the salesman will have misdirected his "pitch" to satisfy the salesman's illusions about what the prospect wants instead of satisfying the prospect's illusions about what he wants. Thus the salesman must correctly determine the prospects "wants" in order that the salesman may later push the prospect's "hot button" in the next stages of the pitch.

Following qualifying the salesman moves to his presentation. It must be keyed to his best understanding of what he believes "turns on" the prospect.

Following presentation, the salesman moves to "close" the sale. Actually, he begins "closing the sale" during the presentation and may even "ask for the order." The prospect may not understand what is going on. If all is smooth, then the prospect just knows he "feels good" because he is about to "take possession" of some product — "tangible" or "intangible" — which will make the rest of his days on earth just wonderful.

The savvy salesman will sense when the prospect is "ready to sign." He will sense when his comprehension of the prospect's needs and desires are mapping with his product as the fulfillment of those needs and desires and he will ask for and get the order perhaps ever so subtly. Properly executed, the entire sales/closing proceedings is silky smooth -- not unlike the gliding of an eagle on lofty air currents or a politician asking a voter to support his program for stealing more money from one group of working class citizens in order that he may give it to another class of citizens.

If the prospect has "objections" why he isn't interested, the salesman must rebut those objections. He must take each objection as it is offered and dissect it. He must analyze the objection and show the prospect how the problem which the objection represents is easily overcome. He must turn the prospect's problems into solutions which are fulfilled by purchase of the product. As each objection is "overcome," the salesman closes the sale again -- he again asks for the order. This procedure continues until the sale is closed or the salesman is "thrown out on his ear."

Your Présumptions/Their Presumptions

By his training, the salesman will keep the mnemonic, "*ass-u-me*," in the forefront of his mind during every step and stage of each sales encounter.

He learns it is fatal to presume anything about a prospect. He must somehow discover what the prospect thinks he needs. He must recognize that even the prospect may not be willing to admit consciously what his needs are. This means he must be capable of sensing and correctly processing the three messages which every communicator we shall ever face is sending, namely, he must properly "read" the "body language" word, the "sound" word, and the actual verbal words. When these words contradict each other, he must discover why. When they confirm each other, he must tentatively accept the "truth" value of their tripartite meaning.

He must leave nothing to presumption or he may leave the sale elsewhere than in his pocket.

If he operates on presumptions which fail to map with the prospect's beliefs and illusions regarding his needs, then the sale "blows up." The salesman will walk away unfulfilled.

Can less be made of the business of presumptions in our daily affairs and the dangers we face when we proceed on ill-founded presumptions, than what has just been said regarding that most peculiar American preoccupation, the business of selling?

Absolutely not!

Regarding the business of rulership in America, presumptions are 99% of the game.

Presumptions of authority and of law encompass:

- o Our presumptions that we know what is going on whether viewed in the abstract or taken in our individual, pathetic, little daily encounters with our self-styled local, state, and federal rulers.

- o And our public servants' presumptions regarding the sweep of their official powers coupled with their presumptions of their rights pursuant to various doctrines of immunity to use those powers, willfully, unfettered and unmolested, as the mood moves them.

If we are to be masters of our own individual fates, then we must know our own minds and this will mean mustering the will and the skills for critically reviewing our own beliefs and presumptions regarding all that we accept moment-to-moment at face value.

This means we must understand that the entire business of law – in all its branches and subdivisions – proceeds wholly upon nothing more than presumptions that law “is,” hence is somehow and inexplicably beyond our questioning.

It may be a stark realization to discover law both in the abstract and in the specific is dependent wholly on nothing more than presumptions of its authority.

It can be harsh to find one’s self compelled to the inescapable conclusion there is no sedimentary bedrock of law creating some verifiably factual basis for man’s laws.

For some persons the idea may be unacceptable that there is nothing more in law than the idea of law spawning an infinitude of derivative law ideas conceived and implemented by self-serving members of the community. But this is where we generally find the law.

It may be difficult for some to accept law’s reality when the realization dawns that behind every law lie only presumptions of the law’s authority. There is, of course, a reality where laws dwell. It is in the minds of men.

There are those who believe in the law without questioning. They become victims of the law.

There are those who believe in the law, but are prepared to question its authority. They may be justly served by the law.

There are those who believe the law belongs to them. They are tyrants.

There are those who believe in no law. They are outlaws.

All these classes of individuals are found in America. If you are not altogether pacified, hence functionally witless, you will personally have awareness of persons fitting each of these categories.

And so it happens that the business of law is purely metaphysical – the virtual domain and product of the minds of humankind and, therefore, is simply unavailable for verification that it has any existence outside the minds of humankind.

Therefore, for every law’s strictly metaphysical reality there can be found only presumptions of authority for enforcement.

If we are to be holders of the inherent political power of our individual states and our federal nation-state, then we must understand the nature of the idea of law and, consequently, not only know how laws come into existence, but who is subject to them and who has the authority to administer and enforce them.

Your Presumptions/Their Presumptions

Lacking such knowledge, and the will and skills to act upon such knowledge, we are no different than helpless newborns dependent on the will of others for our moment-to-moment survival.

You must ask yourself, is the presumption widely held by Americans of their nation's continued survival and even prosperity justified given everyone's abysmal state of ignorance and their propensity to proceed on nothing but passive acceptance of the ideas, beliefs, and facts they daily live by without ever thinking, much less critically thinking or questioning, the presumptions upon which their ideas, beliefs, and facts are dependent?

We live by individual and collective presumptions, which too often are unjustified. When faith in ideas, beliefs, or facts fail because of unfolding events which blow unquestioned presumptions away, it should be obvious who stands to lose.

The faithful believe without questioning, hence without understanding, hence without capacity to meaningfully anticipate their future prospects.

In the courtroom presumptions are fatal. The case for presumptions is no different outside the courtroom.

Must you be a victim of your own presumptions and those of others with whom you deal?

CHAPTER 13

BURDEN, BURDEN, WHO'S GOT THE BURDEN

"In politics, an absurdity is not a handicap."

Napolean Bonaparte

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments requires recognition from the outset that most local, state, and federal level office holders are wholly committed to preserving what they believe is "the way things are and must be." This is described as the "*status quo*." This means protecting the property, privileges, and franchises of the community's propertied elitist classes and protecting their own bureaucratic/institutional turf. It does not mean protecting the rights of the citizens one and all.

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments requires understanding the burden of proving guilt rests on the prosecution (or plaintiff in civil cases) being able to show the specifics which comprise the elements of proof as set down in American jurisprudence not merely as an abstract proposition, but in terms of nitty-gritty elements of the matter.

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments requires the individual be a linguistic literate and that "magical arguments" can occur only by happy accident if one is not a linguistic literate.

In his *Travel as of Right* workshop Volume I, the author introduces the reader to the business of where the burden lies whenever one is a defendant, whether in a civil or criminal matter. The subject must be understood. Many who would play the sovereign citizen game seem conceptually to understand, but when they become actually engaged are quickly observed to be busier than "the one-armed paper hanger" trying to prove their innocence of the charges against them.


Repeatedly it becomes evident that the practical aspects of keeping the burden of proof on those making charges is simply not grasped.

The self-styled Patriot community is rife with ideas and myths regarding every aspect of what-to-do and what-must-not-be-done as proceedings unfold, if one is not to fall into their mythic horror: **The Adjudicatory Pit of Damnation.**

THE BURDEN OF LINGUISTIC LITERACY

Each step of proceedings reveals fundamental failure to understand what it means to be a sovereign citizen. This includes failure to ensure the burden of proving all charges, averments, arguments, etc. made by his adversaries is squarely on his adversaries' shoulders. Is there a connection between the two just stated ideas?

Obviously, if the individual understands the meaning of the concept of "sovereign" and "sovereignty," then it should be self evident that if the people are individual sovereigns in their land and they are accused of a crime by their fellow sovereigns, or of some tort, then the burden will be on the accuser even though he too is a sovereign.

 What is the reason for this arrangement? Failure to understand the reason will be a measure of your understanding of the metaphysical concept of "sovereign" as posited by the political philosophers of the 17th and into the 19th Century of the Western world. The idea is that when equals accuse each other, then the burden is on the accuser.

This can also be seen as an issue which the methodologies of the general semanticists can shed light on — just as with all out language and metaphysical issues.

Namely, this whole business of sovereignty, burden, etc. and the "meaning" of sovereignty and burden and etc. must be in terms of said semanticists' concepts of self-reflexiveness, multiordinality, and the like all taken with reference to specific contexts of the specific uses of the words, etc.

If you are breezing by what is being said here, looking for the "real nugget" in what is being said in this passage, or perhaps looking for what you think should be said, or expect to be said, then **STOP!**

Without the keys to language, to include the language of political philosophy and law, which the methodologies of the general semanticists epistemologically provide, you are going nowhere.

Understand why you have had no more success playing the sovereign and law games than you have thus far!

Realize, the keys to success are in discovering what the idea of “meaning of meaning” really “means.”

Understand you will not comprehend this business until you understand your own neural functionality and the methodologies which general semantics can provide. These are your tools.

Nothing presented in this workshop is here as mere filler and fluff. It all is extremely relevant to the task you presume to be committed to: discovering and using the secrets of oral (and written) arguments in the courtroom and elsewhere.

This workshop addresses the fundamentals which must be learned to become a linguistic literate. Ignore the books referenced as part of this workshop at your continued peril. If you feel like a loser now, imagine being pointed to the keys and refusing to individually discover them.

Doing the business of living the life of an American sovereign citizen requires being a linguistic literate. This is so obvious no one seemingly grasps this essential fact. It is so obvious everyone who has a part in your educational experiences has failed to introduce you to the art of critical thinking.¹ You see critical thinking is nothing more or less than being a linguistic literate and practicing what you know, thus living as a critical thinker, hence as a linguistic literate.

In no other way can an individual “decode” all the fallacious arguments upon which his adversaries are wholly dependent for advancement of their fraudulent claims and authorities. In no other way can the individual in consequence of said decoding then craft contextually on point, hence meaningful, questions in rebuttal. In no other way can the individual hold his adversaries’ “feet to the fire” and get answers to his questions which do not prove to be mere silence or evasions.

And, dear friends, silence and evasive answers are acts of avoiding the burden of proof.

You will know you are a linguistic illiterate, and have your “work cut out for you” to become linguistically literate, if you can’t see and decode their fallacies, or can’t craft meaningful rebuttals to their fallacies, and consequently, can’t hold their “feet to the fire” resulting in getting proper answers to your proper challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction. Realize all this is a closed loop.

¹ Of course, here we have an example of an occasion when it is appropriate to be “a little bit paranoid,” namely, we should be suspicious that our religious and secular leaders may have their own hidden agendas motivating them to overlook our learning to be anything more than knee jerk, passive thinkers. The situation is simply made more absurd when many from the cohorts of our teachers are linguistic illiterates, themselves. The blind leading the blind. But this must be a subject for another day.
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If you are not getting the above commented end results thereby ridding yourself of pretenders to authority who cannot prove their authority and likewise getting dismissed other varieties of fraudulent claims made against you, then your linguistic literacy level is not up to snuff.

Do not kid yourself that you know you have it all figured out and "things ain't happening for you" because "they" are just too "corrupt," too "evil," or too what-ever and the "real truth is nobody can exercise their rights or get justice in this country any longer." There can be no passing the buck. It is time to recognize the nature of the problem and the task to be undertaken to solve the problem.

It will be worth while to consider the possibility that what is obvious can be the most difficult to discover and to learn. Linguistic illiteracy is so obvious and so obviously widespread that few realize it is their problem and the nation's problem.

Make no mistake, there is firstly a burden to recognize when one is linguistically illiterate and to rectify the problem as aggressively as possible. There is no hope, otherwise, of becoming knowledgeable and practiced in the secrets of oral (and written) arguments in the courtroom and elsewhere.

In this regard it will be critically important to recognize that some individuals are more burdened in overcoming their linguistic illiteracy than others. Consider the challenge in becoming linguistically literate which the fanatic and the pacifist face:

THE BURDEN OF FANATICS

The story of mankind is the story of neurotics and psychotics caught up with an internally generated vision of reality which blinds them to alternative images potentially available via their own senses from the external world in which they are fated to live.

Such people are fanatics — they are "true believers" in their particular cause and those who do not unreservedly share their beliefs are their enemies. Such persons must either be converted to their beliefs or such persons must perish for such persons do not deserve to live in their world.

The burden of the fanatic is to rage and to accuse those who will not rage with him of raging themselves.

The classic book of insight regarding the nature of fanaticism is *The True Believer*, by Eric Hoffer, published in 1951 and still available in paperback or soft bound editions. Consider the following from the back cover from the Perennial Library, 1966, edition of Harper & Row, Publishers:

"Who is the True Believer?"

“According to Eric Hoffer –

“He’s a guilt-ridden hitchhiker who thumbs a ride on every cause from Christianity to Communism.

“He’s a fanatic, needing a Stalin (or a Christ) to worship and die for.

“He’s a mortal enemy of things-as-they-are....

“Reporting on the true believer, Mr. Hoffer examines, with Machiavellian detachment, mass movements from Christianity in its infancy to the national uprisings of our own day. His analysis of the psychology of mass movements, is a brilliant and frightening study of the mind of the fanatic, the man whose personal failings lead him to join a cause, any cause, even at peril to his life – or yours.”²

Do not deprive yourself of a reading of Eric Hoffer for you will gain important insights in dealing with fraudulent authority – both religious and secular -- run-a-muck in America. Americans are no less subject to self and mutually induced hypnosis and seduction to metaphysically conjured images and abstractions which cannot be verified to exist anywhere but within their own minds than are peoples on other parts of the planet.

Being American makes no one less prone to subscribe to absolutist ideas. Or less predisposed to order the universe into notions that all matters can be resolved to “either/or,” “them versus us,” “good guys versus bad guys,” as people are inclined everywhere.

Whether over privileged or under privileged, no man may conjure metaphysical concepts with reckless abandon and not come to harm eventually when he confuses his ideas so created as having verifiability in the objective world of reality.

General semantics can provide insights unmatched elsewhere into the linguistic mechanisms which predispose man to this kind of behavior. Concurrently, neuroscience provides the other elements in the mind-state equation towards understanding why mankind is so easily recruited to fanaticism.

Why is the subject of the fanatic and his burden so important?

Because it is a major key to understanding the condition of the world in which we live.³

² These quotes are from the back cover of the paperback.

³ For example, there are people who believe that world peace is within the grasp of mankind if enough people will only think about it or pray for it. Such innocent foolishness does nothing to advance the cause of world peace. Such notions involve no critical thinking about the subject of prospects for

It is a major key in understanding why well-intentioned citizens often go to court where they are unmercifully abused by their public servants who do not share their understanding of rights and citizenship, in part quite often, because their public servants are fanatics to a cause which the citizen fails to recognize or comprehend. The problem is compounded for those citizens who come to court blinded by their own causes.

Therefore, it is critical consideration to understand when you are dealing with a fanatic sitting on the bench and elsewhere in the courtroom as it is when dealing with others in any setting.

And it is equally important to recognize the fanatic who may dwell within.

Ironically, the true believer – the full blown fanatic – will invariably fail to consciously grasp he is a fanatic – such is the nature of believers in absolutist ideas. So it is that fanaticism may be equated with neurosis or psychosis.

The general semanticists can provide powerful insights into the linguistic labyrinths from which fanatics spring forth. Do not fail to keep in mind, the neuroscientists provides powerful insights why the fanatic dwells within all of us. With such understanding we have a better chance of not becoming victims of our own bio-computers.

The tragedy of the fanatic is that he carries an impossible burden. He must forever prove his cause and he must forever demand that all others accept his cause and prove they believe in it.

Therefore, the fanatic, when required to appear in court, presents a tragicomedy.

He believes he knows all that must be known, and need be known, because he is a fanatic to the circularly abstract knowledge of his cause, hence he can never successfully communicate with his adversaries/accusers/public servants unless, by astonishing and happy coincident, they belong to his identical cause. In consequence, there can be no resolution of the problem which brings him to court, except that the parties with the bigger sticks will prevail.

If an accused comes to court and finds his adversaries/accusers/public servants are fanatics to their cause, he must understand their cause and that they are fanatics to it. If he does not, then he has no chance of defeating their attack on his unalienable rights, his so-called civil liberties, his right to life, liberty, and property.

The burden of the fanatic's cause is always impossible for him to carry or to prove. This knowledge can be your secret advantage.

world peace and set up a basis for a strong presumption they really understand nothing at all about the mechanics of the human brain and its use.

For this reason, the fanatic is easily defeated by an individual who understands his cause, and also understands how to place a proper burden on the fanatic which he must prove or call the encounter quits.

THE BURDEN OF PACIFISTS

We have discussed earlier the pacification of America by diverse means to include:

- o The intellectual attack under the pseudo-intellectual banner of nihilism within the academic community to reduce an entire nation into critical thought-deprived imbeciles regarding which *The Closing of the American Mind* by Alan Bloom provides a most instructive introduction,

- o And by the most comprehensive mind management machine ever assembled in the history of man right here in the "Good Ole U.S. of A" regarding which *The Mind Managers* by Herbert I. Schiller presented the first comprehensive picture not long after it had fully flowered in its present post WWII institutional form as a merger of private and public megaorganizations,

- o And by the total usurpation of real life experiences by the substitution of "mediated experiences" for the overwhelming majority of present day Americans via man-created media with which modern Americans now primarily preoccupy themselves and, thus, rely for their sensory input/stimulation from the world external to their brains.

With the invention of the printing press, the printed word became a major mechanism for mediated experience. Prior to that, oral recital was the only media for mediated experience. Man passed down knowledge by story telling, myths, etc.

But with the introduction of the radio in the 1920s new forms of mediated experience became available as with motion pictures at the turn of the century. Thanks to the unfolding marvels of photo/electronic technologies, mediated experience began playing an ever increasing role in substituting for real life experience. With the wide spread introduction of TV in the 1950s, mediated experience began substituting for real life experience on an ever more comprehensive scale.

Regarding this business *Four Arguments for Elimination of Television* by Jerry Mander, as reviewed earlier, fully introduces the scale of the problem facing modern Americans wherein they are loosing all touch with the real world. Mander coined the phrase "mediated experience." Every argument he raises in his book regarding the fatal consequences to mankind posed by our modern electronic marvels is even more relevant with the introduction of the age of the computer-on-a-chip to include the PC, all the Nintendo-related stuff, and other electronic goodies of the last 15 years.

Efforts to suppress critical thinking and channel all thought have surpassed the wildest imaginings of George Orwell's *1984* and Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* written over 50 years ago.

De facto dictatorship is already at hand. Its form is the *Institutional Autocracy*.

Observe that technology has made possible a temporary explosion of human population — a people bloom⁴ — which is coupled with a concurrent, but likely temporary,⁵ new form of statist/dictatorial rulership. This new form of authority over the people reigns as an institutional autocracy of faceless, mindless bureaucrats ostensibly guided by enlightened education/training to perform their rulership functions scientifically and efficiently.

Therefore, appreciate the obvious. It is not possible for a large faceless autocracy to exercise powers of rulership if the people are in possession of critical thinking powers.

In such circumstances, the ruled would be continuously critically analyzing the acts and behavior of the rulers. Such circumstances would appear to be chaos in the view of the Institutional Autocracy — a continuous, hence intolerable, challenge of their presumptions of their *status quo*.

Therefore, also appreciate the obvious necessity that most people be preoccupied with mindless mediated experiences substituted for real life experiences.

By living primarily in virtual worlds such individuals are most easily controlled.
Why?

Because there is no necessity for highly developed feedback loops of data analysis between real world experiences and the individual minds. Feedback from the real world invariably calls for development of critical thinking skills to understand what is happening in the real world. By mediated experiences, all “external events” are simply prepackaged occurrences existing only in virtual worlds and require no feedback analysis, inasmuch as, they are virtual. Being virtual, they are whatever the individual having the experiences and his manipulators who manufacture the mediated experiences chooses them to be.

⁴ Just the other day we learn from the news media that the world's population has just doubled to 6 billion souls from a mere 3 billion in 1960. A great deal of the credit for this belongs to the so-called Green Revolution which was launched in the 1960s as the antidote to world famine. Any one acquainted with the mathematical aspects of biological processes will understand that absent famine/pestilence, or other like kind events, the world's population can be expected to double again to 12 billion in less than another 30 years. If your are pacified, you will not spend too much time reflecting on this subject.

⁵ Kindly note, the author refers to the present population levels and the present circumstances of our rulership as temporary. One does not have to be a “rocket scientist” to understand this, however, there is a necessary precondition that one not be pacified into a state of mindless inability to observe the obvious.

Such is the plight and circumstance of individuals having no decently developed feedback loop capacities between their respective senses to the external, real world and their respective minds. Such individuals lacking in skills of critical thinking are linguistic illiterates. Being linguistically illiterate they lack the prerequisite skills to become critical thinkers. By these terms and definitions, we describe the pacifist.

Pacifists come in all varieties, but share one thing in common; namely, their powers of critical thinking are undeveloped – stunted.

A major role of many religions especially as practiced in the modern, Western world where man is estranged from the earth which alone can nurture him, is to create illusions of union with the cosmos or with the creator of all, but in fact, except for so-called primitive religions, they deal in disconnected and self-reflexive abstractions.

Abstractions disconnected from external world experience are unverifiable by objective means through any information error correction loop closure between the senses and the brain's powers of analyzing abstracted data from the external world. When multiple levels of abstracting are engaged, each further removed from external verification than the last and each dependent for meaning solely on the last, lower level abstraction, the problem of self-reflexiveness, as the general semanticists call it, occurs.

Such are man's virtual worlds such as where matters of law, politics, economics, religion, philosophy, video games, etc. exist. Man becomes disoriented with himself and the outside world when he confuses abstractions disconnected from the external world with matters of reality considered to be "of the real world." And rest assured, this problem of confusion is epidemic.

Therefore, it is a major feature of promotion of such abstractions that they are to be taken at face value. When there is little else to offer the people, but such disconnected, self reflexive abstractions, it becomes paramount to preoccupy the public with mediated experiences lest they find time to rediscover the real world and begin asking questions which cannot be answered without shattering the illusions of the *status quo*.

The most dangerous consequence of these engagements exclusively in virtual worlds is that the individuals become pacified. Being pacified, they are incapable of developing skills of critical thinking or recognizing valuable information available to their senses from the real world. Instead, they have virtual visions.

Some pacifists may be committed to a religion. Others to some "secular," virtual vision; it may be political, economic, consumerist, hedonistic, intellectual, Nintendo, or what-have-you. But, in any case they are committed to myths, dogmas, slogans, mantras, virtual imagines, propaganda pitches and spiels of one stripe or another. They become programmed to seek prepackaged programming for their minds. They seek only to learn and think passively. They reject things which demand they critically think. They are

followers of fanatics, politicians, bureaucrats, ministers, educators, Nintendo and any others who make no demands that they critically think.

Pacifists carry the burden of being victims. Victims of all who "see them coming." Therefore, when the pacifist must appear in court he carries the burden of being his adversaries' willing victim and is incapable of defending himself on any grounds.

Why?

Because lacking development of his potential critical thinking powers, he can prepare no arguments either challenging fraudulent authority, making his affirmative defenses, or making any defense of himself regarding any matter confronting him.

Therefore, the burden of the pacifist if he tires of being a victim in all matters large and small that life presents, is to develop his critical thinking powers. He must become linguistically literate.

He must discover "**the meaning of meaning**" found within his mother tongue as processed in his brain in the multiordinal, self-reflexive sense which the methodology of general semantics can epistemologically expose as opposed to the mindless nonsense meaning of the question "**What is the meaning of meaning?**" taken as a simple-minded, pseudo intellectual "word game" tautology.⁶

Consider further certain other epistemological facets of the burden issue upon which the political and law facets are dependent:

THE BURDEN OF RECOGNIZING FALLACIES

Fallacies are the stock in trade of politicians, charlatans, salesmen, advertisers, self proclaimed ministers of the gospels, educators, lawyers, bankers, bureaucrats, judges, and the like. In other words, fallacies are the stock in trade of those individuals regarded so often in the past as the "pillars of the community," as well as, others not regarded among the "pillars."

Once an individual understands what fallacies are, these statements are seen as so self evident that comment seems a surplus of words. Regrettably, given the State of the American Mind, overstatement here is not likely surplus.

It is a fact of life, that anyone required to appear in a courtroom, whether on a civil, criminal, or fraudulent quasi civil or quasi criminal matter, must be capable of recognizing fallacies.

⁶ We are discussing here and elsewhere nothing less than the root cause of individuals inability to understand "the language of law." Said language is easily deciphered once the individual understands how to play the epistemological game. It can only be done by becoming a linguistic literate.

For the burden will be on him to uncover every fallacy presented in court as argument against him to include his adversaries' presumptions the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over him in the first place, or those fallacies will be used to "prove" the case against him. And the irony will be that fallacies prove nothing when appropriately rebutted.

Therefore, the individual must accept the burden of recognizing and rebutting all fallacies presented as arguments against him in the courtroom and elsewhere.

THE BURDEN OF PROVING FALLACIES

The point of being able to recognize and rebut fallacies as previously discussed is to be able to conclusively rebut them. When a fallacy is conclusively rebutted, the adversary, or judge, or who-ever, must now prove the "truth" presumptively inherent in the fallacy. Of course, by definition, any fallacy has no sufficient basis in truth, notwithstanding some forms of fallacy incorporate elements of truths – the old "half truth" conundrum/hang-up.

Therefore, the burden of proving fallacies rests with your adversaries, the judge, and the like, once you have revealed the fallacy and objected to it with a sound and conclusive argument in rebuttal. This is the nature of the beast, in consequence of the fact that in America you are a holder of the inherent political power of your state and nation. Being such a holder, you have an unalienable right to plenary due process of law. Plenary due process of law includes the right to get a proof of the "truth" presumptively reposing within all arguments comprised of fallacies.

THE BURDEN OF BEING RATIONAL

Neurotic and psychotic behavior is the norm in modern America because of the pacification of the population by the means discussed in this workshop. Arguments which are not founded on critical thinking often appear irrational to all others excepting possibly individuals sharing the seemingly identical irrationality. Such are the advantages and disadvantages of commitment to irrationalities.

Therefore, fanatics and pacifists are at risk when they appear in the courtroom and elsewhere of appearing to be irrational by their arguments. If they do not intend to be victims of their adversaries, then they are advised to develop and use their latent powers of critical thinking.

For the "true believer" this may be impossible. He can only be left to his fate, if he can't recover from his blind commitment to his cause.

For the pacifist, it may also prove impossible, since more than just going through “deprogramming” is involved. The mechanisms of critical thinking must somehow be engaged and learning to think critically via meaningful feedback loops must somehow begin. Here an understanding of the epistemological challenge and the methodologies which the general semanticists can offer as tools for coming to terms with the language medium can be the turning point in learning to think critically.

Given the kind of civilization Americans presently “enjoy,” it understandably may be for many individuals a real challenge in undertaking such learning. Overcoming denial of the obvious, critically reviewing all presently “known” facts in light of the obvious, rejecting information which has no, or negligible, verifiable “truth” value, can be too much.

All who would dare to take control of their lives, must know that the pacifist orientation is now the institutionally dictated mode for American life, but that to be oriented to passive thinking as a life style is to be oriented to being a victim of every hair brain schemer coming down the pike.

To be rational, requires being an active thinker, to have powers of critical thinking. The burden of being rational rests on the individual sovereign citizen for otherwise he will be considered a witless ward of “the state” – the Institutional Autocracy.

When you go to court, you will get respect only if you are rational. If you are not getting respect, then realize your powers of rationality need work. If you make excuses why you aren’t getting respect, be highly suspicious that you are indulging yourself in irrationalities.

When you are truly rational, you will discover you have empowered yourself. And you will discover, when you have empowered yourself, the “others” will also empower you. This is the magic. This is where Gerry Spence’s “magical argument” happens.

THE BURDEN OF PROVING INSANITY

If you have actively engaged in “standing up” for your birthright, then you have heard stories of individuals, or you know an individual, or you are an individual who, in consequence of attempting to represent himself in his court case, either has been threatened with being committed to psychiatric help, or has actually been committed.

Typically, the hapless individual is at a loss. He may be enraged, or humiliated, or simply confused by the development.

What he usually doesn’t understand is that there is nothing unusual about his instant case. Our self appointed rulers frequently resort to setting up the argument that “*pro se* litigants” suffer some psychotic disorder.

What he further doesn't understand is there is a long tradition of one segment of the community, usually those holding power, to set up the accusation/argument that other members whom they wish to dominate for religious, political, economic, or other reasons are "mentally disturbed."

To appreciate the institutionalization of the "mentally disturbed" ploy as a common practice in America to get rid of those who refuse to religiously or politically align themselves with the "powers that be," one should read the works of Thomas S. Szasz, a noted psychiatrist. In particular his books titled *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry*, *The Myth of Mental Illness*, and *The Manufacture of Madness*.

There is a long standing unholy alliance between the psychiatry profession and our nation's lawyers and judges and other "pillars" of our communities. They work hand in glove in creating "highly effective forms of human bondage." We are no more advanced as a society than we were several hundred years ago when religious trials for witchcraft and other crimes/sins were a standard fare on the dockets of ecclesiastical courts.

Today's religious/political prisoners are not accused of being "heretics" or even of being "deviants," instead other currently politically correct labels are used. What they share with individuals accused of being witches, usurers, or other crimes against the Lords Spiritual or the Lords Temporal in the past is that for one reason or another they are deemed to be interfering with the sensible rhythms of the community's *status quo* as viewed by those presuming to hold power.

Therefore, it is important to know with whom you are playing. Of course, fanatics are inherently at a disadvantage in this game because being "true believers," in their specific cause they are blind to the views of all others.

The American nation was built on this attitude. For fanatics compelled to appear in court things are bad enough when the adversaries whom they face are not also fanatics to some cause or other, but when their adversaries, to include the judge, are fanatics to boot it is a real killer.

Therefore, consider this point: When a judge or a prosecuting attorney is also a fanatic unable to see anything but the beacons flashing along the route of his own private crusade, then do you suppose a defendant who can only see and argue his view of the universe could very well be a candidate for "psychiatric evaluation?"

Similarly for the pacifist who has mapped into some "wacko" sounding lines of argument and is only able to "parrot" the spiel which he has passively accepted. Unable to break out of the programmed lines he has adopted on blind faith, he projects to his adversaries the appearance of being unbalanced, or worse, signals by his performance that

he will be incapable of fending off charges of needing a “psychiatric evaluation” if they are injected into the proceedings.

You must understand how the keepers of our society endeavor to isolate and stigmatize the modern day dissenter who appears to threaten their *status quo* no differently than the “heretic” or “deviate” of yesterday. You will understand how such policies are conducted pursuant to their truly held belief they act for the good of the victim.

Therefore, you will better understand one more reason why being a fanatic to your cause, what ever it is, or simply one of the multitudinous pacifists, can get you in trouble. You will understand why there can be no substitute for learning to think critically and to use your critical thinking powers to protect yourself from the mindless elitist classes and their mindless wizards, lackeys, and stooges.

The irony of being accused of being in need of psychiatric help is that the typical citizen is incompetent to shift the burden of proof where it belongs on his adversaries. The answer is not to run and hide. The answer is to determine to use your brain actively instead of passively.

It should be easy to avoid every getting into the situation of being considered a candidate for “psychiatric evaluation,” but to accomplish that task you will have to be more rational than your self-assumed handlers, to include the psychiatrists, who are licensed to judge who is rational and who ain't.

THE BURDEN OF DEFENDING THE *STATUS QUO*

Now we come to one of the main events of American rulership: defense of the *status quo*.

Ole Rip Van Winkle is supposed to have eased off into the nearby woods on a summer's afternoon to take a snooze and not awakened to come home for supper for 40 years. He discovered things had changed considerably. It is an astonishing fact that there are tens of millions of Americans who may as well have been asleep their entire lives for all they know about the dynamics of change in everything we experience as “life,” to include the practical side of governance in America.

They don't teach practical politics and governance in Political Science 101 at Rubber Duck University. And they have probably abandoned Civics classes at Bill Clinton High School – probably having replaced that part of the curricula with a full one semester course in how to fill out a 1040A income tax form.

So here's the big secret about what the main concern of governing at the local, state, and federal levels come down to: maintaining the *status quo* for the self appointed,

self aggrandizing, propertied elitist classes to include all their wizards, lackeys, and stooges who supposedly toil as the people's political trustees. Is this tough to grasp?

This means that when you go into court:

- o Arguing your unalienable rights to plenary due process of law as a holder of the inherent political power, or
- o You bring up the subject of your state and national constitutions, and
- o You challenge the authority of those public servants moving against you, and
- o You question the lawfulness of certain of their acts,

Then you should expect the judge, the prosecutor, the law enforcement officer, and every other official and bureaucrat involved in your case to be interested in nothing else but maintaining the sociopolitical/socioeconomic balance of their little piece of the world.

And that piece is perceived to belong to the aforesaid elitist classes and those who serve them. This is our Institutional Autocracy in operation. There is no place here for individuals demanding their so-called constitutional rights be respected or demanding anything at all about their individual personality be respected to include their life, their liberty, nor their property.

Therefore you must understand with whom you are dealing and you must understand how to make your arguments regarding the only lawful authority in the land. That being an authority which begins with you and not with the great, headless, corporate beast of the Institutional Autocracy.

You must realize your adversaries will automatically assume the burden of defending the *status quo* and will take up their defensive and offensive positions accordingly whenever playing their roles as public officials. You must realize that without even thinking about it, they simply presume their authority begins and ends with the interests of the elitist classes and themselves and that notions of the people holding the inherent political power are foreign to them.

And consequently, you must be skilled in the art of argument sufficient to the task of forcing your adversaries to admit their authority is fraudulent and bogus when ever such is the case. And most of the time "such is the case."

The author's 3-volume *Travel as of Right* workshop materials address the substantive and procedural issues and elements of this business as they relate to the traffic law scheme specifically. But it all applies equally to all other regulatory schemes. The present workshop addresses the key subjects of the art of argument itself.

Make no mistake, no matter where one starts on the burden compass, the final issue where burdens are concerned in American Jurisprudence is the issue of who has the burden of proof when ever charges are made which require adjudication.

How ironic though that the aforesaid burden points must be considered before there will be any meaningful context for considering the present issue. And all because failing to realize the context of his predicament, the individual can only harbor false expectations regarding his chances for a proper proceeding wherein the burden of proof holds firmly where our peculiar American political metaphysics says it must lie.

Therefore, consider the following:

THE BURDEN OF PROVING INNOCENCE

For a long while in the courts of England — both the king's and the ecclesiastical courts — the burden was on the defendant to prove his innocence. After trials by ordeal were done away with, the defendant's case went before a jury. Interestingly, for a long while the practice of many English courts was to a theory that because the burden of proving innocence was on the defendant, the prosecution could make no case at all. This had the effect of resulting in acquittals for most defendants because juries only heard their side of the story.⁷

This theory came to America with the early colonists as part of their English common law heritage, but many trials were by ordeal and many others were conducted allowing the prosecution to argue. The burden was intolerably on hapless defendants.

The Salem witch trials brought an end to the theory of guilty until proven innocent in America. Outcry from the news of these trials in other colonies and their own revulsion in the Massachusetts colony brought an end to this theory. The theory of innocent until proven guilty became the American common law — a part of its unwritten constitution. It was incorporated in their respective written state constitutions and the national constitution later when they formed governments for the protection of their unalienable rights and defense against foreigners following "independence."

THE BURDEN OF PROVING GUILT

As just reviewed, the law of the land in America is defendants are innocent until proven guilty. It is exceedingly ironic that now this applies as well as for the corporate beasts which are merely "fictions at law" styled as "artificial persons" as it does for the

⁷ For a most comprehensive review of the evolution of law in England following the fall of Rome, see *A Concise History of the Common Law*, by Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass. 1956.

holders of the inherent political power whose land this is said to be and for whom there are courts within their governments.

The principle of innocent until proving guilty was posited as the unalienable right of sovereign Americans. It was intended to serve the people and not artificial creatures which might subsequently be created upon nothing more than outrageous presumption of their right to do so, in the name of "the state," when no such right can be demonstrated in the first place and then empower those *corpora ficta* creatures with legal rights in the second place.⁸

Such is the evolution of the new ruling class – the Institutional Autocracy.

In any case, there is another equally astonishing irony at work: In practice, the typical *pro se* defendant goes to court to answer to charges of violating laws and committing crimes with no proper idea of the elements of proof, nor does he understand the difference between having to prove his case versus holding the prosecution to conclusively proving his case against the defendant. It is all a great mystery.

For this reason, many a *pro se* defendant when charged with violating some administrative law – traffic regulatory laws, for example – goes to court trying to prove he is innocent and the law enforcement officer, the prosecutor, and the judge being accustomed to witnessing these spectacles all do their parts in encouraging the proceedings along those lines.

The same thing typically happens even if said citizen defendant brings an attorney to represent him.

Either the attorney really doesn't know diddley squat about where the burden lies himself. Or, he understands the concept, but the practice of the principle is beyond his grasp -- meaning he doesn't understand how to argue and require the elements of proof from the prosecution.

Or he knows these things, but goes along with the show knowing his client is too ignorant to recognize the screwing he's getting.

Therefore, the burden will fall on the citizen when faced with being a defendant against "the state," to understand how to argue the burden of proof rests on the prosecution and to compel the acquittal in the absence of conclusive proof beginning with conclusive proof of any jurisdiction at all.

⁸ For a review of the monkey business of corporations such as you will find no where else, read the author's book *American Catastrophe: Corporations and Their Attendant Franchises and Rights* to be published in 2000.

When an individual is charged with some genuinely criminal law violation, proceedings must follow the state's criminal Rules of Court. If the individual intends to defend himself, he absolutely must learn the business of "elements of proof." This is not a one day program. But it begins with the study of criminal pleadings and practices in his state, or federal as the case may be.

Typically he is arrested and jailed. Most crimes today are prosecuted via the "plea bargaining" scheme. There are criminal lawyers who practice for years and have never brought a case to trial because they handle all their cases by selling their clients on plea bargaining whether innocent or guilty of the alleged crimes. Guilt or innocence are irrelevancies. What is different about today than 400 years ago? Not as much as you may think. Cutting deals is all the rage because it's cost effective and because everybody but the defendant gets to "look good" and adjourn early for a few rounds of golf or other indulgent pastimes.

Likewise, when the charges relate to some administrative law issue, the first order of business is challenging subject-matter jurisdiction. Now the burden is on "the state" to prove firstly the court even has the right to hear the case at all. Where administrative laws are concerned, this is rarely the case. This subject and much more are addressed in painfully exquisite detail in the author's 3-volume *Travel as of Right* workshop materials/manuals.

And not lastly, when the citizen finds himself the defendant in a tort, the burden rests on the plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

What else must we say?

CHAPTER 14

THE JURY AND OTHER ALLIES TO YOUR CAUSE

“Oh give me a break, just a ten-minute break,
When I don't have to sit and listen to this shit,
Oh, give me a chance to get up and dance,
For it's such a bore, I long for the door.”

*Note left by an anonymous juror in a jury box after
the jury's dismissal, quoted from **The Jury: Trial
and Error in the American Courtroom** by Stephen
J. Adler*

**MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments
require understanding how to transform the jury, as well as,
the judge, the prosecutor, and all witnesses into your allies
regardless of their preconceptions, their presumptions, and
their emotional and rationalized commitments to their own
beliefs and causes which may conflict with your case.**

DO YOU EXPECT MORE FROM THE JURY AND ALL THE “OTHERS” THAN YOU SHOULD EXPECT FROM YOURSELF?

Do you seek justice in your case?

Do you expect the law enforcement officers, lawyers, the judge and any other
public servants in your case to obey the law pertaining to your case?

Do you understand the law and the facts in your case?

These are not casual questions. Too many people are unrealistic about their
encounters with their state's (or federal) judicial system/schemes.

If you filed a civil complaint, then you are a plaintiff. If you are summoned to
appear in court on a civil complaint or charged with some crime, then you are a defendant.

The first question is: "Do you really understand the law and the facts which you are raising in your case as a plaintiff or which others are raising if you are the defendant?"

The first question begs a second question as its answer:

What is it that you must know if you are to know with any confidence that you know the law and the facts of your case?

Answer:

You must learn the significance of being able to verify through meaningful feedback with the external world that has relevance just what is the law of your case and the facts of your case. This means you must be linguistically literate in order to recognize the significance of critical thinking to your success and in order to develop your critical thinking capacities. If you do not have comprehension of the epistemological/semantic difficulties and pitfalls in your language, then you will not realize your not insurmountable limitations of language are imposing insurmountable limitations on your powers of reasoning, thus ability to recognize the political and law facts in your case, or meaningful, verifiable facts in any of your experiential encounters of your life.

Everything that the neuroscientists and the general semanticists can teach you will serve you regarding your study of the law subjects which you seek to find and understand as the basis for your having any case in the first place. Likewise, regarding your study and understanding of the facts which you believe give rise to your right to seek redress for the wrong(s) you perceive your defendant(s) committed against you when the plaintiff, or to have your case dropped or acquitted when you are a defendant.

How is this? The answer is absurdly simple – this likely accounts for the reason it is usually overlooked.

The answer is that we are easily deceived by ourselves. This is nothing to be embarrassed about. It is a matter of being human. It is a matter of understanding. And how better to understand yourself, meaning your own mind, than to understand basics of the functionality of the human brain? It would, after all, be self deception to suppose yours is not a human brain, would it not?

Realizing the difference between passive learning and thinking and active learning and thinking and how the brain engages in both modes is critically significant to your prospects for being successful in the courtroom with your cases and also all other occasions when you must be more than a mere consumer/worker bee/robocitizen....

Realizing that development of critical thinking is the key to success where law matters are concerned....

Realizing that critical thinking is active thinking mode behavior....

And regarding all this, there is also the critical importance of your discovering the insights and methodologies of the general semanticists, which they have contributed to the body of linguistic works said to be the science of epistemology, and realizing the insights and methodologies of the general semantics provide serious tools in aiding your comprehension of the language in which you are constrained to know the law and the facts of your case and, thus, constrained to argue the law and the facts of your case.

Fantasies are born of misunderstandings about the law and the facts. These will not provide your platform for prevailing. Fantasies are but the result of illusions and deceptions and the illusions and deceptions arise because of innocent lack of acquaintanceship with the limitations of the very language of law and the language in which the facts are constrained to be presented.

Know this: Not only are many Americans functionally illiterate, but almost all Americans are linguistic illiterates. If you are to be the master of your fate where encounters with law are concerned, then you can afford to be neither a functional illiterate or a linguistic illiterate.

America's high school, college, and university diploma mills "matriculate" hundreds of thousands of "graduates" each year. It is big business. But, realize that hardly any of them are linguistically literate meaning have working comprehension of the limitations of their mother tongue as vehicle for communication of their thoughts to their fellow humans or to themselves. In such manner does the virus of self illusions and deceptions spread to each succeeding generation. It is done through simple, innocent failure to realize the mother tongue is as easily the medium for conveying meaningful, verifiable thoughts and messages as for conveying meaningless nonsense. What irony to realize that human society spins on year after year sustained on uncountable illusions, deceptions, and delusions because the greater portion of all human communications are unverifiable, meaningless nonsense which make sense only because the human brain has no more difficulty processing nonsensical messages as processing verifiable messages. The difference in how messages are processed is the difference between passive experiences and active experiences where active experiences are, by and large, critical thinking experiences.

So back to the original questions of this chapter.

First. **Do you seek justice in your case?**

"Justice" is a high level linguistic abstraction. "Justice" can't be verified to exist in the observable, external, "real" world can it? If you say "yes," you already have a problem here. Some will say "yes." It will mean there are serious confusions existing in

their minds obscuring their knowing the external world versus their knowing the universes existing virtually in their minds.

But “no,” is the most likely verifiable answer. Realizing “justice” is a metaphysical concept conceived by members of mankind will serve usefully in being able to critically analyze your motives and your expectations for your case. It will be important to realize that “justice” is a high level linguistic abstraction as the general semanticists describe it having no meaning at all outside of some explicit contextual use of the word. It will be important because you will understand how to give the idea of justice meaning in your individual cases when they occur and not just in your mind, but in the minds of the others involved in your case — judges and jurors, for example.

If you believe you seek justice, then you must understand how the idea of justice is perceived by you, by your adversaries, and by the jury. This means you must have spent some time critically thinking about this strictly metaphysical concept known as justice which will mean that you have done some study about what American jurists have said about it and also you will do some investigation to learn what the so-called average American thinks justice is. Along the way you will be uncovering things about the idea which you didn't know to include your own idea which you didn't really consciously know as well as you may have thought. And it will mean you will be able to look at your case with new insight as to whether you have any case at all in terms of justice being done which will be favorable to you. It may turn out that “justice” would be served if your adversaries prevail. Also, it will mean that you will begin to develop ability to argue the issue of justice as a part of the issues of your case. And not lastly, as you investigate all this you may find that the “professionals” in the law business appear most if not all of the time interested in everything but justice. All this must be evaluated as a part of critical analysis of the merits of your stance.

Second. Do you expect the law enforcement officers, lawyers, the judge and any other public servants in your case to obey the law pertaining to your case?

There is an old lawyer's adage which runs:

“When you have the law on your side, argue the law.

“When you have the facts on your side, argue the facts.

“When you have neither the law or the facts on your side, then assassinate the character of the person.”

[Here “person” means plaintiff, defendant, or witness, as the case may be, whose case, or testimony, the lawyer is adversarial to.]

Is this a tip on what the lawyering business is all about?

Is it a clue about how judges operate when someone is challenging their bureaucratic/statist-oriented/me-first turf?

Is this an insight about how lawyers and judges form in alliance when their mutual turf to include their egos are being challenged?

Realize that having no law to back them or no facts to back them is no deterrent to lawyers generally. Furthermore, it is usually the case for judges.

How do you deal with such schemers?

But first, imagine being so innocent of the proceedings of law and the nation's systems for justice, that the individual can only see he is wronged and he has a right to redress? Sadly, that is the very condition of many Americans. Critical thinking includes investigation of the real world and critical analysis of one's observations.

The pacifists buy at face value the propaganda and hockey puck ceaselessly hypergenerated by America's self appointed elitist ruling classes and their now autonomously running amuck Institutional Autocracy via a thousand forms of media.

The fanatics run open loop on their own causes constructing their own propaganda and hockey puck as they go in support of their ideas of law, justice, and every thing else.

But to succeed in your instant cases, you must understand the law in your case and be able to recognize when law enforcement officers, lawyers, judges and all others involved in your case are not observing the law. In this way you will bring proper law for review and you will know when that law is being observed. Likewise, you will know when your adversaries have not brought proper law to the case when you are the defendant. How can you do this except by critical thinking and analysis?

Why must you do this?

Because in no other way will you be able to build your arguments into "magical arguments" with which you can enlist the jury to become your ally.

Third. Do you understand the law and the facts in your case?

What has already been said, applies here also. How can you enlist the jury to be your ally, if you do not really understand and know the law and the facts in your case?

Many are the self deceived who believe they have been wronged, but it turns out they can establish no law for their case and worse they can't even establish meaningful, verifiable facts for a case. Critical thinking skills mean everything here. Passive thinking and knowledge so acquired, lead to all sorts of misconceptions, illusions, deceptions, and delusions.

Guess what? The primary business of our elitist minded fellow Americans and the now running amuck Institutional Autocracy they have created is to feed and nurture a nation of pacifists. A nation of consumer/worker bee/robocitizens who feed, labor, vote, and pay their taxes on command. A nation of passive learners and thinkers.

So, should it be a surprise that many folks can have unverifiable, even incoherent ideas, thus illusions and even delusions about what is law, about what their rights are, about what the facts of their case are, etc.? Indeed!

But, if you really do understand the law and the facts of your case – a process which occurs by maintaining a meaning feedback loop between your own brain and the rest of the so-called “real” world -- that is the external world where the attitudes of law dwell in other minds and where the facts of your case can be found, then guess what?

**HOW DO YOU MAKE THE JURY
AND ALL “OTHERS”
IN YOUR INSTANT CASE
YOUR ALLIES?**

You can make the jury your ally. You can construct the “magical argument.” It will be magical, not because some one declared it was magical – an act of mere abstract decree. But, rather because it proves indeed at that moment in time, to be magical.

Likewise, you can make the judge and the lawyers/prosecutors who stand against you also your allies -- your strong allies.

How do you do this?

It is done because you truly have the law on your side and the facts on your side. And you are effective in your ability to argue the law and the facts of your case.

When you go to court and the issue is clearly that the court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case brought against you in the first place, then your first ally will be the judge. If you know how to bring a proper challenge of subject matter jurisdiction before the court, the judge most of the time will fall into all sorts of antics to avoid properly answering the challenge.

If you understand, how to ask the right kinds of questions ¹ regarding the nature of his office, and the necessity of his making a proper answer to your challenge, and you

¹ Remember, learning how to ask the most meaningful questions possible, is the essence of being a scientist, notwithstanding not everyone with a Ph D in some science discipline is thus automatically a scientist. The reason being many of these individuals may not have learned how to ask the most meaningful possible questions in pursuit of their endeavors as scientists. Being able to ask every more incisively meaningful questions is at the epistemological core of discovery. How else can you extract

know how raise the issue of his “good faith” obligation to answer your challenge made in good faith, then you can begin a dialog which will lead to his having to admit he has ~~know~~ authority to hear the case. Most often judges nowadays are either too ignorant or too arrogant to recognize when the law brought against you does not apply, therefore, they will steam roller you. But, if your know how to play the “good faith” game with them, you will recruit him as your ally. That is to say, a point will be reached where the judge will see the “rightness” – the “justice” in your argument and he will want to do “justice.” He will drop your case, one way or another.

There can be times, when the judge doesn’t want to let go and drop the case. It can happen because he is so abysmally ignorant or arrogant of the law and fanatically committed to his post, that he simply is unable to let go. He is still your ally. But only if your dialog establishes he is clearly ignoring his “good faith” duty to you and all the people by proceeding as he is doing without ever answering your challenge. Recall it is fundamental of American jurisprudence that when subject-matter jurisdiction is challenged, the challenge must be answered first before proceeding to the case and that for this reason alone the court loses subject-matter jurisdiction.²

You now sue him in a tort action for failure to deal in good faith.³ Done properly, an affirmative defense of “judicial immunity” will not be sustained as grounds for dismissal of your tort suit brought against the judge.

Judicial immunity applies only when a court has subject-matter jurisdiction. When such is challenged and the challenge is unanswered, then there is no subject-matter jurisdiction, hence no basis for claiming “judicial immunity.”

Therefore, realize that even when a judge refuses to answer your challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction he remains your ally, if you know what you are doing. How?

It happens when you bring your tort suit and the attorney representing him regarding your suit appears before the second court attempting to get your suit dismissed and is unable to show the judge ever answered your challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction in the earlier case wherein you were defendant.

“truth” out of your public servants than by asking them questions they can’t answer without admitting they have no authority in your case? How else can you show a jury the facts in your case, but by asking questions which get to those facts which the jury will recognize are in favor your of cause and not your opponents?

² This business is reviewed in depth in the author’s *Travel as of Right* workshop materials, namely, a court may even be able to prove subject-matter jurisdiction if challenged, but if the judge fails to answer the challenge by showing the jurisdiction, then the court loses the jurisdiction in that case. This is no small point where challenges and answers of subject-matter jurisdiction are concerned in American jurisprudence.

³ The author’s *Torts: Your Remedy When Your Public Servants Act in Bad Faith* workshop materials review this subject in extensive detail complete with exhibits of a proper tort complaint, memos of law, motions, etc.

When his attorney fails to be able to show your defendant judge ever answered your challenge according to law, then they fail to show the judge ever had any judicial authority in your case, therefore, he can't claim judicial immunity.

Now he must answer your tort complaint no differently than any other citizen. He has failed to show he was acting as a judicial officer, your political trustee, but rather was simply in his political trustor capacity acting as though he were a judge.

In attempting to get around this most obvious problem, he and his attorney will raise one nonsensical argument after another. You will be able to rebut their arguments, that is to say defeat their arguments with yours if your linguistically literate.

That will mean you are able to recognize each and every fallacy they raise as argument and expose by rebuttal those fallacies compelling them to answer your rebuttals. In so doing they will have to admit their fallacious arguments are irrelevant, nonsensical, etc. Such is the nature of fallacies. But realize only the epistemologically knowledgeable will recognize fallacies and challenge them exposing them for what they are to the jury, to the court, to the world. Likewise, in the process you will also be showing the jury, all others, and the world that your adversaries proceeded against you in bad faith in the earlier proceeding which is giving rise to your present tort action.

All that is said for the judge above, applies equally to any prosecutor moving against you when you were defendant.

Likewise, should you ever be a defendant in a criminal matter in which it appears no challenge of subject-matter jurisdiction is sustainable and you are compelled to defend against the actual charges, then even here both the judge and the prosecutor can be made your allies when they have no law or facts in their case.

Again, none of this plays if you do not really understand the law and the facts of your case. In many instances, individuals do not have verifiable law and facts on their side, but want to believe that they do.

And you must understand priceless wisdom of Gerry Spence regarding magical arguments in his book *How to Argue and Win Every Time*.

When you understand what Gerry has to say and you are also a linguistic literate in consequence of your understanding of the epistemological pitfalls of our languages and communications, from which it follows you understand how to recognize fallacies and turn your adversaries' fallacies on them, then you can make the jury and all others your allies in your causes.

Your written arguments will “sound” in facts which can’t be rebutted except by irrelevant and rebuttable nonsense and your oral arguments will “sound” in “truth” as only magical arguments can. By your oral and written arguments you will recruit the jury and all others to become your allies in your causes.

What more is there to say?

Nothing as far as the conceptual ideas of justice, rights, wrongs, magical arguments, etc. are concerned.

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

But, there are always more books which will further your understanding of the concept of the jury and their potential as your allies. In reading these books you will also gain further insights into how all “others” involved in your cases are recruited as your allies to include, opposing attorneys, prosecutors, judges, witnesses, etc. Among such books are the following:

The Jury: Trial and Error in the American Courtroom, Stephen J. Adler, Time Books/Random House, 1994. A highly useful, primarily anecdotal, introduction to the American jury system. Includes discussions of the theories and principles of the American jury.

Jury Nullification: The Evolution of a Doctrine, Clay S. Conrad, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, N. C., 1998. This a unique book providing a most comprehensive overview of the principle of so-called jury nullification in America. Written by a trial lawyer. Loaded with all the major cases and issues regarding jury nullification. The only short coming is that being written by a lawyer, it fails to make fundamentally clear the real reason for jury nullification in the first place. Namely, the political fact that the people being the holders of the inherent political power, they have the unreserved right to decide both the law and the facts of every case they hear. This is one of the most painful of all subjects to our elitist-minded fellow Americans and is thoroughly “trained” out of America’s “professional” lawyering class. This will be the subject of a book the author is putting together. It will pick up where Clay Conrad leaves off in his absolutely “must read” book.

Crime and Punishment in American History, Lawrence M. Friedman, Basic Books, a Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1993. This is a must read book also for a big picture introduction to what has been considered crime in America form the early 1600’s through this decade. You will get your eyes opened about a lot of things. It goes into everything, the definitions of crimes, the culture, everything. There is one point however, regarding our modern ideas about who is to administer and enforce our criminal laws. The author makes the presumption that criminal law must be entrusted into the

hands of a trained, "*professional*" class because the public at large are just "*amateurs*" when it comes to maintaining an orderly society. If there were ever a "fatal" presumption loose in the land, this is it. It permeates the thinking of modern America's elitist classes. Truly total societal disaster looms on this foolish notion. The Institutional Autocracy looms large and out of control to be destroyed in time by its own "professional" and arrogant stupidity.

An Essay on the Trial by Jury, Lysander Spooner, 1852. Spooner was a prolific 19th Century American lawyer and jurist. This treatise, long out of print, will provide an unparalleled knowledge of the History of the English and American jury systems and what our jury system still means to this day. Such can be said because our political facts upon which American governance is wholly dependent remains unchanged, notwithstanding all the "living constitution," "constitutional policy" flimflam to the contrary. This book is available from the author as a reprint for \$30.00 including shipping and handling.

CHAPTER 15

YOU – WRIT LARGE

“Consider the postage stamp: its usefulness consists in the ability to stick to one thing till it gets there.”

Josh Billings

“Men are often capable of greater things than they perform. They are sent into the world with bills of credit, and seldom draw to their full extent.”

Horace Walpole

“The wind and the waves are always on the side of the ablest navigator.”

Edward Gibbon

MEGASECRET: Effective oral and written arguments in your individual case requires you master the art of making “magical arguments” and this comes from the power within.

Only you.

No one else can do it for you.

The old Chinese proverb declares “*A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.*” To this very day, many Chinese peasants literally walk thousand mile journeys to get from their province to one of the cities seeking their “fortunes.” So did Americans at one time. Today few of us will even “walk to the corner store.”

There is no magic in learning to be a magician.

There is no magic in discovering the art of critical thinking, but there can be a sense of magic in the realization of the discovery.

Do not be surprised to discover the epistemological path cleared by the methodologies of the general semanticists will be your shortest route to developing your powers of critical thinking.

Do not be surprised to discover that in the process you will empower yourself.

Do not be surprised to discover that once you are able to empower yourself through critical thinking skills, you will have a new kind of confidence in your arguments

YOU – Writ Large

with which you will also unlock the power of your “heart” to utter your “magical” arguments.

Do not be surprised to find through such self empowerment your arguments have the “credibility” which Gerry Spence describes.

Do not be surprised to discover when you have empowered yourself that the “others,” to include your “adversaries,” empower you also.

Do not fail to set out to empower yourself.

For if you do, there is no reason why you will not succeed. You only have to “stay the course” and it will happen.

And the experience will be yours.

EPILOGUE AND POST MORTEM

“...the development of commercial society..., with the triumphal victory of exchange value over value, first introduced the principle of interchangeability, then the relativization, and finally the devaluation of all values.”

Hannah Arendt

“Scarcely anything is more difficult than something that is obvious.”

Wendell Johnson

“What ails most people is not that they are ignorant, but that they know to much that isn't so.”

Adolf Meyer

“Everything is connected.”

*Fundamental tenet of American
Indian belief and philosophy.*

If you would understand that which must be understood in order to argue successfully in the courtroom and elsewhere, then you will need to understand the state of the American mind at the end of this 20th Century. It will reveal things about the state of your own mind you may not have realized.

In the chapters of this workshop much has been made of understanding how your brain functions. In such understanding will come realization that the neocortical brain doesn't likely know the difference between “right” and “wrong,” “good” and “evil,” “truth” and “falsity” – at least not in terms of any “hard-wired” functionality. Likewise, there isn't likely any instinctive or intuitive way of knowing the meaning of words, symbols, or the like.

What our ideas of law, ideas of rulership, and ideas of all our societal customs and practices mean to us must be learned. Many are of the presumption that where law, rulership, and other customs of a nation are concerned, there must be mutual understanding of members of the society regarding the meaning of the specifics of law, rulership, and other customs or there will be social chaos. It is a reasonable presumption.

Imagine a society where ideas of law, rulership, and other customs of the nation no longer have any meaning at all to many members of the community – or the meanings they do have are simply used or invented when convenient or in order to gain some advantage over another. Does it seem absurd to imagine such a society could exist, at least for very long?

Well what if you discovered such a society existing now and it is your America?

Consider the following:

Alan Bloom from his vantage point in the American academic community writes a New York Times best seller – *The Closing of the American Mind* in which he makes a compelling case that nihilism, a composite term for elements of several past schools of European philosophy, now prevails as the state of mind, or attitude, of college and university administrators and professors.

The nihilistic ¹view now dominates the intellectual agendas of the liberal arts departments and related of our colleges and universities influencing every aspect of teaching policy and curricula. The nihilistic camp took control during the late 60's Vietnam student uprisings.

Bloom's argument is said to be that the social and political crisis which the 60's ushered in is really an intellectual crisis of the nation. The points he makes in his book are all well taken.

That a crisis of the American state of mind is at hand is clear if the individual troubles himself to begin taking readings from the American pulse. It is the policy prevailing throughout our local, state, and federal governments.

Lawyers and judges define the law to be what ever they can get away with. Any lawyer can find case law to "support" any position on an issue he may wish to prove. Winning is everything. Nothing else matters. Shepardizing case law is farce.

¹ Broadly described, nihilism in its contemporary usage is a philosophy of negation rejection of traditional morality, order, and authority, together with the feeling that no basis exists on which a new order can be erected. It denotes an extreme skepticism for the idea that there can be any objective basis of truth or objectivity. Ironically, the entirety of propositions comprising nihilistic views are on analysis reduced to linguistic fallacies. Knowledge of the linguistic methodologies offered by general semantics provides the individual with the means of recognizing the circularity of reasoning built into the nihilistic arguments along with the attendant confounding of contextual meaning in the very words of the nihilistic arguments and ideas and all the rest of the linguistic confusions of meaning. Nihilistic arguments on epistemological/general semantics analysis are seen to be nothing more than constructions of nihilistic-oriented virtual realities. Nihilists fail to comprehend the real-world upon which they are dependent for physical existence outside of the virtual world constructions of nihilism. Vernacularly speaking, they are caught up in "word games" and "mind games." In other words, they reflect to extreme what is a wide spread Western world infirmity; namely, partial and sometimes total incapacity to perceive the external world as it actually exists at any given moment either from sensory impairment to receive external world information or from mental impairment/blockage to process sensory organ input.

Constitutions are farce. The only thing that has meaning in the courtroom is what the judge wills to have meaning.

Judges make "decisions" and issue "rulings" taking any position on an issue that suits their political or personal mood of the moment. A reading of *Closed Chambers* by Edward Lazarus who served as a law clerk in the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 1990's will introduce you to the antics and outrages of the nation's chief justices.

In the executive department of the federal government it isn't just the "chief executive" who defines words and ideas, etc. to mean what ever suits him. The same goes for Congress and all the "fourth branch" of federal government follies/departments.

Ditto at the state levels. Ditto at the local levels. Who doesn't know of at least one scandal in his state or local government? Answer: The brain dead.

Every social institution and enterprise across the land will reveal the nihilistic view of "meaning is what you make of it" attitude in full flush. Why? In order to gain control, to win, to make it, to succeed, to make a profit, to make a bigger profit, to monopolize, to be top dog.....

But there has to be a reason, an explanation, for the nation's social, political, and intellectual crisis. What is it?

Are not the subjects of this workshop addressing many of the reasons? But there is more that can be said regarding the reason.

There is more than one reason in the explanation.

If one were held to giving a one reason answer the best one might be to say the reason is the nation is in a state of linguistic unsanity caused by wide spread linguistic illiteracy. To understand this answer one must first read *People in Quandaries* by Wendell Johnson.

More insight and a further glimpse at the answer can be had by reading *A Nation of Salesmen: The Tyranny of the Market and the Subversion of Culture* by Earl Shorris, Avon Books, 1994. Shorris like Jerry Mander, earlier discussed, was an advertising man who built his own ad agency.

Just as Alan Bloom provides us with an explanation of what has happened to American higher education as seen from the academic perspective, so Earl Shorris gives us another view taken from the salesman/advertising man's perspective. And it is devastating.

We get an important history and evolution of the American salesman. It is a positive image of a class of men who helped America grow by providing a needed service

in the form of “drummers” and “peddlers” crisscrossing the land with their wares. It is the story of whole new markets for wares and services opening up because of the pioneering promotions of salesmen and then admen.

But at some point, selling became an end in itself. More importantly, the salesman and the adman learned the importance of twisting the meaning of things real and virtual to mean what ever was convenient to have them mean in order to complete the sales transaction. To “do the deal.”

The meaning of things apart from the transaction — the deal — were no longer important -- no longer relevant. What mattered was that anything could mean anything as long as a sale was made.

The American salesman’s *raison d’etre* is an observation found to be practically every American’s reason for being. It is the reason for the many manias which infect the people from Wall Street and Madison Avenue and Pennsylvania Avenue to Main Street. It is the infestation of the land.

To quote just one passage from Shorris:

“Surrounded by relative values, with no influence on the setting of those values, the salesman lives apart from the meaning of things and acts. After all, how can he know what something means if he cannot judge it, but must wait for others to do so, and then accept whatever they say as if he were a blank slate? Moreover, he must accept the judgment of the market as it happens: yes one day, no the next; good in the morning, bad in the evening. Even after it has been inscribed, the black slate has no permanence; the judgments by which *homo vendens* lives changes constantly. What meaning can be assigned then other than impermanence?

“Condemned to endless and ever-changing tolerance, separated from judgment, *homo vendens* responds to relativism by negating all meaning. He has no choice, no other way to respond, for to accept meaning imposed by others, with no hope of affecting it, would be to live as an intellectual chattel, a slave to other men’s opinions. Yet the salesman’s alternative results in an equally inhuman condition: By denying the value of value, making everything relative, he reduces life to a process over which no one has control. Unlike the nihilists of the preceding century, the salesman does not conclude that everything is permitted; he sees everything as worthless — that is, what is done or not done has no importance.

“Once he arrives at such a conclusion, *homo vendens* is set loose, not free, but disconnected, isolated. He suffers a loneliness unimaginable even to the nihilist, for the nihilist lived in response. He rejected something. Permission, even in the nihilist credo, must be granted, implying a judgment by some force, some group, some set of rules from which permission can be secured. In the world of *homo vendens*, permission no longer matters,

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transactions matter; nothing else on earth or in heaven, not love, or money, nothing can truly be said to have value but the transaction itself.”

If you haven't noticed, everyone in America now seems intent on selling something. Every thing is for sell. Everyone knows “the price of everything, but the value of nothing.”

Among contemporary America's salesmen, you will find:

o The law enforcement officer, the prosecutor, the judge are selling the “law” and “authority.” Never mind the law enforcement officer can't explain the law he enforces or its authority. Never mind the prosecutor argues the law he presumes to use in his case, but can't explain it. Never mind the judge issues rulings but can't explain his reasons for his decisions by any proper statement of conclusions of law in his decisions and orders. Never mind that none of them knows or cares what the meaning of law is.

o The educator who knows nothing of his subject, but is prepared to teach it or more typically project an illusion of teaching.²

o The minister who is selling his “faith,” yet knows nothing of the many interpretations of his own religion by others professing his own faith nor cares, or dares to know, but believes with “all his heart” and “purse” that his version is the only and “one true” interpretation” of his religion. Not daring to actively think about the meaning of his faith, he must constrain himself to the chanting of the dogma and to willful enforcement of his dogma on all who will receive it.³

o The scientist who must use care in defining things pertaining to his chosen discipline in order to get verifiable results, but who abandons reason of necessity in order to get along with the rest of his society more especially with those obsessed with control and monopoly of the political and economic resources of the community. Why? In order to live with the rest of society – which insists on linguistic unsanity – and also to get funding for his specialty from the unsane who control the purse strings wherein only

² John Dewey (1859 - 1952), at the turn of the century, posited the proposition that any teacher could teach any subject by learning how to teach and that knowledge of the subject, itself, was secondary and even irrelevant. The educational establishment adopted this view and “teachers colleges” have cranked out the peoples' instructors for 50 to 70 years on this premise. Americans have always been linguistically illiterate -- save a small minority of each generation. But now they are illiterate in practically every subject sense, for no lack of reasons. And not lastly, where the subject of illiteracy is concerned, there is a “capstone” variety, so to speak. It goes by the label “functional illiteracy.” Things have progressed so far now, one can find functional illiterates among the nation's teachers.

³ The story of Christianity has been the story of Christians raging against other Christians. Christians raging against the heathens. Christians raging against infidels. Christians raging against heretics. Christians raging against sinners. There is no more bloody chapter in the story of man than the Christian chapters. But of course, even in their own time, Christians have never been able to seize a monopoly on blood letting for that is one of mankind's universal franchises.

within his science specialty sphere may he indulge himself in active learning, thinking and reasoning.⁴

o Then there is that unique American estate: the politician. Prostitution is illegal in America formerly for "moral" reasons, now perhaps more on grounds of "public health." But prostitution is not illegal if you are a politician. The American politician is the quintessential man for meaninglessness. Billy Bob Clinton is a stark specimen of the species, but he has always been there. America's politicians are but the reflection of Americans' ideals and beliefs which is a credo of nihilism, namely, nothing can be allowed to have meaning while at the same time denying the dynamics of the external "real" world in favor of ideas of static, unchanging, highly abstracted, meaningless virtual worlds.

What are we describing?

A nation is in its death throes for want of sanity, hence fatal inability to deal with a meaningful, "real" world.

In America, the meaning of everything is said to be relative.⁵ More importantly no one knows the meaning in anything. Few know the differences between the external "real" world and the infinitude of virtual worlds.

Many have little contact with the external "real" world at all. They are connected via an n-dimensional matrix – networks, or grids – of corporate umbilical cords to an infinitude of virtual worlds.

⁴ There is no department of science that we do not see madness engaged in order to practice the internal sanity needed within the discipline itself.

An example is the development and deployment of the "benefits" of the nuclear sciences. The "scientists" insisted that underground nuclear testing in the Nevada desert would remain "locked in the earth" posing no problems, but now it is admitted that deep underground aquifers are becoming radioactive. This means the spread of nuclear contamination in water resources in the Western states which cannot be fixed thus will exist for tens of thousands of years. In the beginning of the "nuclear age" it was understood there was no solution to the problem of "nuclear waste," but it was promoted that one would be found. Among the ideas was that it could all be "shot into space." Now it is understood there is no dumping solution and an agency of the federal government is already allowing the recycling of "low grade" radioactive materials to be used anew in goods for the American consumer.

⁵ The term "relative" and "relativism" must be understood in context as must all words. There are fanatics loose in the land who clinging desperately to their peculiarly Western world notions of absolutes in an absolute world, take raging exception to any ideas that things are relative. Of course, everything must be considered relative to other things, this is a context issue. But, others of nihilistic persuasions for want of understanding of the need for context when assigning meaning and values to things, have taken the concept of "relative" and "relativism" to establish a nihilistic argument that nothing can be allowed to have value or meaning because "everything is relative." The general semanticists describe this kind of idea, or thinking, as a multi-ordinality problem, or confusion. It occurs because the individual(s) are linguistic illiterates not recognizing the limits, the operational parameters, of their language. As an analogy, the nihilist-minded, as well as their opposite brothers, the fatalists, are like a painter who does not understand the limits of the different pigments, oils, and other materials, to include his brush and his canvas he is confined to use when painting his picture.

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Does this mean that "all is lost" and there is nothing left, but to "take the pipe?"

Only the weak-willed, the shallow minded, and the fearful will draw that conclusion.

For it is possible to become sane by seeking understanding of the functionality of the human brain from which it is possible to gain perspective on the human condition.

... coupled with seeking understanding of the obvious.

... all of which lead to understanding the "real" world in which we are constrained to live.

In the real world we find sanity because the real world cannot be comprehended on any other terms.

In our virtual worlds we may chance to find sanity, but more likely we find unsanity and insanity because only in states of unsanity and insanity may virtual worlds exist.

To understand our prospects we must be linguistically literate.

In the "real" world, everything is connected.

APPENDIX I
EPISTEMOLOGY
ARTICLE
FROM
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ¹(1977)

This article will give you a significant introduction to the subject of so-called epistemology and its scope. The subject crosses many boundary lines with man's other metaphysical endeavors, his scientific endeavors, etc.

Be neither intimidated nor dismissive of the subject of epistemology, for law dwells only with epistemological domains.

¹ First published in 1768, EB is said to be the longest continuous business enterprise in the Western world. You will find it on the Internet at eb.com. EB no longer maintains a field sales organization, but printed sets of this most authoritative of encyclopaedia are still available from the publisher pursuant to information at their aforesaid web-site.

R.B. PANDEY, *Historical and Literary Inscriptions* (1962), provides a transliterated selection of later Indic epigraphy as well. L. DEROY, *Initiation à l'épigraphie mycénienne* (1962), provides a comprehensive survey of the study of Mycenaean tablets. E.S. ROBERTS, *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, 2 vol. (1887-1905), remains the classic compendium of its kind; while more recent, shorter surveys of its subject are found in G. KLAFFENBACH, *Griechische Epigraphik* (1957); and A.G. WOODHEAD, *The Study of Greek Inscriptions* (1959). A more elaborate recent treatment is that of M. GUARDUCCI, *Epigrafia greca*, 2 vol. (1967-69). The Cretan laws have been sumptuously edited and commented in R.F. WILLETTS, "The Law Code of Gortyn," *Kadmos*, suppl. 1 (1967). The old standard works on Latin inscriptions, J.E. SANDYS, *Latin Epigraphy*, 2nd ed. rev. (1927); and R.L.V. CAGNAT, *Cours d'épigraphie latine*, 3rd ed. (1898), are updated only in such summary surveys as R. BLOCH, *L'épigraphie latine*, 3rd ed. (1964). The elaborate edition of the principal Umbrian inscription by J.W. POULTNEY, *The Bronze Tables of Iguvium* (1959), gives text, translation, grammar, extensive commentary, and facsimiles of the tables themselves. R.W.V. ELLIOTT, *Runes; An Introduction* (1959), is especially thorough on the side of British runes; while W. KRAUSE, *Runen* (1970), is a compact but comprehensive survey of the entire field of runology.

(J.P.L.)

Epistemology

Epistemology (Greek *epistēmē*, "knowledge") is here understood as the study of the nature and validity of knowledge. Typically, epistemologists examine the degrees of certainty and probability and the differences between knowing (with certainty) and believing (without being certain). Their concern is primarily with human knowledge. It is true that, on observing the behaviour of animals, birds, and insects, they note certain points of comparison with human behaviour that may be held to illuminate and justify the view that animals can be said to know; and they may conceive of divine knowledge, too, as comparable to human knowledge but greatly transcending it—as perfect omniscience free from all the imperfections of human knowledge. But both inquiries depend upon a prior acquaintance with human knowledge.

It is not the intention of this article to present a chronological study of theory of knowledge throughout the ages. Though, in the course of the argument, the main teachings of the leaders in this field will be discussed, they will not be presented chronologically; the interest lies in concept and theory rather than in history.

Nor is it the purpose of the article to consider what is usually termed the philosophy of science (though this is what "epistemology" sometimes connotes in Continental philosophy). In all inquiries, including the sciences, there are common epistemological problems; but there are also specific problems pertaining to each of the different sciences, for instance, problems about methodology. These are not the concern of this article but are the task of the specialists in each particular field—in biology, physics, geology, and so on—or of the philosopher of science, whose prerogative it is to provide a catalog of methodologies and to discuss the specific problems of the sciences (see SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY OF). The present article deals, instead, with what in Europe is sometimes called gnosiology.

The following subsection of the article will be followed by a subsection on the relations between epistemology and certain other disciplines, such as psychology and logic. In the first main section a brief sketch will be given of the points at issue in contemporary epistemological theories. The argument will be confined to theories; that is to say, individual authors will not be discussed. It will present the state of play in this field of inquiry at the present moment. In the succeeding sections, the main topics of epistemological theory set forward by past and present philosophers will be dealt with. In the sixth section some concluding reflections will be given.

The main topics are thus outlined as follows:

- I. Function, scope, and relations of epistemology
 - Epistemology as a discipline
 - Relation of epistemology to other disciplines
 - Relation to metaphysics
 - Relation to psychology

- Relation to philosophy of mind
- Relation to logic
- Relation to other studies
- II. Diversities of contemporary epistemological theory
 - Sense perception
 - Sense-datum theory
 - Phenomenalism
 - Perceptual assurance of physical objects
 - Levels of assurance
 - Quest for certainty
 - Belief
 - Mental activity
 - Thinking and language
 - Inference
 - Reason and the a priori
- III. Rationalist orientation
 - Rationalism prior to Kant
 - Classical Rationalism
 - Rationalist elements in Scholasticism
 - 17th-century Rationalism
 - Critical Rationalism of Kant
 - Post-Kantian Rationalism
 - Rationalism of absolute Idealism
 - Realist Rationalism
 - Attempts to transcend reason
- IV. Empiricist orientation
 - Ancient Greek and medieval Empiricism
 - Classical philosophers
 - Medieval philosophers
 - Modern and recent Empiricism
 - Early forerunners
 - Classical British Empiricists
 - Assessments and recent expressions of Empiricism
- V. Conceptual thinking
 - Concepts
 - Language
 - Universals
- VI. Concluding reflections
 - Conflict of Empiricism with Rationalism
 - Blend of Empiricism with Rationalism

I. Function, scope, and relations of epistemology

EPISTEMOLOGY AS A DISCIPLINE

If "the proper study of mankind is man," then epistemology or theory of knowledge is a worthy part of that study, for it deals with an aspect of human life that is of fundamental importance. To act wisely in the world, it is necessary to know that world and understand it; this is not to say, however, that, if a man knows, he will inevitably use the knowledge wisely. It is true that the past several centuries have witnessed rapid advances in knowledge that have made possible higher standards of life; but it is equally true that this very knowledge has frequently been misused, increasing man's misery. Moreover, the new knowledge has sometimes provoked a sense of insecurity, even a certain loss of morale. The universe has been shown to be incomparably vaster and man's role in it less significant than had been assumed. Advances in astronomy, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology have in many respects been disturbing. Yet, paradoxically, men are proud of these achievements. If the world seems now less cozy than it used to be, if its very vastness is forbidding, it is man himself who has discovered the truth about the world—if it is the truth. Indeed, man is also uneasy about his liability to error. Men assert confidently what they take to be the truth, only to find later that their assertions frequently have been false—hence man's great need not only to know the world around him but also to know himself better and, in particular, the need to understand the character and reliability of his own cognitive powers. The epistemologist seeks to provide an urgently needed knowledge about knowledge.

The need for knowledge about knowledge

RELATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY TO OTHER DISCIPLINES

The disciplines most closely related to epistemology are metaphysics, psychology, philosophy of mind, and logic.

Relation to metaphysics. Traditionally, metaphysics (the study of the nature of Being) was held to have three parts—ontology, cosmology, and epistemology—and was ranked as the highest of the university secular studies. Today, because of the influence of Positivist and Empiricist teachings, the tendency is to deny it any place whatsoever in the curriculum, on the grounds that what it at-

The present tendency to reject metaphysics

tempts to study transcends human comprehension and is not susceptible of philosophical analysis. But epistemology, though it is a part of metaphysics, has not suffered the same fate. Recently there have been signs of a possible partial restoration of metaphysics, and because the studies are concerned with the problem of the general structure of the world, the findings of metaphysicians may become a matter of interest to epistemologists.

Psychology's break with philosophy

Relation to psychology. Fifty years ago, psychology and epistemology were closely related branches of philosophy, and, in fact, insofar as philosophy was concerned with the *genesis* of knowledge, there was no distinction between them. The part concerned with the *validation* of knowledge was linked with logic; but logic was not as sharply separated from psychology as it is today. A century ago the Empiricist John Stuart Mill spoke of logic as "not a science distinct from . . . psychology. . . . Its theoretic grounds are wholly borrowed from psychology." In the early years of the 20th century, however, psychology broke away from philosophy, rejected its methods, and became an empirical discipline. Epistemologists, on the other hand, continued to use, with greater precision, the methods of analysis. They subjected their key concepts—know, believe, see, infer, and true—to close analysis, with useful results. The trend of psychology and epistemology away from each other ignores the fact that there are points at which they could still help each other: the epistemologist's analysis of concepts could help psychologists in the study of cognition. Conversely, the epistemologist would benefit from examining the work of psychologists on such things as the beginnings of knowledge of number, of movement, and of reality in young children, and it would be advantageous if various epistemological theories of sense perception were to show an awareness of, for example, psychological studies of perceptual systems and the role of accumulated past experience in conditioning present perception.

Relation to philosophy of mind. Philosophy of mind is a comparatively new discipline whose boundaries at present are loosely drawn. In the widest interpretation it would presumably include epistemology as one branch of its total subject matter, for an inquiry into the whole of mental life would cover the study of the theoretical or cognitive aspect of mind. In fact, philosophy of mind tends to leave the study of the nature and validity of knowledge to the epistemologist and concentrates on other issues: first, on the nature of mind and its relation to body; second, on the distinction between the self and other selves; and third, on the description of the various aspects of the mind's life. In his study of the cognitive aspect the philosopher of mind leans on the work of the epistemologist and finds it necessary to familiarize himself with the findings of epistemology and psychology. But the philosopher of mind is necessarily concerned with practice as well as with theory—*i.e.*, with willing and acting—and he is concerned too with man's emotional life. The epistemologist, in turn, finds it clearly of importance for him to come to terms with some of the problems considered by the philosopher of mind. Thus, his theory of knowledge is likely to be influenced by the attitude that he adopts toward the mind-body problem; he is concerned with the central notion of a knowing self; and he finds that the descriptions provided by philosophy of mind of mental states, mental acts, and mental dispositions are of considerable value.

Difference in aims and scope

Relation to logic. It is sometimes said that epistemology is an admixture of many disciplines, of, for instance, metaphysics, psychology, and (since its method is analytic) logic. The fact is that the aims of epistemology are very different from those of logic. The concern of logic is with the formal structure of valid reasoning; it sets down the principles of valid inference. Epistemology, on the other hand, deals with the nature of cognition of all kinds: with man's awareness of the world in sense perception, his insights into possible hypotheses, his guesses—which are in no sense the concern of logicians. Though epistemology makes use of logical teaching on inference and particularly on deduction, it is also true that there is a difference between the epistemologist's attitude and that

of the logician: the logician seeks the form of deduction in general and formulates it: p implies q ; p , therefore, q . The epistemologist accepts his formulation but then asks what addition is necessary to describe the inference in full. If, for instance, there is present an intuition that p implies q , this is a point that is irrelevant to the logician but of great concern to the epistemologist. Epistemology cannot be identified with logic even in respect to that part of it that is most analytical in character but logical techniques can be applied to the problems of epistemology (see LOGIC, APPLIED: *Epistemic logic*).

Relation to other studies. Three other studies are related to epistemology, though not as closely as those already considered: (1) *Morals*: it is sometimes argued that a person ought to accept certain beliefs, even when he is not completely convinced of their truth, because of the good consequences of the acceptance, and it can also be argued that a moral issue is present in any act of knowing, that knowledge is an ethical concept, that knowledge that a certain proposition is true involves the duty to accept or believe the proposition. (2) *Sociology*: the problem of the influence of society and its prevailing culture upon the beliefs of an individual or of the way social relationships affect the power of a man to see the truth for himself occurs not only at the level of ordinary life; when scientists work in teams, for example, the question arises whether pressure is exerted to bring an individual scientist into line with the rest of the team in his acceptance or rejection of scientific theories (are there, for example, group ideologies in science as there are in politics?). Sociologists often provide epistemologists with interesting information on such topics as whether philosophical theories are communal or individual. (3) *Philosophy of religion*: Interrelationships here have to do with such questions as whether all human knowledge is illumination; whether there is special revelation; whether men literally "see all things in God"; whether it is essential that any knowledge that men may gain of God is God's self-revelation to them; and how revelation fits into the rest of man's knowledge (see RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY OF: *Basic themes and problems in the philosophy of religion: The problem of God, the Absolute, or the supreme value: The knowledge of God*).

II. Diversities of contemporary epistemological theory

It is impossible to provide a single definition to cover all of the many uses of the words know, knowing, and knowledge. The use that most concerns the epistemologist is knowing that something is the case. Such knowing may be certain knowledge or it may be only probable knowledge. Knowing that something is the case is propositional knowledge: it is knowing that a proposition or statement is true or probable. Such knowledge presupposes that language exists. But "knowing that" is only one kind of knowing; and no epistemologist would say that knowing is knowing only insofar as something is expressed in a verbal statement—it is not mere assertion. Further, even though a man asserts that he knows something, it need not always follow that he does know it, for he may be stating something he really knows to be untrue, or he may be in error. There has been considerable contemporary concern about the so-called performative uses of "I know that . . ."; thus a man may use sentences beginning with this utterance to express, for instance, conviction or to emphasize a point ("I know that he will come") or to express agreement, or even to plead with someone ("I know that you will help"). It is thus wrong to identify knowing with saying that one knows.

Epistemologists draw a distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how." (One could similarly distinguish between "knowing that" and "knowing why," "knowing where," "knowing who," and so on.) "Knowing how" is not a knowing that something is the case. "I know how to speak German" points to a skill or capacity. "Knowing how" may also include some "knowing that"—knowing, for instance, that, in German, the verb tends to come at the end of a sentence. Of the two, "knowing that" is of greater interest to the epistemologist.

Moral sociology philosophy of religion

The meaning of knowing

gist because the statement, if significant, has truth value. Among true-false statements, however, there is a further distinction in the ways in which a statement may be true. "Lead is heavy," for example, differs from "If something has a given quality, then it either has that quality, or it does not have it": the first is a factual statement made on the basis of sensory experience; the second is a logical truth and not a matter of experience. The first is contingent—lead might not have been heavy but in fact it is; the second is necessary. Acceptance of the finality of this distinction makes it possible to distinguish, in turn, between two kinds of knowings—one factual (of the external world and of the world of mind or spirit), the second logical. Finally, there is a distinction between immediate (direct) and mediate (indirect) knowledge: One form of the distinction comes down from the ancients, that between uninferred and inferred knowledge; a more modern form is that between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; a third is the distinction between knowing a sense-datum or sensum or phenomenon directly and knowing the thing itself, the reality behind it, indirectly.

SENSE PERCEPTION

Sense-datum theory. The study of sense perception begins with consideration of a person's factual knowledge of the world and is concerned not merely with that world but with man's consciousness of it as well. The world is conceived of as a world of material objects that exist in space and time and continue in being over a period of time. Such objects are solid and are able to affect other objects and to be affected by them. Among the objects that they affect is man's body; and he, through his sense organs in particular, registers those affections. The outcome, it is claimed, is that he becomes aware of the physical world. Physiologists and psychologists describe these sensory processes without pretending to a full knowledge of them.

The above account, however, needs considerably more detailed analysis, and with analysis comes dissension. In the first place, it is naïve to suppose that a table before a man directly affects his eyes and so enables him to see it; it is rather the light rays deflected from the table that affect his eyes. If this fact be admitted, it may still be argued that the presence of the table is nevertheless the differentiating factor causing him to see a brown, rectangular patch when he now looks in its direction. But to say this may also be naïve, for in another light its colour may appear yellow and from another angle its shape may appear rhomboid. It may be said that these are abnormalities and that the man knows how to allow for them. But the contention involves the assumption that the "normal" colour is the real colour. Such an assumption requires justification.

Reflection on these contradictions led to the so-called sense-datum theory. According to this theory, the yellow object must be included among the objects seen, so must the florin-sized moon that is seen. Furthermore, if a man sees a mirage, he sees it, and it, too, is a visible object. Objects immediately seen or felt are said to be sense-data that exist, though they are to be distinguished from "real" objects in the physical world. The moon that a man sees is different (e.g., in size) from the "real" moon; yet, it is supposed to be related to it; the problem is to define how the two are related, to determine whether a person can gain any knowledge about the "real" moon by considering the characteristics of the visible moon.

Sense-data, sensa, or sensibilia exist, in this theory, as particular objects, and in this sense the dualism of sensum and real object is complete. Sense-data, some say, can even exist unsensed. They are "there." On the whole, however, theorists tend to be neutral on the nature of their existence; sense-data are fleeting private objects rather than public ones, and, since they are linked with specific physical objects, they may in some way represent them. But this part of the doctrine is invariably vague, and it does not necessarily follow that the sense-data must be products of the affection of sense organs and brain by external physical things; it is at least conceivable

that they are brought about by man's own action or, again, by God's action. Therefore, the fact that a person experiences sense-data does not permit him to assert that physical objects exist.

This conclusion, however, is unwelcome to sense-data theorists, some of whom have tried to counter it by arguing for a causal theory of perception on the following lines: because sense-data exist and have come into being, it is natural to infer that they must have been caused, but the most plausible answer as to how they are caused is that they are the product of the action of physical objects upon sense organs. Yet, the causal argument, which may be strong in other contexts, is weak in this context. For in the dualist sense-datum theory (1) the person does not know directly that physical objects exist, and (2) he does know that sense-data could conceivably have been wrought by other means. It is consequently difficult in this theory to justify belief in physical objects and doubly difficult to characterize the physical objects linked with specific sense-data.

Three lines of action in response to this predicament appear possible. First, the epistemologist can attempt a thorough re-examination of the ways in which men come to know the existence of physical objects. Second, he can deny the independent existence of physical objects and attempt to develop a fresh Idealist, or mind-centred, theory of sense perception. Third, he can adopt a phenomenalist theory—an alternative that was in fact attempted by the Empiricists David Hume and John Stuart Mill and elaborated in the mid-20th century.

Phenomenalism. The phenomenalist begins by asserting that any attempt to infer the existence of physical objects upon experiencing sense-data is wholly unnecessary. Both (1) the naïve theory that a person sees at least the surface of physical objects directly and (2) the causal argument have been discredited. He is sure only of the phenomena—of what appears. But this is quite enough, the phenomenalist suggests, to enable a person to talk significantly of physical objects; and, if so, nothing more is needed. He can certainly talk sensibly of this table without first showing that physical objects exist independently of himself. For here is a brown, rectangular phenomenon in front of him: if he puts his hand on it, it feels smooth; if he presses upon it, he feels a resistance; if he tries to lift it, it feels heavy. He experiences, too, the phenomena of space and of time; for he has to move forward in space to experience the tactual, and he has an experience of earlier and later. When he says "There is a table here," all he means is: "If I look in the right direction, if there is sufficient light, etc., I shall see a brown, rectangular figure"; "If I stretch out my hand, I shall feel a smooth surface"; and so on. In other words, without any loss of meaning, he can always reduce a physical-object sentence into sentences about sense-data.

Though phenomenalism still has its defenders, it has met with considerable criticism. (1) It is argued that in stating the theory the phenomenalist already presupposes the existence of physical objects. In saying "If I put out my hand, I feel a smooth surface," he presupposes his own existence as a physical body. If the phenomenalist replies that he sees his hand as he sees the table, phenomenally, it may be countered that, when he says that he puts out his hand, this *I* is, at least, a physical object bringing about a certain change in a situation and that such causal changes cannot be accounted for in pure phenomenalist terms. The phenomenalist, however, might argue, in turn, that the account of causation that is presently orthodox is itself one that is framed in terms of a constant and regular conjunction of phenomenally observed sequences. The question then remains whether the orthodox account is true. (2) The series of phenomenalist statements into which the phenomenalist reduces a physical-object statement is an infinite one because there are, for instance, an infinite number of locations from which an object may appear. The phenomenalist reduction must, therefore, consist of more statements than any human being could ever complete. The phenomenalist might reply that sufficient phenomena might be observed to make an approximate reduction possible and so to

Problem of the existence of materia objects

Criticism and rejoinder of phenomenalism

enable him to speak significantly of the physical object. But the question would still remain as to the point at which it could be said that he has observed sufficient of these related phenomena to justify speaking of one and the same physical object. (3) The physical-object statement, "There is a table here," is a categorical statement (of sheer fact); but the phenomenalist statements into which it is reduced are hypothetical: "If I look in this direction, I shall see a brown, rectangular patch." No categorical statement, however, can be reduced without loss of meaning into hypothetical statements. The physical-object statement categorically asserts the existence of a physical object. The phenomenalist might reply that the sentence "I now see a brown patch" is a categorical statement that is nonetheless phenomenalist. Yet, if this be granted, the sentence is still not a physical-object sentence, for, even if (improbably) it were held to be an affirmation of the existence of the *I* perceiving, it would still not necessarily be the categorical affirmation of a physical object. Clearly, not one of the phenomenalist's reductive statements is a categorical physical-object statement; thus the reduction must always be inadequate.

It has sometimes been maintained that the only difference between phenomenalist and realist is one of language, that, although the realist chooses to speak in the physical-object language and the phenomenalist in sense-data language, both are speaking of the same thing. Yet, it would appear that, if the criticism just considered is sound, then what is asserted categorically in the physical-object statement, viz., the existence of the physical object, quite apart from any linguistic considerations, can never be asserted in phenomenalist statements.

Perceptual assurance of physical objects. The problems of sense perception were studied closely and energetically by epistemologists (by the British philosophers C.D. Broad and H.H. Price, in particular) in the decades between the world wars. Their approach was from the Empiricist angle, and, in spite of protests from Realists, the sense-datum theory tended to dominate the scene until adherents of the theory found it difficult to silence the critics who held that the theory ruled out complete assurance that physical objects exist. Discussion of sense perception thus reached an impasse and in the postwar period little advance has been possible; hence, philosophers have tended to turn to other problems. The one development has been that of phenomenism, but, as has been seen, it too has failed to silence the critics.

It seemed necessary, therefore, to make a radical change in the approach to these problems. The Idealist solution, that only mind-dependent objects exist, appears to many philosophers to conflict with man's assurance of the existence of independent physical objects, the very same assurance that beclouds the sense-datum theory and phenomenism. Some epistemologists are therefore tentatively approaching the problem from the study of this assurance itself. The acquisition of sense-data, they argue, is not the beginning out of which comes assurance of the existence of physical bodies; on the contrary, it presupposes that assurance. Sense experience offers further knowledge of that of which the existence is already known. The mistake that Empiricists have made is to identify sense perception with the acquisition of *sensa*, such as yellow, square, or heavy, and then to explain knowledge of the physical by compounding and relating such data. This is to enter into the perceptual experience when it is at an advanced stage, but to assume that this is its beginning, and to solidify by abstraction the elements that one then finds. For a human being to survive as an organism he has to interact with objects around him, and from the first, therefore, it has been a condition of his life that he should be aware of the world of objects around him. He possesses a nervous system that makes interaction possible and enables him to seek actively for information. Sensations are accompaniments of the operations of such nervous systems; they are wrongly conceived as objects in themselves. Some have felt that a false emphasis on sensations has blinded the philosopher to the real situation and has caused a crop of problems that have confused him.

A new Empiricism may thus be in the making that finds

confirmation and backing in new teachings in psychology and physiology. In this view, no veil hangs between man and the world, or certainly none formed from sense-data. This is an Empiricism without skepticism. Nonetheless, certain difficulties remain, the chief among them being perhaps the part that seeing colours and hearing sounds play in clarifying the qualities pertaining to objects in the world. Is, for example, an object lying before the observer really brown and rectangular; are there some qualities that belong to things essentially, whereas others are only contingent; and can such problems ever be solved by philosophical reflection upon sense experience?

LEVELS OF ASSURANCE

Quest for certainty. Of central importance to epistemology is the alleged assurance of the existence of a physical world. How this assurance is to be graded is a critical problem; a person may be certain of the existence of an external world containing physical objects but not be certain that the world is exactly as it appears in sense perception. On the contrary, such a person may think it necessary to carry out further tests and may check to determine, if he can, the qualities and relations of objects. In certain circumstances, he may even be doubtful about the very existence of an object that appears to be present; he may suspect an optical illusion or even a hallucination. But he is still certain that the external world and physical objects within it exist. He would claim certainty, too, for much else—for instance, that he himself exists and that other persons exist, that two and two are four, and that, if a thing has a particular quality, it cannot at the same time not have it. These a person takes to be certainties. Nonetheless, people frequently fail to achieve such certainty, and there are philosophers who hold that men never attain complete certainty. Complete certainty must then be further considered. The traditional Rationalist asserts that man gains complete certainty in the exercise of the faculty of reason; reason can provide him with absolute truth, at least in those areas in which it is free to function. It does not and cannot mislead, as the senses do; it in no way rests on sense perception. It is positive and contains no hypothetical element; it is not itself inferential, though it provides the principles basic to inference. It is intuitive and direct, providing indubitable and infallible knowledge—*i.e.*, knowledge of what is necessary.

There are philosophers who continue to defend a Rationalism of this full-blooded kind, though many, if not most, philosophers are hesitant about its claims and would reply that, admittedly, men are completely certain of many things, that such knowledge is contrasted with belief, which may carry a high degree of assurance but is never completely certain, but that, though a person may be certain of something and not merely opine it, it is still possible that he may be in error. If this is so, then he does not know infallibly by reason, and being sure is not enough. It has been asserted that there are three necessary conditions of knowledge: (1) a man, say Arthur, is sure that a certain proposition *p* (*e.g.*, "London is in England") is true; (2) he is able to justify his assurance by producing adequate evidence for *p*; and (3) *p* is, in fact, true. Yet the cogency of the theory thus formulated has been questioned. It is not clear what justifying a man's assurance (2) signifies. Apparently it means causing others, say William and Henry and Mary, to be sure by producing evidence for them to consider. This only means, however, that others are now sure, too. But if one doubts Arthur's assurance he may also doubt that of William, Henry, and Mary. So again, though it is obvious that, if Arthur really knows that something is true, it is true, Arthur may nonetheless think that he knows something even though it is false. Moreover, William, Henry, and Mary may all think they know it too, and yet it may be false. This means that conditions (2) and (3), though genuine conditions of knowledge along with (1), cannot possibly be used as tests whether Arthur is knowing. So there is no adequate test whether Arthur is knowing, and yet it is admitted that men can be sure and at the same time be in error. Such a conclusion points to skepticism about the Ration-

The need for a radical change of theory

Rationalist approach to certainty

The new non-skeptical Empiricism

alist's ideal. One should be content with belief, the skeptic argue, and not claim certainty. With the necessary modifications, many philosophers could adapt the formulation used in the case of knowing something and apply it to believing it instead. They could then hold, as many philosophers do, that belief occurs only if (1) someone believes that something is the case; (2) what is believed to be the case is evident for the person believing it; (3) what is believed to be the case is true.

The question then arises, however, whether the rejection of the possibility of completely certain knowledge is justified. The distinction between infallible knowledge and fallible certain knowledge is of vital importance in this context: To say that men are never certain is to go against the facts. The fact is that men are daily quite certain of where they live, the size of their paycheck, that they are now tired, and so on; what does lie beyond them is infallible knowledge of absolute truth. But to deny the possibility of infallible knowledge is not to deny that of certain knowledge. It would appear, therefore, that the schools that speak today of certainty being beyond the reach of men and of all alleged knowledge being only belief are in error and that their error rests on their failure to distinguish between complete certainty, of which man is capable, and knowledge of absolute truth, beyond every possibility of error, of which, apparently, he is not capable.

Belief. In some of its uses, the word belief has an emotive overtone, as when a man speaks of belief in God, signifying thereby an element of trust in and esteem for the object. But most often the word is used without evaluative overtones. To believe is to accept something as being the case; it is a species of knowing that is not certain but probable. There are degrees of probable knowledge, ascending from the lowest probability to the highest. Further, belief may be either dispositional or occurrent—dispositional, as when a man is called kind although not now performing a kind act, and occurrent, as when he is said to be angry only while actually in that state of mind. A person gets used to certain recurrences and comes to believe dispositionally that they will go on recurring—that his food will nourish him, that clouds presage rain, and that fire causes heat. Some epistemologists argue that all believing is dispositional. And, for those who also deny the possibility of certain knowledge, it would seem that all cognition is dispositional. But this would seem to be an extreme view. Although much believing is properly dispositional, not all of it need be. If, for instance, an attorney in examining a case looks at all the evidence, weighs the possibilities carefully, and finally concludes that Smith is in all likelihood guilty, he cannot be said to have acquired this belief dispositionally; for in his case there is an act of judging, and the belief is thus an occurrent.

The sources of the evidence on which a man may base belief require consideration. The first of these is, clearly, sense perception, the actual seeing, touching, and hearing; the second is the memory of such experiences; and the third is inference from the information gained initially by the senses. In addition, an observer may be conscious of his own feelings of pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, grief, envy, love, and hatred. From these sources a body of information may be acquired to which a person can turn when seeking evidence and by which he is so disposed that certain statements are acceptable while others arouse suspicion. Another important source of evidence is "hearsay knowledge," all that a person has been or is being told by others. His information would be very slight indeed if it were confined to what he has gained independently of others; for the greater part of it comes from communication with others—through talking, writing, reading, picturing, and so on.

The next question debated is one as to the adequacy of evidence for or against a belief. Evidence is usually taken to be adequate (1) when it enables a man to settle the point at issue, to make up his mind, and (2) when it provides him with the truth. It has been suggested that there is no real difference here, for only a knowledge of the truth could settle the issue. But men often have to make

up their minds on mere probabilities. Moreover, if knowledge is always fallible, then to say that the evidence is adequate would inevitably be to speak relatively; it would be adequate for the person now seeking to determine its adequacy. He would want to re-examine the evidence and to check the sensory experiences, the memory, and the inferring. He would reflectively study the dispositions and tendencies, both those that seem almost mechanical—for instance, beliefs that (to quote David Hume) are "lively ideas associated with present impressions"—and those that are the outcome of wide attentive experience of recurring phenomena stored over many years. He would ask whether too much was being taken for granted in such dispositional beliefs and whether they could always be trusted. In the same way, he would check the hearsay knowledge; the time and circumstances in which the informants reported and the reliability of the informants are important. Having carried out this re-examination of the evidence, he would seek for fresh evidence. The total result of his labours might then be that he would still find the evidence inadequate or adequate enough to base a probable belief upon it or entirely satisfactory. In such circumstances the test of adequacy would be subjective throughout; on the other hand, it would now be a test satisfying a reasonable man. Whether this would give it objectivity depends presumably on the account one gives of the reasonable. At this stage it would be wrong to assume that the adequacy is ever other than subjective.

There is also the further debatable point whether a belief for which the evidence has been shown to be adequate, a justified belief, is identical with knowledge in the strict sense. It can now be seen that the evidence is adequate only in a relative and not an absolute sense; nonetheless, it justifies belief in the opinion of reasonable men. A person might be convinced and certain, so that justified belief would here be one with knowledge in the strict sense and not be mere opinion. On the other hand, such knowledge would not be infallible and would not be knowledge of absolute truth. Clearly, three states are to be distinguished: (1) probable knowledge; (2) certain knowledge, which is not knowledge of absolute truth; and (3) infallible knowledge of absolute truth. Adequate evidence gives man (2), and, in this sense, fully justified belief is certain knowledge; but it is not knowledge of absolute truth.

The meaning of the term probable requires brief consideration. The probable is sometimes defined as what is believed—i.e., it is subjectively determined. Efforts may be expended to make it less subjective by bringing forward supporting objective statements; but the probable, in this sense of the word, is never wholly objective. In other senses, however, the probable is objective throughout. When the mathematician speaks of what is probable—for instance, the probability of an event recurring in a sequence of events—he seeks objective certainty, and his probability is the ratio of the number of favourable cases to the total number (both favourable and unfavourable) of equally possible cases and can be worked out mathematically. In another sense, the mathematically determined probability of an event can turn out to be improbable; if the occurrence has, for example, only a 4 percent probability, one should speak of the occurrence as being improbable. Finally, it is reasonable to ask whether, if it is said that a statement is probable, this means that the speaker is certain that it is probable or merely thinks it is probable that it is probable.

MENTAL ACTIVITY

Thinking and language. What distinguishes contemporary epistemology from earlier studies in the field is its profound interest in linguistic problems. On the one hand, the demand for precision in the use of language has been greatly stressed. Some writers have spoken of the need for a special, technically exact, philosophic language; others have held that the whole task of philosophy is to make completely plain what is being said at any moment. Doubts have been expressed about the possibility of a specialist philosophic language, and attempts to handle philosophic problems in the language of formal logic so

Meaning
of
probable

fallible
certain
knowledge

Sources
and
adequacy
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evidence

far have not always been successful. It has further been doubted whether analysis, in the sense of analyzing precisely what is being said, is the whole of philosophy. Probably no one would deny, however, that as high a degree of linguistic precision as is possible is a requirement in all philosophic discussion and that the epistemologist, for instance, has been helped by closer analyses of such words as know, believe, and see.

His interest in linguistic problems has been heightened, too, by his realization of the part that language plays in human thinking. It has even been argued that there can be no thinking without the use of language. It would seem difficult to deny, however, that men who are capable of thinking verbally need not always do so: intelligent thinking in a football player on the field is not necessarily verbal thinking. Nonetheless, it remains true that human thinking is, for the most part, verbal. The question that then arises—and it is central to epistemology—is that of the influence of language on thinking. At issue is not so much the different influences that different natural languages—English, Chinese, Iroquoian—have on the thought of the respective peoples but the differences in thought that the use of language in general makes possible. Of great importance is the fact that it makes possible statements (in which a quality of a subject is predicated or a member is placed in a class or a class in another class) or compound statements (involving conjunction, disjunction, or implication). Though one sometimes speaks of animals as “deducing” something, yet logical deduction, which adds power to thought, appears to be possible only when a person has learned to speak in statements and to think verbally.

Nature
of the
concept
and of the
universal

Difficult problems that arise in discussing thinking are those of the nature of the concept and of the universal (or general term—see below *V. Conceptual thinking: Concepts and Universals*). There is fairly general agreement that a concept is not, as traditionally assumed, an inner accusative (or object)—although some contemporary accounts of “intentions” as objects of thought seem to come close to saying this. In general, however, the teaching that the concept is any kind of an object is rejected; philosophers prefer to speak, instead, of having concepts, and the fact that a person has a concept is revealed by what he says and does. In this view, the concept is a mental capacity and is thus dispositional; *i.e.*, present even while not overtly expressed. The concept of liberty that a person has, for instance, will be clear from what he says. But even this interpretation of what a concept is can hardly be adequate. The concept of liberty for the English speaker is rather the accretion of both linguistic and nonlinguistic dispositions around the word liberty, and to understand it fully would be to make plain the character of these accretions.

The problem of universals is more metaphysical because it involves consideration of what it is that lies behind the successful use of general words like man or whiteness (as opposed to “Adolf Hitler” or “this sheet”). Nominalists reply that nothing is behind it but man’s powers of grouping, classifying, and naming; conceptualists claim that man’s ability to use general words successfully involves dispositional beliefs about what is and what occurs, as well as linguistic dispositions; realists stress the importance of recognizing recurrences in nature. (For a discussion of these rival schools, see below *V. Conceptual thinking: Universals*.) The final theory of universals must assure man freedom to frame universals as principles of thought, but also, since thought must be applicable to the real world, knowledge of universals must in some cases rest upon a recognition of recurrences in nature.

Problem of
induction

Inference. Textbooks group induction with deduction as species of logical inference. Induction, sometimes described as a passage from the observation of particular cases to general statements, is claimed to be the method of many of the natural sciences, normally providing probable conclusions only. Further, it is the method in daily life of finding rough generalizations or working hypotheses. But induction is somewhat hesitatingly grouped with deduction as a method of logical demonstration, for philosophers have been hard pressed to establish the va-

lidity of inductive procedures. On the face of it, induction is a passage from some cases to all, from all the observed cases (all observed swans are white) to all cases (all swans are white); and this is an extrapolation that cannot be logically justified. It is generally claimed, however, that the element of induction in inductive reasoning may be bolstered by items of deduction and also by analogical reasonings. Attempts have been made to use statistical methods, based on the mathematical theory of probability, to strengthen the induction. Again, it has been suggested that induction should not be thought of solely as a passage from particular observations to a generalization, that this step should rather be followed by a secondary induction, *viz.*, the testing of such a generalization by its coherence, or lack of coherence, with the system of generalizations already established in the relevant field of inquiry.

But these proposals have not satisfied the critics, some of whom insist roundly that induction is a nonlogical type of demonstration. Indeed, it has been argued that the passage from observations to generalization is no demonstration whatsoever, certainly not one susceptible of logical analysis; “induction” in this view becomes simply an inspired guess, a hunch. Once a generalization or hypothesis is made, it can then be tested logically (*e.g.*, the discovery of one negative instance will refute it). Others reject this view and argue that the thinker, in proceeding inductively, does not merely leap at a generalization but also makes a rational estimate of the probability of the generalization, and in so doing, he proceeds logically.

Of all mediate knowledge the surest is established by deduction, a passage from premises known to be true to conclusions following validly from these premises (see SYLLOGISTIC). The epistemologist, however, is concerned with the nature of inference, seen at its best in deduction. Inference has been conceived as a technique of sentence transformation providing an efficient means of advancing in thought. On a different view, inference begins with a thought content that develops of itself in thought. For both of these views, inference is in a certain sense passive. On a third view, however, inference is an activity, *viz.*, perceiving or intuiting an implication. The premises necessarily imply the conclusion; no one can choose what he is about to intuit, but the intuiting itself is free and the mind active.

Further, there are problems about acquiring premises. It is essential that the reasoner should have established their truth, for a valid inference from true premises can never yield a false conclusion. But these truths, as has been seen, may be either truths of fact or truths of reason. Whether this difference can be ignored or necessitates two theories of inference depends upon a person’s view of reason.

Reason and the a priori. Finally, consideration must be given to contemporary Rationalism. Its expression differs in detail from the older traditional doctrine, but what is essential to it today, as in the past, is the assertion that account must be taken of man’s faculty of reason as a source of information that cannot be derived from any other source. Reason, operating in its purity, provides knowledge of foundational concepts, such as being, unity, substance, and cause, and of principles, such as noncontradiction (that a statement and its negation cannot both be true), which are conditions necessary for the possibility of knowledge. It provides, that is to say, the pure a priori features of human knowledge, as contrasted with the a posteriori features derived from experience. Traditionally, thus pure a priori knowledge is infallible.

The Rationalist today can adduce considerable evidence in favour of his thesis, an instance being the manner in which man’s thinking is dominated by such principles as that of noncontradiction. He does not claim that all knowledge is acquired by reason (he claims less in this respect than did the traditional school); but he insists on a certain minimum of a priori without which human knowledge, he holds, cannot be understood. Nonetheless, the Rationalist thesis confronts acute problems, one of which is whether there are truths that only reason, a special exclusive faculty, can know. Analytic truths are

Deduction
from
premises

said to be of this nature; so, too, are categorial truths about the structure of the world, and, in addition, there are transcendent truths. In respect to the first, the so-called analytic truths, it must be admitted that a statement can be true solely in virtue of the meaning of its terms (e.g., "A bachelor is unmarried"). Once the terms are understood, the truth of the statement must be granted. Here, it is said, is a truth apprehended by reason. Yet the question can be asked whether it is in fact essential to suppose a special faculty to be at work here. These statements are analytic; they are necessary and, in that sense, a priori. Yet it may be asked whether this discerning or intellectual perceiving—that, since the terms mean what they do mean, the statement must be accepted as true—is really a special faculty operative only in this very limited field or whether it may not be the discerning that provides assurance throughout man's cognitive experiences.

As for the body of basic categorial knowledge that Rationalists believe conditions the development of further knowledge, considerable doubt is expressed today about their description of such knowledge—e.g., of substance and of cause. The fact is that the bases of man's conceptual systems can and do change, that the principles usually held to be basic to thought in general, such as those of noncontradiction, identity (that everything is what it is), and excluded middle (that no third statement can be admitted between two contradictories), are still being reformulated and amended by logicians. It is not clear how this rethinking could happen, if reason once and for all had planted these absolute truths upon man's mind. Finally, it is argued that knowledge of the transcendent, the nonempirical, which, too, is taken to be a priori, may well have been derived from the experienced, even though it itself is never directly experienced. Thus, Rationalism has had to face considerable criticism. Some of the criticisms have pointed toward the view that human knowledge rests throughout on convention, but conventionalism itself has come up against assurances that man has in his experience about things and occurrences that are independent of him; and such knowledge can in no way be regarded as conventional.

Though it is inevitable that many matters that are relevant to contemporary epistemology have been omitted from this brief sketch, some of the gaps will be filled in later. The purpose of the foregoing outline has merely been to provide an insight into the main confrontations.

III. Rationalist orientation

In the next three sections the main doctrines of epistemology are set out primarily on a notional rather than a chronological basis. Epistemological theories can be divided roughly according to whether, in the gaining of knowledge, they stress the role of (1) reason, (2) sense experience, or (3) concept and language.

RATIONALISM PRIOR TO KANT

Classical Rationalism. Though ancient Greek Rationalism had its first explicit expression in Plato's doctrine of Forms or Ideas, there had been earlier suggestions of Rationalism. The Greek philosophers had consciously set before themselves the task of understanding the world, primarily the physical world, and this they interpreted to mean understanding the laws that hold within that world and its permanent structure and order. This was to assume, however, that it was an ordered and rational world—an assumption that is seen clearly in many of the extant fragments from early Greek writers. Thus, the philosopher and mathematician Pythagoras of Samos (flourished late 6th century BC) thought that "all things are numbers"; and the monist Parmenides, a generation after him is held by many scholars to have been a Rationalist. Certainly, a little later Anaxagoras argued in Athens that *nous* (reason or intellect) was the original cause of movement in the universe. He described *nous* as "the thinnest of all things," as infinite, completely pure and unmixed, and as absolute in power and in knowledge of all things. Both Plato in the *Phaedo* and Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* expressed disappointment that Anaxagoras made so little use of the notion of *nous* in his cosmology.

Theory of Forms in Plato. In his theory of Forms or Ideas, Plato, no doubt influenced by Socrates, put forward the first fully explicit Rationalist epistemology. Possibly the most striking description of Form and of the knowledge of it is found in the *Symposium*, in which it is said that a man who has observed many beautiful objects and reflected about them may, of a sudden, glimpse supreme Beauty, "eternal, unproduced, indestructible"—not beauty relative to a time, a place, a thing, or a person but absolute Beauty. "All other things are beautiful through a participation of it." Along with the Form of Beauty go the Forms of the Good and of the Just discussed in *The Republic*. Other forms mentioned by Plato are those of unity, plurality, equality, likeness, unlikeness, motion, and rest. Later, he adds the Forms of things, for instance, of man and all living creatures, of fire and water, possibly even of hair, clay, and dirt.

The Forms are not known by the senses, and he explains in the *Phaedo* how the senses may show things to be more or less equal, though equality itself ("the just equal") is not seen or felt but is known independently of sense. Forms, Plato holds, may be recalled from knowledge that the soul possessed prior to its union with its present body or may be directly apprehended. In either case the knowledge emanates from a divine element in the soul that knows the transcendent Form and eternal object and thereby reveals its own eternity. The same account of Forms is found in *The Republic*, in which a contrast is made between opinion and knowledge. Opinion, resting on sense experience, informs a person of the phenomenal, but knowledge reveals the unchanging real; the former is fallible but the latter infallible.

Thus, the outcome of Plato's discussion of knowledge was, first, a conviction that, whereas sensory experience is superficial and deceptive, the soul nevertheless is able to know—and to know infallibly—the immutable, the essential, the Forms that exist separated from the phenomenal. Secondly, a universal science that is eternally true is possible.

In turning to Plato's later dialogues, it is surprising that so little attention is paid in them to the Forms. The most important epistemological study among them, the *Theatetus* (to be considered later in *IV. Empiricist orientation: Classical philosophers*), is an examination of sensory knowledge and of belief that manages to carry this out without once referring explicitly to the Forms. The *Philebus* and *Timaeus* have only certain comparatively brief references to them. The *Sophist* also fails to provide a full discussion of Forms; and what is most interesting is that, in it, Plato argues that "change, life, soul, and understanding" are real along with the Forms. The one dialogue of this latter period that deals at length with the Forms is the *Parmenides*, in which the ancient monist Parmenides takes the young Socrates to task and is critical of his theory of Forms. The purpose of the dialogue is puzzling; though it is sometimes thought that Plato here repudiates his earlier doctrine of Forms, this is not the generally accepted view. Instead, the dialogue may well express some of Plato's doubts about the adequacy of his earlier views on a crucial point—the relationship between the Forms and the particulars that participate in the Forms. Possibly it may express, too, his doubts about the ontological status of the Forms and of the relations that the Forms have to one another.

What is important is Plato's statement of Rationalism. The senses do not reveal the true structure of the world, he holds, but reason reveals it; consequently rational knowledge must be clearly distinguished from sensory awareness. These are quite distinct faculties and their objects are probably distinct as well. Knowledge of the objects that reason reveals is presupposed in all other knowledge. The theory of Forms thus aimed at providing a Rationalist foundation for any subsequent epistemology. Further, it provided ontology (the study of Being) with the permanent and immutable (in contrast to the mere flux of the followers of the Pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus) and morality with absolute standards (in contrast to the subjectivity of the Sophists, private teachers of success).

Nonsensory origin of the Forms of Plato

analytic, categorial, and transcendent truths

Socratic Rationalism

Criticism
of Plato's
transcendent
Forms

Categories, nature, and reason in Aristotle. Aristotle qualified Plato's Rationalism but did not reject it. He was critical of the Platonic view that knowledge is a universal system deducible from a principle, such as that of the Form of the Good. However excellent such a deductive universal science may appear in theory, Aristotle saw that in practice it transcends human capabilities; when human knowledge is considered as it is, it is clearly not Plato's universal science, and his epistemology is erroneous because the theory of Forms on which it rests is erroneous. In his *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*, Aristotle attacked the concept of a Form. Plato, he held, thinks of it as a separate existence, an individual. But, if the Form man is an individual existent, it presumably has something in common with Socrates; but this common element points to a further Form, the third man, and this begins an infinite regress (a fourth man, a fifth man, . . .).

Aristotle held, instead, that the things of the world are individual existences having qualities. Though each individual is a substance separate from every other, individuals may have qualities in common. Yet, if two substances have a common quality, this in no way justifies the assertion that a Form of that quality exists. In Aristotle's opinion this theory is false and misleading, for the quality—admittedly common and admittedly as real as the things sharing it (though not particular, as they are)—exists as a quality of both and possibly of many other things. It does not exist as a self-subsistent entity, and there is no Good in the Platonic sense, though many things are good.

Nor, finally, did Plato succeed in making clear the relations between the Forms. Aristotle rejected the view that there is a genus, such as Being or Good, which contains all other Forms as species within it or which has as species substance, quality, quantity, and relation. Aristotle held that the latter are what he called categories and listed. What exists may be a substance, a quality, or a quantity, and what has being may exist in any of these senses. But there is, for Aristotle, nothing that exists that is all of these things, that is to say, Being; a category is not a species of the genus Being.

In these respects, then, Aristotle rejected certain aspects of Plato's Rationalism, but he nonetheless retained Rationalism itself and reaffirmed it, holding that the world is rationally ordered (though there is a place for chance in it). God is its unmoved mover. Because God, however, is wholly self-contemplative, it is nature rather than God that controls the growth of the world, a nature that "does nothing in vain" but always works for an end.

There are difficulties in this account of the function of nature. It is not clear, for example, that nature proceeds rationally; Aristotle thought that conscious reason is not found at any level of life lower than man. In the *Ethics* a high value is set on reason, and its use in contemplation is said to be man's deepest happiness. It is "the best thing in us, for even if it be small in bulk, in power and worth it surpasses everything." Aristotle followed Plato in ascribing the adjective divine to reason. His fullest account of it is in *De anima* (*On the Soul*), in which his psychology is set forth. A man's soul, he wrote, is to his body as axeness is to axe; it is that which realizes the body's potentiality. Like other living things, men learn how to find nourishment; they reproduce themselves; they see, imagine, desire, and seek. But man, too, can reflect and think, can affirm that a predicate pertains to a subject or deduce one statement from another. Human beings thus possess intelligence and the power of reason (*nous*). Insofar as it concerns itself with material provided by sensory experience and imagination, he held, reason itself partakes of the passivity of these faculties.

Man's rationality, however, reflects also the presence of active, as opposed to passive, reason. Active reason does not proceed mediately, through judgment and deduction, which are fallible; it is direct knowledge. Being wholly free from the affection of the material and in no way dispositional, active reason owes nothing to the development into which it momentarily enters and which it illuminates; it remains, instead, what it is essentially, immortal and eternal. It would appear from this (the pas-

sage is difficult to interpret) that Aristotle—in spite of his emphatic rejection of the theory that knowledge of transcendent Forms is essential for the attainment of truth—nonetheless concluded that man gains the final truth only when an element enters into the knowing process, that has not appeared previously in that process; that which is no development of it but something itself wholly transcendent, eternal, and infallible. This is active reason. By it man knows such basic principles as that of noncontradiction.

Later Greek and Roman Rationalism. There are Rationalist elements in extant fragments from the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, the most notable writers of which were Zeno of Citium, Epicurus, Chrysippus, Poseidonius, Carneades, and Aenesidemus. All of these (with the possible exception of Poseidonius) were Materialists; yet the Stoics, in particular, freely introduced Rationalist elements (which could not always be made consistent with their Materialism) into their philosophies. Even the Sceptics, paradoxically, employed rational arguments against Rationalism.

Finally, reference must also be made to Plotinus, the foremost Neoplatonist philosopher, who was a Rationalist in the respect that he paid to *nous*. In Plotinus' view, *nous* is the wisdom in the universe and the first emanation of the One, which is supreme. Through *nous* the world is illumined throughout all stages of its hierarchy. These stages consist in the One, *nous*, soul, soul-in-body, matter, Man, who is soul-in-body, can strive by rational means to understand what is above him; he may grasp the rationality of the world. Yet he cannot take the final step by reason alone; God is the One; God is not an object standing over against a knower, and men cannot be such knowers. The final step is not reasoning to God nor even intuiting him; it is union with him. Plotinus' philosophy thus ends in a mysticism that rests on Platonic Rationalism.

Rationalist elements in Scholasticism. The Scholastics, as the philosophers of medieval Christendom were called, are characterized by their outstanding confidence in reasoning and are sometimes criticized for having overemphasized the importance of sheer deductive argument and of subtle analysis in philosophy. Yet their confidence in reasoning and argument does not of itself prove them to have been Rationalists, except in a superficial sense. As has been seen, Plato was a Rationalist not in stressing the importance of deductive argument but in his doctrine of eternal Forms apprehended by the infallible grasp of *nous* (rational intuition); and Aristotle, who rejected the Forms as separate, eternal entities, nevertheless accepted and retained the notion of a supreme intuitive faculty essential to knowledge.

In the centuries that followed, there was considerable discussion of the celebrated account of active and passive *nous* in Aristotle's *De anima*; in the teaching (in the 11th and 12th centuries) of the great Arab-language philosophers Avicenna and Averroës, for instance, some part of the separatedness of the Platonic Forms was brushed off onto Aristotle's *nous*. As stated above, Plotinus thought of *nous* as separate and, while not deifying it, made it the first emanation from the One. The Arabs, too—and, after them, Siger of Brabant, of the secular faculty at Paris—tended to speak of *intellectus* not as a faculty in the human mind but as a separate entity, in which men participate, so that it is one in all men. In the ensuing (13th) century, however, St. Thomas Aquinas rejected this doctrine forcibly. To accept it, he argued, is to make impossible a coherent account of the intellectual lives of men in view of the intellectual differences between them; it is to deny man's individuality and so his moral responsibility; and it is to impugn his status as "master of his own operations." Though Aquinas rejected this influential doctrine, he in no way rejected Aristotle's Rationalism in so far as this (along with Plato's) consists in regarding the intellect as the supreme faculty in knowing.

The works of Aquinas best reveal the character of Scholastic Rationalism. The soul, he held, is "the first principle of life in those things which live" and shows itself in two aspects, viz., knowledge and movement. In man's case the

Plotinus
nous

Reason as
divine:
"the best
thing
in us"

Thomas
Aquinas
view of
the soul

soul organizes the life of the body, and soul-in-body possesses not only sensitive and nutritive powers but also intellectual powers. Intellect, being one of the soul's powers, is not the essence of the individual human soul, but neither is it the same in all men. The intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies. Man is the lowest of intellectual beings, as contrasted with angels and God, and his intellect is described as "potentiality with regard to things intelligible." But it is not mere potentiality, for Aquinas accepted Aristotle's view that the human soul has, too, its active *nous*: human intellect is able to participate in the superior intellect of God and so man is illumined and things are made intelligible. Intellect, wherever it is found, is concerned with the universal and general. In perfect intelligences, these universals and the relations between them are all grasped directly, but man "advances from one thing understood to another" through discursive reasoning. Nonetheless, both the intuition and the reasoning are intellectual, though reasoning has a certain measure of imperfection as compared with intuiting. Men, however, are not wholly deprived of intuitive knowledge since they can begin with principles, such as that the whole is greater than the part, which come to man *naturaliter*—i.e., "everyone knows them."

Not that these principles are known innately; but, since man is intelligent, they are from the first present "in potential." Man needs the occasion to activate what is there. His mind "is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written": but then he experiences the sensible; and, in consequence, what is all along present potentially in his intelligent life is now actualized, and he gains understanding. "With us to understand is to be passive." Bodily sensations provide the occasion, and the person, who is soul as well as body—i.e., intellectual as well as sensitive—is illumined. Aquinas did not adopt the Platonic view that sensation and intellect are alien to one another in man's case. On the contrary, it is through sensory experience that the human intellect comes to understand, and it is to the soul's advantage that it is united with the body. Man's knowledge begins with sense experience, and it can do so because the sensory phantasma (or presentations of the mind) can be illuminated by active intellect, which then by its power abstracts intelligible species or concepts from them. The senses determine the particular, but intellect then receives the universal. Having received it, however, the human intellect—because of its lowly grade—is not powerful enough to gain immediate and full understanding, but it gains enough to proceed mediately by discursive reasoning.

So Aquinas demonstrates the necessity of sensory experience as providing particular sense images and of intellect as illuminating the sensory so as to abstract the universal. Just as in Aristotle, there are thus two aspects to human intellect: (1) the actualizing of the potential, which is the work of intellect as active, and (2) the passive reception of understanding, passive intellect. Aquinas made sure, however, that his own theory of knowledge, in spite of its recognition of the necessity of sensory experience, is no sensualism but is Rationalist in its recognition that knowledge is possible only on the possession of rational powers. Of all the Scholastics, Aquinas was thus the most like Aristotle in his epistemology, and he shared in his Rationalism.

The fortunes of Rationalism in Scholastic thought after the death of Aquinas can be traced in the philosophies of two scholars. At the turn of the 14th century, Duns Scotus, the great British Scholastic, sought to make clearer the character of a truly rational knowledge and maintained that arguments from effects to causes (e.g., from the existence of the world to the existence of God) never provide conclusive proof. Man knows of God's existence through revelation; he can have no a priori proof—the only kind that, in Scotus' view, would be a true rational demonstration. William of Ockham, trained as an Oxford Franciscan, developed the same theme in the mid-14th century. Like Scotus he had no doubts about revelation and the faith, but he carried skepticism about Aristotle's and Aquinas' Rationalism well beyond Scotus.

He asked whether the intelligible species are anything other than the philosopher's own mental creations. He even suggested that *intellectus*, whether active or passive, might be nothing more than an abstraction thought to be a real entity. Entities, said Ockham, should not be unnecessarily multiplied.

17th-century Rationalism. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz—sometimes known as "the continental Rationalists"—mark the climax of precritical Rationalism.

Cartesian Rationalism. René Descartes is held to have been the father of modern Rationalism. His Rationalism lies in two features of his teaching, presented in his *Discours de la methode* (1637; *Discourse on Method*, 1950): first, in what he says about method and, second, in his account of clear and distinct knowledge. Having expressed dissatisfaction with his education, he decided to subject everything that he had hitherto accepted as true to a methodical doubt in order to build a surer science of God, man, and nature. His main interest in the *Discourse*, it is clear, was in the latter, the science of nature. (His particular purpose was "to deduce rules in medicine of greater certainty than those at present in use.") Descartes, himself an expert mathematician, attributed the success of mathematicians in his day to the method that they employed. Mathematicians begin with the simplest truths, the foundational axioms, and pass step-by-step to knowledge of the more complex. He proposed to use "all that is best both in geometrical analysis and in algebra" to solve the problems of natural science. Each of these problems was to be divided into the simplest possible parts; and, beginning with these simples, by chains of easy reasonings, satisfactory conclusions could be reached. This meant, he admitted, assuming a specific order to exist in the natural world, although one cannot be sure that it does exist there. The aim is to project mathematical order into the physical world so as to enable the inquirer to understand it rationally. In every case the investigator should also check each link in the chain by careful enumerations and reviews. This procedure is rational in a specific way, for Descartes sought not merely any order, as all Rationalists do, but an order that is strictly mathematical.

Of fundamental importance to his whole epistemology is another rule:

To accept nothing as true which I do not know to be such clearly (*évidemment*) that is, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice and to comprise nothing more in my judgments than what presents itself so clearly and so distinctly to my mind, that I have no ground whatsoever for holding it in doubt.

What is clear is "present and manifest to an attentive mind," and what is distinct is "precise and different from all other objects." The mind grasps the clear and distinct as infallibly true, so that an intuition of this order is the irrefutable answer to Skepticism. Descartes held that "intuitus" is

not the fluctuating testimony of the sense, nor the misleading judgment of a wrongly combining imagination, but the pure intellectual cognising (*conceptum*) of which an unclouded and attentive mind is capable; a cognising so ready and so distinct that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we thus intellectually apprehend.

He who seeks for truth must not hope to find it in sense perception—he must "detach his mind" from the senses—nor again in blundering imagination but in a pure intellectual apprehension of infallible truth resistant to doubt. Here, then, at the opening of modern philosophy, is a definitive assertion of man's power to know indubitably by pure intellect, entirely by the light of reason.

Later, Descartes would seem to qualify the absoluteness and finality of *intuitus*, for he appeared to appeal to God's veracity as the final guarantee of the truth of what is known clearly and distinctly. Inasmuch as his argument—both to his own existence from his consciousness that he thinks (*Cogito, ergo sum*) and subsequently to God's existence—rests on intuition, it has been held that he is here involved in a vicious circle. His defenders, however, have held that no such circle is involved, that Descartes was pointing to the source of all man's powers in

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God and at the same time to his own failures, particularly his failures of memory. The failure, in some views, applies to the occasions on which he fails to intuit clearly and distinctly; for, whenever he does so intuit, in spite of his general fallibility, he attains infallible knowledge. There is, further, a relation between *intuitus* and deduction Descartes speaks of both as part of the intellectual faculty of knowledge, which knows and never fails to know. Yet, Descartes has to admit that deduction is not as certain as intuition, for it is not simple. Intuition, is simple as sheer apprehension and also in its object. It can only apprehend "the simple nature," for the latter alone is clear and distinct. Deduction, on the other hand, is complex. Yet, it too, being intellectual, can give man the truth, as long as he does not *will* to err.

But the problem, then, is how to relate deduction to the intuitive apprehension of simple truth—which is what, in Descartes's view, knowledge essentially is. Deduction is mediate knowledge of the complex and can be knowing in the strict sense, Descartes argues, because each implication in the deduction is intuited; the implication itself must be "a simple nature." Yet, it cannot be the sheer simple of Descartes's sheer intuition. It must be simple in the sense of a "simple relation." But this raises two questions: (1) whether this relation is simple in the sense required and (2) whether, if deduction is intellectual, in this narrow sense, the Cartesian deduction would not have to be confined to the reasoning of pure mathematics and whether, in particular, inferences about the natural world—which are neither simple nor clear and distinct—could ever be *deductio*. This is to ask, in other words, whether deductive knowledge is always knowledge of the logically possible rather than of what actually is. It would appear that there remain difficulties in the account of deduction that Descartes provided.

Subsequent continental Rationalism. If this were a history of Rationalism, it would be necessary to add here extensive accounts of the 17th-century philosophies of Benedict de Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz.

Spinoza's use of the mathematical approach

Spinoza, like Descartes, emphasized the importance of proceeding in a strictly orderly manner. The order to be followed is that of mathematics, as reflected in the title of his famous work *Ethica in Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata* (completed 1675).

All true knowledge thus shares the necessity of mathematics; each step and every new conclusion must be demonstrated with logical necessity. But this is to assume a metaphysic: the world known must be a system that is rational and necessary, and, if it is such a system, it must be one. Spinoza thus speaks of it as God, or Substance. Men know it under two aspects—thought and extension—that are not to be regarded, however, as different entities (as in Descartes's account of mind and body) but as two attributes of the one entity. A change in the body is a change in the mind; if the body is affected by another body, there is a parallel change in the mind, and this is the explanation of sense perception. The mind has an "idea." If it happens to a person's mind as the result of a body affecting his body, the idea is not an adequate thought of his body or of the other body; it is confused. But people do have adequate ideas—*i.e.*, ideas such that, if one thinks any one of them, he will see that it has all of the intrinsic marks of a true idea. This is the stage of *ratio* as contrasted with sense perception. The object is known as self-evident, clear and distinct (as Descartes said), but as something, too, that cannot be methodically doubted. "Whoever has a true idea, at the same time knows that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt the truth of the matter." Or, "for the certainty of truth no other sign is necessary than to have a true idea." True ideas, too, are the same for all men; a common body of science that all men accept can be worked out. But Spinoza, having reached this point, does not find it complete as an account of human knowledge, for he thinks that beyond *ratio* is an intuitive knowledge of God, of the one Substance. It is in this intuition that man finds pure intellect, and out of this insight comes an "intellectual love of God" that is eternal.

Like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz wished to see the

method of the mathematician applied to philosophical problems. For this purpose he demanded a new symbolic logic that would ease the burden of philosophical speculation and at the same time ensure accuracy. Given such a logic, philosophers could settle their differences with the ease of an accountant, merely by calculating. Leibniz realized that such a calculus would only be possible if the world were one system, but this did not mean that it would have to be one Substance as Spinoza thought. The world, Leibniz held, is a composite of a vast number of simples; each simple, or "monad," is a substance having its own qualities. Every monad is different from every other monad; it "has no windows by which anything may enter or go out." Any knowledge that it has, consequently, is innate and comes from within. It is the subject of its own predicates and is constantly changing; for it expresses (without observing) the changes of all other things; and this is its "perception." Though this is a kind of knowledge, it is confused and indistinct.

There are, however, monads—and men are monads of this kind—that know eternal and necessary truths (their opposites being impossible). They have this knowledge because they are reflective and contemplate themselves. They are thus led to such truths as the principle of non-contradiction. Here, the knowledge is clear, distinct, adequate, and intuited and is the highest that a man can attain. But Leibniz saw that man is also aware of contingent happenings, or truths of fact, about which he makes statements that are true without being necessary. They do not occur without a reason, however, for there is a sufficient reason for them in God's will, insofar as God desires to bring about the best of an infinity of possible universes. Necessary truths, on the other hand, are not dependent on God's will but depend solely on his understanding. Because God chose this universe as the best, the whole of it is in harmony with itself. Insofar as man is rational and apprehends the necessary and eternal, he is a being capable of understanding some part of the universe and so of entering into a relationship with God.

CRITICAL RATIONALISM OF KANT

In the 18th century, Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, was a Rationalist but a Rationalist with a difference. He had been trained in the school of Leibniz and his systematizer, Christian Wolff, and accepted their philosophic standpoint until middle life, when he became critical of what he termed their "dogmatic Rationalism." The *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781; *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1929), Kant's chief work, was a sustained and penetrating examination of the claims that Rationalists had made for human reason with the rejection of many of them. Nonetheless, Kant remained a Rationalist.

Kant rejected the view of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz that the philosopher should adopt the methods of mathematics. To suppose that the problems of philosophy can be dealt with by these methods is, he thought, to deceive oneself; for, whereas the mathematician constructs his own concepts, defines for himself what a triangle is, sets down axioms, and draws chains of inferences with exactness, the philosopher deals with concepts of metaphysics, such as space, time, substance, and causality, or of morals or aesthetics and does not construct his concepts but has to wait on experience and then seek concepts that appear to explain it. Inevitably, therefore, the method of philosophy is different from that of mathematics. In the second place, Kant takes the doctrine of representative perception seriously. Sensory experience provides a phenomenal knowledge of things. Consequently, no universal statement about what is experienced is immediately applicable to the real world; it is "a representation of a representation." In the third place, in such a situation, any talk of calculating the universe seems naive. Kant denies that rational analysis, of itself, can provide new knowledge of what exists, and it is idle to expect analytical demonstrations to establish the nature of what lies beyond immediate experience. They cannot, for instance, prove or disprove the being of God. Kant expressly criticized Leibniz for "intellectualizing appearances." Leibniz, he said, had spoken of sensations as con-

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Kant's
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Rationalism

fused, feeble intellections not yet clarified into adequate ideas and had failed to realize that sensibility and understanding are "two sources of representations which, while quite different, can supply objectively valid judgments of things only in conjunction with each other."

Kant's total rejection of dogmatic Rationalism is the explanation of the curious arrangement of his *Critique*. At the outset he had divided the work into what he intended to be two main parts, viz., (1) the transcendental doctrine of elements and (2) the transcendental doctrine of method. In the actual composition, however, the latter turned out to be little more than an appendix dealing with the uses of reason and reporting certain positive uses of it on the practical side. In respect to the theoretical side, however, Kant was content to repeat the warning given in the transcendental dialectic that, whereas pure reason is adequate in mathematics, it cannot provide, independently of experience, knowledge of the real world.

Yet, in spite of what has just been said, Kant remained a Rationalist. More often than not his thought was conditioned by his Rationalist training, and his language was the language of the Leibniz-Wolff school. This complicates his argument, especially at those points at which he was moving away from this school. Certainly, this continued use of the language and procedures of the "dogmatists" would not of itself make Kant a Rationalist; but his comment on Leibniz, referred to above, is more revealing in the contrast it makes between Leibniz and John Locke, a British Empiricist. Leibniz had intellectualized sensibility just as Kant thought that Locke had sensualized intellectual concepts. Leibniz and the dogmatic Rationalists were wrong, Kant believed, in supposing that knowledge is gained by intellect or reason only and that sensation is a low, passive form of intellect, unclear and confused; they did not understand that human knowledge must involve the operation of two distinct faculties, sensibility and intellect. Nevertheless, as against what he took to be Locke's standpoint, Kant fully endorsed the Rationalist criticism. If no account of human knowledge that ignores empirical elements is adequate, equally no account of knowledge in purely empirical terms is adequate; for a rational element is present in all knowledge.

It would appear that, although experience is admittedly a source of information, elements that are not empirically given are already present in the simplest experiences, that a man's more elementary experiences of himself and of things around him, for instance, involve space and time; but space and time are not given. So, too, in the case of the more precise knowledge of the natural sciences, features are present that, in Kant's view, cannot be derived from sensibility; insofar as knowledge is scientific, its statements are true necessarily, and, being necessary, they are also universal and eternal. Kant assumed, without ever proving it, that space and time are not given empirically, and he further assumed that experience can never provide the universal and necessary. These are basic assumptions of Cartesian Rationalism, and Kant accepted them without question. It then follows that there are elements in all knowledge that are not empirical. Kant's main purpose in the *Critique* was to reveal these elements, and, insofar as this is the case, the *Critique* is predominantly a Rationalist statement, even if it rejects some part of the earlier Rationalism.

Kant agreed that a priori elements enter into all human knowledge. But, whereas dogmatic Rationalism held that all a priori knowledge is analytic, Kant held that the most important part of it is synthetic—i.e., it provides genuine additional knowledge. Kant did not deny the possibility of an a priori knowledge that is purely analytic in the Leibnizian sense, but he regarded a man's knowledge of himself and of the natural world as synthetic rather than analytic and yet as involving features not given in experience—that is, as a priori. Whatever is given in sensation becomes part of a system of unified experience; the occurrence of the system presupposes a "unity of apperception" transcending sense. Such apperception should not be regarded as the work of memory alone, and it is no mere disposition; it involves the judg-

ment-making and statement-making function—that is, the logical function. It is a system thought of, for instance, in terms of substance, a thing that is, or in terms of quantity, quality, or relation.

All the manifold, therefore, so far as it is given in a single empirical intuition is determined in respect of one of the logical foundations of judgment and is thereby brought into one consciousness. Now the categories are just these functions of judgment, in so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of a given intuition. Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories.

Kant's account of the categories is worked out at great length in the transcendental deduction of the categories. Deducing in this context means justifying, and what he seeks to justify is that the process of knowing, bringing the given manifold into one consciousness, is regulated by pure concepts of the understanding, not given in experience. Sometimes the suggestion is made that these categories are innate, sometimes that men possess them although they are never conscious of acquiring them; but always it is insisted that they are not derived from the senses. They are the contribution of intellect or reason or understanding to the totality that is human knowledge. The number of the categories is fixed, and Kant gives a list of them and in complicated arguments attempts to prove the necessity of each category.

Kant's stress on knowledge as a coherent system pertaining to one consciousness leads to Idealism; the absolute Idealism that developed out of this aspect of his philosophy will be considered below. But, when Kant himself referred to Idealism in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he was speaking of something else, viz., of the ontology of immediate objects of perception.

In two important passages, one in the first edition only and the other in the second only, he reflected on the difficulties arising from the accounts given of sense perception by Descartes and the British Empiricists. Sense perception is of appearances only, which, it is supposed, are representations of physical objects; the physical objects represented are not directly seen. But whether or not they exist is a question, it may be argued, that cannot be answered. One is tempted to hold that nothing can be said about the existence or nonexistence of such objects. This is one form of Idealism, however, that Kant rejected. Nonetheless, he did not reject Idealism. He proposed, rather, to give significance to talk about a physical object by thinking of it not as a "thing-in-itself" beyond the veil of sense but as phenomenal. It is what appears, appearing always in accordance with empirical laws and with the principles of space and time. These are not laws and principles of things-in-themselves but of the empirically known, of "the actual." Such an Idealism, which Kant termed transcendental, he thought was consistent with his view that space and time and the categories are a priori, for the transcendentals can apply to the actual physical world only if that world is phenomenal. They could not apply to things-in-themselves.

Subsequent reflection on this problem, however, led him to introduce a new theory in the second edition of the *Critique*. It is not only true that man does experience physical objects (though again not as things-in-themselves) in sense perception, but it is also true that such an experience is necessary if he is ever to be conscious of his own existence. For this is a consciousness of a being in time and presupposes whatever is necessary for experience of such a being. What is presupposed is perception of something permanent, and he found such an experience in his perception of a physical object or thing outside himself. Thus, he cannot know that he exists if he does not also already know that physical things having a measure of permanence exist.

POST-KANTIAN RATIONALISM

Rationalism of absolute Idealism. Absolute Idealism was first set forth explicitly and fully by Hegel, whose first published work, entitled *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie* (1801), reveals the sources of his Idealism. Johann Fichte, an ethi-

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The system of G.W.F. Hegel

cal Idealist, had developed Kant's notion of the ego, the conscious, free, creative moral agent, and applied it beyond the realm of morality to metaphysics and epistemology. The universe itself is to be explained in terms of absolute, creative ego, and consciousness is to be understood in the same terms. Knowing is creating, rather than discovering. Friedrich von Schelling, an aesthetic Idealist, on the other hand, had concentrated on the unity and systematic identity of consciousness that he thought was implicit in Kant's doctrines, particularly the doctrine of the unity of apperception. Schelling argued that it involves an identity of being, so that subject and object, the knower and nature, that which is other than him, are all one. Hegel built his system on these foundations.

To Hegel, the fundamental reality is not matter but mind, of which matter is one manifestation. Absolute mind is immanent, dynamic, and developing, the development being orderly and tending to ever-increasing complexity. The order is dialectical. The three-fold dialectical argument begins with a thesis, opposite which stands an antithesis; and out of both emerges a synthesis. It is not merely a method of argument or thought but is itself the method of the development of the universe—and this fact, indeed, explains its great usefulness in thought. Thus, the *Encyklopädie* (1817), the fullest statement of Hegel's philosophy, is set out in three parts: (1) the science of the idea in and for itself—i.e., logic; (2) the science of the idea in its otherness—i.e., the philosophy of nature; and (3) the science of the idea returning to itself out of its otherness—the philosophy of mind.

Hegel's is a logic very different from that of the textbooks of his day. The latter dealt with fixed, stereotyped, and rigid methods of reasoning, so abstract as to be in the extreme case almost irrelevant to being. A new logic, he claimed, is needed, not of reasoning but of reason. "The battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding has reduced everything." Hence, much of the "Logic" of the *Encyklopädie* (its first part) is a discussion of epistemological problems, leading up to a final part that is a study of the idea itself—as it is rational but also as it has values, is free, and is the good. The second part, the "Philosophy of Nature," proceeds by the same sort of dialectic through the study of narrow mechanics and physics to organic nature; and the third part, the "Philosophy of the Spirit," begins with subjective mind, the sensitive nutritive organic consciousness operating in the world of nature, and proceeds through the objective mind of the person in society to absolute mind revealed in the deepest consciousness of the world in art, religion, and philosophy. These are themes that Hegel also elaborated in his other works, for instance, in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807; *Phenomenology of Mind*, 1910). It is seen that, in a negative sense, Hegel was opposing the formalism of the past while setting out positively a theory of development and evolution, both metaphysical and epistemological, which deeply influenced the thought of the 19th century. His faith, in the last resort, is a faith in reason; his evolutionary theory in no way rests on change. Reality works out its own development rationally. The foundation of his philosophy (and that of his followers) rested on his celebrated statement, "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational."

Absolute Idealism was a powerful force in the German universities in the mid-19th century, although (apart from Hegel) the movement yielded no outstanding thinkers; possibly the most important was Ludwig Feuerbach, a humanizer of theology, who gave a strongly naturalistic turn to the Hegelian teaching and provided some of the foundations of the Marxist philosophy. Outside Germany, absolute Idealism flourished at the turn of the 20th century in Britain in the writings of F.H. Bradley and others, in America in those of Josiah Royce, and, somewhat later, in Italy in Benedetto Croce.

Bradley did not regard his philosophy as Hegelian; he was critical of Hegel and was doubtful, indeed skeptical, about many points in his philosophy. Nevertheless, the influence of Hegel is apparent everywhere in his writings. Metaphysics, logic, psychology, and epistemology are, in his view, all one inquiry. Human knowledge is what it is

because the universe, of which the thinking man is a part, is what it is—that is to say, a rational system, coherent and self-fulfilling. Accordingly, the criterion of successful thought is its systematic coherence; thinking is of relations, all of which are internal to the system. Advance in knowledge thus lies in the widening of systematic thought rather than in the discovery of isolated facts. At the same time, Bradley gave only qualified assent to the theory that knowing is creating; he thought it "a partial truth." Indeed, the statement that "man makes truth" is so erroneous, he thought, as to be misleading. What must be said, however, is that man's knowledge is participation in the Absolute's knowledge of itself. "The Reality," he explained, "was known always, and now [in me] its knowledge occurs. My contribution leaves it un-increased, and yet is indispensably requisite." That there is this human contribution to the totality of truth can, however, only be maintained if it be granted that there are degrees of truth, for no human knowledge can be complete and absolute in itself. Further, it is in terms of this incompleteness of knowledge (rather than of total ignorance) that human error is to be explained.

Realist Rationalism. Though Rationalism was supposed by many to have reached its definitive expression in absolute Idealism, there were certain Rationalist epistemologies that were not Idealist. Thus, contemporaneous with Bradley at Oxford, John Cook Wilson put forward a theory of knowledge that rested on a very close analysis of such concepts as knowledge, apprehension, judgment, statement, belief, thought, definition, inference, induction, and deduction. The members of the Cook Wilson school were critical both of Hegel and of Kant, finding their main inspiration in Plato and Aristotle, especially in the Platonic distinction between knowing and opining. Knowledge and belief differ in kind and not in degree, as the Idealists had taught. Both Cook Wilson and his follower H.A. Prichard insisted that knowledge is *sui generis*. A person knows that he knows, and he knows too that the experience of believing is a different experience. When he does know, he cannot then be in error. Thus, the epistemology of this school rests finally on the assertion of infallible knowing and is comparable in this respect to the epistemologies of Plato, of Aristotle, and indeed of Descartes, insofar as Descartes rested infallibility on the nature of the knowing itself rather than on the fact that God is not a deceiver. This Oxford school was in this respect essentially Rationalist but not Idealist.

It can be said, too, of the most successful and most influential critic of British Idealism, G.E. Moore, that, though his "Refutation of Idealism" (1903) was the main factor in the decline of that school, the common-sense intuitionism of his writings ranks him still among the Rationalists. Indeed, a long list of post-Hegelian philosophers who rejected absolute Idealism and yet were Rationalists could be drawn up. Only two further instances are cited here. Prior to World War II, Edmund Husserl, the founder of Phenomenology, propounded a philosophy very different from both absolute Idealism and the Realisms of his day. The very strong Rationalistic basis of his theory is sometimes neglected, though he insisted upon it throughout. Knowledge in the strict sense is infallible certainty; it is insight into the self-evident, self-evidence being the mark of all sound knowledge. Logical law, which is so known, is in no sense an empirically based probability. Again, in the later writings of the U.S. philosopher Brand Blanshard (born 1892), while his earlier Idealism is abated, his Rationalist philosophy is still emphatically and powerfully maintained.

ATTEMPTS TO TRANSCEND REASON

In concluding this section, reference must be made to claims that man can transcend reason to achieve a higher knowledge. Plato's account of knowledge of Being and Kant's of the thing-in-itself are sometimes interpreted in this way, though safer examples are to be found in the epistemologies of Plotinus and Spinoza. In the 3rd century AD, Plotinus, the foremost philosopher of Neoplatonism, spoke of (1) an irrational soul, that which senses and imagines without ever using the faculty of reasoning.

Cook Wilson and the Oxford school

The system of F.H. Bradley

Plotinus' views of the soul

But he also held that man, through intellectual self-discipline, may become (2) a rational soul and have true understanding of himself and of the world. Moreover, above the rational is (3) a soul in which nous provides immediate insight. This is human reason at its best. There is still a higher knowledge than nous, however—if indeed it can be called knowledge—viz., the soul's knowledge of God. How can man experience God? He does not see him, for God is no object standing over against the knower. Plotinus was led to use the metaphor of contact. Man touches God, and the touch becomes union. Toward the close of the sixth book of the *Enneads*, Plotinus described the ecstasy of this knowledge that transcends reason. It is not to be interpreted, however, as a rejection of reason; it is the outcome of disciplined thought and intellectual struggle leading to intuitive knowledge.

Plotinus' account of man's knowledge of God found a modern counterpart in Spinoza's *Ethics*. For Spinoza, however, God is not "beyond being" but is Being. To know anything as it is, not in isolation but as it relates to and depends upon other things, is already to begin to know the infinite. It is to understand and have rational knowledge of the Substance that is. Yet, insofar as this is knowledge of the general and universal features of Substance, it cannot be the highest knowledge, for the highest must be an intuitive and nonabstract knowledge of Substance or God; and this involves feeling as well as reason. It is an "intellectual love of God." *Ratio* thus passes into a higher stage of knowledge that Spinoza named "*scientia intuitiva*."

In such epistemologies as these, Rationalism is accepted and an effort made to complement it. But there are other epistemologies that are critical of it: human reason, it is held, works through abstraction and generalization and misses what is individual and concrete; its scope is thus limited, and it is blind to important epistemological features. For man does not know what is individual and concretely real. This is a point emphasized at the turn of the 20th century by the French intuitionist Henri Bergson, who was not antirational but rejected the view that true and reliable knowledge is to be found only by closing the mind to all possible procedures other than the rational. The truth is that discursive intellectual understanding needs to be supplemented by what Bergson called intuition. For example, clock time, which human intelligence has brought into being, needs to be understood in terms of the underlying intuition of real time. Again, rational argument pointing to determination in human life is to be tested by the intuition of free will. Furthermore, the prophetic intuition that God is love is of greater significance in religion than any logical demonstrations about God's nature. Human intelligence needs the supplementation and possibly the correction provided by intuition.

On the other hand, a note of impatience with Rationalism, if not of bitterness toward it, was present in an earlier writer, the Danish Christian Søren Kierkegaard, who flourished in the mid-19th century and who in his *Either/Or* (1843) and his *Philosophical Fragments* (1844) argued that the life of reason dehumanizes man; the intellectual fails to commit himself, so that, in a sense, he himself never exists; a man has to choose, to take sides, in order to be, and the intellectual tends to stay on the fence. In the second place, the intellectual assumes that nothing can be true that is contrary to reason and so rules out the "absolute paradox" of religion, particularly of the Christian religion. This same charge had been made earlier (in the 17th century) by Blaise Pascal, a scientist and religious philosopher, and indeed by all who accept the view that knowledge rests not on reason but on a fundamental act of faith.

Opposition to the domination of human life by intellectual disciplines has come, too, from those who see danger in the influence of modern science. The Neo-Kantians Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert in Germany, for instance, opposed the doctrine that the naturalism and positivism of the sciences provided a true view of human life and sought to set out a new life philosophy.

As a final point it is notable that much so-called anti-

Rationalist criticism is directed rather against the "understanding" than the "reason" in Kant's sense of these two terms. And, as has been seen, Kant himself, and other Rationalists, were only too well aware of the defects of the understanding.

IV. Empiricist orientation

ANCIENT GREEK AND MEDIEVAL EMPIRICISM

Classical philosophers. Empiricist elements are discernible in the Pre-Socratics and in Plato and Aristotle. *Pre-Socratics.* The early philosophers of Greece were curious about the nature of the external world; in particular, they sought to solve the problem whether the apparently different objects in it are ultimately composed of one material—for instance, of water, air, or fire. Their concern was with what exists and not with the knowledge of it or with the mind that knew. They took it for granted that their method was to be observation plus speculation on what was observed. They are sometimes said to have been Empiricists. But, if they were, they were not consciously so, and it is questionable whether the description is appropriate, particularly to the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics. Nevertheless, such accounts as remain of, for instance, the philosophy of Leucippus, whom Aristotle said was the first to put forward the atomic theory, suggest that his opposition to Parmenides' monist theory of being rested on empirical grounds. The evidence of the senses does not support Parmenides' theory, and by this criticism Leucippus adjudged it false and put forward in its stead a pluralistic atomic theory, asserting the existence of a void between the particles of reality. Some time later, Leucippus' atomic theory was defended by Democritus, perhaps the greatest of the physical philosophers. By then, however, Protagoras, Socrates, and others were grappling with epistemological problems.

Democritus himself is reported as affirming that sensation is due to the passage of atoms from outside objects through the sense organs into the soul, which, like all else, is material and consists of atoms. Though images are left in the soul, they are inevitably distorted in the process—and so is the "knowledge" thus gained. The ancient Skeptic Sextus Empiricus reported him as saying: "Sweet and bitter, hot and cold, and colour exist by convention only; in reality atoms and the void exist." This would seem to mean that any knowledge based on the senses is likely to be unreliable because of the condition of the human body and of those things that impinge and press upon it. Yet, Democritus, apparently, wished to affirm that the atoms and the void are fully known. (Aristotle's criticism of this claim was that no successful account of the knowledge of objects can rest on a purely Materialist philosophy.) Though an evaluation of the exact teaching of Democritus is impossible in view of the fewness of the extant fragments, it is interesting to find doubts being expressed from the first about the cogency of "information" gained through "distorting" sensory media.

Theaetetus of Plato. In dealing with sense perception, the most significant work in classical literature is undoubtedly Plato's *Theaetetus*, and it is a mark of his genius that almost at the beginning of the discussion of this problem he should have produced so penetrating a study. The *Theaetetus* is divided into three parts: the first (151d-187a), the part to be considered here, examines the theory that sense perception is knowing, the second that true judgment is knowing, and the third that true judgment, with the reason (*logos*) for affirming it, is knowing. Each of these three theories is rejected. The mathematician Theaetetus, a leading personage of the dialogue, defends the view that sense perception (*aisthēsis*) is knowledge. By sense perception he means the perception of objects, particularly their visual perception. Things are as they appear to the observer. This thesis is put forward as the position of Protagoras, the Sophist, and Theaetetus and Socrates sympathize with it. If a man now sees a patch of yellow in front of him, it is beyond all doubt and infallible that there is a patch of yellow before him. But the question remains whether this is infallible knowledge. If the object of true knowledge has any

Whether sense perceptic is knowled;

rationalism

permanence and is one and the same for all, then seeing the yellow patch is not an instance of true knowledge. A wind feels warm to one person but cold to another, and it may be possible to argue that sense perception, while in a sense infallible, is yet always relative. Heraclitus had held that whatever is known is in a process of flux and is never permanent. Just now, and for a particular observer now, the wind is warm. The wind and he himself who now feels the wind to be warm are both changing ceaselessly, but for the moment it must be granted that for him the wind is warm. Such sense perception could then be said to be infallible knowledge of the truth.

It has to be asked whether this account of knowledge can stand examination, whether any and every man is to be the measure of truth, and indeed whether living things other than man might also serve. The theory would seem to hold that, since pigs and baboons presumably have sense perceptions, a pig can be the measure of truth. Again, a distinction is made between wise and foolish men on the ground that the former are more likely to know the truth and less likely to lapse into falsehood, but this distinction would be meaningless if what every man experiences, however foolish the man, is invariably the truth. This would appear to assume that the statements of the 'inexpert' are as true as those of the 'expert', that, if doctor and patient disagree about the latter's illness, both know the truth equally well. Even though it be granted that in sense perception each and every individual is in a sense infallible, it is still reasonable to ask if it can be supposed that this is true outside sense perception. Surely the infallibility of sensation is no infallible knowledge of the truth. Truth is permanent: once true always true. But, if all things are changing; then what men wish to know would be constantly changing: nothing would stay from one moment to the next to be known. Furthermore, the observer who knew a moment ago will be changing. If this is indeed a world of constant flux and nothing more is to be said, it is a fair question whether there can be any place within it for permanent truth.

Plato sums up. It is said that perception is knowledge in the strict sense, infallible knowledge. A man sees the colour that he sees, and no error can enter. Yet, it is a question whether this is what is meant by knowledge. Seeing a shade of colour is a very different thing from knowing something about a physical object. The former is the product of one sense only—vision. The latter involves more than all of the special senses can give. It involves a knowledge of the being of objects, that they exist; of the difference between them; of likeness or unlikeness. Such knowledge is given not through the operation of one special sense but through the power of the mind itself, which reveals a truth that holds for the future as well as for the present, since it is permanent. Strictly speaking, seeing a shade of colour, smelling a smell, or hearing a sound, in spite of their infallibility, are not genuine instances of knowing. In Plato's view, to find true knowledge a man must apprehend the Forms.

Importance of sense perception in Aristotle. Aristotle shared Plato's Rationalism even though he rejected his theory of Forms; on the other hand, he did not share Plato's general mistrust of sense perception. Some of Aristotle's most original contributions to learning were made in the field of biology, the outcome of his own close observation of nature and of the seriousness with which he took the information that the senses provide. Moreover, his father was a physician of Ionian stock, and the Ionians prided themselves on the accuracy of their observations. Sense perception, Aristotle thought, provides the starting point of learning. To survive, all living things must have first powers of nutrition, but, in addition, they must have, those of sensation so as to be aware of objects and, in particular, to be able to distinguish between them. Living things need sensory powers in order to select what is nutritious, but these powers, too, provide experience, which—in the human case—can be stored up, compared with other experiences, reflected upon, and used to understand the world. "Without sense-perception there can be no learning and no understanding," for there would be nothing to reason about in respect to nature. Aristotle

conceived of sensation as one faculty that specifies itself in the various ways of the five senses. In addition, however, the sensory faculty perceives "common" sensibles (common to two or more of the senses)—e.g., being one or many, being of a certain shape, being in movement or at rest. These are known in sense perception but not through any one, and only one, specific sense. Further, a person may see a colour and at the same time, incidentally perceive a concomitant, as when a certain white object is perceived as the son of Diaries. Today such a perception is frequently contrasted with the bare sensation of the white patch and said to involve recognition. Aristotle clearly counted both the perception and recognition of the physical object as a part of the knowledge that the senses provide.

Nevertheless, he recognized, too, that sense perception is inadequate. He emphasized that sense perception is knowledge of the particular—the particular taste or colour and also the particular thing or person or the particular event. It is knowledge of the here and now, though it is true that a person's remembering the same particulars occurring over and over again may lead to an expectation and a generalization—for instance, that, given a certain occurrence, then a certain other occurrence will always follow. Aristotle was aware of the part induction can play in yielding general knowledge, but such knowledge is not completely certain; it is not necessary and universal knowledge. Human beings are capable of a necessary and universal knowledge that is true not for this moment but eternally. Though sense perception never provides such knowledge, reason does—not only in providing mankind with the ways of procedure, particularly the syllogism, which makes demonstrated, necessary, and universal conclusions possible, but also by providing the fundamental laws upon which the demonstrations rest. Aristotle agrees with Plato that the highest field of human knowledge is one into which sense perception does not enter; the most to be expected of sense perception is that it leads to generalizations that can be argued about rationally. But Aristotle would add that any conclusions produced by such arguments, insofar as they apply to the natural world, can and should always be tested by appealing to sensory experience. In *De generatione animalium* he remarked, for instance, that, though theories about the generation of bees are many,

the facts have not yet been sufficiently grasped; if ever they are, then the credit must be given rather to observation than to theories, and to theories only if what they affirm agrees with the observed facts.

Aristotle was as clear as any Empiricist that the conclusions of reasoning, if they are about the world, are to be verified or falsified by the evidence of the senses.

Post-Aristotelian Empiricism. A word may be added about the two principal post-Aristotelian schools, those of the Stoics and Epicureans, particularly in view of 17th-century assumptions that these schools founded a thoroughgoing Empiricism. Not all of the extant fragments confirm this view, particularly in the case of the Epicureans. It is noteworthy that, in one account of Epicurus' views on the infallibility of sense perception, he is said to have held that what is seen in hallucinations and in dreams is true. This would seem to suggest that, by the infallibility of the senses, he meant no more than Socrates did in the *Theaetetus*—that is, that, if one sees a blue patch, one is undeniably seeing a blue patch—even if it be seen in a hallucination. But this is very different from claiming that sense perception gives infallible knowledge of the world. Cicero complained, possibly unfairly, that Epicurus failed to give due attention to deductive and intuitive rational knowledge and suggested that this made it easier for him to magnify sense perception.

Whatever be said of Epicurus, however, the ancient fragments make it clear that the Stoics were confirmed Empiricists. They held that the senses provide the soul with the first material for thought, the sensible "presentations"; up to this point, the soul is like a sheet of white paper with nothing written upon it. But this, in the Stoic view, is not the only source of presentations and is not reliable. In sensation the soul gives its assent. For the soul,

Sensation,
truth, and
change

Biological
approach
to sense
perception

The Stoics
and
Epicureans

though analogous to white paper in taking the sensory impressions, is yet not actively passive. On the contrary, it receives the sensory presentations, deliberates upon them, presents conceptual material of its own, and after deliberation recognizes and firmly grasps the truth. Sensation of itself cannot provide such knowledge. It is notable that, in developing an epistemology, the Stoics and Epicureans were further hindered by the necessity of explaining human knowledge in terms of a narrow atomistic Materialism.

Medieval philosophers. Up to the time of Albertus Magnus, in the 13th century, the task of philosophy was primarily to justify the Christian faith by rational argument. This curtailed the growth of natural science. Albertus, a scientist as well as a theologian, was the first influential thinker to insist that, whereas the authority in disputes on the faith was the theologian, he was not necessarily the authority in more mundane inquiries. If the question was one of medicine, one should turn to Hippocrates and to Galen; if of physics, to Aristotle. Information in physics, Albertus held, comes first from the senses, and the development of the natural sciences comes best through disciplined observation.

This lesson was not forgotten by his most distinguished pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas. In the natural sciences, Aquinas acknowledged the authority of Aristotle, and his thought followed closely that of Aristotle both in the latter's account of sense perception and of its role in knowledge. But he did not follow Aristotle blindly. Thus, in his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, he sometimes openly disagreed—for instance, in the examination of Aristotle's doctrine of incidental sense objects. He did not disapprove, however, of the Empiricist strain in Aristotle's approach to nature or of the view that human knowledge in this field begins with and rests upon sense experience.

Yet, oddly enough, real advances in the natural sciences came not from the Dominican Aristotelians of the Albertus-Aquinas school but from their critics, the Oxford Franciscan Platonists, of whom the most important figure was Roger Bacon, a 13th-century friar, who owed much to his teacher, the influential Robert Grosseteste. The explanation of the success of the Franciscans is simple but also profound: they were mathematicians; they believed that the development of the natural sciences could take place only by applying mathematics to the findings of sensory observation. Experimental science was in part disciplined observation but also in part applied mathematics. Bacon's own experiments were of no great importance, but he had the genius to see the right way to proceed.

The movement in the 14th century to liberate the natural sciences from dominance by theology was furthered by skepticism about the adequacy of reason in metaphysics. The view that the universal (or general) concept known by the intellect was the true object of knowledge was now questioned; the true object is the real, and the real is the particular and individual. Concrete "thisness," as Duns Scotus termed it, is not to be ignored. William of Ockham regarded knowledge of the individual existent through sensory intuition as the foundation of knowledge. He did not deny the need for abstraction in order to help judgment, but it is erroneous, in Ockham's view, to suppose that abstracted objects or conceptions contemplated by the mind exist outside the mind; universals belong to the mind's abstraction and conception, not to the real world. It followed from this that a strictly Rationalist theology, concerned with the concept of a divine being, could not positively assert the existence of the divine being, because the concept is a creation of the human mind. Man has, says Ockham, no intuition of God (as one can now intuit this white patch before him). The being of God is revealed; it is not known either by intuition or again by abstract thought; it is a matter of faith. On the other hand, the being of a particular natural object is known intuitively in sense perception, and this fact completely justifies the Empiricist approach to the natural sciences, as contrasted with that of the Rationalist. Such was the solution of the problem of man's knowl-

edge of God and of nature that finally emerged from the medieval schools, and it was a solution that eased the way of the Empiricist.

MODERN AND RECENT EMPIRICISM

Central to the modern discussion of Empiricism are the contributions of John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. But three other slightly earlier figures cannot be ignored, viz., Francis Bacon, Pierre Gassendi, and René Descartes.

Early forerunners. Francis Bacon, at the turn of the 17th century, expressed optimism about modern science in his *Advancement of Learning* (1605), in which he stressed the need for more experimental work and less speculation. In the *Novum Organum* (1620) he attempted to set forth the complete method for the new science. The proper approach to nature, Bacon held, is Empiricist rather than Rationalist. This means that the procedure is inductive, passing from the observation of particulars to generalizations, and not deductive. But Bacon is critical of those Empiricists who think their task completed when they have jumped from observations to any sort of theory. It must be "a gradual and unbroken ascent" ultimately to the most general axioms by "dwelling duly and orderly" on the observed phenomena. True advance demands patience and the greatest of care in view of "the dullness, incompetency and deceptions of the senses." Bacon had some important insights. In discussing negative and affirmative instances, for example, he held that "in the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance is the more forcible of the two." Yet, his occasional insights do not add up to a complete theory. What can be claimed for him is that he taught Empiricists to question their assumptions and their procedures while continuing to reject the mere speculation, divorced of reference to experience, of the Rationalists.

A contemporary of Descartes and a reviver of Epicureanism, Pierre Gassendi was influential in his day in France and was not without influence elsewhere, particularly in England. His scientific contribution was limited, largely because of his lack of mathematical understanding. He was, indeed, suspicious of demands for complete mathematical certainty in the natural sciences, for the observations of nature and of life provide a foundation for probability only. "I live," he said, "from day to day, accepting nothing which goes beyond the limits of probability." His fame rested rather on his influential advocacy of a new metaphysic based on the Epicurean physics of atoms moving within a void. He advocated, too, the moral teaching of Epicurus and his epistemology. Gassendi was charged in his day with being, in his theory of knowledge, a sensationalist (who reduced experience to sensations). It is true that he believed that there is "nothing in the intellect" not derived from the senses and that he asserted, with Epicurus, that the senses never err (the Theaetetan infallibility of bare sensation). But this does not make Gassendi a sensationalist, for he also admitted readily that the senses are frequently deceptive and are then to be corrected by reason, "which is superior to sense."

In his lifetime Gassendi, though much the lesser man, was regarded as Descartes's rival. And, indeed, the standpoints of the two philosophers were very different. Descartes sought certainty in metaphysics, in physics, in psychology, and in morals and believed that man has the powers to establish it if he chooses, whereas Gassendi thought that probability based finally on sense experiences is sufficient for human needs.

Descartes, in his *Principia Philosophiae* (1644), gave an account of the nature of sensation, showing how neural movements affect the brain and, through it, the mind. The information thus provided is of great utility in a practical sense, but none of it is wholly reliable. It tends to be deceptive and creates deep prejudices that are inimical to a true knowledge of the world. Descartes emphatically rejected the Empiricist view that there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses; it contradicts his own Rationalist account of knowledge. The most that sensation can do is to provide material for

Francis Bacon's attempt to provide a method for science

The work of Pierre Gassendi

thought; it can suggest, for instance, the notion of extension, which the intellect can then handle geometrically. It suggests too the existence of an external world of physical objects. Sometimes an object taken to be external is not in fact external, as in the case of illusions; but Descartes argued that doubts about the existence of an external world on this ground can be dissipated by noting that the perception of it is provided by a veracious Creator who has also provided man with a means of testing the validity of the perception—by the criterion of clear and distinct ideas. Thus, sensation is useful and, in a limited way, illuminating; but for full illumination one must turn to reason and intellect—for instance, to the mathematical analysis of the external world. Given this illumination, observation and experiment can be exceedingly valuable, but without it they do not provide an adequate basis for human knowledge.

Classical British Empiricists. The classical sources for the study of Empiricism are the writings of three British philosophers—John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume.

Influence of Gassendi: the "clean slate"

John Locke's new way of ideas. John Locke was said by Leibniz to have been "established in the system of Gassendi" and was viewed on the Continent in the early 18th century as the champion of the Gassendists. He was not so regarded at home, however, for the influence of other (English) movements upon him was too obvious. Leibniz clearly had in mind the conflict between Gassendi and Descartes and held that, in this conflict, Locke was on Gassendi's side. This judgment, however, needs qualification, for, though Locke was suspicious of Cartesian speculation and theories, yet his was not a simple choice between Gassendi and Descartes. Locke had cooperated with leading English scientists, such as Robert Boyle, a pioneering physicist and chemist, and Thomas Sydenham, an eminent physician, and had studied the work of Isaac Newton. Locke had learned from these scientists that the new science was not merely the product of a better empirical observation of nature; it rested, too, on a successful application of mathematical techniques. This latter element had not been emphasized in the teaching of Gassendi.

If this qualification be made, it is then safe to acknowledge Locke's debt to Gassendi. In the *Essay* he set out to consider "the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." In Locke's treatment of the origin of knowledge Gassendi's influence is very obvious. At the beginning, Locke affirmed, the mind is as "white paper, void of all characters." It lacks innate ideas, though it does possess innate powers. It is "a clean-slate." Ideas come to be written upon it through sensation of the external world and reflection (introspection) of the internal world; "these two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring." Locke showed in Book I of the *Essay* how, as against the Cartesians, there are not innate ideas in the mind, and his main purpose in Book II was to establish that all of man's ideas originate in sensation or reflection. This does not mean that all ideas, say of the external world, are themselves sensed, for, from what is sensed, other ideas may be derived. It means instead that, if a man lacked all five senses, if he had no sensory experiences, he would have no knowledge of the external world; for such knowledge, sense perception is essential. And this is Empiricism.

Locke's view of the representational function of perception

Locke acknowledged that there are difficulties in the theory. The senses, he explained, "convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things; and the mind is thus stocked with ideas." How is this statement to be interpreted? Is "having an idea" itself a knowing? When Locke spoke in Book IV of knowing with certainty, knowing in the strict sense, this is not to be identified with the having of ideas in sense perception but with intuiting that ideas are, or are not, related in certain ways. Nevertheless, he did find it necessary to admit a "sensitive" knowledge that is more than merely probable. A person may imagine, for instance, a cat with webbed feet, but he would not then claim that it existed; if he

saw such a creature, however, he would make this claim. A man cannot deny that the sun that he now sees exists. Sense perception is a knowledge of existents, and Locke never thought otherwise; yet, this is difficult to accord with what he said about the representative function of sensory ideas.

The senses, he explains, "convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things." There are three elements that should be distinguished: (1) the mind, (2) the physical thing, (3) the idea or perception. The mind in Locke's day was generally held to be a substance that has real existence and that is distinct from a physical substance; on the whole, Locke accepted this view, though he was not prepared to rule out the possibility that God may have "super-added" to man's material body "the faculty of thinking." This would necessitate that there exist two substances in the world, material and immaterial, but not that man is a dualism of two substances. The second element is the physical thing known—for instance, the table. It is necessary to distinguish, however, between the mediately and the immediately known; what is known in sense perception (the table) is known mediately. For what one is aware of immediately is the third element, the idea or perception—e.g., the brown colour of the table or its smoothness. A complex of simple ideas represents the table, and it is through being immediately aware of this complex that one becomes mediately aware of the table. The purpose of this doctrine is to explain how, in seeing a table, one may sometimes see its colour to be brown and sometimes some other colour. Things are not always what they appear to be, but men, nonetheless, know them through their appearances. Locke did think that in the case of certain qualities, which he called primary—e.g., solidity, being extended, or being in motion or at rest—the observer could be sure that the ideas resemble the real qualities; but this is not so in the case of ideas of secondary qualities—e.g., colours, tastes, and smells. Yet, he did not doubt that men do know physical things through sense perception.

Berkeleyan Idealism. There are acute difficulties in Locke's account of sense perception as was made clear by contemporary critics, one of whom, Bishop George Berkeley, an immaterialist of the early 18th century, accepted the view that knowledge of the world originates in the having of ideas in sense experience. But he did not accept Locke's next step—i.e., that these ideas represent qualities or things in the external world; on the contrary, he regarded representationalism as a millstone around Locke's neck. An idea may possibly represent another idea: *a* could be like *b* (in which *a* and *b* are ideas), but *a* can never be like a material thing and cannot represent it.

Berkeley rejected the widespread assumption that a material world exists beyond the veil of ideas, but, even were it true, Berkeley would still hold that having ideas would throw no light on its nature. Further, Locke's distinction between ideas of primary and ideas of secondary qualities does not help him, for the very same arguments that show that ideas of secondary qualities cannot be representations of the qualities of material things show, too, that ideas of the primary qualities cannot be such representations. Yet, for the Empiricist the origin of knowledge lies in the gaining of ideas; and it would appear to follow that the knower cannot really know his world, because, apparently, the only means of doing so is through the discredited representations. Berkeley's answer is that ideas do not represent a material world and that this answer need not disturb the would-be knower dependent upon ideas; for there is no material world. One reason among several that Berkeley had for adopting an immaterialist philosophy—and an important one for him—is that it finally solves the difficulties of the representationalist theory.

If, however, a person does adopt immaterialism, there is a problem of what is to be said in a positive way about ideas, since the theory that they are representations is rejected. Berkeley's solution lies in the adoption of Idealism, the theory that what exists and what is real is solely mind having ideas. Ideas exist as being perceived by a mind, their *esse* ("to be") is *percipi* ("to be perceived"). Berkeley

Immaterialism

Idealism: "To be is to be perceived"

himself acknowledged that this system of Idealism might be criticized on the ground of its subjectivity. If a person claims that what is is what he perceives, then what is would be subject to his whim at any moment, and there would be no objectivity and no order in the world. But this, Berkeley replied, is to fail to grasp the nature of the process of having ideas. When a man opens his eyes in broad daylight, he is constrained to see what he does see. What he sees is not determined by him. In imaging or daydreaming, he is free to conjure up what idea he chooses, but, when he sees something, then what he sees is in no way dependent on his will. Nonetheless, the idea seen is dependent on mind, though clearly not on his mind; thus, when he sees it, it must be given to him by some universal mind able to produce all these ideas. They are certainly not of the viewer's willing; they are lively and distinct and come in such an order and with such a coherence that one soon gets used to their regularity. The rules followed are, in fact, the laws of nature, which are thus revealed to man not by reasoning nor by intuitively grasping an objective necessity but by experience. Knowing the world of nature is a process of becoming familiar with the established ways "wherein the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense." In this way, one knows objective law, and Berkeleyan Idealism is not to be equated with subjectivism.

Impressions in Hume. Whereas reflections on the difficulties in Locke's Empiricism helped to lead Berkeley to Idealism, they led the Scottish philosopher David Hume, of the ensuing generation, to Skepticism—though in both cases other factors were also at work. Berkeley had argued that, beginning with Lockean Empiricism, a coherent system of philosophy could be maintained but only if it were an Idealist system. Hume, however, could not accept the view that the physical object could be identified with an idea. He was also more conscious than Berkeley of the deep skepticism present in Locke's own philosophy. The 18th century was Rationalist; but paradoxically, it acknowledged Locke, the Empiricist, as the source of its Rationalism. Locke's appeal to the life of reason, as contrasted with that of emotion and passion, had been very effective. Furthermore, there were, in fact, Rationalist elements at the heart of his epistemology, since he thought man capable of absolutely certain knowledge by rational intuition and by it alone. Nonetheless, man's link with the existing physical world, he held, is through ideas, and the correctness of their representation is suspect, at least in the case of ideas of secondary qualities. As a consequence, Locke explicitly affirmed that man's knowledge of the physical world does not extend to that certainty that would permit it to be called scientific. Observing the phenomena gives useful hints and clues; but "certainty and demonstration," he held, "are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to." This is the skepticism present in Locke, a skepticism regarding the possibility of exact and certain knowledge of the natural world; and it is the skepticism that Hume developed.

Hume himself acknowledged that certainty is possible in a very limited field, viz., when the ideas are clear and necessary and the relations between them can be grasped by reason. Such is the case, for instance, in arithmetic and algebra. Others had argued that the causal principle that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence is also known rationally and that knowledge of it provides a base for the objective, necessary science of nature. Hume, in a brilliant argument, claimed to refute this view on Empiricist grounds.

To understand the refutation, however, a student first needs to understand Hume's earlier account of ideas. Knowledge begins with "impressions"—this is Hume's term—and impressions come with "a force and liveliness" that make them unique. "Ideas" are in turn "faint images of these" impressions. This blue colour is a sensed impression; the perceiver can later recall the colour, and then it is an idea. An impression and the corresponding idea can be simple or complex, and, in the case of a simple impression, say the taste of a pineapple, the corresponding idea exactly resembles the impression. If some-

one thus speaks of a simple idea, it is perfectly justifiable to ask him what simple impression it exactly resembles. If he cannot answer, his idea lacks clarity. In the same way, it is reasonable to ask to what simple impression the idea of a causal relation corresponds. In view of Hume's phenomenalism, one answer is impossible for him: he cannot speak of an impression of a physical thing exerting power and so causing change. Certain impressions may suggest the presence of a continuing existent, but such an existent is never experienced. This is not to say that it does not exist but that man cannot know it, for he is confined to the phenomenal. For him it is the perceptions that are real, and, since "nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions," a knowledge of what exists beyond these is impossible. It is true that men talk of a physical object; but what they have in mind then is "a bundle of perceptions," though this bundle may recur so constantly in their experience that they tend to think of it as a continuing identity. This is a part of their experience; yet, it does not establish the existence of a continuing physical object in the world. Thus, it makes no sense to say that a person has an impression of one real thing acting on or affecting another.

The philosopher must speak in terms of simple impressions. But, even when he does so in the present context, he is still baffled. For apparently no one has an impression of causing. The observer does not perceive *p* causing *q* to move away. Strictly speaking, the most that a person sees is *p* moving in *q*'s direction; he next sees the contacting, and he then sees *q* move away. So far, there is no knowledge of a causal relation. But, when he sees this sequence occur frequently, by an association of ideas, which Hume finds to be an important principle of the imagination, he does tend to assume that *p* causes *q* to move away. The actual simple impressions present are (1) contiguity (*p* and *q* are contiguous) and (2) priority in time (*p*'s movement being prior to *q*'s). Though these impressions alone would not give the feeling of a causal relationship, these plus the regularity of the experience and the constancy of the conjunction could do so. The expectation of an event, given the prior conditions, is strong and grows in strength with the increase in experience, until, finally, the observer feels that one *must* cause the other. There is a necessity in the causal relation; yet, the necessity is not now objective. It is a subjective necessity only, a necessity for the imagination controlled by the association of ideas. The observer must believe that *p* causes *q* to move.

The argument throws light, Hume thought, on the nature of belief. Belief is having a present *impression*, for instance of *p* moving, and associating with it an *idea* of *q*'s moving, so that, before one sees *q* moving, one believes it will move. In this sense, one may be said to know the causal relation and only in this sense. Knowledge of cause and effect, therefore, is not a rational intuition nor a rational demonstration, but a belief determined by imagination and its laws. The much-prized sciences are thus not rational; they in no way rest on rational insights into the objective nature of the world. They rest, instead, on an experience of impressions in a certain constant order and on the beliefs that the imagination is induced to bring into being as a consequence.

Clearly, one cannot accept the Rationalist account of the knowledge of the causal relation and still remain an Empiricist. The Empiricist may concede the possibility of rational intuition, say, in mathematics but not in the natural sciences nor in psychology. The physical existent is what it is, but men do not know what sort of being it has. The theory of representative perception is wholly unnecessary and solves no problem, for what is phenomenal can never represent what is not phenomenal. The principle of causal relationship belongs to the phenomenal world and makes possible a science, but it is only a science of which the necessity is subjective. Finally, knowledge of substantial continuants—i.e., of identities (whether physical objects or persons)—rests solely on the experience of a series of impressions gained on many occasions in a regular order and on the "bestowing of an identity" on the perceptions, thus "producing the fiction

Causatio:
and belie

of a continued existence." Whatever the nature of its true existence, a "physical existence" is experienced by man as a recurring series of impressions. Personal identity, too, is explained in the same way. The abiding personality, like the continued existence of external things, is an "illusion of the imagination"; yet, an illusion without which men could not live their lives.

Summary
of classical
Empir-
icism

Assessments and recent expressions of Empiricism. The half century from 1690 to 1740 thus witnessed a bold attack on the problems of epistemology. Starting from the dictum that "there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses" and taking this dictum seriously, conclusions were drawn that were both brilliant and disturbing. Locke interpreted it to mean that a complete reduction of all ideas into simple ideas was feasible and that this reduction would help to show that the most complex ideas had reference, however remote, to what really existed; for they were reducible to simple ideas, and these, he assumed, resembled the real things. Contradictions in sensory experience, however, caused him to doubt whether the ideas of secondary qualities did resemble the qualities of real things, but at least the ideas of primary qualities resembled them. Further, he failed to reduce all complex ideas—for instance, the idea of substance—into simple ideas. Berkeley contended that Locke in his theory of knowledge had attempted the impossible. Complete skepticism was inevitable if knowledge was held to depend on the establishment of correspondences between ideas in the mind and independent material things outside the mind, and the distinction between ideas of primary and ideas of secondary qualities could not save Locke. What was necessary, in Berkeley's opinion, was a revolutionary change of outlook; it was necessary to deny independent matter and assert that what existed consisted solely of mind and ideas. Hume agreed with Berkeley's diagnosis of Locke's failure but rejected the remedy that he proposed. Idealism was unacceptable. Human experience was of the phenomenal only, and no one could say what lay behind the veil of phenomena. Instead of Idealism, Hume offered a phenomenalist account of human knowledge that enabled one to speak significantly of continuing identities of things and persons and of changes in and between them, but it was a knowledge that arose from familiarity with the phenomena and from inductions based on this familiarity. As for sure knowledge of what exists other than phenomena, Hume admitted that he had none.

18th-century assessments. That these consequences of Empiricism were disturbing is clear from many of the writings of the time, two of which may be briefly mentioned. Richard Price, a British moralist, was quite emphatic on one point: that no account of sense perception can be given in terms of sensation alone; for such notions as substance, space, and duration, which are not given in sensation, show the presence of understanding, "the faculty that discerns truth." The understanding is itself "a spring of new ideas," and these ideas are made use of in sense perception and in the comparison and relating of ideas.

Another—and fuller—examination of the Empiricists is that of Thomas Reid, founder of the Scottish common-sense school of philosophy. Reid criticized the failure of the Empiricists to distinguish between sensation and perceiving. Sensing is having an impression; but perception is

first, some conception or notion of the object perceived; secondly, a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; and thirdly, that this conviction and belief are immediate and not the effect of reasoning.

More than all he criticized Berkeley and Hume for allowing their speculations to lead them to positions (immaterialism and total Skepticism, respectively) that are obnoxious to common sense.

On the Continent, while recognition of Locke was widespread, few recognized the significance of Berkeley and Hume. Kant, however, did appreciate the importance of Hume's teaching in epistemology and found it necessary, as a consequence, to make radical changes in his Rationalism. In seeking to understand the world, the knower

must first wait on experience for he is dependent upon sense-data. He does not construct the concepts that he thinks from nothing. And there is no possibility of his "calculating the universe" in the extreme Rationalist sense. On the other hand, no attempt to reduce intellectual concepts into sensibles can succeed. For, whereas human knowledge is admittedly a matter of ordering the manifold of the senses, it can only be ordered when principles are given that have been gained not in experience but rationally and a priori. Pure Rationalism of the Leibnizian kind and pure Empiricism of the Humean kind both fail. Kant attempted to frame a theory of knowledge that has both Rationalist and Empiricist elements, but he found himself encumbered by the difficulties of both schools. His partial acceptance of Empiricism, for instance, involved him in a representationalist interpretation of ideas, which contributed to his difficulties with an unknowable "thing-in-itself" and an inexperienceable "real self."

The emphasis on sensation in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume influenced various aspects of 18th-century life. It had a profound effect upon the ethical teaching of the age, leading through the moral-sense theory ultimately to Utilitarianism. On the more theoretical side, the extreme teaching of the French sensationalist Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, influential in France and Italy, is significant. He argued that the full life of the human mind emerges out of the power of sensing. Condillac is noted for having imagined a statue that is lifeless until one first superadds to it a sense of smell. If the statue is genuinely able to smell, then it will soon come to desire and to will; if, further, the sensation of touch is superadded, then will follow a consciousness of a real external world, and so on. Given sensation, all the rest of human experience follows. In England the Materialist Thomas Hobbes, a political philosopher, had argued a century earlier not merely that conscious life is a development of sensations but also that the explanation of sensation is a physical one, the affecting of physical organs by physical motions. David Hartley, an 18th-century physician and philosopher, explained the associationist theory, which Hume made central to his epistemology, in terms of brain vibrations, whereas his disciple, the clergyman Joseph Priestley, discoverer of oxygen, made clear the Materialist implications of this theory. These were emphasized, too, by several other French Materialists of the 18th century, one of whom used the analogy of digestion and spoke of the brain as secreting thought. Many of these writers were medical men; their plea, in effect, was for a purely empirical science of physiology, on the one hand, and of psychology, on the other. They found support in Condillac's sensationalism.

Empiricism and Positivism. Along with sensationalism, another offshoot of the Empiricist school was the Positivism of the 19th century. Condorcet had already expressed the spirit of the new movement, and his work influenced Auguste Comte, the founder of the Positivist school. Comte lectured privately in Paris in the 1830s and published his *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830-42), which set down the Positivist principles. He claimed that the development of science, on the one hand, and the Industrial Revolution, on the other, had given birth to a new culture that derived its principles neither from theological dogmatism nor from abstract metaphysics but from science. The methods that had worked so well in natural science needed to be applied to a new science, sociology. In Britain, Comte had an admirer in John Stuart Mill, whose Empiricism and Positivism are apparent in all of his writings, as they are, too, in those of his father, James Mill, and of Jeremy Bentham, known—as were the Mills—for his Utilitarian ethics. John Stuart Mill objected, however, to what he took to be an illiberal and doctrinaire feature of Comte's teaching, viz., that, once sociological laws are established by scientific methods, they are then—like laws of physics—not to be questioned. Mill objected on moral grounds and also on epistemological grounds, because the sciences, as he thought, provide men with beliefs only and never with absolute certainties. Mill accepted the fundamental epis-

Culmination
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temological positions of Hume—*i.e.*, the rule of induction, the regular sequence theory of causality, the greater ontological significance of the particular, and phenomenalism. (Mill held that a physical object is a permanent possibility of sensation.)

Mill's doubts about Comte's teaching were shared by Positivists later in the century. Toward its end, in the German-speaking world, a school arose that was Positivist in outlook but critical of the earlier naïvetés of the movement. These men questioned the earlier uncritical assumptions of Comte as to the reliability and universal applicability of scientific method. The school included in its ranks Karl Eugen Dühring, author of a Materialistic "philosophy of reality," and Richard Avenarius, the founder of "empiriocriticism"; but the most prominent figure was a physicist, Ernst Mach, at the University of Vienna. For Mach, who later taught philosophy, science is first and foremost a matter of economy, "the complete possible presentation of facts with the least possible expenditure of thought." The facts are known in experience; science is not fact-finding but fact relating; it does not claim to present the absolute truth about the world. Its so-called laws are not absolute but are at best "limitations of possibilities." Thus, the view of the early Positivists that strict adherence to scientific method guarantees truth was not shared by the later Positivists; yet, they were as emphatic as their predecessors had been that metaphysics is to be avoided. The outcome of their thinking was a fairly general Skepticism.

In the meantime, the pioneers of mathematical logic, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred North Whitehead, had established that an element of necessity is present in mathematics and logic, and this helped a group of new Positivists in Vienna—among them Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Friedrich Waismann, and Otto Neurath—to put forward a Positivism that rests on a sure logical basis. It was argued that some statements can be shown to be true or false by appeal to experience and others by appeal to logic and that both classes of statement are significant. But allegedly factual statements about objects beyond experience—*e.g.*, metaphysical and theological statements—cannot be held to have meaning. This new philosophy was advanced forcibly in *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), by a British Positivist, A.J. Ayer. Many criticisms have been made of Logical Positivism, the most damaging being that of A.C. Ewing, a Cambridge philosopher, that it would appear to make any philosophic statement whatsoever (including the statement of Logical Positivism itself) meaningless. Moreover, granted that the necessity of logic and mathematics is that of tautology, which, however, involves exact synonymy, W.V. Quine, a U.S. logician, questioned the assumption of analysts and tautologists that there is such a thing as complete synonymy. Thirdly, contemporary Positivists disagree about what experiencing is, for some think of it as the observation of colours, tastes, and sounds, others as that of physical objects, and this ambiguity still remains to muddy the waters of Empiricist arguments.

Empiricism and Pragmatism. Finally, in discussing Empiricism and Positivism, reference must be made to Pragmatism, a movement that flourished, mainly in the United States, at the turn of the 20th century. Its leading figures were Charles Sanders Peirce, an engineer and logician, and William James, a psychologist and philosopher. James's charm, liveliness of style, and generosity of spirit made him the better known of the two. In his suspicion of speculative metaphysics, he was a Positivist; thinking is always a means to an end, he held, and the end is practice. He argued that "truth in our ideas means their power to 'work,'" and that "any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak . . . is true *instrumentally*." Replying to outraged critics in *The Meaning of Truth* (1909), he argued that this view does not imply subjectivity; that, on the contrary, his Pragmatism is throughout objective and empirical, for it rests on the awareness of "brute fact"—*e.g.*, "that this paper is white." But brute-fact knowledge is limited and is to be eked out by way of conceptual knowledge; the latter, however, is largely dispositional in

character, involving "a procession of mental associates and motor consequences."

The epistemological features of Pragmatism were given a fuller and more adequate treatment in the highly original writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, a gifted logician and painstaking analyst whose interest in practice was less dominating than that of James. He was less concerned, too, with the reality of individuals and concrete particulars and not at all attracted by James's nominalist philosophy of "radical Empiricism." The link between the two lies in the adoption by both of the pragmatic method that Peirce and James, along with other friends, thought out together in Harvard in the early 1870s.

For Peirce, man's knowledge begins with what he observes through his senses and what he is told by others. He may hold tenaciously to what he has so gained. But doubts inevitably occur, and he finds his senses occasionally deceptive. The authority of others, particularly of those whom he deeply respects, may assuage these doubts, at least temporarily. Other philosophers have held that, if the doubts return, he must then appeal to his own powers of intellectual intuition. But Peirce denies that human knowledge is ever intuitive in this sense; all of the evidence shows that it proceeds in another way—not through intuition but through thinking.

Many would agree that the thinking that has given the most satisfaction to mankind (in the sense of enabling man to ward off doubts and so to believe) is scientific thinking. Consequently, the best approach to the understanding of human knowledge is a study of the method and purpose of science. Scientific thinking, however, is conceptual thinking. Hence, some account must be given of the concept. This account provides the core of the Pragmatism of both Peirce and James. Peirce defined Pragmatism as follows:

Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

A person may conceive of a diamond—*i.e.*, he may think of what it does and conceivably can do. The concept, then, is the conception of these actual and conceivable effects. Thus, part of the concept of diamond is of an object that can scratch a glass surface. Scientific thinking, by the method of hypothesis (or "abduction"), originates new concepts and also verifies them in experience and thus enriches the conceptual content of scientific thought and establishes its truth or falsity. The truth is what survives the verification processes of science, not of one scientist but of all. "The opinion, which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth." The investigation by the community of scientific inquirers, "if continued long enough," is destined to attain truth. Such is the fundamental nature of science and so of human knowledge at its best. But this account inevitably provokes the question: "How long is long enough?" Peirce seems aware of the possible criticism and confesses that his philosophy is "fallibilist," since "perfect certitude and exactitude" can never be attained.

A century after its birth, no school of Pragmatism survives; but its influence, blended with that of Positivism, remains. John Dewey's instrumentalism owed much to James and Peirce, and their influence is felt, too, in other circles—*e.g.*, in the operationalist Perry Bridgman, and in operationalism generally, and in the conceptualist Pragmatism of C.I. Lewis. It is notable, too, that there are elements of Pragmatism in W.V. Quine's *Word and Object* (1960) and in his papers.

V. Conceptual thinking

CONCEPTS

In the two schools of epistemology considered up to this point, the role of reason, on the one hand, and that of sense perception, on the other, have been stressed. It would be acknowledged by both schools, however, that there are other factors in the situation that need attention. Both, for instance, would acknowledge that thinking is one such factor. This is not reason; neither is it sense

Pragmatism and science

experience; but it is, nonetheless, part of the whole cognitive experience. Admittedly, this statement would be disallowed by Hegelian Idealists, because their Rationalism admits no final distinction between thinking and knowing: thinking is the self-development of an ideal content, and this is knowing. The more usual view, however, is that thinking may lead to knowledge, may help to extend knowledge—though it need not do so. The question that arises is what “leading to knowledge” and “extending knowledge” signify in this context.

Both reason as intellectual apprehension and sense perception are intuitive, but thinking proceeds mediately through concepts. Thinking involves having concepts. This has been interpreted to mean that concepts are the objects of thinking. Locke took this view at the outset of modern epistemological speculation. For him, the term idea covered concepts, but it also covered the impressions of sensation—e.g., the colour now sensed and the impression of feeling, for instance, of anger. He used the term, he said, “to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks.” Thinking is directed to an object, and any such object is an idea. The view that the idea is the object of thinking, when widely applied, caused many difficulties in subsequent discussion. To guard against these difficulties, it is necessary, in the first place, not to confuse an impression with a concept and, in the second place, not to assume without question that a concept is an object of thought.

A concept is not an impression. A person may now see a red patch, but this red patch is not a concept. Furthermore, this particular red patch, when remembered, is still not a concept. Usually one thinks of a concept as pertaining to a stage of mental activity higher than that of merely sensing or even remembering. It is something intellectual as involving language and as contrasted with the barely imaginative. Yet, it does not seem to be the case that having a concept invariably presupposes the ability to speak. It is true that the phrase having a concept may be defined as an experience possible only for a person who can speak, but this definition is arbitrary. A deaf mute who has never learned to speak may have seen many storks. But seeing this particular stork or remembering a particular stork is not having a concept. Yet, the deaf mute may think of storks, though none is now visible and though he is not now recalling in memory any particular stork. It is reasonable, then, to suppose that the deaf mute could have the concept though he has no language. It is not unusual to use the word concept in this way, and anyone who does so is implicitly rejecting the view that all concepts are necessarily verbal.

But most concepts are verbal. This statement requires interpretation as to whether it signifies that the concept is the object of conceptual thinking and that the word is the concept's name. Locke seems to say something of the kind. The concept (for Locke, “the general idea”) that is the object of thinking has a name, viz., the general word. Here, two questions arise. The first is how the name functions. Presumably it functions somewhat as a proper name, designating the object; but this is surely wrong. The second is whether it is correct to speak of the concept at all as an object. It is admittedly not an object in the sense in which this table is an object, for it is in the mind; it is an internal accusative, what the thought is directed to within the mind. One can immediately object, however, that no one, in his thinking, is ever conscious of the existence of such an inner object or accusative. To this claim it may be replied that it must, nonetheless, be there. It is argued, for instance, that, when a person thinks of a transcendent object, he must be thinking of a concept, since the object transcends all experience. Or, again, when he translates the English word liberty into the German *Freiheit*, there exists the concept as well as the two words. In this view, there is a world of material existences and also a world of psychological occurrences; but, in addition, there is a third world, that of concepts existing as objects of the mind.

If it be felt that this multiplication of worlds is to be condemned, an alternative theory must be sought. One such alternative is to regard the concept not as a mental

entity but rather as a capacity. This view stems from David Hume's account of abstract ideas, in which he suggested that the abstract idea (as contrasted with impressions and simple and compound ideas) should be thought of not as an entity in the mind, but as a disposition of the mind, or, in his own words, as a propensity. This suggestion provides the basis for the alternative theory. The philosopher should speak not of concepts but of having concepts, and his best way of determining whether a person has a concept is not by asking him whether he finds such a concept in his mind but, for example, by observing his behaviour. When he observes heavy clouds, he looks for his umbrella; and his response is the same if, when he is on his way out of the house, somebody tells him, “There are heavy clouds about.” Familiarity with the English language, on the one hand, and with the climate, on the other, has disposed him to respond to the statement in that way. In either instance, he has a concept of heavy clouds presaging rain.

Having a concept is having a disposition or a capacity. This seems to be a more hopeful theory than that concepts are mental entities, but it, too, is not without difficulties. For, in the first place, the investigator can never directly study a disposition but only the consequences of being so disposed, and this makes for vagueness. Secondly, the mind is said to frame concepts; but, if these concepts are capacities, it must be questioned whether it makes sense to speak of the mind framing its own capacities. Finally, it is reasonable to ask whether it really makes sense to say that the concept is just a capacity, whether it would not be better to think of it as a capacity or capacities along with a certain content or core—which is not to be thought of as an internal accusative. Thus, a man might think of the concept in terms of Frege's account of the reference of the logical predicate term. The predicate term, he held, is a general word (or words) that is to be understood in terms of a function of which the values are truth values. Something is said about an object *a*, and the schematic logical form of the statement is “*f a*,” in which *a* stands for the logical subject and *f* for the concept. The question, then, is whether there is in this function “*f . . .*” a clue to the nature of the concept in verbal thinking. If, in the open sentence “. . . is a tyranny,” a person can use this locution significantly, if he possesses the necessary empirical and linguistic dispositions, then he has the concept of tyranny. The open sentence is not itself a disposition, but a significant use of it presupposes the presence of dispositions in the mind that are essential if this locution is to be used significantly. There is a core, which in this case takes the form “. . . is a tyranny,” that has dispositional accretions around it that enable the locution to be used significantly. This approach would explain the nature of concepts in verbal thinking. A like theory could be worked out for concepts in nonverbal thinking. In respect to nonverbal thinking, having a concept would be explained in terms of accretions of dispositions and capacities around images; in respect to verbal thinking, it would be explained in terms of accretions around general words or open sentences.

LANGUAGE

The epistemologist is much concerned with language and, particularly, with the use of general words in conceptual thinking. But, beyond general words, all aspects of language are of interest to him. Much of what is known by each person is known by listening to others, by speaking with them, and by reading what they have written. Language is, first, a means of communicating between men. For the most part, the communication proceeds through statements that purport to state what is the case. But language may be used also to ask questions, to command, to cajole, and to express one's feelings. In addition, one uses it in thinking, and this latter use is the philosopher's main interest. Yet, this approach may give his study of language a slant that may hide a good deal from him.

For instance, exact thinking is logical thinking, and the philosopher may tend to think of language generally as a completely logical instrument obeying logical laws. He will think of statements as strictly logical statements and

Whether concepts are capacities or dispositions

Whether concepts are impressions or objects of thought

Logical versus broader uses of language

of words as fixed logical terms. Thus, he will analyse "Hitler is dead" as follows: "Hitler" is a logical proper name designating one person and one person only, and "being dead" is a precisely defined predicate term the meaning of which is fixed so that "Hitler is and is not dead" is ruled out logically. Here, language is being used in accordance with strict logic, but this is not its only use nor even its usual use. If the philosopher confines his study to this use of language, his account of it will be both narrow and misleading.

It is sometimes said that Ludwig Wittgenstein, a seminal philosopher of language between the wars, gave too narrow an account of the use of language in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), first published as *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (1921); and that this was one of the "grave mistakes" to which he confessed in the preface to his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). It should be noted, however, that the *Tractatus* is primarily a study of logic and philosophy. It expresses his interest in what can and what cannot be stated in logically principled factual statements; and this is what can be thought logically, for what cannot be stated cannot be thought. It expresses an interest, too, in the logical principles involved in the making of these statements and holds that these principles are tautologous. Such was Wittgenstein's interest in the *Tractatus*.

But in *Philosophical Investigations* he looked at language in all of its uses and found it to be much more flexible and less restricted than he had held it to be in the *Tractatus*. Early in the *Investigations* he talked of language as a sort of game in which the rules vary according to custom. He who would understand how the game is played can do so only by participating in it. So, too, the meaning of the words used in a language is not immutably fixed; one can only know it by observing how the words are, in fact, used at any time. Obedience to linguistic rules is a matter of "custom, use or institution" rather than of following deep, unchangeable, logical principles. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. Thus, the attitude toward the study of language in the *Investigations* is very different from that in the *Tractatus*. It is Empiricist rather than Rationalist; but it is an Empiricism with a difference, for it is not scientific Empiricism. It does not seek to pass forward from the observation of particular cases to systematic generalizations about language; it is content to observe piecemeal and to bring out the puzzles that arise on reflection upon each new observation. Wittgenstein reflected, for instance, on uses of the utterance "I am in pain," and out of the reflection came the question whether and in what sense a language can be private.

Neither the method of the *Tractatus* nor that of the *Investigations*, however, is the only method of language study. The study by linguists of the general structure of language itself gives rise to puzzles: for instance, whether, as Noam Chomsky, a generative grammarian, thinks, the facts of grammar are such that a distinction must be made between deep structures and surface structures of grammar and whether the phonemic and the semantic components of language are dominated by these deep syntactical components. Furthermore, the exact study of the natural languages by linguists and of speech by psychologists can provide results that are of value to the epistemologist, and, in fact, many scholars consider it regrettable that he does not make greater use of them. In particular, they could be useful in his study of thinking and his attempt to distinguish it from and relate it to knowing.

As has been seen, not all thinking or conception is verbal, though most of it is; and the question arises how language, as an instrument used in thinking, affects the thinking. Natural languages, such as English and French, have certain features in common (though not a common grammar)—for instance, they are conventional in their use of phonemic symbols; they employ analysis and synthesis; and they can pluralize and speak in general terms. The first use of language was for communication; in this use and in the development of language as a means of communication, thinking was already involved; and no

hard-and-fast line can be drawn between thinking and using a language. When men became more and more reflective, the use of language as the instrument of thought affected that thought; the techniques of convention, analysis, and generalization were at hand for the thinker. Symbols could be used in new ways to further thought; deductive argument became possible; and thinking could be carried on in "eternal" sentences. But the epistemologist's question—i.e., whether there is any guarantee that such conceptual thinking can ever be used to extend knowledge—remained to be answered. This is a question that the study of language cannot of itself solve, for it involves metaphysical as well as epistemological issues. In particular, it raises the issue of universals, which must now be briefly examined.

UNIVERSALS

Universals, which are expressed in common nouns or terms, may be described—perhaps inadequately—as either recurrences or principles of grouping or classifying. They have been a bone of contention among philosophers throughout the centuries. At various times, by various schools, the universal has been presented as the ultimately real existence, the Form, as a thought or a concept, as a word or series of words, as an identical recurring quality, as a group of qualities that resemble one another, as a class of things, as a genus, as a species, as a principle of classification, and, finally, as what can be predicated of an individual thing, a species, or a genus. In view of this complexity of definition, disagreement is not surprising. Much of the complexity is due to the fact that the theory of universals is advanced to solve a complex problem, viz., (1) to explain and justify grouping, classifying, and the use of the general word; (2) to find a standard by which to establish what is and is not valuable; and (3) to provide a metaphysics in which what is real can be clearly distinguished from what appears.

Socrates and Plato between them set forward the theory of Forms or Ideas (see above *Rationalism prior to Kant: Classical Rationalism: Theory of Forms in Plato*) that claimed to solve the whole problem in its full complexity: human beings, closely tied to sense perception, think of visible and tangible things as real, whereas, in fact, they are appearances only; the beautiful things known in nature are manifestations of beauty itself; and, when a person knows beauty, he knows what is real, and he has a standard by which to determine what is and what is not beautiful; finally, knowledge of the Form of beauty enables him to group beautiful things together, provides him with a principle of classification, and enables him to use a general word significantly. Aristotle was critical of the view that the Form had this separate existence and found the universal in the common quality.

The argument was passed on to medieval philosophers through Porphyry, one of the founders of Neoplatonism, in the 3rd century and through the late Roman statesman and philosopher Anicius Boethius at the turn of the 5th century; it was hotly debated in the 11th and 12th centuries; and in the 13th century the different theories were neatly formulated by Albertus Magnus, the leading scholar of the century: universals are held by some (e.g., by Plato) to exist before the things that exemplify them, to be *ante rem*; by others (e.g., by Aristotle) to exist in the things, to be *in re*; by still others to exist in thought or conception only as abstractions or even as names only, to be *post rem*. In the 13th century it was the second theory that was most widely accepted, but there was more support for the third in the 14th century. *Ante rem* and *in re* theories were called Realist and *post rem* Nominalist, though in fact the medieval thinkers of this school were, in modern parlance, more often Conceptualists (the universal is a concept) than Nominalists (the universal is a word or set of words only).

In the modern period the Empiricists thought of universals as concepts abstracted from experience and tended to shift the discussion from the nature of the universal to the manner of its abstraction. The Rationalists maintained that some universals are known a priori. In the writings of contemporary philosophers, Realism of an

History of the problem of universals

The contributions of linguists

Requisites
for a
solution

Aristotelian type and Conceptualism have flourished; but Positivists have advocated Nominalism, while Idealists and members of the mathematical logicist school have advocated a Platonic Realism. In epistemology the problem of universals is clearly linked with that of the ontological relevance of conceptual thinking. Its solution would seem to require the following: (1) a full understanding of the manner in which general words are used in thinking; (2) a study of qualities to help determine the precise nature of the link between the quality and the thing to which it is said to belong; (3) an examination of the theory of common qualities—asking whether the theory rests on the supposition of the existence of identical qualities or of resembling qualities or of both; (4) a determination of the principal dispositional features that are present, though not overtly expressed, in conception; and (5) a definitive answer to the question of what it is "to have a concept." It would seem that enough is known of these matters to enable one to say that there are universals. There are recurring resemblances between qualities, and there are also identities of qualities. In the second place, there are universals in the sense of principles of grouping or classifying. For the epistemologist the question then arises whether such a theory of universals can provide the necessary foundation for a theory establishing the ontological relevance of human thinking.

VI. Concluding reflections

The scope of the foregoing discussions has been limited by various considerations. In the first place, the article has been concerned solely with the thought of the West. (For the epistemologies of India and of China, see INDIAN PHILOSOPHY and CHINESE PHILOSOPHY.) In the second place, some matters that are in certain respects epistemological are not usually studied under this head. It is not usual, for instance, to discuss the nature of moral consciousness or, again, of aesthetic appreciation in works on epistemology, though such discussion might be illuminating. (See ETHICS and AESTHETICS.) Again, problems that are discussed in epistemological studies, such as knowledge of the self, of other selves, and of God, are not given special treatment here since they are covered in other articles (see MIND, PHILOSOPHY OF and RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY OF).

CONFLICT OF EMPIRICISM WITH RATIONALISM

The present inquiry into epistemology has concentrated on the main flow of Western speculation from the days of the Greeks to the present. As has been seen, two schools of thought are prominent, namely, the Empiricist and the Rationalist, but it is clear that neither of these schools has been able to offer a wholly satisfactory account of knowledge.

Sense
experience
and the
external
world

The Empiricist thesis is that human knowledge is either directly acquired in sense perception or derived from what is thus acquired. It follows from this that nothing is or can be thought that was not "previously in the senses." For such a theory a satisfactory account of the function of sense perception obviously is a crucial necessity. Whether sense perception reveals the external world as it is and shows up its characteristics becomes an important question, though reflection on the contradictions in sensory experience has made it impossible to hold on for long to an affirmative answer to it. A person may observe that the moon he is looking at is covered wholly by a coin held at arm's length; yet, the moon for an observer standing on its surface is a vast object of which he sees a very small part. One concludes that what he now sees does not, in fact, show the moon's real size. Yet, he does see something. If he says that this visible something is not the real moon, he has then assumed a dualism. What he immediately sees is an object given to the senses, a sense-datum or sensum, but it is not the physical object, the real moon. The problem, then, is that of relating the two. It has to be asked how the Empiricist can say that sense perception reveals the real external world if what is immediately seen is a sensum. The dualism of real object and sensum would seem to throw doubt on the very

possibility of knowledge of the external world in sense perception. It is, perhaps, possible to argue that the sensum is a representation of the real object or that it represents it in certain selected aspects; so that the real object is in part known. But this is to raise the question of whether and how the claim that the sensum represents, say, such and such a quality or qualities of the real object can be tested. If the difficulties of the representationalist theory have driven philosophers to reject dualism, some might suggest that, in order to re-establish a monist theory of knowledge, one should adopt then an Idealism denying the independent reality of the physical object or affirm that human knowledge is phenomenalist. In the latter view, man is concerned with phenomena only and the question of whether physical objects exist or do not exist beyond the veil of phenomena does not arise. Yet, both the Idealist and phenomenalist accounts, too, are full of difficulties; and it is doubtful whether the original thesis, that all human knowledge of the outer world is directly acquired in sense perception or derived from what is so acquired, can be sustained by the adoption of either account.

There have been philosophers who have held that sense perception is a snare and that it provides no reliable information; yet, this seems extreme. What is objectionable in the Empiricist position is rather the claim that sense perception is the sole provider of information. On the face of it, it seems incorrect to say that all that a person knows of the world around him is known through sense perception. For instance, it may be true that much of what one knows he learns from what others tell him (in speech or writing)—*i.e.*, from "hearsay knowledge." And the surest source of information may well be the knowledge provided by an expert in any field. To this the Empiricist might reply that in both cases the information in question, though not given to the layman in sense experience or derived from what is so given, is nonetheless given in or derived from the sense perception of his informant or of someone else. Thus, a man is told that there are black swans in Australia. He has never seen a black swan and has never been to Australia; yet, if he is satisfied about the reliability of his informant and especially if the latter says, "I saw them there," he accepts this information. The layman's gaining of the knowledge, however, is dependent not only on the informant's sense experience but also on the layman's understanding of what he says; thus, one condition of hearsay knowledge is the successful use of a language. But this, the Empiricist would say, has to do with the medium in which the information is conveyed to another person; the information itself is gained in sense experience.

A more complex case is presented when an inductively established scientific generalization is reported. Though it will be said that this generalization is still empirically based, "based" is an ambiguous word in this context. The information has been gained by the scientist using the methods that he and his fellow workers accept in this field. It involves sense experience or sensory observation together with scientific reasoning. The knowledge is admittedly empirically based, but this leaves open the question whether it is correct to speak in this case of sense experience as the sole provider. The point can be taken a step further. One of the most important features of scientific method is hypothesis making. The scientist, having observed widely and being thoroughly acquainted with the body of knowledge about the matter in hand, has an insight and proffers it as a hypothesis. Such an insight could possibly be described as a perception but certainly not as sense perception. A natural science is an empirical inquiry; it uses information gained in sensory experience; further, it verifies hypotheses by appeal to the senses. Yet, the Empiricist's claim that such knowledge is either gained in sense perception or derived from sense perception must be dismissed as misleading.

It is generally agreed that the empirical sciences do not give certainty but only probability. To assert this is to assert that there are degrees of knowledge; a person may know a statement *P* with complete certainty (know "in the strict sense"), or he may opine or believe *P* without

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being certain, holding it to be just probable or probable with a high or low degree of probability. In the traditional Rationalist view, as has been seen, it is man's reason alone that enables him to know at the highest level—to say "This is true absolutely." Absolute truth is not given in sensory experience nor can it be derived from it. But man is endowed with a pure intellectual power that enables him to know truth positively—truth that is not qualified in any way, which is unchanging and necessary. The information presented by sense experience is uncertain, holding relatively with a certain context, so that to build upon it is to build on shifting sand. In contrast, the information that reason provides is unchanging: "once true always true." To know by reason is to know infallibly; and it is on this rock of infallible rational intuition that human knowledge rests.

This doctrine contrasts strongly with Empiricism. It is undoubtedly comforting, but reflection on its claim still generates doubts. The main doubt is the all-embracing one of whether human beings ever have a knowledge that is strictly infallible. Plato thought they do. But only a few, the "true philosophers," have it, and even in their case infallible knowledge is of Forms or Ideas only. Others supposed it to be more widely spread—for instance, every rational creature could see certain mathematical and logical statements to be true beyond all doubt. Thus, the statement, "The interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," is infallibly true and so is the statement, "This figure is a triangle or not a triangle." These are necessarily true statements that cannot possibly be false, because they are tautologous. No one can doubt that a is a . But, if the Rationalist thesis is taken to mean that reason provides and is the sole provider of infallible knowledge and if this infallible knowledge is of the tautologous, it might appear that reason's contribution is slight. Further, it may be asked whether even the barely tautologous statement is known infallibly.

BLEND OF EMPIRICISM WITH RATIONALISM

It could be argued that, in order to make the contrast between Empiricist and Rationalist clear, the immediately preceding paragraphs have tended to exaggerate the differences between them. For, when the history of the conflict is recalled, one finds few Empiricists, if any, who do not have some place for reason in their theory of knowledge and few Rationalists who are not prepared to acknowledge the contribution of sense experience. The difference is one of emphasis: the part played by experience is more important in the Empiricist's mind, and that by reason is more important in the Rationalist's mind. But the general view is that human knowledge is dependent on both experience and reason; experience provides the "manifold," or material, of knowledge; reason provides the principles for ordering this material. Such is the general line followed by epistemologists.

If human knowledge is regarded as a blend of experience and reason, it is necessary to ask whether the theory is then acceptable. It is reasonable to ask whether the blending will result in the modification of material given in experience and reason. Sensory experience, it is supposed, is an awareness of the concrete particular; and there could be a danger that the ordering zeal in the blended knowledge will diminish the concreteness of the immediately experienced and so mislead. On the other hand, reason in its purity provides necessary, infallible knowledge. The question, then, is whether the material that it is now called upon to order will be such that no necessary knowledge is henceforward possible.

Problems of this sort arise. They may be dismissed by some philosophers as the consequences of making two abstractions—sense experience and reason—into one thing and of viewing sense experience in this context as something working against generalization and reason as struggling to secure infallibility. It must be admitted that the tendency is strong to think and speak of sense experience and reason as two faculties operating more or less independently in the attempt to increase knowledge.

As against the above criticisms of the blended theory of knowledge, however, two points can be made. In the

first place, the assumption that sense experience gives the particular and never the general can itself be questioned. The evidence available suggests that very young children do not distinguish between particular and general. What one begins with, it would seem, is as general as it is particular. It is only later, when the child has reflected, that he comes to conceive a particular thing, isolated, substantial, and enduring. It may be wrong, therefore, to suppose that early experience is of the concrete and particular and that later conceiving generalizes the experience and to a degree falsifies it. In the second place, it can also be questioned whether the function of reason is to provide man with infallible principles by which to order the manifold of experience. It may be that these principles are provided in some other way: they may be stipulations of the thinker, or they may be hypotheses. Mathematics and logic, it is said, do provide complete certainty within a framework of tautologies. But one may then ask whether the function of reason is to grasp the truth of tautologies. It is necessary to question the assumptions of the critics of the blended theory both in respect to experience and to reason.

There is, further, a double assumption in arguing that man is capable of infallible knowledge and therefore that reason must be one of his faculties, since reason alone knows the infallible. Even if man enjoyed infallible knowledge, it would still be necessary to prove that the possession of the faculty of reason is a requisite for such knowledge; one cannot assume this. Nor can a person assume that man does have infallible knowledge. It might be answered: "But surely he is certain of many things!" This is so, but to be certain of something is not the same as having infallible knowledge of it: it is not the same for the simple reason that a man can be certain, absolutely certain, and yet be in error.

It is clear that many problems are left for the epistemologist to solve. No one would say that the subject of sense perception is satisfactorily disposed of, in spite of the considerable attention paid to it. Interest in the analysis of conception is comparatively new, but it has become apparent that difficulties abound in this field. Along with the study of concepts goes that of universals, and linked with both is the study of thinking, which in turn involves an examination of language and of its relation to thought. Finally, there looms the problem of reason and of its function in human knowledge and in human life. The study of these and other matters will certainly keep epistemologists busy for the foreseeable future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. The subject of epistemology is wide and a vast number of books have been written in this field. What follows is a brief selection, mostly of mid-20th-century books, which the student might find useful as an introduction.

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Sense-perception: Highly recommended is H.H. PRICE, *Perception*, 2nd ed. rev. (1950). The following are further useful studies: A.J. AYER, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (1940); R.M. CHISHOLM, *Perceiving* (1957); R.J. HIRST, *Problems of Perception* (1959); J.L. AUSTIN, *Sense and Sensibilia*, reconstructed from the manuscript notes by G.J. WARNOCK (1962); D.W. HAMLIN, *Sensation and Perception* (1961); A.R. WHITE, *G.E. Moore: A Critical Exposition* (1958); A.O. LOVEJOY, *The Revolt Against Dualism* (1930); H.A. PRICHARD, *Knowledge and Perception* (1950); M.H. MANDELBAUM, *Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception* (1964); and WILFRED SELLARS, *Science, Perception, and Reality* (1963), reprinted 1968.

Belief and certainty: One may begin by referring the reader to C.I. LEWIS, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (1947); BERTRAND RUSSELL, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (1948); and G.E. MOORE, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1953). For later views, see NORMAN MALCOLM, *Knowledge and Certainty* (1963); JAAKKO HINTIKKA, *Knowledge and Belief* (1962); BRAND BLANSHARD, *Reason and Analysis* (1962) and *Reason and Goodness* (1961); RICHARD I. AARON, *Knowing and the Function of Reason* (1971); and A.C. DANTO, *Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge* (1968). Very relevant, too, are LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN's last investigations

Rejoinders
to the
criticisms

Remaining
problems

The
blended
theory and
its defects

On Certainty (1969). The collection of papers entitled *Knowledge and Belief*, ed. by A. PHILLIPS GRIFFITHS (1967), is to be highly recommended.

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Schools of epistemology. Elsewhere in this encyclopaedia are biographies of the leading philosophers together with accounts of their principal works. See also the bibliographies of articles on the various epistemological schools and movements mentioned in the text. The reader may also consult further the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by PAUL EDWARDS, 8 vol. (1967); and D.J. O'CONNOR (ed.), *A Critical History of Western Philosophy* (1964). Below are some useful commentaries.

The Greeks: On early Greek philosophy the best general guide for the newcomer is still JOHN BURNET, *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (1914). On Plato, see the comprehensive *Plato: The Man and His Work*, by A.E. TAYLOR (1926). The standard commentary for Aristotle is W.D. ROSS, *Aristotle* (1923). A number of excellent commentaries are available on individual works by Plato and Aristotle: F.M. CORNFORD, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (1935), is noteworthy. See also GREGORY VLASTOS, "The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*," *Phil. Rev.*, 63:319-349 (1954). G.E.L. OWEN and H. CHERNISS are leading contemporary scholars in this field; see the latter's *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (1944) and *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (1935, reprinted 1964). An introductory account of Aristotle's philosophy is D.J. ALLAN, *Philosophy of Aristotle* (1952). The main difficulty with minor Greek philosophic writers is to find out exactly what they say, since it is necessary to depend on fragments. G.S. KIRK and J.F. RAVEN, *Presocratic Philosophers* (1957); H.F. VON ARNIM, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (1905-24); and H. USENER, *Epicurea* (1887, reprinted 1966), provide good collections.


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Modern: Not unexpectedly, the best commentaries on Descartes are in French; see HENRI GOUHIER, *La Pensée métaphysique de Descartes* (1962); and OCTAVE HAMELIN, *Le Système de Descartes* (1921); but there are good introductory studies in English, for instance, S.V. KEELING, *Descartes*; 2nd ed. (1968). On Spinoza, two contrasting works for those beginning to read this philosopher, who is not too easy to understand, are L. ROTH, *Spinoza* (1924); and STUART HAMPSHIRE, *Spinoza* (1951). RUTH SAW has written on Leibniz (1954); but BERTRAND RUSSELL, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, 2nd ed. (1937), may not prove too difficult. General studies of John Locke are D.J. O'CONNOR, *John Locke* (1952); and RICHARD L. AARON, *John Locke*, 3rd ed. (1971); of Berkeley, G.J. WARNOCK, *Berkeley* (1953); of Hume, D.G.C. MACNABB, *David Hume* (1951). The beginner will find Kant difficult and introducing him is not an easy task, but compare S. KORNER's general introduction on Kant (1955). On Idealism generally, an excellent study is A.C. EWING, *Idealism* (1934). (R.Aa.)

Equatorial Guinea

The Republic of Equatorial Guinea (República de Guinea Ecuatorial), on the west coast of Africa, is the only independent Spanish-speaking state on the African continent. Formerly Spanish Guinea, a colony of Spain, it consists of two geographically separated provinces—Río Muni, a coastal enclave, and Macías Nguema Biyogo (formerly Fernando Po), an offshore island—whose unity is only political and cultural. This fragmented republic

has a total area of 10,831 square miles (28,051 square kilometres) and a population that in 1975 was estimated to be about 310,000. Río Muni, or continental Guinea, with an area of 10,038 square miles (25,998 square kilometres), is a roughly rectangular territory bounded by Cameroon to the north




EQUATORIAL GUINEA

and Gabon to the east and south. The estuary islands of Corisco (about six square miles), Elobey Grande (less than a mile square), and Elobey Chico (less than a tenth of a mile square) are administratively included in the province of Río Muni, which thus has a total area of 10,045 square miles. The second province, Macías Nguema Biyogo consists of the island of Macías Nguema Biyogo proper—off the coast of Cameroon, with an area of 779 square miles (2,018 square kilometres)—and Pagalu (formerly Annobón), a volcanic island of less than seven square miles that lies south of the Equator almost 400 miles (640 kilometres) to the southwest of Macías Nguema Biyogo.

By any standard Equatorial Guinea forms a small political unit, and it is beset by regional differences, geographic isolation, a fragile economy, a lack of trained personnel, and the incubus of a heavy psychological legacy from the colonial era, which ended when the country obtained its independence on October 12, 1968. The capital of the republic is Malabo (formerly Santa Isabel), on Macías Nguema Biyogo. Bata, on the mainland, is only the administrative capital of Río Muni but aspires to become the national capital. (For coverage of historical aspects, see WEST AFRICA, HISTORY OF.)

Relief, drainage, and soils. *Río Muni.* The enclave of Río Muni is too small to have a geographic unity of its own. A coastal plain about 12 miles (20 kilometres) wide abuts on the coastal hills, which lead to inland plateaus (called *mesetas* in Spanish) that rise toward the frontier with Gabon. There are several ranges of hills. The central range divides the Río Benito Basin to the north from the southern basin of the Río Utamboni. The Niefang-Mikomeseng range north of the Río Benito is somewhat lower. All these ranges form segments of the Monts de Cristal in Gabon. The province is divided by the Río Benito (known as the Woleu River in Gabon), which runs generally from east to west and is nonnavigable except for the first 12 miles inland. To the north, the Río Campo (called the Ntem in French-speaking Africa) marks part of the frontier with Cameroon. In the south, Río Muni, from which the province takes its name, is not a river but the estuary of various Gabonese and southern Río Muni rivers, among which the Utamboni is the largest. To the east, the border with Gabon follows the meandering course of the Río Kié (Kyé) rather than the legal frontier, which runs along a line 11°20' east of the Greenwich meridian. Except for some limited use of waterpower on lumbering sites, the rivers of Río Muni are not exploited. The coast

Independence



APPENDIX II
SEMANTICS
ARTICLE
FROM
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ¹(1977)

What is said about the epistemology article from EB applies equally to this article. Further bear in mind that “semantics” is a subset of the field of “epistemology.”

Whereas the statement is made in the previous title page to Appendix I “*be neither intimidated nor dismissive of the subject of epistemology, for law dwells only with epistemological domains*” so now it must be emphasized regarding semantics. For the language of law will never be understood until language is understood as is only possible by viewing it through the prism of semantics and in particular general semantics. Do not presume to understand the language of law if you are not versed in semantics as key to the meanings of the language of law.

¹ First published in 1768, EB is said to be the longest continuous business enterprise in the Western world. You will find it on the Internet at **eb.com**. EB no longer maintains a field sales organization, but printed sets of this most authoritative of encyclopaedia are still available from the publisher pursuant to information at their aforesaid web-site.

After the establishment of the Latin empire of Constantinople (1204), the Turks were the natural allies of the Greeks and the enemies of the crusaders and their allies, the Armenians. Kay-Khusraw, therefore, in 1207 took the important harbour of Attalia (Antalya) from the Italian Aldobrandini; but in 1211 he perished in battle with Theodore I Lascaris, emperor of Nicaea. His son and successor, Kay-Kā'ūs, made peace with Lascaris and extended his frontiers to the Black Sea by the conquest of Sinope (Sinop; 1214). On this occasion he took prisoner the Comnenian prince Alexius, who ruled the independent empire of Trebizond (Trabzon), and compelled him to acknowledge the supremacy of the Seljuqs, to pay tribute, and to serve in the armies of the sultan. Elated by this great success and by his victories over the Armenians in Cilicia, Kay-Kā'ūs attempted the capture of Aleppo, at this time governed by the descendants of Saladin, but the project was defeated by Ayyūbid resistance.

Kay-Kā'ūs' brother, 'Alā' ad-Dīn Kay-Qubādh (Kaikobad) I (1219-37), was the most powerful and illustrious prince of this branch of the Seljuqs. He extended his rule as far as Seleucia and desisted from further conquest only on condition that the Armenian princes would enter into the same kind of relation to the Seljuqs as had been imposed on the Comnenians of Trebizond. But his greatest military fame was won by a war that, however glorious, was to prove fatal to the Seljuq Empire in the future; in conjunction with his ally, the Ayyūbid prince Ashraf, he defeated the Khwārazm-Shāh, Jalāl ad-Dīn, near Erzincan (1230). During this war Kay-Qubādh put an end to a collateral dynasty of the Seljuqs of Erzurum and annexed its possessions. He also gained the city of Khilāt with dependencies that had recently been taken from the Ayyūbids by Jalāl ad-Dīn. This acquisition, however, led to a new war, as Kay-Qubādh's ally, the Ayyūbid prince, contested it. Sixteen Muslim princes, mostly Ayyūbids, of Syria and Mesopotamia, under the leadership of al-Malik al-Kamil, prince of Egypt, marched with considerable forces into Asia Minor against him. Happily for Kay-Qubādh, the other princes mistrusted the power of the Egyptian, and it proved a difficult task to penetrate through the mountainous, well-fortified accesses to the interior of Anatolia. The advantage thus rested with Kay-Qubādh, who extended his power in upper Mesopotamia. This expansion was pursued by his son Kay-Khusraw II.

The Seljuq sultanate assessed

The Seljuq sultanate of Anatolia can now be seen to have been one of the most important Muslim states of its age. Its population was a mixed one, including Christians, Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, and Iranian Muslims; but, when compared with the other Seljuq realms, of which the Turks had been only a small, if leading, element, it was really "Turkey" and was so called by its contemporaries. The Seljuqs of this line succeeded in establishing an administration largely based on the institutions of their Iranian-Seljuq neighbours, but it was modified by the Byzantine heritage and by its own evolution. With order and tolerance of all races and religions established, agriculture and mining activity revived, so that to foreigners Turkey seemed one of the richest of countries; meanwhile commerce was developed with the assistance of Italian merchants. In the cities beautiful buildings, several of which still survive, show the purity of an art related to, though not exactly identical with, the Iranian-Seljuq art of the same period. Literature, mostly in Persian, flourished, and, with it, mystical movements, such as that inspired by Jalāl ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī.

Yet this political organization and civilization were not really soundly based. The Seljuqs failed to tame, particularly in the frontier districts, the Turkmens, who, though partially settled, were impatient of centralized administration; they remained fond of petty wars against their Christian neighbours and still adhered to their traditional social and religious beliefs and practices. Newcomers from the countries invaded by the Khorezmians and Mongols added to their feeling of unrest. This helps to explain why, when the Mongol flood reached the frontiers of Turkey, which were no longer protected by the Khorezmian state, the Seljuq realm was no more able to resist than had been

the Muslim principalities of Iran. At the Battle of Kōse Dagh (1243), between Erzincan and Sivas, the independence of the Seljuqs was lost forever.

The Mongol protectorate. The Mongols did not destroy the Seljuq state, but, in accordance with their plan, reduced it to vassalage. After the death of Kay-Khusraw II (1245) the quarrels between his sons led to a division of Asia Minor, 'Izz ad-Dīn Kay-Kā'ūs II taking the part west of the Halys and Rukn ad-Dīn Qilīch Arslan IV the part to the east. When the former intrigued with the Mamlūks of Egypt and the Byzantine emperor, however, he was driven out and fled to Constantinople. The unity of the realm was thus restored, but the financial requirements of the Mongols and the intrigues of the great chiefs with them against one another quickly brought about a breakdown of the Seljuq administrative system. In the central provinces and cities, the all-powerful minister, the *perwane* Mu'īn ad-Dīn Sulaymān, who had Rukn ad-Dīn executed c. 1265, succeeded in maintaining the Iranian-Islāmic civilization of the recent golden age; to this end he cooperated with the Muslim viziers of the Mongol Il-Khān of Iran, the suzerain of Anatolia. In the distant and mountainous districts, however, the Turkmen amirs, free from any form of government, established small principalities of their own: in the Taurus, on the Byzantine frontier; on the south Aegean coast, later even near the straits and the Black Sea. With their help and that of Baybars, the powerful Mamlūk sultan of Egypt, the most dreaded enemy of the Mongols, a group of Muslim nobles in Anatolia revolted during 1276-77 against the Mongol protectorate. The *perwane* himself had negotiated with them, and although he finally refused to join them, thus assuring the victory of the Mongols, he was executed. For a time the Seljuq sultanate was then no more than a Mongol province. Seljuq sultans, Kay-Khusraw II (died 1283), Mas'ūd III, and Farāmurz, still reigned nominally, but in the first years of the following century the dynasty ended in obscurity.

Thereafter the power of the Turkish amirates increased and the control of the Mongol Il-Khāns of Iran became less effective until it also finally disappeared, in the 1330s. (Ed.)

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Semantics

Semantics is the philosophical and scientific study of meaning. The term is one of a group of English words formed from the various derivatives of the Greek verb *sēmainō* ("to mean" or "to signify"). The noun semantics and the adjective semantic are derived from *sēmantikos* ("significant"); semiotic (adjective and noun) comes from *sēmeiōtikos* ("pertaining to signs"); semology from *sēma* ("sign") + *logos* ("account"); and semasiology from *sēmasia* ("signification") + *logos* ("account"). It is difficult to formulate a distinct definition for each of these terms because their use largely overlaps in the literature despite individual preferences. Semantics is a relatively new field of study, and its originators, often working independently of one another, felt the need to coin a new name for the new discipline; hence the variety of terms denoting the same subject. The word semantics has ultimately prevailed as a name for the doctrine of meaning, in particular, of linguistic meaning. Semiotic is still used, however, to denote a broader field: the study of sign-using behaviour in general.

Historical survey of the study of semantics. The concern with meaning, always present for philosophers and linguists, greatly increased in the decades following

World War II. The sudden rise of interest in meaning can be attributed to an interaction of several lines of development in various disciplines. From the middle of the 19th century onward, logic, the formal study of reasoning, underwent a period of growth unparalleled since the time of Aristotle. Although the main motivation for a renewed interest in logic was a search for the foundations of mathematics, the chief protagonists of this effort—notably the German mathematician Gottlob Frege and the English philosopher Bertrand Russell—extended their inquiry into the domain of the natural languages, which are the original media of human reasoning. The influence of mathematical thinking, and of mathematical logic in particular, however, left a permanent mark on the subsequent study of semantics.

This mark is nowhere more obvious than in the semantic theories offered by the Neopositivists of the Vienna Circle, which flourished in the 1920s and 1930s, and which was composed of philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists who discussed the methodology and epistemology of science. To such "logical" Positivists as the German-born philosopher Rudolf Carnap, for instance, the symbolism of modern logic represented the grammar (syntax) of an "ideal" language. Because the Logical Positivists were, at the same time, radical Empiricists (observationalists) in their philosophy, the semantics of their ideal language has been given in terms of a tie connecting the symbols of this language with observable entities in the world, or the data of one's sense experience, or both. Against such a rigid ideal as logic, natural language appeared to these philosophers as something primitive, vague, inaccurate, and confused. Moreover, since a large part of ordinary and philosophical discourse, particularly that concerning metaphysical and moral issues, could not be captured by the ideal language, the Positivist approach provided a way to brand all such talk as nonsensical, or at least as "cognitively" meaningless. Accordingly, the Positivists engaged in a prolonged, and largely unsuccessful, effort to formulate a criterion of meaningfulness in terms of empirical verifiability with respect to the sentences formed in natural language.

Another source of dissatisfaction with the vernacular was made apparent shortly before World War II by the work of the American anthropological linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf's famous thesis of linguistic relativity implied that the particular language a person learns and uses determines the framework of his perception and thought. If that language is vague and inaccurate, as the Positivists suggested, or is burdened with the prejudices and superstitions of an ignorant past, as some cultural anthropologists averred, then it is bound to render the user's thinking—and his mental life itself—confused, prejudiced, and superstitious. The Polish-American semanticist Alfred Korzybski, the founder of the movement called General Semantics, believed that the cure for such vague and superstition-laden language lay in a radical revision of linguistic habits in the light of modern science. Natural language did not remain without champions in the face of this combined onslaught from the logicians and the Whorfians. A reaction started in England, first in Cambridge, then in Oxford. Influenced by the English philosopher George Edward Moore but more so by the "converted" Vienna-born Positivist Ludwig Wittgenstein, the philosophy of "ordinary language" (also known as the Oxford school) came into its own in the 1940s. According to the philosophers of this group, natural language, far from being the crude instrument the Positivists alleged it to be, provides the basic and unavoidable matrix of all thought, including philosophical reflections. Any "ideal" language, therefore, can make sense only as a parasitical extension of, and never as a substitute for, the natural language. Philosophical problems arise as a result of a failure to see the workings of man's language; they are bound to "dissolve" with improved understanding. These assumptions provided a mighty impetus to reflect upon the vernacular language, including its minute points of grammar and fine nuances of meaning. Indeed, some of the later representatives of this approach, particularly the English philosopher John L. Austin, became re-

nowned as much among linguists as among philosophers.

In the 1950s the science of linguistics itself rose to the challenges that had been coming chiefly from philosophical quarters. The development of transformational, or generative, grammar, initiated by the work of the U.S. linguists Zellig S. Harris and Noam Chomsky, opened a deeper insight into the syntax of the natural languages. Instead of merely providing a structural description (parsing) of sentences, this approach demonstrates how sentences are built up, step by step, from some basic ingredients. In the hands of the philosopher, this powerful new grammar not only served to counter the positivistic charge of imprecision laid against natural language but aided him in his own work of conceptual clarification. Moreover, the generative approach promised further results: since the late 1960s some steps have been taken to develop a generative semantics for natural languages, in addition to a generative syntax.

PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON MEANING

Meaning and reference. On a rather unsophisticated level the problem of meaning can be approached through the following steps. The perception of certain physical entities (objects, marks, sounds, and so on) might lead an intelligent being to the thought of another thing with some regularity. For example, the sight of smoke evokes the idea of fire, footprints on the sand makes one think of the man who must have passed by. The smoke and the footprints are thus signs of something else. They are natural signs, inasmuch as the connection between the sign and the thing signified is a causal link, established by nature and learned from experience. These can be compared with road signs, for example, or such symbols as the outline of a heart pierced by an arrow. The connection between the symbol and the thing signified in these cases is not a natural one; it is established by human tradition or convention and is learned from these sources. These nonnatural signs, or symbols, are widely used in human communication.

In this framework the elements of language appear to be nonnatural signs. The interest in words and phrases reaches beyond their physical appearance: their perception is likely to direct attention or thought to something else. Words, in fact, are the chief media of human communication, and, as the diversity of languages clearly shows, the link involved between words and what they signify cannot be a natural one. Words and sentences are like symbols: they point beyond themselves; they mean something. Smoke means fire, the pierced heart means love. Words mean the thing they make us think of; the meaning of the word is the tie that connects it with that thing.

There are some words for which this approach seems to work very straightforwardly. The name Paris means (signifies, stands for, refers to, denotes) the city of Paris, the name Aristotle means that philosopher, and so forth. The initial plausibility of such examples created an obsession in the minds of many thinkers, beginning with Plato. Regarding proper names as words *par excellence*, they tried to extend the referential model of meaning to all of the other classes of words and phrases. Plato's theory of "forms" may be viewed as an attempt to find a referent for such common nouns as "dog" or for abstract nouns like "whiteness" or "justice." As the word Socrates in the sentence "Socrates is wise" refers to Socrates, for example, so the word wise refers to the form of wisdom. Unfortunately, whereas Socrates was a real person in this world, the form of wisdom is not something to be encountered anywhere, at any time, in the world. The difficulty represented by "Platonic" entities of this kind increases as one tries to find appropriate referents for verbs, prepositions, connectives, and so forth. Discussion of abstract entities such as classes (e.g., the class of all running things) and relations (e.g., the relation of being greater than . . .) abound in philosophical literature; Gottlob Frege even postulated "the True" and "the False" as referents for complete propositions.

There are many more serious problems besetting the referential theory of meaning. The first one, eloquently

Influence
of
transformational
grammar

Words as
symbols

Denotation
and
con-
notation

pointed out by Frege, is that two expressions may have the same referent without having the same meaning. For example, "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" denote the same planet, yet, clearly, the two phrases do not have the same meaning. If they had, then the identity of the Morning Star and the Evening Star would be as obvious to anybody who understands these phrases as the identity of a vixen with a female fox or a bachelor with an unmarried man is obvious to speakers of English. As it is, the identity of the Morning Star with the Evening Star is a scientific and not a linguistic matter. Thus, even in the case of names, or expressions equivalent to names, one has to distinguish between the denotation (reference, extension) of the name—i.e., the object (or group of objects) it refers to—and its connotation (sense, intension)—i.e., its meaning.

The second problem with the theory of referential meaning arises from phrases that, though meaningful, pretend to refer but, in fact, do not. For example, in the case of such a definite description as "the present king of France," the phrase is meaningful although there is no such person. If the phrase were not meaningful, one would not even know that the phrase has no actual referent. Russell's analysis of these phrases, and the U.S. philosopher Willard V. Quine's similar treatment of such names as Cerberus, effectively detached meaning from reference by claiming that these expressions, when used in sentences, are equivalent to a set of existential propositions; i.e., propositions without definite reference. For example, "The present king of France is bald" comes out as "There is at least, and at most, one person that rules over France, and whoever rules over France is bald." These propositions are meaningful, true or false, without definite reference.

Names, in fact, are very untypical words. The name of the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, has no meaning in English. Whether it means anything in Burmese does not matter either; the reference is not affected by the meaning or the lack of meaning of the name. Names, as such, do not belong to the vocabulary of a language; most dictionaries do not list them. Thus, in spite of the initial plausibility, the idea of reference does not help in understanding the nature of linguistic meaning.

Meaning and truth. Despite the failure of referential meaning, many philosophers were quite unwilling to give up the idea that the meaning of linguistic expressions has something to do with objects, events, and states of affairs in the world. They reasoned that if language is used to talk about the physical environment, then there must be some connection between man's words and the things around him. If reference fails to provide the link, something else must.

In the face of referential failure Russell fell back on truth. The Positivists suggested verifiability as the criterion of empirical meaning. Indeed, at least in many cases, it stands to reason that to understand a sentence is to know what state of affairs would make it true or false. Such considerations motivate the alethic (Greek *alētheia*, "truth") semantic theories, which claim that the notion of meaning is best explained in terms of truth rather than reference.

The most influential discussion of the notion of truth was offered by the Polish-born mathematician and logician Alfred Tarski in the 1930s. His semantic definition of truth is contained in the following formula (which he called [T]):

(T) X is true if, and only if, p

in which " p " is a variable representing any sentence and " X " is a variable representing the name, or unique description, of that sentence. The easiest way to obtain such a unique description is to put the sentence in quotation marks. Thus, we get such instances of (T) as

"Snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white.

The above formula implies a distinction between the object language and the metalanguage. " X " represents the name of a sentence in the object language—i.e., roughly, the language used to talk about things in the world. The

instances of (T) themselves, however, are in the metalanguage, the language in which one can talk about both things in the world and sentences of the object language. Tarski claimed that no language can contain its own truth predicate, for if it did then it would permit the formation of such sentences as:

(S) This very sentence is false.

Is the sentence (S) true or false? Clearly, it is true if, and only if, it is false, which is an intolerable paradox. Consequently, for any language the predicate " \dots is true" and other semantical predicates must belong to a language of a higher order (a metalanguage).

For this reason Tarski restricted his theory to clearly formalized, artificial languages, a decision that was very much in line with the positivistic tendencies of the 1930s. Nevertheless, the Tarski formula remained attractive even to some semanticists concerned with meaning in natural languages. For one thing, it seemed to succeed in pairing linguistic entities (named by the values of " X "; e.g., the sentence "Snow is white") and nonlinguistic entities (named by the values of " p "; e.g., the fact, or possible state of affairs, that snow is white). This correlation, however, is not very helpful because each one of the nearly infinite number of sentences one may form would have its "fact" as a counterpart, identifiable only by means of that very same sentence. Consequently, if linguistic meaning consisted in these correlations, no one could learn the meaning of any sentence at all and certainly not the meaning of all the sentences the speakers of a language are able to understand.

What was needed was a theory explaining the contribution of individual words—a clearly finite set—to the truth of sentences. Tarski himself, as well as other writers, suggested a repeatable procedure based on the notion of satisfaction. Snow, for example, satisfies the sentential function " x is white" because "Snow is white" is true. In much the same way, 3 satisfies the function " $2 \cdot x = 6$ " because " $2 \cdot 3 = 6$ " is true. Simply stated, the meaning of the predicate " \dots is white" is determined—and is learned,—in terms of the set of objects of which it is true.

As this approach is extended to cover the wide variety of words that exist in a natural language, however, its initial simplicity—and thereby its attractiveness—becomes progressively lost. This can be illustrated by "egocentric" words like "I," "you," "here," and "now"; by connectives like "since," "however," and "nevertheless"; and, if these appear trivial, by such crucial words as "believe," "know," and "intend," on the one hand, and "good" and "beautiful" on the other. Whereas it is plausible to say that, for instance, Joe and Mary satisfy the function " X loves Y ," provided Joe loves Mary, it is more complicated to determine what would satisfy such functions as " X believes Y ," " X knows Y ," or " X intends Y ." " X " is satisfiable by people, but the satisfaction of " Y " poses a problem. If one suggests such things as propositions, facts, and possibilities, one is confronted with abstract entities of a kind similar to those encountered in the Platonic theory of referential meaning. Again, can it be said that John and a unicorn will satisfy the function " X looks for Y "—if it is true that John looks for a unicorn?

Another difficulty arises concerning "good," "beautiful," and other words of moral or aesthetic judgment. If, for example, beauty is indeed "in the eye of the beholder," then what one person calls beautiful might not appeal to another, yet two people might keep arguing as to whether the thing is beautiful or not. Thus, people may seem to agree on the meaning of the word, yet remain at odds about its application. The meaning of such "emotive" words cannot be decided in terms of truth alone.

A more serious objection to the alethic (truth) theory arises from the fact that many significant utterances of natural language are not true or false at all. Whereas statements, testimonies, and reports are true or false, or orders, promises, laws, regulations, proposals, prayers, curses, and so forth are not assessed in terms of truth or falsity. It is not obvious that the employment of words in these speech acts is less relevant to their meaning than their use in speech acts of the truth-bearing kind.

Tarski's
semantic
definition
of truth

Limitations
to
the
"mean-
as truth
theory

Meaning and use. The difficulties just mentioned lead to another view concerning the notion of meaning, a theory that may be called the use theory. This view admits that not all words refer to something, and not all utterances are true or false. What is common to all words and all sentences, without exception, is that people use them in speech. Consequently, their meaning may be nothing more than the restrictions, rules, and regularities that govern their employment.

The use theory has several sources. First, in trying to understand the nature of moral and aesthetic discourse certain authors suggested that such words as "good" and "beautiful" have an emotive meaning instead of (or in addition to) the descriptive meaning other words have; in using them one expresses approval or commendation. If one says, for instance, that helping the poor is good, one does not describe that action, but says, in effect, something like "I approve of helping the poor; do so as well." Such is the role of these words, according to these thinkers, and to understand this role is to know their meaning.

The second, and more important, stimulus for the use theory was provided by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This philosopher not only pointed out the wide variety of linguistic moves mentioned above but in order to show that none of these moves enjoys a privileged status proposed the idea of certain language games in which one or another of these moves plays a dominant or even an exclusive role. One can imagine, for instance, a tribe whose language consists of requests only. Members of the tribe make requests and the other members comply or refuse. There is no truth in this language, yet the words used to make requests would have meaning. Human language as it exists in reality is more complex; it is a combination of a great many language games. Yet the principle of meaning, according to this theory, is the same: the meaning of a word is the function of its employment in these games. To Wittgenstein the question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?"

Finally, John L. Austin offered a systematic classification of the variety of speech acts. According to him, to say something is to do something, and what one does in saying something is typically indicated by a particular performative verb prefixing the "normal form" of the utterance. These verbs, such as "state," "declare," "judge," "order," "request," "promise," "warn," "apologize," "call," and so on, mark the illocutionary force of the utterance in question. If one says, for instance, "I shall be there," then, depending on the circumstances, this utterance may amount to a prediction, a promise, or a warning. Similarly, the words of the commanding officer, "You will retreat" may have the force of a simple forecast, or of an order. If the circumstances are not clear, the speaker always can be more explicit and use the normal form; e.g., "I promise that I shall be there" or "I order you to retreat."

To rephrase the conclusion already stated: the dimension of truth and falsity is not invoked by all the utterances of the language; therefore, it cannot provide an exclusive source of meaning. There are other dimensions, such as feasibility (in case of orders and promises), utility (in case of regulations and prescriptions), and moral worth (in case of advices and laws). These dimensions may be as much involved in the understanding of what one said and, consequently, in the meaning of the words the speaker used, as the dimension of truth.

As previously mentioned, philosophers professing the alethic theory claimed that the meaning of a word should be explained in terms of its contribution to the truth or falsity of the sentences in which it can occur. The latest form of the use theory is an appropriate extension of the same idea. According to some exponents, the meaning of a word is nothing but its illocutionary act potential—i.e., its contribution to the nature of the speech acts that can be performed by using that word. One difficulty with this view is that the definition is too broad, to the extent of being unilluminating or useless. Given this definition, nobody would know what any word means without knowing the entire language completely because the possibilities of employing a given word are not only

without limit but extend to every conceivable context and circumstance. As Wittgenstein stated so forcefully,

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.

If this be the case, how can one account for the obviously gradual and prolonged process of learning a language? Indeed, the definition of the meaning of a word as illocutionary act potential seems to overstate the case. The obvious truth that the meaning of performative verbs, and other words closely tied to one illocutionary aspect or other, cannot be divorced from the nature of that type of speech act, does not entail that the meaning of an ordinary word, like "cat" or "running" is affected by any illocutionary force. Such words can occur in utterances bearing all kinds of illocutionary forces, so the contribution of these forces, as it were, cancel out. Nevertheless, what remains is the fact that all words are used to say something, in one way or another. The use theory would put a strong emphasis on the word "used" in the previous sentence. The next, and final, approach to meaning would stress the word "say."

Meaning and thought. In Wittgenstein's chess example, moves are made by moving the pieces. In a language, moves (saying something) are made by using words. And, according to the use theory, as a piece is defined by its move potential, so (the meaning of) a word is defined by its "saying" potential.

This analogy works only up to a certain limit. Whereas chess is only a game, the use of language is much more. One plays chess—or any other game—for its own sake; one speaks, however, with other ends in mind. Games, as it were, do not point beyond themselves; speech does. In order to see this, compare an ordinary conversation with such word games as children play—e.g., exchanging words that rhyme, or words that begin with the same letter. These word games are language games and nothing more because the children use words according to certain rules. In doing so, however, they do not say anything except in the trivial sense of uttering words; nor are they called to understand what the other children say beyond the minimal feat of recognizing the words.

In real speech the situation is radically different. The point of using words in a real speech act is to be understood. If someone says, "It will rain tomorrow," his aim is to make the hearer believe that it will rain tomorrow. It is possible, of course, that the hearer or listener will not believe the speaker. Nevertheless, if the hearer understands what the speaker says, he will at least know that this is what the other person wants him to believe by saying what he says. Similarly, if one says, "Go home," and the listener understands what is said, then, whether or not the listener will actually go, he will at least know that this is what the speaker wants to bring about by using these words. Thus, the notion of saying something is inseparably tied to such concepts as belief, intention, knowledge, and understanding.

The view just outlined is a reformulation of a very traditional idea, namely, that speech is essentially the expression of thought. Words are used not to play a game with fixed rules but to express beliefs and judgments, intentions and desires; that is, to make others know, by the use of words according to fixed rules, that one has certain beliefs, desires, and so forth, and that one invites others to share them.

"Expression of thought" sounds rather vague. For one thing, what is a thought? Suppose John believes that Joe has stolen his watch. John can express this belief by saying, "Joe has stolen my watch" or "My watch has been stolen by Joe" or "It is Joe who has stolen my watch" and so on. Moreover, if John is a multilingual person, he can express the same belief in German, French, and so forth. These variants, called paraphrases and translations respectively, will express the same belief, the same thought. But whereas it makes sense to ask for the exact words of John's statement or to ask about the language in which it was made, it would be foolish to ask for the exact words of John's belief or to ask about the language in which it is framed. The alternative in "Do you believe

Speech as an expression of thought

that Joe has stolen the watch, or that the watch was stolen by Joe?" does not make sense. Consequently, the same thought—the same proposition, as some philosophers prefer to call it—can be expressed by using various linguistic media. In other words, the same thought can be encoded in various codes (languages) and in various ways in the same code (paraphrases) in much the same way as the same idea can be expressed in speech or in writing and the same numbers can be written by using Roman or Arabic numerals.

From this point of view, it appears that saying something involves encoding a thought and that understanding what one said involves decoding and recovering the same thought. The meaning of a sentence will consist in its relation to the thought it is used to encode. This may be viewed as the fundamental thesis of the psychological theory of meaning.

As previously explained, no theory of meaning can be adequate as long as it treats sentences as indivisible units. For, in the first place, the potentially infinite number of sentences would defy any attempt to learn their meaning one by one, and, second, such a theory could not account for the obvious ability of fluent speakers to understand entirely novel sentences. There must be, therefore, a correlation between certain recurring elements of sentences (roughly, words) and certain recurring elements of thoughts (roughly, concepts or ideas). Accordingly, the learning of the semantic component of a language will consist in the learning of these connections.

Synonyms
and
analytic
proposi-
tions

In this learning process two notions play a prominent role: synonymy and analyticity. As the sentences that express the same thought stand in the relation of paraphrase (or translation), so words or phrases that code the same idea are related as synonyms—e.g., "vixen" and "female fox." Again, because one concept may include another, the sentence expressing this relation will record a conceptual truth or analytic proposition; e.g., "A dog is an animal." A definition, finally, will exhibit all parts of a concept by a combination of such propositions.

What concepts are and how they are related to words are topics that have been discussed throughout the history of philosophy. The following problems related to concepts pertain to the core of philosophical psychology: whether all concepts are derived from experience, as Aristotle and the Empiricists believed, or whether some of them at least are innate, as Plato and the Rationalists maintained; whether concepts exist prior to and independent from their verbal encodings, as the Realists and Conceptualists claimed, or whether they are nothing but a certain "field of force" accompanying the words, as the Nominalists thought.

It should be noted that these disputes, in a modern garb, still continue with undiminished force. Contemporary Empiricists still try to reduce most concepts to a configuration of sense data, or a pattern of nerve stimulation, while the Behaviourists attempt to explain understanding in terms of overt behaviour. Modern-day Rationalists reply by insisting on the unique spontaneity of human speech and by reviving the theory of innate ideas.

MEANING IN LINGUISTICS

Prag-
matics,
semantics,
and syntax

Semantics in the theory of language. The science of linguistics is concerned with the theory of language expressed in terms of linguistic universals—i.e., features that are common to all natural languages. According to the widely adopted schema of the U.S. scholar Charles W. Morris, this theory must embrace three domains: pragmatics, the study of the language user as such; semantics, the study of the elements of a language from the point of view of meaning; and syntax, the study of the formal interrelations that exist between the elements of a language (i.e., sounds, words) themselves. Subsequently, certain authors spoke of three levels: the phonetic, the syntactic (the phonetic and syntactic together are often called grammatical), and the semantic level. On each of these levels a language may be studied in isolation or in comparison with other languages. In another dimension, the investigation might be restricted to the state of a language (or languages) at a given time (synchronic

study), or it might be concerned with the development of a language (or languages) through a period of time (diachronic study).

Semantics, then, is one of the main fields of linguistic science. Yet, except for borderline investigations, the linguist's interest in semantic matters is quite distinct from the philosopher's concern. Whereas the philosopher asks the question "What is meaning?", the typical questions the linguist is likely to ask include: "How is the meaning of words encoded in a language?" "How is this meaning to be determined?" "What are the laws governing change of meaning?" and "How can the meaning of a word be given, expressed, or defined?"

A few examples will suffice to illustrate some of these problems, and to show how the linguist's approach differs from that of the philosopher. In the matter of encoding, words are arbitrary signs; to some authors, particularly to the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, this feature of arbitrariness represents an essential characteristic of all real languages. Nevertheless, in all languages there are clear cases of onomatopoeia—i.e., the occurrence of imitative words, such as "whisper," "snore," "slap," and, more remotely, "cuckoo."

There are several other issues that pertain to the question of encoding. Certain languages show a marked preference for very specific words, at least in certain domains, while lacking the corresponding general terms, which are the only ones occurring in other languages. The Eskimos, for instance, have a number of words denoting various kinds of snow, but no single word for snow. Similarly, in English, although there are distinct names for hundreds of animal species, there is no name for the very familiar animal species of which the female member is called cow and the male member bull.

There are also certain languages, such as English or Chinese, that for the most part prefer single words rather than the compounded phrases that other languages (e.g., German) seem to favour. Accordingly, whereas the English vocabulary is larger, the German words are more pliable, capable of entering into compounds often of great length and complexity. Such differences support De Saussure's distinction between lexicological and grammatical languages.

Another distinction can be drawn concerning the relative frequency and importance of context-bound and context-free words. The meaning of such English words as "take," "put," and "get" depends almost entirely on the context—e.g., putting up with somebody has very little to do with putting off something or other. These can be compared with verbs like "canter" or "promulgate," which, by their very specific meaning, almost determine the context, rather than having their meaning determined by the context. Clearly, the context-bound type of word, such as "take" or "put," lends itself to idiomatic use, rather than the context-free word.

There are some obvious regularities in the change of meaning that are of interest to the linguist. One such regularity is the extension or transference of meaning based upon some similarities—i.e., the phenomenon of metaphor. For example, one can speak of the leg of the table, the mouth of the river, the eye of the needle, and the crown of the tree. These are anthropomorphic metaphors: the transfer goes from something belonging to an individual or close to him (his body, garments) to something more remote. The same principle operates in the extension of meaning from a domain close in interest rather than in physical proximity. Baseball-minded people are apt to speak of "not getting to first base," "striking out," or "scoring a hit" in contexts often remote from baseball. For a similar reason, many abstract concepts are denoted by words transplanted from the concrete domain. Such phrases as "grasping ideas," "seeing the point of a joke," "body of knowledge," "in the back of my mind," and many others, are the result of this very important move from the abstract to the concrete.

Meaning changes of another type are the result of emotive factors. The word democracy, for instance, has all but lost its original meaning and has become a word applicable to any system the speaker wants to praise. The

Context
bound
and
context
free
words

contrary development is exhibited in the recent history of such words as "Fascist" and "aggression." In order to avoid derogatory connotations one is often forced, by social pressure, to use euphemisms, often to the detriment of clarity. Examples of this include the switch from "underdeveloped nations" to "developing nations," from "retarded children" to "exceptional children," and from "old people" to "senior citizens."

The preceding are but a few examples concerning coding and meaning change. The questions about the ways of finding out what a word means and about the manner of giving an adequate definition of a word deserve a more detailed account.

Meaning, structure, and context. Foreigners in a strange country and linguists are often confronted with the task of learning a new language. It is important to realize that in doing so they do not set out with a completely blank mind: they expect to learn a language (*i.e.*, a system of communication describable in terms of a large set of linguistic universals). They expect—consciously in the case of the linguist and unconsciously in the case of the layman—to find words and sentences, grammatical structures, and illocutionary forces in that language. And, on the semantic level, they expect words that will fit into the familiar semantic classes. They are confident, in other words, that the language they intend to master will be intertranslatable with their own.

Therefore, although at the very beginning their learning remains on the ostensive level (trying to find out the name of this or that kind of object), very soon they proceed to the level of first guessing, then establishing, the meaning of words from the contexts in which they occur. This has to be the case, for words that in any way can be viewed as "names" of objects (*i.e.*, that could be learned ostensively) form but a fraction of the vocabulary of any language. Anyone who doubts this should but try to list the words from this paragraph that could be learned ostensively. Moreover, linguists find no great difficulties in learning dead languages—*e.g.*, that of the ancient Egyptians—without any contact with any speaker, provided that a sufficiently large corpus of texts is available and that some clues are provided to the meaning of at least some words.

If any more evidence concerning this point is needed, one should remember that "pictorial" dictionaries are bound to remain on the kindergarten level, and that the mark of a good dictionary is the abundance of appropriate contexts. Thus, the contexts show the concept.

These intuitions are behind the U.S. philosopher Paul Ziff's semantic theory. According to Ziff, the meaning of a word is a function, first, of its complementary set, which consists of all the acceptable sentences in which the word can occur, and, second, of its contrastive set, which consists of all of the words that can replace that word in all of these sentences without rendering the sentences deviant. Clearly, the elaboration of the contrastive set will produce words more and more similar in meaning to the word in question, the limiting case being synonyms that can occur wherever the word in question can occur.

This theory is in need of further refinement. In the sentence "The cat sleeps," the fact that "cat" can co-occur with "sleep" undoubtedly casts some light on the meaning of these words (a cat is a kind of thing that can sleep). But there are a great number of sequences that could complete the frames "The cat sleeps and . . ." ". . . said that the cat sleeps," and so forth. Clearly, the near infinity of the resulting sentences will not contribute anything to the meaning of "cat" beyond what the segment "the cat sleeps" already contributes.

Transformational grammar can be of assistance at this point. According to this approach, the sentences just considered are simply surface forms, each corresponding to an underlying structure, in which "cat" and "sleep" appear as forming an elementary, or kernel sentence (roughly: "a cat sleeps"). The essence of Ziff's insight can be reinterpreted in terms of the notions developed by Zellig S. Harris: co-occurrence (instead of complementary set) and co-occurrence difference (instead of contrastive set), both restricted to kernels. Because the vocabu-

lary of a language is limited and the number of kernel structures is very small, the meaning of a word can be determined on the basis of a finite set of elementary sentences.

The contribution of grammar to semantic theory is by no means exhausted by this step. For the grammatical restrictions on a word represent, as it were, the "skeleton" of its meaning before the "flesh" is put on by the co-occurrences. The very first step in giving the meaning of a word is to specify its grammatical category—noun, verb, adjective, adverb, connective, and so forth—and not to speak of grammatical constants (such as the first, but not the second, "to" in "I want to go to Paris"), the meaning of which, if any, is entirely determined by their grammatical role. A refined grammar yields much more: the fact that the adjective "good," for example, unlike adjectives like "yellow" or "fat," can occur in the frames "(He is) good-at (playing chess)"; "(The root is) good to (eat)"; "It is good that (it is raining)"; "It was good of (him) to (come)" says a great deal about the meaning of that word. The co-occurrences then complete the picture.

Lexical entries. Good dictionaries offer a variety of contexts for the items listed, but, obviously, this is not enough. For one thing, no dictionary can list all the co-occurrences. There must be devices to sum up, as it were, the information revealed by the contexts. This is the role of dictionary definitions. The branch of scientific semantics that is concerned with the form and adequacy conditions of dictionary entries is called lexicography.

A systematic study of dictionary entries was presented in the 1960s by the U.S. philosophers Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor. According to them, the standard form of a dictionary entry comprises three kinds of ingredients: grammatical markers, semantic markers, and distinguishers. The grammatical markers describe the syntactic behaviour of the item in question in terms of a refined system of grammatical categories. The traditional division of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, and so on is but the first step in this direction. The class of nouns, for example, has to be subdivided into count nouns (like "cat"), mass nouns (like "water"), abstract nouns (like "love"), and so forth. The class of adjectives must be classified into subclasses that are fine enough to capture the grammatical peculiarities of such adjectives as "unlikely" or "good." The traditional subdivision of verbs into transitives and intransitives has to be completed to account for such verbs as "compare" or "order," which obviously involve three noun phrases ("someone compares something to something"), often of a particular kind ("human" nouns or noun clauses).

The idea of a semantic marker is merely a further elaboration of the traditional notions of genus and species. The result is a system of semantic markers that comprise such items as "physical object," "animate," "human," "male," "young" (in the case of the entry for "boy"), and others. Katz claims that the problems of synonymy, analyticity, and contradiction can be handled, at least in part, in terms of lexical items sharing some or all of their semantic markers.

Finally, the distinguisher completes the dictionary entry by giving, as it were, the leftover, if any, of the semantic information. There is no general form for the distinguisher; it may give the atomic weight (for elements), purpose (for tools), concise description (for animals), and so forth.

Generative semantics. According to the original formulation of generative or transformational grammar, the semantic and the syntactic components were regarded as distinct elements in the deep structure of a sentence. The syntactic component consisted of a relation of phrase markers giving the transformational structure of the sentence, usually represented by a "tree" diagram with the phrase markers as nodes (*e.g.*, "S" for sentence, "NP" for noun phrase). The semantic content entered through the process of lexical insertion—*i.e.*, the replacement of the phrase markers by words, the carriers of meaning. Lexical insertion was supposed to take place at the very beginning of the series of transformations leading up to the surface form of the sentence. The original input of mean-

Lexical
insertion
in a
generative
grammar

ing, as it were, was carried through the transformations yielding the semantical reading, or sense, of the whole sentence.

Several modern studies have attempted to demonstrate that this separation between syntax and semantics cannot be maintained. It appears that certain words in themselves indicate a structure analogous to syntactic structures. For example, consider "harden" and "break." To harden something is to cause that thing to become hard (or harder); to break something is to cause something to become broken. Because "harden" consists of two elements, "hard-" and "-en," thus it could be argued that the word itself is structured; "break" does not indicate any structure, yet its meaning clearly involves one. "Broken," therefore, carries a more basic semantic unit than "break." Again, in the case of such verbs as "re-mind," "allege," "blame," or "forgive," one feels that their meaning is highly structured, and, with some thinking, one can articulate the presuppositions of these words, which involve a great number of semantic units in a very complex relationship.

These and similar reasons support the theory of generative semantics, which denies a clear distinction between the semantic and the syntactic components. The transformations, in this theory, connect the surface structure of the sentence with its semantic representation (or according to some linguists, its logical form). Words, then, can encode either a semantic primitive (such as "blue") or a whole structure (such as "forgive") within the semantic representation. Thus, there is no definite point in the transformational history of the sentence at which lexical insertion must occur. The ultimate conclusion of this view is that, instead of the threefold division of semantics, syntax, and phonetics, all that is needed is the simple distinction between semantics and phonetics, corresponding to the distinction between meaning (as structured) and its verbal encoding. How much, finally, of the semantic structure can be attributed to a particular language, and how much can be ascribed to common (and possibly innate) elements of the human mind, remains a fascinating problem for continued study.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Collections of essays: The best and most comprehensive selection of relevant papers is J.F. ROSENBERG and C. TRAVIS, *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (1971). A good collection of earlier contributions, mainly from the Positivistic school, is found in L. LINSKY (ed.), *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language* (1952). J.A. FODOR and J.J. KATZ (eds.), *The Structure of Language* (1964), contains some fundamental papers on transformational grammar. J.H. GREENBERG (ed.), *Universals of Language* (1963), includes some key articles on scientific semantics. V.C. CHAPPELL (ed.), *Ordinary Language* (1964), offers some typical articles on ordinary language philosophy. R.M. RORTY, (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn* (1967), shows the development of linguistic philosophy in a broad selection of papers.

Books: W.P. ALSTON, *Philosophy of Language* (1964), is the best current introduction to philosophical semantics. M. BLACK, *Language and Philosophy* (1949), discusses some earlier views. L. BLOOMFIELD, *Language* (1933), contains a classic discussion of scientific semantics. B.L. WHORF, *Language, Thought and Reality*, ed. by J.B. CARROLL (1956), raises the issue of linguistic relativism. J.J. KATZ, *The Philosophy of Language* (1966), offers a semantic theory tied to generative grammar, the best expression of which is found in N. CHOMSKY, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965). W.V. QUINE, *Word and Object* (1960); and P. ZIFF, *Semantic Analysis* (1960), represent two different but influential semantic theories. Some of the leading ideas for modern philosophical semantics come from C.L. STEVENSON, *Ethics and Language* (1944); J.L. AUSTIN, *How to Do Things with Words* (1962); L. WITTGENSTEIN, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed. (1968); and *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations*, 2nd ed. (1969).

(Z.V.)

Semiconductor Devices

Semiconductor devices are electronic circuit components, such as transistors, fabricated from a material that is neither a good conductor of electricity nor a good insulator; hence the name semiconductor. This article covers the preparation of semiconductor materials and the de-

sign, manufacture, and application of the more popular semiconductor devices. Specific devices are covered in greater detail in the articles THERMOELECTRIC DEVICES; LASER AND MASER. A more theoretical treatment of semiconductor action is given in SEMICONDUCTORS AND INSULATORS, THEORY OF. All the devices described in this article are discrete devices, as opposed to the more recent integrated devices described in the article INTEGRATED CIRCUITRY.

Semiconductor and junction principles. A wide range of semiconductor devices is available, made from a number of materials and by a variety of processes. The applications for these semiconductor devices cover the whole electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet frequencies to the control of direct current. There is now a semiconductor device suitable for practically any electronic application, even at extremely high frequencies and powers.

The materials known as semiconductors have electrical resistivities (the resistance of a cube of the material one centimetre on a side) in the range intermediate between insulators and metals. The resistivity of elemental semiconductors always decreases with increasing temperature, and these materials often show some decrease in resistivity when illuminated with light (photoconductivity). The most commonly used semiconductors are presently the elements germanium and silicon, but certain compounds, such as gallium arsenide, indium antimonide, and copper oxide, have useful semiconductor properties.

Electrons in an isolated atomic structure can exist only in certain definite energy levels. If an electron moves from one level to another, energy is either absorbed or emitted. The electrons in an atom that possesses relatively little energy move in orbits close to the atomic nucleus. If the electron absorbs energy from an outside source (for example, ultraviolet light), it may jump to a higher energy electron orbit, but these jumps always occur in discrete steps.

When a number of atoms are assembled in a group, as in a regular crystalline structure, the electrons are influenced by the electrical fields of neighbouring atoms as well as by the parent nucleus, causing the discrete energy levels to spread out into energy bands. These bands do not normally overlap; for any given atomic spacing there are permissible energy bands interspersed with gaps called forbidden energy gaps.

The outermost electrons of an atom are normally in what is called the valence band. If one of these electrons absorbs energy it is said to be excited; it may absorb enough energy to cause it to leave the valence band and jump temporarily to a conduction band, where it is free of the attractive force of the nucleus. In semiconductor materials, these conduction bands are often empty or only partially filled.

Electrons in the conduction band may be made to move easily by an electric field, and this drift is commonly known as a conduction current. The energy gap between the top level of the valence band and the lower level in the conduction band is the minimum energy (usually expressed in electron volts) required to produce a free electron in a crystal. Generally, a wider energy gap is related to a higher melting point.

The electrical conductivity of any material depends on the number of charge carriers available in the conduction bands, per unit volume, and on the rate at which these carriers move under the influence of an electric field. If a negatively charged electron is moved into a vacant level in the conduction band, this leaves a corresponding positive imbalance, or "hole," in the valence band.

Because of this concept it is convenient to think of electrical conduction as consisting of negative charges carried by electrons and positive charges carried by holes. In a pure semiconductor, conduction takes place by electron-hole pairs, but the electron and the hole have different mobilities; that is, they move with different velocities in an electric field. The differing electron and hole mobilities are caused by the fact that they start at different energy levels and travel under differing forces in opposite directions.

Electrical conduction in highly pure semiconductors

Electrical
conductivity
volts

APPENDIX III

**BOOKLIST
FROM
INSTITUTE OF GENERAL SEMANTICS**

General semantics may be considered a subset of "semantics" and of "epistemology," however it is a most important subset. In terms of its value to an individual who determines to seriously study its propositions, thesis, etc. it is a truly powerful tool towards understanding the problems man faces in using his brain to deal with the world wherein he finds himself.

General semantics does not attempt to justify itself by arguments designed to perpetuate itself as a discipline, but rather is dedicated to developing better tools for unlocking man's innate capacities for knowing.

General semantics uncovers existing cultural impediments hindering man's processes of sensing, of perceiving, of processing the information he perceives, and then advancing to new levels of knowledge made possible by his improved powers of processing in consequence of overcoming old cultural impediments to the processes and the like.

INSTITUTE OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

BOOKLIST

Recently, several people have had difficulty understanding how to place an order for the products carried by the IGS. We have a high priority on implementing an automated purchasing system, but until that can be accomplished, we hope that a brief explanation will aid you in using the current system. At the bottom of this page, there is an e-mail link which may be used to place credit card orders, or make inquiries. E-mail your order, specifying the titles and price of the desired merchandise, applicable shipping charges, and sales tax (if any). Either include your credit card number, or supply it in one of the methods outlined in our security document. If you have any trouble figuring out the applicable prices, shipping charges, etc., use the link to make an inquiry. Under normal circumstances, your questions will be answered, or your order acknowledged on the next working day. We regret any confusion this system may have caused.

BY KORZYBSKI

Alfred Korzybski, *Manhood of Humanity*, 1921, 2nd ed.(1950). With additional materials: three papers by Korzybski including "What I Believe" (1948), "Author's Note" from *Selections from Science and Sanity* (1948), "Some Non-Aristotelian Data on Efficiency for Human Adjustment" (1941); "Korzybski's Concept of Man" by Cassius J. Keyser, and "A Memoir: Alfred Korzybski & His Work" by M. Kendig. Foreword by Edward Kasner, lviii + 326 pp. \$21.00*

Korzybski's

new functional definition of humans as a time-binding class of life and its implications.

Alfred Korzybski, *Time-Binding: The General Theory*. Two papers, 1924-26, 9th printing (1979). 85 pp. \$5.95*

Temporarily out of stock

A bridge between MANHOOD OF HUMANITY and SCIENCE AND SANITY. Early formulations later developed into "General Semantics". Very forthright style, more aphoristic and pithy (and sketchy) than expanded SCIENCE AND SANITY.

Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics*. 1933, 5th Ed., 1993. Preface by Robert P. Pula. (1993). c + 806 pp. \$34.95* (Shipping US 1 copy \$4.00, additional copies \$2.00 each. Foreign Book Mail \$4.75)

The fundamental, irreplaceable exposition of general-semantics. In this work Korzybski developed important lines of thought neglected by subsequent authors.

Alfred Korzybski, *General Semantics Seminar*. Transcription of notes from lectures given at Olivet College, 1937, 2nd Ed. (1964), viii + 96 pp. \$8.95*

Twelve lectures given to college students on general-semantics theory, backgrounds, and applications. Korzybski caught 'live.'

Retains much of the warm anecdotal flavor of his platform manner. Minimal editing.

Alfred Korzybski, *Selections from Science and Sanity* . Compiled by G. E. Janssen. Introductory note by author (1948), 7th printing with additional material (1972), xvi + 286 pp. \$10.95*

Arranged by Guthrie Janssen to give a more 'teachable'

presentation. Some material and all of Book III is omitted. Intended for 'beginners'

but not watered down. The text is all

Korzybski's

own.

Alfred Korzybski, *Le Role Du Langage Dans Les Processus Perceptuels* . Translation by George Psheradsky of Chapter 7 in the book *Perception: An Approach to Personality* (Ed. Blake & Ramsey, Ronald Press, 1954, now out of print), 44 pp. \$4.75.*

A French translation of

Korzybski's

masterful last paper "The Role of Language in the Perceptual Processes," reprinted in English in GENERAL SEMANTICS BULLETIN NUMBER 36. An excellent final summary by Korzybski which can serve as an introduction to the larger work.

M. Kendig, Coll. & Arr., *Alfred Korzybski: Collected Writings, 1920 - 1950* , 1st edition, (1990). xxv + 915 pp. Paperback \$45*, Hardcover \$55* (Shipping US \$4.00 Foreign \$6.50)

These writings, both public-formal and private-informal, show much of the process of Korzybski's

evolving work that eventuated in his principal publications MANHOOD OF HUMANITY (1921) and, later, SCIENCE AND SANITY (1933), and in his major work in society: the founding of the Institute, lecturing, giving seminars — taking his message out of the study into the hurly-burly world of the "person-in-the-street". The SUPPLEMENTARIES included in the collection pointedly show that after the climactic publication of SCIENCE AND SANITY, in another sense his work was just beginning.

OTHER AUTHORS

Sanford I. Berman, Ed., *Logic and General Semantics: Writings of Oliver L. Reiser and Others*. (1992), 212 pp. \$10.00

Reiser, a professional philosopher and one of Korzybski's

early fellow workers, wrote some valuable material on the philosophical, logical and scientific underpinnings of

Korzybski's

work. This book includes Part I of

Reiser's

THE PROMISE OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM and two of his other papers, as well as articles by Berman and others. It provides a thorough, readable account of Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian logics and orientations.

D. David Bourland, Jr. and Paul Dennithorne Johnston, Eds., *To Be or Not: An E-Prime Anthology* . (1992), xix + 185 pp. \$14.00

A compendium of discussions of Bourland's extension of Korzybski's

concern for the "is of identity." A question: "Do we need to go so far?" Read it and decide.

Francis P. Chisholm, *Introductory Lectures on General Semantics* , 1944, 14th printing. (1983), vi + 126 pp. \$10.95*

Focuses on the important contributions general-semantics can make to general education and "the gravity of the problems involved in all science and human evaluation which arise from the necessary limitations of human formulations."

Don Fabun, Ed., *Communications: The Transfer of Meaning* . (1968), 48 pp. \$6.00

A popular, colorfully illustrated introduction to some general semantic formulations.

William V. Haney, *Communications and Interpersonal Relations* . Fifth Ed. (1986), xxi + 599 pp. \$40.50

Written for use in college courses, management-development seminars, supervisory training programs, adult education classes, and for individual self-study.

S. I. Hayakawa and Alan Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Action* , Fifth Ed. (1990), 287 pp. \$25.50

Influential and well-written study of the role of language in human life. Hayakawa acknowledges his debt to Korzybski and the book has served as many people's introduction to general-semantics. However, the book oversimplifies general-semantics, failing to adequately treat it as a system. An important source of the recurring confusing of general-semantics with semantics.

Gregg Hoffmann, *Media Maps and Myths* . (1993), vii + 141 pp. \$15.00

"What happens when a conscientious veteran newspaperman questions many of the assumptions of his profession and looks across disciplinary lines for more effective ways to do his job? In this book Gregg Hoffmann raises many of the questions that trouble him and suggests answers he has found useful."

Kenneth Johnson, *General Semantics: An Outline Survey* . (1972), 44 pp. \$7.50

Tightly organized yet readable summary that can serve as either an introduction or review.

Kenneth Johnson, Comp., *Graduate Research In General Semantics* . (1992), 38 pp. \$7.00*

An updated compilation of masters and doctoral research in general-semantics listing authors, titles, degrees, and citations in "Dissertation Abstracts International" and other sources.

Kenneth Johnson, Ed., *Thinking Creatically* . Foreword by Steve Allen. (1991), xiv + 325 pp. \$15.95*

Based on papers delivered at a conference at Yale University in 1988, Thinking Creatically exhibits a wide range of sophistication in formulating and applying general-semantics. It can be approached as a sampler of how its twenty-two contributors have struggled with general-semantics "in the trenches" of teaching.

Paul Dennithorne Johnston, D. David Bourland, Jr. and Jeremy Klein, Eds., *MORE E-PRIME: To Be or Not: II* . (1994), xxx + 333 pp. \$17.75

A further compendium of discussions of Bourland's extension of Korzybski's

concern for the "is of identity." A question: "Do we need to go so far?" Read and decide.

Wendell Johnson, *People In Quandaries: The Semantics of Personal Adjustment* . (1946), 526 pp. \$20.00

A model of popularization, one of the finest and most accurate books yet written on the system of general-semantics. Original, simply-written and practical, it has a strong focus on dealing with many forms of unhappiness ranging from mild disappointment to severe maladjustment. Johnson, a psychologist and speech pathologist, taught at the State University of Iowa and had a legendary reputation as a teacher. Must reading!

Susan Presby Kodish and Bruce I. Kodish, *Drive Yourself Sane! Using the Uncommon Sense of General-Semantics* . Foreword by Albert Ellis, Ph.D. (1993), xiv + 194 pp. \$11.95*

A concise lively introduction to general-semantics, "...it applies Alfred Korzybski's brilliant general-semantics philosophy to its readers'

everyday lives and shows them how to live more sanely in a still highly irrational and partially insane world." (From the Foreword by Albert Ellis.)

Irving J. Lee, *How To Talk With People* . (1952), 171 pp. \$9.00

A practical guide to human intercommunication, particularly in small groups. Excellent for those involved in committee work, staff meetings, etc.

Irving J. Lee, *Language Habits in Human Affairs* . (1941). 2nd edition 1994. Xxvii + 285 pp. \$18.00*

An early popularization of general-semantics that had Korzybski's endorsement

—
he wrote the foreword.

Lee's presentation is made memorable by his inclusion of many vivid examples and pointed quotations.

Irving J. Lee, *The Language of Wisdom and Folly* . (1977), 371 pp. \$14.00

Selections from scientific and philosophic literature paralleling and amplifying works in general semantics. Contains classic essays by Lady Viola Welby, Susanne Langer, William James, Benjamin Lee Whorf and Morris Cohen.

Edward MacNeal, *Mathsemantics: Making Numbers Talk Sense* . (1994), x + 310 pp. \$22.95.

You can add apples and oranges

despite the dire warnings of your second-grade teacher

—
1 apple + 2 oranges = 3 fruit. Many people who consider themselves good at numbers often don't understand what they 'mean.'

MacNeal addresses the origins of their shortcomings, the serious social consequences, and how mathsemantic deficiencies can be overcome.

Catherine Minter, *Words and What They Do To You* . (1965) 5th printing (1971), 128 pp. \$6.00*
 Temporarily out of stock

The most widely used of all teaching manuals for introducing general-semantics at the junior and senior high school levels. Twelve brief chapters, each investigating a general-semantic principle, each followed by applications of the discoveries made.

Mary Morain, Ed., *Teaching General Semantics: A Collection of Lesson Plans for College and Adult Classes* . (1969), x + 142 pp. \$10.00

Interesting, usable lectures, outlines and classroom activities contributed by teachers in colleges, adult education and management training.

Mary Morain, Ed., *Classroom Exercises in General Semantics* . (1980), vii + 142 pp. \$10.00
 Temporarily out of stock

Both TEACHING GENERAL SEMANTICS and CLASSROOM EXERCISES IN GENERAL SEMANTICS provide lesson plans with exercises and experiments demonstrating levels of abstraction, perceptual processes, extensionality, word magic, etc. Recommended for college and advanced high school courses.

Mary Morain, Ed., *Bridging Worlds Through General Semantics* . (1984), xvii + 347 pp. \$15.00
A well-edited and highly readable compendium from the pages of ET CETERA. Provides excellent background reading in a wide variety of fields.

Mary Morain, Ed., *Enriching Professional Skills Through General Semantics* . (1986), xix + 326 pp. \$15.00

A representative collection of articles that have appeared in ET CETERA, the general-semantics review founded in 1943.

Gerard Nierenberg, *The Complete Negotiator* . (1986), 328 pp. \$19.95

General-semantics applied to negotiation by one of the masters of the craft.

Gerard Nierenberg, *Workable Ethics* . (1987,) 110 pp. \$14.95

Nierenberg advocates an ethical system based on time-binding.

Juliete Nierenberg and Irene Ross, *Women and The Art of Negotiating: Techniques For Achieving Success In Your Business and Personal Relationships* . (1985), 224 pp. \$9.95

A popular yet sturdy discussion of negotiating as a life issue, particularly as it applies to women. Derived immediately from the formulations of Gerard Nierenberg and more remotely from those of Korzybski. The book also should be read by men, not only to gain insights from the abstracting of two feminine experts on negotiating as it affects women, but as a spur to reflect on their own attitudes about a process in which we are all engaged. Well written.

William H. Pemberton, *Sanity for Survival: A Semantic Approach to Conflict Resolution* . (1989), xiv + 137 pp. plus appendices. \$11.00

*From the foreword: "Pemberton says,
'As*

*a class of life we may never attain
perfection.'*

*However, his faith in us comes through as he gives hope and a formula for a better life through
improving our communication skills."*

T. C. Pollock and J. G. Spaulding, *General Semantics Monograph III* "A Theory of Meaning Analyzed: Critique of I. A. Richards' 'Theory of Language'." Supplementary Paper "The Lexicographer and General Semantics" by A. W. Read, Foreword by A. Korzybski and M. Kendig (1942), xvi +64 pp. \$6.95*

*Especially valuable for its "Foreword" by Korzybski and M. Kendig, including the first printed
version and discussion of the*

*'logical
fate'*

*diagram which appears on the cover of the GENERAL SEMANTICS BULLETIN. Clear
discussion of the consequences of a change in premises.*

Robert R. Potter, *Making Sense: Exploring Semantics & Critical Thinking* . (1974), ix +245 pp. \$15.00

Temporarily out of stock

*Lively high school textbook introducing many aspects of general-semantics. Also challenging
for adults. For*

*'semantics'
in the title read*

*'general-
semantics.'*

*Potter has come as close as anyone to writing an up-beat
'modern'*

*high school text. Profusely illustrated with photographs and drawings, including the Structural
Differential. Contains many applications, via questioning, to social issues. Thoughtful
questions and assignments at the end of each chapter which the adult reader will also find
challenging.*

Gregory Sawin, editor, *Thinking and Living Skills*. Introduction by Alvin Toffler (1995), xviii + 255 pp. \$17.00

*... gives readers a clear sense of the usefulness of general semantics in everyday life. Readers
will find here, also, how this usefulness is matched by inspiring historical ideas.*

Marjorie A. Swanson, *General Semantics Monograph IV* "Scientific Epistemologic Backgrounds of General Semantics." (1959), viii + 81 pp. \$9.95*

*Six lectures given at a general-semantics seminar. Helps to develop an understanding of
scientific methods, relates colloidal behavior to semantic reactions, deals with some aspects of
epistemology, and discusses the ethical consequences she derives from science. This
monograph can be profitably read in conjunction with Book III of SCIENCE AND SANITY or
as a necessary minimum of scientific awareness without which the
student's
'general-*

semantics'
might degenerate into mere
'philosophy,'
'linguistics,'
etc.

Harry L. Weinberg, *Levels of Knowing and Existence: Studies In General Semantics* . (1959), 2nd Ed. (1973), xiv +274 pp. \$8.95*

Engaging discussion by a noted general-semanticist of perennial epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic problems. Some of Weinberg's solutions seem very convincing.

Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought & Reality* . Ed. John B. Carroll. (1956), xi + 278 pp. \$11.95

Posthumous collection of Whorf's papers relating to 'linguistic relativity,' his controversial theory postulating correlations between linguistic structures and divergent world-views found in different cultures.

GENERAL SEMANTICS BULLETIN

General Semantics Bulletin - The Annual Journal of the Institute. Current issue is Volume #62 available May 1996 - \$15. Members of the Institute receive the Bulletin as part of membership. Additional copies for members - \$10. Volume #63 scheduled to be published in 1996. Back issues of Bulletin available (except #4 through #7, #10 through #13, #16 through #19). Single copy - \$15, Members - \$10. A set of 33 Bulletins (some are multiple issues) comprising available issues of volume #s 1 through 61 (except as noted above) - \$247.50, Members - \$165.

AUDIO and VIDEO TAPES (Prices include shipping)

Alfred Korzybski, *Historical Note on the Structural Differential* . (1947), 35 minute audio tape. \$12.95*

An informal account by Korzybski of how he came to invent this training aid, and explaining it. An illuminating adjunct to the Structural Differential wall chart.

Alfred Korzybski, *Intensive Seminar* , December 27, 1948 - January 2, 1949. Unedited, 37 hrs., audio tapes, with audio index and illustrations, \$200.00

Korzybski 'whole'.

An entire seminar showing the wide range of systematic concerns and human behaviors, including accent, that Korzybski brought to the lecture platform.

Irving J. Lee, *Talking Sense* . From the 1952 television series *Of Men and Ideas* . Three hour VHS format video tape. \$39.95*

This three hour black and white video tape was made from the original films, and preserves these excellent introductions presented by Professor Lee.

Richard W. Paul, *Critical Thinking and The Way We Construct The Meaning of Things* . 1987 Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture, presented October 30, 1987, New York City. 98 minute audio tape, \$12.95*

Richard Paul, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique at Sonoma State University, has published extensively on "critical thinking". This talk presents his critical views on general-semantics. With this tape we include a written critique, "General Semantics and Science: A Response to Richard W. Paul" by James D. French, which was published along with Dr.

Paul's

talk in GENERAL SEMANTICS BULLETIN, Number 55, 1990.

Robert P. Pula, *General Semantics Seminar* . 6 one hour audio tapes. \$59.95

A weekend seminar in general-semantics with Robert P. Pula. Lively, entertaining and rigorous. Pula has served for many years as the lead lecturer at Institute seminar-workshops. One of the most Korzybskian of post-Korzybskian expositions of general-semantics.

Allen Walker Read, *Changing Attitudes Toward Korzybski's*

General Semantics . 1983 Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture, presented November 4, 1983, New York City. 45 Minute audio tape. \$12.95*.

What influence has

Korzybski's

work had, and what influence can we expect it to have in the future? Doctor Read, a preeminent linguistic scholar and general-semantacist, presents a personal and historical view of general-semantics that places it in the broader context of intellectual currents. A good example of

Read's

sharp and forthright presentation style. Highly recommended.

OTHER

*The Structural Differential Wall Chart (Science and Sanity , Chapter xxv). Silk-screened on flag cloth with grommets for hanging, 38" x 17" \$23.50**

The central yet simple diagram by which Korzybski pictured the relationships (order, structure) on which his system is built. Allows students to visualize the fateful relations between and among non-verbal processes, silent organismic responses and verbal formulations. Important for teaching and self-study.

Mira Edgerly Korzybska, *The Time Binder* . A full- color museum quality reproduction of the portrait of Alfred Korzybski by his wife. Image size 4 3/4" x 4 1/2". Double-matted and ready to be framed - \$25.00* Wood-framed under glass - \$55.00*

IGS COFFEE MUG an elegant coffee mug, in ivory with a gold cap band, emblazoned in cobalt blue with the message: **THE MAP IS NOT THE TERRITORY** on one side, and the Institute logo on the other. \$7, plus \$3 first class postage for the first mug, and \$1.50 for each additional one ordered at the same time.

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APPENDIX IV

“MISSION: CRITICAL”

**A
COURSE
OR DISCOURSE
ON
FALLACY/SEMANTICS/CRITICAL THINKING**

**AN
ITEM
OFF THE INTERNET**



"If it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be;
but as it ism't, it aim't. That's logic."--Lewis Carroll

Mission: Critical is an interactive tutorial for critical thinking, in which you will be introduced to basic concepts through sets of instructions and exercises. Formal instructional materials have been kept to a minimum, in order to take advantage of Mission: Critical's interactive format. Through immediate reinforcement for right and wrong answers to a series of increasingly complex exercises, you will begin to utilize the essential tools of intellectual analysis.


Mission: Critical has gone through several major revisions since it first came online in January, 1996. Below are three links: to the original version (1996-1998), to the first version as an online course (1998-99), and to the current version (1999-2000). Though the original is probably the most accessible for the casual user, from its Main Menu, it has not benefited from some of the revisions and additions of subsequent iterations.



1996-1998



1998-1999






1999-2000

For a brief overview of Mission: Critical, you are invited to take a tour, (originally constructed for the 1998 GII Awards). You may also do a keyword search of the tutorial sections.

GIJ Tour Search


We are very interested in receiving your reactions, criticisms, and suggestions, and hope to incorporate as many of these as possible in future revisions of the design and content of Mission: Critical. To contact Mission: Critical, please use the Contact Mission Control link at the bottom of this and other pages.

Mission: Critical supports the concept of cooperative development of educational resources on the Web. We are interested in creating reciprocal links between this and other critical thinking web pages, either on our links page (in the Re: Sources section) or, if suitable, internally within Mission: Critical itself. Please contact Mission Control for further information.





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